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From Locksley Hall
For I dipt into the future,
far as human eye could see,
Saw the Vision of the world,
and all the wonder that would be;
Saw the heavens fiU with commerce,
argosies of magic sails,
Pilots of the purple twilight,
dropping down with costly bales;
Heard the heavens fill with shouting,
and there rained a ghastly dew
From the nations' airy navies
grappling in the central blue;
Far along the world-wide whisper
of the south-wind rushing warm,
With the standards of the peoples
plunging through the thunder-storm;
Till the war-drum throbbed no long_
and the battle-flags were furled
In the Parliament of man,
the Federation of the world.
There the common sense of most
shall hold a fretful realm in awe,
And the kindly earth shall slumber,
lapt in universal law.
So I triumphed ere my passion
sweeping through me left me dry,
Left me with the palsied heart,
and left me with the jaundiced eye;
Lye, to which all order festers,
all things here are out of joint:
Science moves, but slowly slowly,
creeping on from point to point:
Alfred Baron Tennyson
(1842)
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Introduction
Planetary radar astronomy has not attracted the same level of public attention as, say, the
Apollo or shuttle programs. In fact, few individuals outside those scientific communities
concerned with planetary studies are aware of its existence as an ongoing scientific
endeavor. Yet, planetary radar has contributed fundamentally and significantly to our
knowledge of the solar system.
As early as the 1940s, radar revealed that meteors are part of the solar system. After the
first detections of Venus in 1961, radar astronomers refined the value of the astronomical
unit, the basic yardstick for measuring the solar system, which the International
Astronomical Union adopted in 1964, and they discovered the rotational rate and direc-
tion of Venus for the first time. Next, radar astronomers determined the correct orbital
period of Mercury and calculated an accurate value for the radius of Venus, a measure-
ment that Soviet and American spacecraft had failed to make reliably. Surprisingly, radar
studies of Saturn revealed that its rings were not swarms of minute particles, but rather
consisted of icy chunks several centimeters or more in diameter. Planetary radar also pro-
vided further proof of Albert Einstein's theory of General Relativity, as well as the "dirty
snowball" theory of comets. The only images of Venus' surface available to researchers are
those made from radar observations. The ability of planetary radar astronomy to charac-
terize the surfaces of distant bodies has advanced our general knowledge of the topogra-
phy and geology of the terrestrial planets, the Galilean moons of Jupiter, and the aster-
oids. The Viking project staff utilized radar data to select potential landing sites on Mars.
More recently, radar revealed the surprising presence of ice on Mercury and furnished
the first three-dimensional images of an asteroid.
Again, these achievements seldom have attracted the attention of the media. The initial
American radar detections of the Moon in 1946 and of Venus in 1961 attracted notice in
daily newspapers, weekly news magazines, news reels, and cartoons. Only in recent years
have the accomplishments of radar astronomy returned to the front-page of the news. The
images of Venus sent back by Magellan received full media coverage, and images of the
asteroid Toutatis appeared on the front-page of the New York Times.
Planetary radar astronomy has shared its anonymity with other applications of radar to
space research. The NASA radar-equipped SEASAT satellite provided unprecedented
images of Earth's oceans; European, Canadian, and Japanese satellites, as well as a num-
ber of space shuttles, have imaged Earth with radar. The radars of NASA's Deep Space
Network also have played a major role in tracking space launches and spacecraft on route
to planets as distant as Saturn and Neptune. Among the more down-to-Earth, visible and
even pervasive applications of radar are those for air traffic control and navigation, the
surveillance of automobile traffic speeds, and the imaging of weather patterns reported
daily on television and radio.
Planetary radar astronomy is part of the great wave of progress in solid-state and digital
electronics that has marked the second half of the twentieth century. For instance, the ear-
liest planetary radar experiment marked the first use of a maser (a solid-state microwave
amplifying device) outside the laboratory. Although radio astronomy has long claimed the
first maser application for itself, namely in April 1958 by Columbia University and the
Naval Research Laboratory, two months earlier, MIT's Lincoln Laboratory used a maser
in its first attempt to bounce radar waves offVenus. The same radar experiment also saw
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oneofthefirstusesofadigitaltaperecorder,aswellastheincorporationfadigitalcom-
puterandotherdigitaldataprocessingequipmentintoacivilianradarsystem.
Theoriginsofthissolid-stateanddigitalelectronicsprogress,aswellasofplanetaryradar
astronomy,arerootedinelectronicresearchanddevelopmentthatstartedasearlyasthe
1930s.Thefirstradarastronomyexperiments,whichwerecarriedoutonmeteorsandthe
Moonin the1940s,reliedonequipmentdesignedandbuiltformilitarydefenseduring
WorldWarII andwerebasedonresearchconductedduringthe1930s.
Planetaryadarastronomy,andsotooradaritself,haditsoriginsinBigScience.British
warpreparationsduringthe1930sconcentratedlargeamountsof scientific,technologi-
cal,financial,andhumanresourcesintoasingleffort.Partofthateffortwasamassive
radaresearchanddevelopmentprogramthatproducedanimpressiverangeofdefensive
andoffensiveradars.Inasecretmissionknownonlyatthehighestlevelsofgovernment,
BritaingavetheUnitedStatesoneof thekeydevicesbornofthatlarge-scaleradareffort,
themagnetron.In turn,themagnetronformedthetechnologicalbaseforanAmerican
radaresearchanddevelopmenteffortonascalequaltothatoftheManhattanProject,
whichhistorianstraditionallyhaverecognizedasthebeginningofBigScience.
Thehistoryofplanetaryadarastronomyin theUnitedStatesi the history of Big Science.
Without Big Science, planetary radar astronomy would be impossible and unthinkable.
That is one of the main contentions of this book. The radar astronomy experiments of the
1940s and 1950s, as well as much of pre-war radar development, were intimately linked to
ionospheric research, which was then undergoing a rapid publication rate typical of Big
Science.
Also, the evolutions of planetary radar and radio astronomy converged. The search for
research instruments free of military constraints brought planetary radar astronomers
closer to radio astronomy during the 1960s, a time when radio astronomy was undergoing
a rapid growth that transformed it into Big Science. Planetary radar and radio astronomy
shared instruments and a common interest in electronic hardware and techniques,
though ironically the instrumentation needs of the two communities ultimately provided
little basis for cohabitation.
In the end, military Big Science was far more important than either radio astronomy or
ionospheric science. Planetary radar astronomy emerged in the late 1950s thanks to Cold
War defense research that furnished the essential instruments of planetary radar experi-
mentation. The vulnerability of the United States to aircraft and ICBM attacks with
nuclear explosives necessitated the creation of a network of ever more powerful and
sensitive defensive radars. What President Dwight D. Eisenhower called the military-
industrial complex, and what historian Stuart Leslie calls the military-industrial-academic
complex, j provided the radar instrument for the first attempts at Venus. The military-
industrial or military-industrial-academic complex served as the social matrix which nur-
tured military and other Big Science research. Planetary radar astronomy eventually
found itself part of a different, though at times interlocking, complex centered on the
civilian enterprise to explore space, that is, what one might call the NASA-industrial-
academic complex.
1. Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT
and Stanford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
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Theemergenceof spaceasBigScienceunderthe financial and institutional aegis of
NASA, and the design and construction of a worldwide network of antennas to track
launches and communicate with spacecraft, furnished instruments for planetary radar
research as early as 1961. Within a decade, NASA became the de facto underwriter of all
planetary radar astronomy. Data on the nature of planetary surface features and precise
reckoning of both the astronomical unit and planetary orbits were highly valuable to an
institution whose primary goal was (and whose budgetary bulk paid for) the designing,
building, and launching of vessels for the exploration of the solar system. Association with
NASA Big Science enhanced the tendency of radar astronomers to emphasize the utility
of their research and promoted mission-oriented, as opposed to basic, research.
The history of planetary radar astronomy is intrinsically interesting and forms the frame-
work of this book. It also says something about Big Science. Defining Big Science, or even
Little Science, is not easy though. After all, how true are the images of the Little Scientist
as "the lone, long-haired genius, moldering in an attic or basement workshop, despised by
society as a nonconformist, existing in a state of near poverty, motivated by the flame
burning within him," and the Big Scientist as "honored in Washington, sought after by all
the research corporations of the 'Boston ring road,' part of an elite intellectual brother-
hood of co-workers, arbiters of political as well as technological destiny"? 2
Since the publication in 1963 of DerekJ. De Solla Price's ground-breaking Little Science,
Big Science, historians have attempted to define Big Science. 3 Their considerable efforts
have clarified the meaning of the term, though without producing a universally authori-
tative definition. If large-scale expensive research instruments are the measure, then one
might count the island observatory of Tycho Brahe in the sixteenth century, or the giant
electrical machines built in eighteenth-century Holland. If Big Science is a large grouping
of investigators from several disciplines working together on a common project, then the
gathering of mathematicians, chemists, and physicists at Thomas Edison's West Orange
laboratory was Big Science. A long-term research project, such as the quest for an AIDS
cure, or one that entails elaborate organization, such as the Manhattan Project, might be
termed Big Science too.
Defining Big Science is the intellectual equivalent of trying to nallJell-O to the wall. For
the purposes of this book, we shall call Big Science the large-scale organization of science
and scientists, underwritten by an imposing pledge of (usually) public funds and centered
around a complex scientific instrument. In his search to understand Big Science, Derek
Price decided to "turn the tools of science on itself," charting the historical growth of sci-
ence by means of a variety of statistical indicators obtained from the Institute for Scientific
Information in Philadelphia. Price concluded that scientific activity (as measured by the
amount of literature published) has grown exponentially over the last three hundred
years, doubling in size about every fifteen years. 4 We also shall define a rapid growth in
scientific literature greater than the Price rate (doubling every fifteen years) as indicating
2. Derek J. DeSolla Price, Little Science, Big Science... and Beyond (New York: Columbia University Press,
1986), p. 2.
3. Price, Little Science, Big Science... and Beyond, p. 15.
4. Price, Little Sdence, Big Sdenc_e (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). This discussion of Big
Science draws on Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, eds., Big Science: The. Growth of I,arg_$cale Research (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1992); James H. Capshaw and Karen A. Rader, "Big Science: Price to the Present,"
O_iri._, ser. 2, vol. 7 (1992) : 3-25; and Joel Genuth, "Microwave Radar, the Atomic Bomb, and the Background to
U.S. Research Priorities in World War If," Science, TechnohJgy, and Human Values 13 (1988): 276-289.
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an emerging Big Science field. Whatever it is, Big Science has become the dominant form
of contemporary American science. Moreover, because of its scale and scope, the conduct
of Big Science necessarily intrudes into many areas of society, and in turn, society, through
political, economic, and other activity, shapes the conduct of Big Science.
The interdependency of institutional factors, funding patterns, science, technology, and
techniques found in Big Science has been the subject of extensive study by historians and
sociologists of science and technology. Scholars traditionally have concerned themselves
with both science and technology and their interactions. Such studies came to be termed
"internalist," meaning that they dealt solely with the inner workings of science and tech-
nology. In contrast stood the so-called "externalist" approaches, which emphasized the
social, economic, political, and other factors neglected by the "internalists."
Starting around 1980, sociologists of science, such as Michel Callon, developed new
approaches, which were introduced into the history of technology by Thomas E Hughes.
These new approaches came to be called generically the "social construction of technol-
ogy." The "technosocial networks" of Calion and the "systems" of Hughes consider the
"internalist" and "externalist" aspects of technology as constituting a single continuum or
"seamless web". Inventors, scientists, instruments, financing, institutions, politics, laws,
and so forth are all equally part of the "technosocial network" or "system". 5
The chief advantage of replacing the "internalist" and "externalist" dualism with the uni-
tarian approach of the social construction school is the more sophisticated and certainly
more complex view of the scientific, technical, economic, political, institutional, legal, and
other aspects of Big Science that it offers. Moreover, by stressing that all components of a
technosocial network are equal and necessary, the social construction approach dissuades
us from emphasizing any one factor, "internal" or "external", over all others.
The social construction approach is useful for creating a taxonomy of the factors that
shape Big Science. Nonetheless, although they served as a guiding principle in the writ-
ing of this book, social construction case studies do not go far enough; they fail to address
the question that is, after chronicling the achievements of radar astronomy, central to this
book--namely the conduct of Little Science in the context of Big Science. Furthermore,
in all the discussions of Big Science, with few exceptions, the symbiotic relationship
between Big Science and Little Science has been overlooked. This relationship is
especially relevant to the organization of science within NASA space missions. The scien-
tists who conduct experiments from those spacecraft typify Little Science: they work
individually or in small collaborative groups, often with graduate assistants, and have
relatively small budgets and limited laboratory equipment. Participation in NASA space-
craft missions induces these Little Scientists to function as part of a Big Science endeavor.
The scientists are organized into both working groups around a single scientific
instrument and disciplinary groups. They participate in the design of experiments and in
5. For a discussion of this evolution, see John M. Staudenmaier, "Recent Trends in the History of
Technology," The American Hi._ttnit:al lbrview 95 (1990): 715-725, as well as Hughes, "The Seamless Web:
Technology, Science, Etcetera, Etcetera," Social Studie..s of Scient_ 16 (1986): 281-292. The primary social con-
struction works are Wiebe E. Bijker, Hughes, and Trevor Pinch, eds., 7"he Social Omstruction of Technological
.S'y._tem.w New l)2re_tion_ in lhe Soaolog_ and History of Tkchnolol. ff (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), and Bijker and lohn
Law, eds., Shaping Technolok_/Buibling Stalely: Studie._ in Sociotethnical Change (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992).
the decisions to drop or modify certain experiments, as well as in the design of the instru-
ments themselves. The overall scale of operation and budget is beyond that normally
encountered by Little Scientists.
One noteworthy exception to the lack of literature dealing with the relationship between
Big Science and Little Science is historian John Krige's study of British nuclear physics
research in the period immediately following World War II. The Labor Government of
Clement Attlee set out to equip the universities of Birmingham, Glasgow, Liverpool,
Cambridge, and Oxford with particle accelerators for conducting high-energy nuclear
physics research. The accelerator program involved the kinds of large-scale budgets and
instruments that typify Big Science; however, research was conducted in a manner more
typical of Little Science. Large multidisciplinary teams, in which physicists and engineers
rubbed shoulders, did not form; rather the physicists remained individual academic
researchersf'
Krige's case of "Big Equipment but not Big Science" finds its parallel in planetary radar
astronomy. Big Science was the sine qua non of planetary radar astronomy, but planetary
radar astronomy was not Big Science. It was, and remains, Little Science in terms of
manpower, instruments, budget, and publications. Planetary radar astronomy took root
within the interstices of Big Science, but rather than expand over time, it actually shrank.
The field attained its largest size, in terms of personnel, instruments, and publications,
during the 1960s. Although one can count five active instruments between 1961 and 1964,
the greatest number to ever carry out planetary radar experiments, only three subse-
quently sustained active research programs. That number fell to two instruments after
1975. For much of the period between 1978 and 1986, only one instrument, indeed the
only instrument to have an established and secure planetary radar astronomy research
program, the Arecibo Observatory, was steadily active.
The number of active planetary radar astronomers has declined since the 1960s too. As a
group, they tend not to reproduce as easily or as abundantly as other scientists, and many
practitioners in the long run find something else to do. Two paths---artifacts of the field's
evolution--lead to a career in planetary radar astronomy. Many follow the traditional
university path---doctoral research on a planetary radar topic, followed by a research
position that permits them to perform planetary radar experiments. Of the current prac-
titioners, the most recent Ph.D. was granted in 1994, the second most recent in 1978. The
path more followed: practitioners were hired to conduct planetary radar experiments.
The declining instrument and manpower numbers are reflected in the planetary radar
astronomy publication record (see Appendix: Planetary Radar Astronomy Publications).
Price has shown that science publications have doubled about every fifteen years over the
last three centuries. The planetary radar publication curve differs markedly from that nor-
mai growth pattern, suggesting a ceiling condition that has limited growth. The nature of
that ceiling condition, as well as the causal factors for the declining size of the planetary
radar enterprise, are part of the story of how planetary radar Little Science has been con-
ducted within the framework of American Big Science. The association of planetary radar
6. John Krige, "The Installation of High-Energy Accelerators in Britain after the War: Big Equipment
but not 'Big Science,'" in Michelangelo De Maria, Mario Grilli, and Fabio Sebastiani, eds., The Restructuring of
l'hy,_ical Science._ in Eur_pe arul the United States, 1945-1960 (Teaneck, NJ: World Scientific, 1989), pp. 488--501.
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Little Science with NASA Big Science ultimately affected the conduct of planetary radar
astronomy. Radar astronomers always had argued the utility of their efforts for space
research; NASA mission-oriented support of planetary radar astronomy only reinforced
that utilitarian inclination. As the story unfolds, other factors that shaped and amplified
the utilitarian tendency of radar astronomers will rise to the surface.
Its relationship with NASA Big Science also transformed planetary radar astronomy from
an exclusively ground-based scientific activity to one that was conducted in space as well.
During the 1960s, planetary radar astronomers distinguished their ground-based research
from that conducted from spacecraft, which they characterized as space exploration as
opposed to astronomy. Starting in the following decade, when NASA became its sole
underwriter, planetary radar astronomy began to engage the planetary geology commu-
nity largely through its ability to image and otherwise characterize planetary surfaces.
NASA funded specific radar imaging projects. At the same time, NASA began planning
two missions to Venus, Pioneer Venus and Magellan, in order to capture in radar images
the features of that planet's surface. Its opaque atmosphere keeps Venus's surface hidden
from sight and bars exploration with optical methods.
Pioneer Venus and Magellan ultimately had a profound impact on the practice of plane-
tary radar astronomy. In addition to enlarging the community of scientists using radar
imagery and other data to encompass both geologists and astronomers, those two NASA
missions erased the turf boundary between space exploration and ground-based plane-
tary radar astronomy. Mthough Magellan in particular also gave radar astronomers a taste
of Big Science, planetary radar astronomy did not permanently shift from Little to Big
Science. Radar imaging from a spacecraft had limited prospects. Ultimately, the greatest
consequence of Magellan for planetary radar astronomy was that it effectively ended
ground-based radar observations of Venus, the chief object of radar research.
The plan of this book is to relate the history of planetary radar astronomy from its origins
in radar to the present day and secondarily to bring to light that history as a case of "Big
Equipment but not Big Science". Chapter One sketches the emergence of radar astrono-
my as an ongoing scientific activity at Jodrell Bank, where radar research revealed that
meteors were part of the solar system. The chief Big Science driving early radar astrono-
my experiments was ionospheric research. Chapter Two links the Cold War and the Space
Race to the first radar experiments attempted on planetary targets, while recounting the
initial achievements of planetary radar, namely, the refinement of the astronomical unit
and the rotational rate and direction of Venus.
Chapter Three discusses early attempts to organize radar astronomy and the efforts at
MIT's Lincoln Laboratory, in conjunction with Harvard radio astronomers, to acquire
antenna time unfettered by military priorities. Here, the chief Big Science influencing the
development of planetary radar astronomy was radio astronomy. Chapter Four spotlights
the evolution of planetary radar astronomy at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, a NASA
facility, at Cornell University's Arecibo Observatory, and at Jodrell Bank. A congeries of
funding from the military, the National Science Foundation, and finally NASA marked
that evolution, which culminated in planetary radar astronomy finding a single Big
Science patron, NASA.
Chapter Five analyzes planetary radar astronomy as a science using the theoretical frame-
work provided by philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn. Chapter Six explores the shift in
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planetaryradarastronomybeginningin the1970sthatresultedfromitsfinancialand
institutionalrelationshipwithNASABigScience.Thisshiftsawthefield1) transform
fromanexclusivelyground-basedscientificactivitytooneconductedin space,aswellas
onEarth,and2)capturetheinterestofplanetaryscientistsfromboththeastronomyand
geologycommunities.ChapterSevenrelateshowtheMagellanmissionwastheculmina-
tionofthisevolution.ChaptersEightandNinediscusstheresearchcarriedoutatground-
basedfacilitiesbythistransformedplanetaryradarastronomy,aswellastheupgradingoftheAreciboandGoldstone radars.
The conclusion serves a dual purpose. It responds to the concern for the future of plan-
etary radar astronomy expressed by many of the practitioners interviewed for this book,
as well as to the author's wish to provide a slice of applied history that might be of value
to both radar astronomers and policy makers. The conclusion also appraises planetary
radar as a case of "Big Equipment but not Big Science". It considers the factors that have
limited the size of planetary radar, its utilitarian nature, and its dependency on large-scale
technological enterprises.
A technical essay appended to this book provides an overview of planetary radar tech-
niques, especially range-Doppler mapping, for the general reader. Furthermore, the text
itself explains certain, though not all, technical aspects of radar astronomy. The author
assumed that the reader would have a familiarity with general technical and scientific ter-
minology or would have access to a scientific dictionary or encyclopedia. For those read-
ers seeking additional, and especially more technically-oriented, information on plane-
tary radar astronomy, the technical essay includes a list of articles on the topic written by
radar practitioners.
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Chapter One
A Meteoric Start
During the 1940s, investigators in the United States and Hungary bounced radar
waves off the Moon for the first time, while others made the first systematic radar studies
of meteors. These experiments constituted the initial exploration of the solar system with
radar. In order to understand the beginnings of radar astronomy, we first must examine
the origins of radar in radio, the decisive role of ionospheric research, and the rapid
development of radar technology triggered by World War II.
As early as 20June 1922, in an address to a joint meeting of the Institute of Electrical
Engineers and the Institute of Radio Engineers in New York, the radio pioneer Guglielmo
Marconi suggested using radio waves to detect ships: I
As was first shown by Hertz, electric waves can be completely reflected by conduct-
ing bodies. In some of my tests I have noticed the effects of reflection and deflection of these
waves by metallic objects miles away.
It seems to me that it should be possible to design apparatus by means of which a ship
could radiate or project a divergent beam of these rays in any desired direction, which rays,
if coming across a metallic object, such as another steamer or ship, would be reflected back
to a receiver screened from the local transmitter on the sending ship, and thereby immedi-
ately reveal the presence and bearing of the other ship in fog or thick weather.
One further advantage of such an arrangement would be it would have the ability
to give warning of the presence and bearing of ships, even should these ships be unpro-
vided with any kind of radio.
By the time Germany invaded Poland in September 1939 and World War II was
underway, radio detection, location, and ranging technologies and techniques were avail-
able in Japan, France, Italy, Germany, England, Hungary, Russia, Holland, Canada, and
the United States. Radar was not so much an invention, springing from the laboratory
bench to the factory floor, but an ongoing adaptation and refinement of radio technolo-
gy. The apparent emergence of radar in Japan, Europe, and North America more or less
at the same time was less a case of simultaneous invention than a consequence of the glob-
al nature of radio research. 2
Although radar is identified overwhelmingly with World War II, historian Sean S.
Swords has argued that the rise of high-performance and long-range aircraft in the late
1930s would have promoted the design of advanced radio navigational aids, including
radar, even without a war. s More decisively, however, ionospheric research propelled radar
development in the 1920s and 1930s. As historian Henry Guerlac has pointed out, "Radar
was developed by men who were familiar with the ionospheric work. It was a relatively
straightforward adaptation for military purposes of a widely-known scientific technique,
I. Guglielmo Marconi, _Radio Telegraphy." Proctedings of the IrL_tituteof Radio Engineers 10 (1922): 237.
2. Charles Sfisskind, _Who Invented Radar?" Endeavour9 (1985): 92-96; Henry E. Guerlac, "The Radio
Background of Radar,"Journal of the Franklin Institute. 250 (1950): 284-308.
3. Swords, A 7_chnical Hi_gtoryof the P,eginninl_ of Rtular (London: Peter Peregrinus Press, 1986),
pp. 270-27t.
2 TO SEE THE UNSEEN
which explains why this adaptation--the development of radar--took place simultane-
ously in several different countries. "4
The prominence of ionospheric research in the history of radar and later of radar
astronomy cannot be ignored. Out of ionospheric research came the essential technology
for the beginnings of military radar in Britain, as well as its first radar researchers and
research institutions. After the war, as we shall see, ionospheric research also drove the
emergence of radar astronomy.
Chain Home
Despite its scientific origins, radar made its mark and was baptized during World War
II as an integral and necessary instrument of offensive and defensive warfare. Located on
land, at sea, and in the air, radars detected enemy targets and determined their position
and range for artillery and aircraft in direct enemy encounters on the battlefield. Other
radars identified aircraft to ground bases as friend or foe, while others provided naviga-
tional assistance and coastal defense. World War II was the first electronic war, and radar
was its prime agent. 5
In 1940, nowhere did radar research achieve the same advanced state as in Britain. The
British lead initially resulted from a decision to design and build a radar system for coastal
defense, while subsequent research led to the invention of the cavity magnetron, which
placed Britain in the forefront of microwave radar. The impetus to achieve that lead in radar
came from a realization that the island nation was no longer safe from enemy invasion.
For centuries, Britain's insularity and navy protected it from invasion. The advent of
long-range airplanes that routinely outperformed their wooden predecessors spelled the
end of that protection. Existing aircraft warning methods were ineffectual. That Britain
was virtually defenseless against an air assault became clear during the summer air exer-
cises of 1934. In simulated night attacks on London and Coventry, both the Air Ministry
and the Houses of Parliament were successfully "destroyed," while few "enemy" bombers
were intercepted. 6
International politics also had reached a critical point. The Geneva Disarmament
Conference had collapsed, and Germany was rearming in defiance of the Treaty of
Versailles. Under attack from Winston Churchill and the Tory opposition, the British gov-
ernment abandoned its disarmament policy and initiated a five-year expansion of the
Royal Air Force. Simultaneously, the Air Ministry Director of Scientific Research, Henry
Egerton Wimperis, created a committee to study air defense methods.
Just before the Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defence first met on 28
January 1935, Wimperis contacted fellow Radio Research Board member Robert (later
Sir) Watson-Watt. Watson-Watt, who oversaw the Radio Research Station at Slough, was a
scientist with twenty years of experience as a government researcher. Ionospheric research
had been a principal component of Radio Research Station studies, and Watson-Watt fos-
tered the development there of a pulse-height technique. 7
4. Guerlac, "Radio Background," p. 304.
5. Alfred Price, Irtstrument_ of l)arkness: The Histm'y of Electronic War[are, 2d. ed. (London: MacDonald
and Jane's, 1977); Tony Devereux, Mex_e, zffer Gods of Battlt, Rtulio, Rtular, ._mar: The Story of Electrcmic__ in War
(Washington: Brassey's, 1991 ) ; David E. Fisher, A Race on the Edge o]"Time: Rtular--the Dehsive Wrap_m of W¢rrld War
//(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988).
6. H. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Polio) Between the War_, 1918-1939 (London: Heinemann, 1976),
p. 322. See also Malcolm Smith, British Air Strategy Between the Wars (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984).
7. Swords, p. 84; Edward G. Bowen, RadarDays (Bristol: Adam Hilger, 1987), pp. 4-5, 7 and 10; Robert
Watson-Watt, The l'ul_e of Rtular: The Autobiography of Sir Ro&rrt Wat._m-Watt (New York: Dial Press, 1959),
pp. 29-38, 51, 69, 101, 109-110, 113; A.E Rowe, One Story of Rtrdar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1948), pp. 6-7; Reg Batt, The Rtutar Army: Winning the War of the Airwaves (London: Robert Hale, 1991),
pp. 21-22. The Radio Research Board was under the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, created
in 1916.
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The pulse-height technique was to send short pulses of radio energy toward the
ionosphere and to measure the time taken for them to return to Earth. The elapsed trav-
el time of the radio waves gave the apparent height of the ionosphere. Merle A. Tuve, then
of Johns Hopkins University, and Gregory Breit of the Carnegie Institution's Department
of Terrestrial Magnetism in Washington, first developed the technique in the 1920s and
undertook ionospheric research in collaboration with the Naval Research Laboratory and
the Radio Corporation of America. _
In response to the wartime situation, Wimperis asked Watson-Watt to determine the
practicality of using radio waves as a "death ray." Rather than address the proposed "death
ray," Watson-Wart's memorandum reply drew upon his experience in ionospheric
research. Years later, Watson-Watt contended, "I regard this Memorandum on the
'Detection and Location of Aircraft by Radio Methods' as marking the birth of radar and
as being in fact the invention of radar."9 Biographer Ronald William Clark has termed the
memorandum "the political birth of radar." Nonetheless, Watson-Wart's memorandum
was really less an invention than a proposal for a new radar application.
The memorandum outlined how a radar system could be put together and made to
detect and locate enemy aircraft. The model for that radar system was the same pulse-
height technique Watson-Watt had used at Slough. Prior to the memorandum in its final
form going before the Committee, Wimperis had arranged for a test of Watson-Watt's idea
that airplanes could reflect significant amounts of radio energy, using a BBC transmitter
at Daventry. "Thus was the constricting 'red tape' of official niceties slashed by Harry
Wimperis, before the Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defence had so much as
met," Watson-Watt later recounted. The success of the Daventry test shortly led to the
authorization of funding (£12,300 for the first year) and the creation of a small research
and development project at Orford Ness and Bawdsey Manor that drew upon the exper-
tise of the Slough Radio Research Station.
From then onwards, guided largely by Robert Watson-Watt, the foundation of the
British radar effort, the early warning Chain Home, materialized. The Chain Home began
in December 1935, with Treasury approval for a set of five stations to patrol the air
approaches to the Thames estuary. Before the end of 1936, and long before the first test
of the Thames stations in the atttumn of 1937, plans were made to expand it into a
network of nineteen stations along the entire east coast; later, an additional six stations
were built to cover the south coast.
Born Robert Alexander Watson Watt in 1892, he changed his surname to "Watson-Watt" when knighted
in 1942. See the popularly-written biography of Watson-Watt,John Rowland, The Rcutar Man: T'heStory of SirRobert
WaLton-Watt ([xmdon: Lutterworth Press, 1963), or Watson-Watt, Three Step_ to Victfrry (London: Odhams Press
Ltd., 1957). An account of Watson-Watt's research at Slough is given in Watson-Watt, John F. lterd, and L.H.
Bainbridge-Bell, The Cath_ule Ray Tulu" in Radio Re._earrh (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1933).
8. By "apparent height of the ionosphere," I mean what ionosphericists call _artnal height. Since the
ionosphere slows radio waves before being refracted back to Earth, the delay is not a true measure of height.
The Tuve-Breil method preceded that of Watson-Watt and was a true send-receive technique, while that of
Watson-Watt was a receive-only technique.
Tuve "Early Days of Pulse Radio at the Carnegie lnstitution,"]+mrnal of Atnu_+pheric and Te'rre+trial Phy+ic.+ 36
(1974): 2079-2083; Oswald G. Villard, .Jr., "The Ionospheric Sounder and its Place in the History of Radio
Science," Radio Science 11 (1976): 847-860; Guerlac, "Radio Background," pp. 284-308; David H. DeVorkin,
Science With a Vengeance: How the Military Created the U.S. Space Sc2ences _ter World War H (New York: Springer-Verlag,
1992), pp. 12, 301 and 316; C. Stewart Gilhnor, 'q'hreshold to Space: Early Studies of the Ionosphere," in Paul
A. Hanle and Von Del Chamberlin, eds., S bare Science (_me._ of Agie: P_pertive._ in the Hi._t_rcy o[ the Space Sciences
(Washington: National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution, 1981), pp. 102-104; J.A. Ratcliffe,
"Experimental Methods of Ionospheric Investigation, 1925-1955,".]_mrnal of Atmospheric and Terrestrial Physic.i 36
(1974): 2095-2103; Tuve and BTeit, "Note on a Radio Method of Estimating the Height of the Conducting
Layer," 7"erre._trial Mag'neti._ra and Atmospheric Electricity 30 (1925): 15-16; Breit and Tuve, "A Radio Method of
Estimating the Height of the Conducting Layel;" Nature 116 (1925): 357; and Breit and Tuve, "A Test of the
Existence of the Conducting Layer," I'hy.sical Review 2d set., vol. 28 (1926): 554-575; special issue of.pmrnal q[
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The Chain Home played a crucial role in the Battle of Britain, which began in July
1940. The final turning point was on 15 September, when the Luftwaffe suffered a record
number of planes lost in a single day. Never again did Germany attempt a massive daylight
raid over Britain. However, if radar won the day, it lost the night. Nighttime air raids
showed a desperate need for radar improvements.
The Magnetron
In order to wage combat at night, fighters needed the equivalent of night vision--
their own on-board radar, but the prevailing technology was inadequate. Radars operating
at low wavelengths, around 1.5 meters (200 MHz), cast a beam that radiated both straight
ahead and downwards. The radio energy reflected from the Earth was so much greater
than that of the enemy aircraft echoes that the echoes were lost at distances greater than
the altitude of the aircraft. At low altitudes, such as those used in bombing raids or in air-
to-air combat, the lack of radar vision was grave. Microwave radars, operating at wave-
lengths of a few centimeters, could cast a narrower beam and provide enough resolution
to locate enemy aircraft.t0
Although several countries had been ahead of Britain in microwave radar technolo-
gy before the war began, Britain leaped ahead in February 1940, with the invention of the
cavity magnetron by Henry A. H. Boot and John T. Randall at the University of
Birmingham.ll Klystrons were large vacuum tubes used to generate microwave power, but
they did not operate adequately at microwave frequencies. The time required for elec-
trons to flow through a klystron was too long to keep up with the frequency of the exter-
nal oscillating circuit. The cavity magnetron resolved that problem and made possible the
microwave radars of World War II. As Sean Swords asserted, "The emergence of the
resonant-cavity magnetron was a turning point in radar history. ''12 The cavity magnetron
launched a line of microwave research and development that has persisted to this day.
The cavity magnetron had no technological equivalent in the United States, when
the Tizard Mission arrived in late 1940 with one of the first ten magnetrons constructed.
The Tizard Mission, known formally as the British Technical and Scientific Mission, had
been arranged at the highest levels of government to exchange technical information
between Britain and the United States. Its head and organizer, Henry Tizard, was a promi-
nent physics professor and a former member of the committee that had approved Watson-
Watt's radar project. As James E Baxter wrote just after the war's end with a heavy hand-
ful of hyperbole, though not without some truth: "When the members of the Tizard
Mission brought one [magnetron] to America in 1940, they carried the most valuable
cargo ever brought to our shores. It sparked the whole development of microwave radar
and constituted the most important item in reverse Lease-Lend. ''13
10. Swords, pp. 84--85; Bowen, pp. 6, 21, 26 and 28; Batt, pp. 10, 21-22, 69 and 77; Rowe, pp. 8 and 76;
R. Hanbury Brown, Bo]fin:A Personal Story of the Early Days of Radar, Radio Astrrmom_,and Quantum Optics (Bristol:
Adam Hilger, 1991), pp. 7---8;P.S. Hall and R.G. Lee, "Introduction to Radar," in ES. Hall, T.K. Garland-Collins,
R.S. Picton, and R.G. Lee, eds., R,u/ar (London: Brassey's, 1991), pp. 6--7; Watson-Watt, I'ut_e, pp. 55-59, 64-65,
75, 113-115 and 427-434; Watson-Watt, ThreeSteps, pp. 83 and 470-474; Bowen, "The Development of Airborne
Radar in Great Britain, 1935-1945," in Russel W. Burns, ed., Rtular Devebqmuent to 1945 (London: Peter
Peregrinus Press, 1988), pp. 177-188. For a description of the technology, see B.T. Neale, "CH--the First
Operational Radar," in Burns, pp. 132-150.
11. Boot and Randall, "Historical Notes on the Cavity Magnetron," IEEE Tranmction._ _rnElectronDevia,._
ED-23 (1976): 724-729; R.W. Burns, "The Background to the Development of the Cavity Magnetron," in Burns,
pp. 259-283.
12. Swords, p. xi.
13. Baxter, Scientists Again._t 7_me(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946), p. t42; Swords, pp. 120,
259, and 266; Clark, especially pp. 248-271.
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In lateSeptember1940,Dr.EdwardG.Bowen,theradarscientiston theTizard
Mission,showedamagnetrontomembersof theNationalDefenseResearchCommittee(NDRC),whichPresidentRoosevelthadjustcreatedon27June1940.Oneofthefirstacts
oftheNDRC,whichlaterbecametheOfficeofScientificResearchandDevelopment,was
toestablishaMicrowaveCommittee,whosestatedpurposewas"toorganizeandconsoli-
dateresearch,invention,anddevelopmentasto obtainthemosteffectivemilitary
applicationofmicrowavesin theminimumtime.'q4
Afewweeksafterthemagnetrondemonstration,theNDRCdecidedtocreatethe
RadiationLaboratoryatMIT.WhiletheMITRadiationLaboratoryaccountedfornearly
80percentof theNDRCMicrowaveDivision'scontracts,anadditional136contractsfor
radarresearch,development,andprototypeworkwereletout tosixteencollegesand
universities,twoprivateresearchinstitutions,andthemajoradioindustrialconcerns,
withWesternElectrictakingthelargestshare.TheMITRadiationLaboratorypersonnel
skyrocketedfromthirtyphysicists,hreeguards,twostockclerks,andasecretaryforthe
firstyearto apeakemploymentlevelof3,897(1,189ofwhomwerestaff)on1August
1945.Themostfar-reachingearlyachievement,accomplishedin thespringof1941,was
thecreationofanewgenerationofradarequipmentbasedonamagnetronoperatingat
3cm.Experimentalworkin theonecmrangeledtonumerousimprovementsin radars
at10and3cm.15
Meanwhile,researchanddevelopmentofradarsoflongerwavelengthswerecarried
outbytheNavyandtheArmySignalCorps,bothofwhichhadhadactiveongoingradar
programsincethe1930s.TheNavystarteditsresearchprogramattheNavalResearch
Laboratory(NRL)beforethatoftheSignalCorps,butradarexperimentersafterthewar
usedSignalCorpsequipment,especiallytheSCR-270,mainlybecauseof itswideavail-
ability.AmobileSCR-270,placedonOahuaspartoftheArmy'sAircraftWarningSystem,
spottedincomingJapaneseairplanesnearly50minutesbeforetheybombedUnitedStates
installationsatPearlHarboron7December1941.Thewarningwasignored,becausean
officermistooktheradarechoesforanexpectedflightofB-17s.16
Historiansviewthelarge-scalecollectionof technicalndfinancialresourcesand
manpowerat theMITRadiationLaboratoryengagedin aconcertedeffortto research
anddevelopnewradarcomponentsandsystems,alongwiththeManhattanProject,as
14. Guerlac, Radar in W¢Md War II, The History of Modern Physics, 1800-1950, vol. 8 (New York:
Tomash Publishers for the American Institute of Physics, 1987), vol. 1, p. 249; Swords, pp. 90 and 119; Batt, pp.
79-80; Bowen, pp. 159-162: Watson Watt, Pulge, pp. 228-229 and 257; Watson-Watt, Three Steps, 293.
In addition to Tizard and Bowen, the Mission team consisted of Prof.J.D. Cockcroft, Col. EC. Wallace,
Army, Capt. H.W. Faulkner, Navy, Capt. EL. Pearce, Royal Air Force, W.E. Woodward Nutt, Ministry of Aircraft
Production, Mission Secretary, Prof. R.H. Fowler, liaison officer for Canada and the United States of the
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, and Col. H.EG. Letson, Canadian military attache in
Washington.
15. Guerlac, Radar in World W_lr II, 1:258-259, 261,266 and 507-508, and 2:648 and 668. See also the
personal reminiscences of Ernest C. Pollard, Radiation: One Story of the MIT Radiation Laboratory (Durham; The
Woodburn Press, 1982). Interviews (though not all are transcribed) of some Radiation Laboratory participants
are available at the IEEE Center for the History of Electrical Engineering (CHEE), Rutgers University. CHEE,
Se_urc.e._ in Flectrical Hist_rry 2: Oral History CoUections in U.S. Rz, positories (New York: IEEE, 1992), pp. 6-7. The British
also developed magnetrons and radar equipment operating at microwave frequencies concurrently with the MIT
Radiation Laboratory effort.
16. Guerlac, Radar in World War II, 1:247-248 and 117-119. For the Navy, see L.A. Hyland, "A Personal
Reminiscence: The Beginnings of Radar, 1930-1934," in Burns, pp. 29--33; Robert Morris Page, The On_'n of
Radar (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, 1962) ; Page, "Early History of Radar in the U.S.
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l.ttl_rmt_rry (Washington: Naval Research Laboratory, 1981); Guerlac, Radar in World War II, 1:59-92; Albert Hoyt
Taylor, The Fi_t Twentyfive _ars of the Naval Research Laboratory (Washington: Navy Department, 1948). On the
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signalling the emergence of Big Science. Ultimately, from out of the concentration of
personnel, expertise, materiel, and financial resources at the successor of the Radiation
Laboratory, Lincoln Laboratory, arose the first attempts to detect the planet Venus with
radar. The Radiation Laboratory Big Science venture, however, did not contribute imme-
diately to the rise of radar astronomy.
The radar and digital technology used in those attempts on Venus was not available
at the end of World War II, when the first lunar and meteor radar experiments were
conducted. Moreover, the microwave radars issued from Radiation Laboratory research
were far too weak for planetary or lunar work and operated at fiequencies too high to be
useful in meteor studies. Outside the Radiation Laboratory, though, U.S. Army Signal
Corps and Navy researchers had created radars, like the SCR-270, that were more power-
ful and operated at lower frequencies, in research and development programs that were
less concentrated and conducted on a smaller scale than the Radiation Laboratory effort.
Wartime production created an incredible excess of such radar equipment. The end
of fighting turned it into war surplus to be auctioned off, given away, or buried as waste.
World War II also begot a large pool of scientists and engineers with radar expertise who
sought peacetime scientific and technical careers at war's end. That pool of expertise,
when combined with the cornucopia of high-power, low-frequency radar equipment and
a pinch of curiosity, gave rise to radar astronomy.
A catalyst crucial to that rise was ionospheric research. In the decade and a half
following World War II, ionospheric research underwent the kind of swift growth that is
typical of Big Science. The ionospheric journal literature doubled every 2.9 years from
1926 to 1938, before stagnating during the war; but between 1947 and 1960, the literature
doubled every 5.8 years, a rate several times faster than the growth rate of scientific liter-
ature as a whole. Iv Interest in ionospheric phenomena, as expressed in the rapidly
growing research literature, motivated many of the first radar astronomy experiments
undertaken on targets beyond the Earth's atmosphere.
Project Diana
Typical was the first successful radar experiment aimed at the Moon. That experi-
ment was performed with Signal Corps equipment at the Corps' Evans Signal Laboratory,
near Belmar, New Jersey, under the direction of John H. DeWitt,Jr., Laboratory Director.
DeWitt was born in Nashville and attended Vanderbilt University Engineering School for
two years. Vanderbilt did not offer a program in electrical engineering, so DeWitt
dropped out in order to satisfy his interest in broadcasting and amateur radio. In 1929,
after building Nashville's first broadcasting station, DeWitt joined the Bell Telephone
Laboratories technical staff in New York City, where he designed radio broadcasting trans-
mitters. He returned to Nash_511e in 1932 to become Chief Engineer of radio station WSM.
Intrigued by KarlJansky's discovery of "cosmic noise," DeWitt built a radio telescope and
searched for radio signals from the Milky Way.
In 1940, DeWitt attempted to bounce radio signals off the Moon in order to study
the Earth's atmosphere. He wrote in his notebook: "It occurred to me that it might be
possible to reflect uhrashort waves from the moon. If this could be done it would open up
wide possibilities for the study of the upper atmosphere. So far as I know no one has ever
17. Gillmor, "Geospace and its Uses: The Restructuring of Ionospheric Physics Following World War 11,"
in DeMaria, Grilli, and Sebastiani, pp. 75-84, especially pp. 78-79.
18. DeWitt notebook, 21 May 1940, and DeWitt biographical sketch, HL Diana 46 (04), HAUSACEC.
There is a rich literature on Jansky's discovery. A good place to start is Woodruff T. Sullivan iII, "Karl Jansky and
the Discovery of Extraterrestrial Radio Waves," in Sullivan, ed., The Early Year_ of Rtutio A._trtmtnny: Reflecti_nt_ Fifty
Years afterJan_ky_ l)iscovery (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 3_t2.
A METEORIC START 7
sent waves off the earth and measured their return through the entire atmosphere of the
earth."18
On the night of 20 May 1940, using the receiver and 80-watt transmitter configured
for radio station WSM, DeWitt tried to reflect 138-MHz (2-meter) radio waves off the
Moon, but he failed because of insufficient receiver sensitivity. After joining the staff of
Bell Telephone Laboratories in Whippany, New Jersey, in 1942, where he worked exclu-
sively on the design of a radar antenna for the Navy, DeWitt was commissioned in the
Signal Corps and was assigned to serve as Executive Officer, later as Director, of Evans
Signal Laboratory.
On 10 August 1945, the day after the United States unleashed a second atomic bomb
on Japan, military hostilities between the two countries ceased. DeWitt was not demobi-
lized immediately, and he began to plan his pet project, the reflection of radio waves off
the Moon. He dubbed the scheme Project Diana after the Roman mythological goddess
of the Moon, partly because "the Greek [sic] mythology books said that she had never
been cracked."
In September 1945, DeWitt assembled his team: Dr. Harold D. Webb, Herbert P.
Kauffman, E. King Stodola, and Jack Mofenson. Dr. Walter S. McAfee, in the Laboratory's
Theoretical Studies Group, calculated the reflectivity coefficient of the Moon. Members
of the Antenna and Mechanical Design Group, Research Section, and other Laboratory
groups contributed too.
No attempt was made to design major components specifically for the experiment.
The selection of the receiver, transmitter, and antenna was made from equipment already
on hand, including a special crystal-controlled receiver and transmitter designed for the
Signal Corps by radio pioneer Edwin H. Armstrong. Crystal control provided frequency
stability, and the apparatus provided the power and bandwidth needed. The relative veloc-
ities of the Earth and the Moon caused the return signal to differ from the transmitted
signal by as much as 300 Hz, a phenomenon known as Doppler shift. The narrow-band
receiver permitted tuning to the exact radio frequency of the returning echo. As DeWitt
later recalled: "We realized that the moon echoes would be very weak so we had to use a
very narrow receiver bandwidth to reduce thermal noise to tolerable levels....We had to
tune the receiver each time for a slightly different frequency from that sent out because
of the Doppler shift due to the earth's rotation and the radial velocity of the moon at the
time.'q0
The echoes were received both visually, on a nine-inch cathode-ray tube, and acousti-
cally, as a 180-Hz beep. The aerial was a pair of "bedspring" antennas from an SCR-271 sta-
tionary radar positioned side by side to form a 32-dipole array antenna and mounted on
a 30-meter (100-ft) tower. The antenna had only azimuth control; it had not been practi-
cal to secure a better mechanism. Hence, experiments were limited to the rising and set-
ting of the Moon.
19. DeWitt to Trevor Clark, 18 December 1977, HL Diana 46 (04); "Background Information on DeWitt
Observatory" and "U.S. Army Electronics Research and Development Laboratory, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey,"
March 1963, HL Diana 46 (26), HAUSACEC. For published full descriptions of the equipment and experiments,
see DeWitt and E. King Stodola, "Detection of Radio Signals Reflected from the Moon," l_*c._edings of the ln._titute
o] Rculio Enkrneer_ 37 (1949): 229-242;.lack Mofenson, "Radar Echoes from the Moon," Electronics 19 (1946):
92-98; and Herbert Kauffman, "A DX Record: To the Moon and Back," QST30 (1946): 65-68.
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The. "bedspring" mast antenna, U.S. Army Signal Ca_,nps, Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey, u._e.d by Lt. Cot. John H. DeWitt, Jr., to
bounce radar echoes off the Moon on l O.]anuary 1946. Two antennas fiom SCd¢-271 stationary radars were positioned side
by side to form a 32-dipole array aerial and were mounted on a lO0-fl (30-meter) t_nt,e_: (Carurtez-y of the U.S. Army
Communicatiorts-Flectronic._ Mu._eum, Ft M_mrturuth, Nero Jersey.)
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The Signal Corps tried several times, but without success. 'q'he equipment was very
haywire," recalled DeWitt. Finally, at moonrise, 11:48 A.M., on 10 January 1946, they
aimed the antenna at the horizon and began transmitting. Ironically, DeWitt was not pre-
sent: "I was over in Belmar having lunch and picking up some items like cigarettes at the
drug store (stopped smoking 1952 thank God)."2° The first signals were detected at 11:58
A.M., and the experiment was concluded at 12:09 P.M., when the Moon moved out of the
radar's range. The radio waves had taken about 2.5 seconds to travel from New Jersey to
the Moon and back, a distance of over 800,000 km. The experiment was repeated daily
over the next three days and on eight more days later that month.
The War Department withheld announcement of the success until the night of
24January 1946. By then, a press release explained, "the Signal Corps was certain beyond
doubt that the experiment was successful and that the results achieved were pain-staking-
ly [sic] verified. "21
As DeWitt recounted years later: "We had trouble with General Van Deusen our head
of R&D in Washington. When my C.O. Col. Victor Conrad told him about it over the tele-
phone the General did not want the story released until it was confirmed by outsiders for
fear it would embarrass the Sig[nal]. C[orps]." Two outsiders from the Radiation
Laboratory, George E. Valley, Jr. and Donald G. Fink, arrived and, with Gen. Van Deusen,
observed a moonrise test of the system carried out under the direction of King Stodola.
Nothing happened. DeWitt explained: "You can imagine that at this point I was dying.
Shortly, a big truck passed by on the road next to the equipment and immediately the
echoes popped up. I will always believe that one of the crystals was not oscillating until it
was shaken up or there was a loose connection which fixed itself. Everyone cheered
except the General who tried to look pleased. ''_2
Although he had had other motives for undertaking Project Diana, DeWitt had
received a directive from the Chief Signal Officer, the head of the Signal Corps, to devel-
op radars capable of detecting missiles coming from the Soviet Union. No missiles were
available for tests, so the Moon experiment stood in their place. Several years later, the
Signal Corps erected a new 50-ft (15-meter) Diana antenna and 108-MHz transmitter for
ionospheric research. It carried out further lunar echo studies and participated in the
tracking of Apollo launches. '23
The news also hit the popular press. The implications of the Signal Corps experi-
ment were grasped by the War Department, although Newsweek cynically cast doubt on the
War Department's predictions by calling them worthy of Jules Verne. Among those War
Department predictions were the accurate topographical mapping of the Moon and plan-
ets, measurement and analysis of the ionosphere, and radio control from Earth of "space
ships" and 'jet or rocket-controlled missiles, circling the Earth above the stratosphere."
Time reported that Diana might provide a test of Albert Einstein's Theory of Relativity. In
contrast to the typically up-beat mood of Life, both news magazines were skeptical, and
20. DeWitt replies to Clark questions, HL Diana 46 (04), HAUSACEC.
21. HL Radar 46 (07), HAUSACEC; Harold D. Webb, "Project Diana: Army Radar Contacis the Moon,"
Sky and TdescqOe 5 ( 1946): 3-6.
22. DeWitt to Clark, 18 December 1977, HL Diana 46 (04), HAUSACEC; Guerlac, RtMar in Wtrrld War
II, 1:380 and 382, 2:702.
23. DeWitt, telephone conversation, 14June 1993; Materials in folders HL Diana 46 (25), HL Diana 46
(28), and HL Diana 46 (33), USeI,_J. Research & Devel_g.qnent Summary vol. 5, no. 3 (10 February 1958): 58, in
"Signal Corps Engineering LaboratoryJournal/R&D Summary," and Monnuntth l_,le.g._age, 7 November 1963, n.p.,
in "Biographical Files," "Daniels, Fred Bryan," HAUSACEC; Daniels, "Radar Determination of the Scattering
Properties of the Moon," Nature 187 (1960) : 399; and idem., "A Theory of Radar Reflection from the Moon and
Plane ts, "J_nzrnal of (_¢rphy._ical Re.$earch 66 ( 1961 ) : 1781 - 1788.
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rightly so; yet all of the predictions made by the War Department, including the relativity
test, have come true in the manner of a Jules Verne novel. '24
Zoltfin Bay
Less than a month after DeWitt's initial experiment, a radar in Hungary replicated
his results. The Hungarian apparatus differed from that of DeWitt in one key respect; it
utilized a procedure, called integration, that was essential to the first attempt to bounce
radar waves off Venus and that later became a standard planetary radar technique. The
procedure's inventor was Hungarian physicist Zolt_n Bay.
Bay graduated with highest honors from Budapest University with a Ph.D. in physics
in 1926. Like many Hungarian physicists before him, Bay spent several years in Berlin on
scholarships, doing research at both the prestigious Physikalisch-Technische-Reichanstalt
and the Physikalisch-Chemisches-lnstitut of the University of Berlin. The results of his
research tour of Berlin earned Bay the Chair of Theoretical Physics at the University of
Szeged (Hungary), where he taught and conducted research on high intensity gas dis-
charges.
Bay left the University of Szeged when the United Incandescent Lamps and Electric
Company (Tungsram) invited him to head its industrial research laboratory in Budapest.
Tungsram was the third largest manufacturer of incandescent lamps, radio tubes, and
radio receivers in Europe and supplied a fifth of all radio tubes. As laboratory head,
Zolt,4n Bay oversaw the improvement of high-intensity gas discharge lamps, fluorescent
lamps, radio tubes, radio receiver circuitry, and decimeter radio wave techniques.25
Although Hungary sought to stay out of the war through diplomatic maneuvering,
the threat of a German invasion remained real. In the fall of 1942, the Hungarian Minister
of Defense asked Bay to organize an early-warning system. He achieved that goal, though
the Germans occupied Hungary anyway. In March 1944, Bay recommended using the
radar for scientific experimentation, including the detection of radar waves bounced off
the Moon. The scientific interest in the experiment arose from the opportunity to test the
theoretical notion that short wavelength radio waves could pass through the ionosphere
without considerable absorption or reflection. Bay's calculations, however, showed that
the equipment would be incapable of detecting the signals, since they would be signifi-
candy below the receiver's noise level.
The critical difference between the American and Hungarian apparatus was fre-
quency stability, which DeWitt achieved through crystal control in both the transmitter
and receiver. Without frequency stability, Bay had to find a means of accommodating the
frequency drifts of the transmitter and receiver and the resulting inferior signal-to-noise
ratio. He chose to boost the signal-to-noise ratio. His solution was both ingenious and far-
reaching in its impact.
Bay devised a process he called cumulation, which is known today as integration. His
integrating device consisted of ten coulometers, in which electric currents broke down a
watery solution and released hydrogen gas. The amount of gas released was directly
proportional to the quantity of electric current. The coulometers were connected to the
output of the radar receiver through a rotating switch. The radar echoes were expected
24. "Diana," 71me Vol. 47, no. 5 (4 February 1946): 84; "Radar Bounces Echo off the Moon to Throw
Light on Lunar Riddle," Newsweek vol. 27, no. 5 (4 February 1946) : 76-77; "Man Reaches Moon with Radar," Life
vol. 20, no. 5 (4 February 1946): 30.
25. Zolt_in Bay, Life i._ Stronger, trans. Margaret Blakey Hajdu (Budapest: Pfiski Publisher, 1991), pp. 5
and 17-18; Francis S. Wagner, Z_dtdn Bay, Atmnic Physiast: A Pioneer _![ Spat:e ]le_iear_h (Budapest: Akad6miai Kiad6,
1985), pp. 23-27, 29, 31-32; Wagner, Fifty Years in the Latn_rat_wy: A Survey o/the ICe,earth A ctivttie.i o/l'hy._i_q._t Zolt¢_n
Bay (Center Square, PA: Alpha Publications, 1977), p. 1.
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to return from the Moon in less than three seconds, so the rotating switch made a sweep
of the ten coulometers every three seconds. The release of hydrogen gas left a record of
both the echo signal and the receiver noise. As the number of signal echoes and sweeps
of the coulometers added up, the signal-to-noise ratio improved. By increasing the total
number of signal echoes, Bay believed that any signal could be raised above noise level
and made observable, regardless of its amplitude and the value of the signal-to-noise
ratio. 26 Because the signal echoes have a more-or-less fixed structure, and the noise varies
from pulse to pulse, echoes add up faster than noise.
Despite the conceptual breakthrough of the coulometer integrator, the construction
and testing of the apparatus remained to be carried out. The menace of air raids drove
the Tungsram research laboratory into the countryside in the fall of 1944. The subsequent
siege of Budapest twice interrupted the work of Bay and his team until March 1945. The
Ministry of Defense furnished Bay with war surplus parts for a 2.5-meter (120-MHz) radar
7
rig_ 2
Antenna built and used tq Zoltdn Bay to I._unte. radar echoe..s off the Me_m in
Felrruary anti May 1946. (C_urtesy of Mrs. Julia Bay)
manufactured by the
Standard Electrical Co., a
Hungarian subsidiary of ITT.
Work was again interrupted
when the laboratory was dis-
manded and all equipment,
including that for the lunar
radar experiment, was carried
off to the Soviet Union. For a
third time, construction of
entirely new equipment start-
ed in the workshops of the
Tungsram Research Laboratory,
beginning August 1945 and
ending January 1946.
Electrical disturbances
in the Tungsram plant were
so great that measurements
and tuning had to be done in
the late afternoon or at night.
The experiments were carried
out on 6 February and 8 May
1946 at night by a pair of
researchers. Without the
handicap of operating in a
war zone, Bay probably would
have beaten the Signal Corps
to the Moon, although he
could not have been aware of
DeWitt's experiment. More
importantly, though, he
invented the technique of
26. Bay, "Reflection of Microwaves from the Moon," Hungarica Acta Physica 1 (1947): 1-6; Bay, Life is
Stronger, pp. 20 & 29; Wagner, Zoltfin, pp. 39_0; Wagner, Fifty Years,pp. 1-2.
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long-timeintegrationgenerallyusedin radarastronomy.As the Americanradio
astronomersAlexG.SmithandThomasD.Carrwrotesomeyearslater:"Theadditional
tremendousincreaseinsensitivitynecessarytoobtainradarechoesfromVenushasbeen
attainedlargelythroughtheuseoflong-timeintegrationtechniquesfordetectingperi-
odicsignalsthatarefarbelowthebackgroundoiselevel.Theuniquemethodevisedby
Bayinhispioneerlunaradarinvestigationsisanexampleofsuchatechnique."27
BothZolt_nBayandJohnDeWitthadfiredshotsheardroundtheworld,butthere
wasnorevolution,althoughotherseitherproposedorattemptedlunaradarexperiments
in theyearsimmediatelyfollowingWorldWarII. Eachmanengagedin otherprojects
shordyaftercompletinghisexperiment.BayleftHungaryfortheUnitedStates,wherehe
taughtat GeorgeWashingtonUniversityandworkedfor the NationalBureauofStandards,whileDeWittre-enteredradiobroadcastingandpursuedhisinterestinastron-
omy. 28
As an ongoing scientific activity, radar astronomy did not begin with the spectacular
and singular experiments of DeWitt and Bay, but with an interest in meteors shared by
researchers in Britain, Canada, and the United States. Big Science, that is, ionospheric
physics and secure military communications, largely motivated that research. Moreover,
just as the availability of captured V-2 parts made possible rocket-based ionospheric
research after the war, 29 so war-surplus radars facilitated the emergence of radar astrono-
my. Like the exploration of the ionosphere with rockets, radar astronomy was driven by
the availability of technology.
Meteors and Auroras
Radar meteor studies, like much of radar history, grew out of ionospheric research.
In the 1930s, ionospheric researchers became interested in meteors when it was hypothe-
sized that the trail of electrons and ions left behind by falling meteors caused fluctuations
in the density of the ionosphere, s° Edward Appleton and others with the Radio Research
Board of the British Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, the same organi-
zation with which Watson-Watt had been associated, used war-surplus radar furnished by
27. Smith and Carr, Radio Exploration of the Planetary System (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1964), p. 123;
Bay, "Reflection," pp. 2, 7-15 and 18-19; P. Vajda andJ.A. White, "Thirtieth Anniversary of Zolt_n Bay's Pioneer
Lunar Radar Investigations and Modern Radar Astronomy," Acta Physica Academia* Scientiarum Hungaricae 40
(1976): 65--70; Wagner, Zo/t,ln, pp. 40--41. Bay, Life is Stronger,pp. 103--124, describes the looting and dismantling
of the Tungsram works by armed agents of the Soviet Union.
28. DeWitt, telephone conversation, 14 June 1993; DeWitt biographical sketch, HL Diana 46 (04),
HAUSACEC; Wagner, Zo/ttin, p. 49; Wagner, Fifty Years,p. 2.
Among the others were Thomas Gold, Von Eshleman, and A.C. Bernard Lovell. Gold, retired Cornell
University professor of astronomy, claims to have proposed a lunar radar experiment to the British Admiralty
during World War lI; Eshleman, Stanford University professor of electrical engineering, unsuccessfully attempt-
ed a lunar radar experiment aboard the U.S.S. Missouri in 1946, while returning from the war; and Lovell pro-
posed a lunar bounce experiment in a paper of May 1946. Gold 14 December 1993, Eshleman 9 May 1994, and
Lovell, "Astronomer by Chance" manuscript, February 1988, Lovell materials, p. 183.
Even earlier, during the 1920s, the Navy unsuccessfully attempted to bounce a 32-KHz, 500-watt radio sig-
nal offthe Moon. A. Hoyt Taylor, Radio Remmisctnces: A Ha_Century (Washington: NRL, 1948), p. 133. I am grate-
ful to Louis Brown for pointing out this reference.
29. See DeVorkin, passim.
30. A.M. Skellett, "The Effect of Meteors on Radio Transmission through the Kennelly-Heaviside Layer,"
Physical Review 37 (1931 ): 1668; Skellett, "The Ionizing Effect of Meteors," Procetdings of the Institute of Radio
Eng/neers 23 (1935): 132-149. Skellett was a part-time graduate student in astronomy at Princeton University and
an employee of Bell Telephone Laboratories, New York City. The research described in this article came out of
a study of the American Telegraph and Telephone Company transatlantic short-wave telephone circuits in
1930-1932, and how they were affected by meteor ionization. DeVorkin, p. 275.
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theAir MinistrytostudymeteorsimmediatelyafterWorldWarII. Theyconcludedthat
meteorscausedabnormalburstsofionizationastheypassedthroughtheionosphere,sl
Duringthewar,themilitaryhadinvestigatedmeteortrailswithradar.Whenthe
GermansstartedbombardingLondonwithV2rockets,theArmy'sgun-layingradarswere
hastilypressedintoservicetodetecttheradareflectionsfromtherocketsduringtheir
flightinordertogivesomewarningof theirarrival.In manycasesalarmsweresounded,
butnorocketswerealoft.JamesS.Hey,aphysicistwiththeOperationalResearchGroup,
waschargedwithinvestigatingthesemistakensightings.Hebelievedthatthefalsechoes
probablyoriginatedintheionosphereandmightbeassociatedwithmeteors.
HeybeganstudyingtheimpactofmeteorsontheionosphereinOctober1944,using
Armyradarequipmentat severallocationsuntil theendof thewar.TheOperational
ResearchGroup,Hey,G.S.Stewart(electricalengineer),S.J.Parsons(electricalnd
mechanicalengineer),andJ.w. Phillips(mathematician),foundacorrelationbetween
visualsightingsandradarechoesduringtheGiacobinidmeteorshowerofOctober1946.
Moreover,byusinganimprovedphotographictechniquethatbettercapturedtheechoes
ontheradarscreen,theywereabletodeterminethevelocityofthemeteors.
NeitherHeynorAppletonpursuedtheirradarinvestigationsof meteors. During the
war, Hey had detected radio emissions from the Sun and the first discrete source of radio
emission outside the solar system in the direction of Cygnus. He left the Operational
Research Group for the Royal Radar Establishment at Malvern, where he and his col-
leagues carried on research in radio astronomy. Appleton, by 1946 a Nobel Laureate and
Secretary of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, also became thor-
oughly involved in the development of radio astronomy and became a member of the
Radio Astronomy Committee of the Royal Astronomical Society in 1949. 32
Radar astronomy, however, did gain a foothold in Britain at the University of
Manchester under A. C. (later Sir) Bernard Lovell, director of the University's Jodreil
Bank Experimental Station. During the war, Lovell had been one of many scientists work-
ing on microwave radar. 33 His superior, the head of the Physics Department, was Patrick
M. S. Blackett, a member of the Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defence that
approved Watson-Wart's radar memorandum. With the help of Hey and Parsons, Lovell
borrowed some Army radar equipment. Finding too much interference in Manchester, he
moved to the University's botanical research gardens, which became the Jodrell Bank
Experimental Station. Lovell equipped the station with complete war-surplus radar sys-
tems, such as a 4.2-meter gun-laying radar and a mobile Park Royal radar. He purchased
at rock-bottom prices or borrowed the radars from the Air Ministry, Army, and Navy,
which were discarding the equipment down mine shafts.
31. Appleton and R. Naismith, 'The Radio Detection of Meteor Trails and Allied Phenomena,"
pr_._dings of the Phy._icalSoc/ety 59 (1947): 461-473; James S. Hey and G.S. Stewart, "Radar Observations of
Meteors," Proc_dings of the Physical ,_ociety59 (1947): 858; Loven, Mete_orAstronomy (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1954), pp. 23-24.
32. Hey, TheEvolution ofRadio Astronomy (New York: Science History Publications, 1973), pp. 19-23 and
33-34; Lovell, The Story of JodreU Bank (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 5; Hey, Stewart, and S.J.
Parsons, "Radar Observations of the Giacobinid Meteor Shower," Monthly Noticesof the Royal Astronomical Society
107 (1947): 176-183; Hey and Stewart, "Radar Observations of Meteors," Proc_._ings of the Physical SocieZy59
(1947): 858-860 and 881--882; Hey, The Radio Universe (New York: Pergamon Press, 1971), pp. !31-134; Lovell,
Me,or Astronomy, pp. 28-29 and 50-52; Peter Robertson, Beyond Southern Skies: Radio Astronomy and the Parkes
Telescope (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 39; Dudley Saward, Bernard l_ve.U, a Biograph_
(London: Robert Hale, 1984), pp. 142-145; David O. Edge and Michael J. Mulkay, Astronomy Transformed: The
Emergenae of ReMioAstronomy in Britain (New York: Wiley, 1976), pp. 12-14. For a brief historical overview of the
Royal Radar Establishment, see Ernest H. Putley, "History of the RSRE,"R_RE Research Rev/ew 9 (1985): 165-174;
and D.H. Tomin, 1"he RSRE: A Brief History from Earliest Times to Present Day,"lEE/_-v/ew 34 ( 1988): 403-407.
This major applied sciene institution deserves a more rigorously researched history.
33. See Lovell, Echoe._of War: The Story of H2S R_utar (Bristol: Adam Hilger, 1991). Lovell's wartime
records are stored at the Imperial War Museum, Lambeth Road, London.
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¥/g_3
The JodreU Bank staff 1951 in front of the 4.2-meter searchlight aerml used in some. meteor radar experiments. Sir Bernard
Lovell is in the center front. (C_ntrtesy of the Director of the Nuffield Radio Astronomy Laboratories, JodreU Bank.)
Originally, Lovell wanted to undertake research on cosmic rays, which had been
Blackett's interest, too. One of the primary research objectives of the Jodrell Bank facility,
as well as one of the fundamental reasons for its founding, was cosmic ray research. Indeed,
the interest in cosmic ray research also lay behind the design and construction of the
76-meter (250-ft)Jodrell Bank telescope. The search for cosmic rays never succeeded, how-
ever; Blackett and Lovell had introduced a significant error into their initial calculations.
Fortuitously, though, in the course of looking for cosmic rays, Lovell came to realize
that they were receiving echoes from meteor ionization trails, and his small group of
Jodrell Bank investigators began to concentrate on this more fertile line of research.
Nicolai Herlofson, a Norwegian meteorologist who had recently joined the Department
of Physics, put Lovell in contact with the director of the Meteor Section of the British
Astronomical Association, J. p. Manning Prentice, a lawyer and amateur astronomer with
a passion for meteors. Also joining the Jodrell Bank team was John A. Clegg, a physics
teacher whom Lovell had known during the war. Clegg was a doctoral candidate at the
University of Manchester and an expert in antenna design. He remained at Jodrell Bank
until 1951 and eventually landed a position teaching physics in Nigeria. Clegg converted
an Army searchlight into a radar antenna for studying meteors.34
34. Lovell 11 January 1994; Lovell, JodreU Bank, pp. 5-8, 10; Lovell, Meteor Astronomy, pp. 55-63; Edge
and Mulkay, pp. 15-16; Saward, pp. 129-131; R.H. Brown and Lovell, "Large Radio Telescopes and their Use in
Radio Astronomy," Vistas in Astronomy 1 (1955): 542-560; Blackett and Lovell, "Radio Echoes and Cosmic Ray
Showers," Proceedings of the Royal Society of London ser. A, vol. 177 (1941): 185-186; and Lovell, "The Blackett-
Eckersley-Lovell Correspondence of World War II and the Origin of Jodrell Bank," Notes and Records of the Royal
Society of London 47 ( 1993): 119-131. For documents relating to equipment on loan from the Ministry of Aviation,
the War Office, the Royal Radar Establishment, the Admiralty, and the Air Ministry as late as the 1960s, see
10/51, "Accounts,"JBA.
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The small group of professional and amateur scientists began radar observations of
the Perseid meteor showers in late July and August 1946. When Prentice spotted a mete-
or, he shouted. His sightings usually, though not always, correlated with an echo on the
radar screen. Lovell thought that the radar echoes that did not correlate with Prentice's
sightings might have been ionization trails created by cosmic ray showers. He did not
believe, initially, that the radar might be detecting meteors too small to be seen by the
human eye.
The next opportunity for a radar study of meteors came on the night of 9 October
1946, when the Earth crossed the orbit of the Giacobini-Zinner comet. Astronomers antic-
ipated a spectacular meteor shower. A motion picture camera captured the radar echoes
on film. The shower peaked around 3 A.M.; a radar echo rate of nearly a thousand mete-
ors per hour was recorded. Lovell recalled that "the spectacle was memorable. It was like
a great array of rockets coming towards one. ''s_
The dramatic correlation of the echo rate with the meteors visible in the sky finally
convinced Lovell and everyone else that the radar echoes came from meteor ionization
trails, although it was equally obvious that many peculiarities needed to be investigated.
TheJodrell Bank researchers learned that the best results were obtained when the aerial
was positioned at a right angle to the radiant, the point in the sky from which meteor
showers appear to emanate. When the aerial was pointed at the radiant, the echoes on the
cathode-ray tube disappeared almost completely.S6
Next joining the Jodrell Bank meteor group, in December 1946, was a doctoral
student fi-om New Zealand, Clifton D. Ellyett, followed in January 1947 by a Cambridge
graduate,John G. Davies. Nicolai Herlofson developed a model of meteor trail ionization
that Davies and Ellyett used to calculate meteor velocities based on the diffraction pattern
produced during the formation of meteor trails. Clegg devised a radar technique for
determining their radiant. 37
At this point, theJodrell Bank investigators had powerful radar techniques for study-
ing meteors that were unavailable elsewhere, particularly the ability to detect and study
previously unknown and unobservable daytime meteor showers. Lovell and his colleagues
now became aware of the dispute over the nature of meteors and decided to attempt its
resolution with these techniques. 38
Astronomers specializing in meteors were concerned with the nature of sporadic
meteors. One type of meteor enters the atmosphere from what appears to be a single
point, the radiant. Most meteors, however, are not part of a shower, but appear to arrive
irregularly from all directions and are called sporadic meteors. Most astronomers believed
that sporadic meteors came from interstellar space; others argued that they were part of
the solar system.
The debate could be resolved by determining the paths of sporadic meteors. If they
followed parabolic or elliptical paths, they orbited the Sun; if their orbit were hyperbolic,
they had an interstellar origin. The paths of sporadic meteors could be determined by an
accurate measurement of both their velocities and radiants, but optical means were insuf-
ficiently precise to give unambiguous results. Fred L. Whipple, future director of the
35. Lovell 11 January 1994; Lovell, Jodrell Bank, pp. 7-8, 10.
36. Lovell 11 January 1994; LovelI,JrulreUI3ank, pp. 8-10; Lovell, Clegg, and Congreve J. Banwen, "Radio
Echo Observalions of the Giacobinid Meteors 1946," Monthly Notices q[ the Royal Astronomical ,_ciety 107 (1947):
164-175. Banwel] was a New Zealand veteran of the Telecommunications Research Establishment wartime radar
effort and an expert on receiver electronics.
37. Saward, p. 137; Herlofson, "The Theory of Meteor Ionization," ICa_lmrLs on ProgTe._s in Physics 11
( 1946-47): 444-454; EIlyett and Davies, "Velocity of Meteors Measured by Diffraction of Radio Waves from Trails
during Formation," Nature 161 (1948): 596-597; Clegg, "Determination of Meteor Radiants by Observation of
Radio Echoes from Meteor Trails," Philo.srq_hical Magazine ser. 7, vol. 39 (1948) : 577-594; Davies and Lovell, "Radio
Echo Studies of Meteors," Vistas in Astronomy I (1955) : 585-598, provides a summary of meteor research atJodrell
Bank.
38. LovelI,J_Mrell Bank, p. 12; Lovell, Meteor A_tronomy, pp. 358--383.
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Harvard College Observatory, a leading center of United States meteor research, attempt-
ed state-of-the-art optical studies of meteors with the Super Schmidt camera, but the first
one was not operational until May 1951, at Las Cruces, New MexicoA9
Radar astronomers thus attempted to accomplish what optical methods had failed to
achieve. Such has been the pattern of radar astronomy to the present. Between 1948 and
1950, Lovell, Davies, and Mary Almond, a doctoral student, undertook a long series of spo-
radic meteor velocity measurements. They found no evidence for a significant hyperbolic
velocity component; that is, there was no evidence for sporadic meteors coming from
interstellar space. They then extended their work to fainter and smaller meteors with sim-
ilar results.
The Jodrell Bank radar meteor studies determined unambiguously that meteors
form part of the solar system. As Whipple declared in 1955, "We may now accept as proven
the fact that bodies moving in hyperbolic orbits about the sun play no important role in
producing meteoric phenomena brighter than about the 8th effective magnitude."40
Astronomers describe the brightness of a body in terms of magnitude; the larger the mag-
nitnde, the fainter the body.
The highly convincing evidence of the Jodrell Bank scientists was corroborated by
Canadian radar research carried out by researchers of the Radio and Electrical
Engineering Division of the National Research Council under Donald W. R. McKinley.
McKinley had joined the Council's Radio Section (later Branch) before World War II and,
like Lovell, had participated actively in wartime radar work.
McKinley conducted his meteor research with radars built around Ottawa in 1947
and 1948 as part of various National Research Council laboratories, such as the Flight
Research Center at Arnprior Airport. Earle L. R. Wehb, Radio and Electrical Engineering
Division of the National Research Council, supervised the design, construction, and oper-
ation of the radar equipment. From as early as the summer of 1947, the Canadian radar
studies were undertaken jointly with Peter M. Millman of the Dominion Observatory.
They coordinated spectrographic, photographic, radar, and visual observations. The
National Research Council investigators employed the Jodrell Bank technique to deter-
mine meteor velocities, a benefit of following in the footsteps of the British. 41
Their first radar observations took place during the Perseid shower of August 1947,
as the first radar station reached completion. Later studies collected data from the
Geminid shower of December 1947 and the Lyrid shower of April 1948, with more radar
stations brought into play as they became available. Following the success of Jodrell Bank,
39. Ron Doel, "Unpacking a Myth: Interdisciplinary Research and the Growth of Solar System
Astronomy, 1920-1958," Ph.D. diss. Princeton University, 1990, pp. 33-35, 42--44 and 108-111; DeVorkin, pp. 96,
273, 278 and 293; Luigi G. Jacchia and Whipple, "I'he Harvard Photographic Meteor Programme," Via_ in
Astronomy 2 (1956): 982-994; Whipple, "Meteors and the Earth's Upper Atmosphere," Reviews of Modern Physic_
15 (1943): 246-264; Whipple, "The Baker Super-Schmidt Meteor Cameras," TheAstronomical Journal 56 (1951):
144-145, states that the first such camera was installed in New Mexico in May 1951. Determining the origin of
meteors was not the primary interest of Harvard research.
40. Whipple, "Some Problems of Meteor Astronomy," in H. C. Van de Hulst, ed., Rad/o Astronomy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 376; Almond, Davies, and Lovell, "The Velocity Distribution
of Sporadic Meteors, _ Monthly Noticesof the Royal Astronom_calSociay 111 (1951): 585-608; 112 (1952): 21-39; 113
(1953): 411-427. The meteor studies at Jodrell Bank were continued into later years. See, for instance, I. C.
Browne and T. R. Kaiser, "The Radio Echo from the Head of Meteor Trails,"Journal of Atmospheric and Terr_trial
Physic4 (1953): 1-4.
41. W.E. Knowles Middleton, Radar Development in Canada: The.Radio Branch of the National Re.tearch
Council O[ Canada, 1939-1946 (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1981), pp. 18, 25, 27,
106-109; Millman and McKinley, "A Note on Four Complex Meteor Radar Echoes, _ Journal of the Royal
Astronomical Societyof Canada 42 (1948): 122; McKinley and Millman, "A Phenomenological Theory of Radar
Echoes from Meteors," Proceedingsof the.Imtitute of Radio Enginee_ 37 (1949): 364-375; McKinley and Millman,
_Determination of the Elements of Meteor Paths from Radar Observations, _ Canadian Journal of ResearchA27
(1949): 53-67; McKinley, _Deceleration and Ionizing Efficiency of Radar Meteors," Journal of Applied Physics 22
(1951): 203; McKinley, Me,or Scurnce.and Engineering (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), p. 20; Lovell, Meteor
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McKinley's group initiated their own study of sporadic meteors. By 1951, with data on
10,933 sporadic meteors, McKinley's group reached the same conclusion as their British
colleagues: meteors were part of the solar system. Soon, radar techniques became an inte-
gral part of Canadian meteor research with the establishment in 1957 of the National
Research Council Springhill Meteor Observatory outside Ottawa. The Observatory con-
centrated on scientific meteor research with radar, visual, photographic, and spectro-
scopic methods. 42
These meteor studies at Jodrell Bank and the National Research Council, and only
at those institutions, arose from the union of radar and astronomy; they were the begin-
nings of radar astronomy. Radar studies of meteors were not limited to Jodrell Bank and
the National Research Council, however. With support from the National Bureau of
Standards, in 1957 Harvard College Observatory initiated a radar meteor project under
the direction of Fred Whipple. Furthermore, radar continues today as an integral and vital
part of worldwide meteor research. Its forte is the ability to determine orbits better than
any other technique. In the last five years, a number of recently built radars have studied
meteors in Britain (MST Radar, Aberytswyth, Wales), New Zealand (AMOR, Meteor Orbit
Radar, Christchurch), and Japan (MU Radar, Shigaraki), not to mention earlier work in
Czechoslovakia and Sweden. 43
Unlike theJodrell Bank and National Research Council cases, the radar meteor stud-
ies started in the United States in the early 1950s were driven by civilian scientists doing
ionospheric and communications research and by the military's desire for jam-proof,
point-to-point secure communications. While various military laboratories undertook
their own research programs, most of the civilian U.S. radar meteor research was carried
out at Stanford University and the National Bureau of Standards, where investigators fruit-
fully cross-fertilized ionospheric and military communications research. The Stanford
case is worth examining not only for its later connections to radar astronomy, but also for
its pioneering radar study of the Sun that arose out of an interest in ionospheric and radio
propagation research.
In contrast to the Stanford work, many radar meteor experiments carried out in the
United States in the 1940s were unique events. As early as August and November 1944, for
instance, workers in the Federal Communications Commission Engineering Department
associated visual observations of meteors and radio bursts. In January 1946, Oliver Perry
Ferrell of the Signal Corps reported using a Signal Corps SCR-270B radar to detect mete-
or ionization trails. 44 The major radar meteor event in the United States and elsewhere,
42. Millman, McKinley, and M. S. Burland, _Gombined Radar, Photographic, and Visual Observations
of the 1947 Perseid Meteor Shower," Nature 161 (1948) : 278-280; McKinley and MiUman, "Determination of the
Elements," p. 54; Millman and McKinley, "A Note," pp. 121-130; McKinley, "Meteor Velocities Determined by
Radio Observations," The AstrophysicsJournal 113 (1951): 225-267; E R. Park, "An Observatory for the Study of
Meteors," Englnee_ngJournat 41 (1958) :68-70.
43. Whipple, "Recent Harvard-Smithsonian Meteoric Results," Tmnsact/ons of the IAU 10 (1960):
345-350; Jack W. Baggaley and Andrew D. Taylor, "Radar Meteor Orbital Structure of Southern Hemisphere
Cometary Dust Streams," pp. 33-36 in Alan W. Harris and Edward Boweli, eds., Asteroids, Comets, Meteom 1991
(Houston: Lunar and Planetary Institute, 1992); Baggaley, Duncan I. Steel, and Taylor, "ASouthern Hemisphere
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MST Radar," pp. 281-284 in ibidem; Jun-ichi Wattanabe, Tsuko Nakamura, T. Tsuda, M. Tsutsumi, A. Miyashita,
and M. Yoshikawa, _Meteor Mapping with MU Radar," pp. 625-627 in ibidem. The MST Radar and the AMOR
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For the meteor radar research in Sweden and Czechoslovakia, see B. A. lindblad and M. Simek,
_Structure and Activity of Perseid Meteor Stream from Radar Observations, 1956-1978," pp. 431-434 in Claes-
Ingva Lagerkvist and Hans Rickman, eds., Asteroids, Comets, Meteors (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 1983); A.
Hajduk and G. Cevolani, Wariations in Radar Reflections from Meteor Trains and Physical Properties of
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(Uppsala: Uppsala University, 1989); Simek and Lindblad, "The Activity Curve of the Perseid Meteor Stream as
Determined from Short Duration Meteor Radar Echoes," pp. 567-570 in ibidem.
44. Ferrell, "Meteoric Impact Ionization Obse/'ved on Radar Oscilloscopes," Physical Review 2d ser., vol.
69 (1946): 32-33; Lovell, MeteorAstronomy, p. 28.
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however,wasthespectacularmeteorshowerassociatedwiththeGiacobini-Zinnercomet.
Onthenightof9October1946,21Armyradarswereaimedtowardtheskyinorder
toobserveanyunusualphenomena.TheSignalCorpsorganizedtheexperiment,which
fit nicelywiththeirmissionofdevelopingmissiledetectionandrangingcapabilities.The
equipmentwasoperatedbyvolunteercrewsof theArmygroundforces,theArmyAir
Forces,andtheSignalCorpslocatedacrossthecountryinIdaho,NewMexico,Texas,and
NewJersey.Formainlymeteorologicalreasons,onlytheSignalCorpsSCR-270radarsuc-
cessfullydetectedmeteorionizationtrails.Noattemptwasmadetocorrelatevisualobser-
vationsandradarechoes.A PrincetonUniversityundergraduate,FrancisB.Shaffer,who
hadreceivedradartrainingin theNavy,analyzedphotographsoftheradarscreenechoes
attheSignalCorpslaboratoryinBelmar,NewJersey.
Thiswasthefirstattempttoutilizemicrowaveradarstodetectastronomicalobjects.
Theequipmentoperatedat1,200MHz(25cm),3,000MHz(10cm),and10,000MHz(3
cm),frequenciesin theL,S,andXradarbandsthatradarastronomylaterused."Onthe
basisof thisnight'sexperiments,"theSignalCorpsexperimentersdecided,"wecannot
concludethatmicrowaveradarsdonotdetectmeteor-formedionclouds."45
In contrastto theSignalCorpsexperiment,radarmeteorstudiesformedpartof
ongoingresearchat theNationalBureauof Standards.OrganizedfromtheBureau's
RadioSectionin May1946and locatedat Sterling,Virginia,the CentralRadio
PropagationLaboratory(CRPL)divisionhadthreelaboratories,oneofwhichconcerned
itselfexclusivelywithionosphericesearchandradiopropagationa dwasespeciallyinter-
estedin theimpactofmeteorsontheionosphere.InOctober1946,VictorC.Pineoand
othersassociatedwiththeCRPLuseda borrowedSCR-270-DSignalCorpsradarto
observetheGiacobinidmeteorshower.Overthenextfiveyears,Pineocontinuedresearch
ontheeffectsofmeteorsontheionosphere,usingastandardionosphericesearchinstru-
mentcalledanionosondeandpublishinghisresultsin Science.
Pineo's interest was in ionospheric physics, not astronomy. Underwriting his
research at the Ionospheric Research Section of the National Bureau of Standards was the
Air Force Cambridge Research Center (known later as the Cambridge Research
Laboratories and today as Phillips Laboratory). His meteor work did not contribute to
knowledge about the origin of meteors, as such work had in Britain and Canada, but it
supported efforts to create secure military communications using meteor ionization
trails. 46 Also, it related to similar research being carried out concurrently at Stanford
University.
The 1946 CRPL experiment, in fact, had been suggested by Robert A. Helliwell of
the Stanford Radio Propagation Laboratory (SRPL). Frederick E. Terman, who had head-
ed the Harvard Radio Research Laboratory and its radar countermeasures research dur-
ing the war, "virtually organized radio and electronic engineering on the West Coast" as
45. Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, "Postwar Research and Development Program of the Signal
Corps Engineering Laboratories, 1945," (Signal Corps, 1945), UPostwar R&D Program." HL R&D, HAUSACEC;
John Q. Stewart, Michael Ference, John J. Slattery, Harold A. Zahl, URadar Observations of the Draconids," Sky
and 7_./escope6 (March 1947): 35. They reported their earlier results in a paper, "Radar Observations of the
Giacobinid Meteors," read before the December 1946 meeting of the American Astronomical Society in Boston.
HL Diana 46 (26), HAUSACEC.
46. Wilbert E Snyder and Charles L. Bragaw, Achievement in Radia: Xeventy Years of Radio ,Science,
Technology,Statubzrds, and Meoaatrementat the National Bureau of Starulards (Boulder: National Bureau of Standards,
1986), pp. 461-465; Ross Bateman, A. G. McNish, and Pineo, "Radar Observations during Meteor Showers, 9
October 1946," Scumce104 (1946): 434-435; Pineo, "Relation of Sporadic E Reflection and Meteoric Ionization,"
Sc/ence 110 (1949): 280-283; Pineo, "A Comparison of Meteor Activity with Occurrence of Sporadic-E
Reflections," Sc/ence 112 (1950): 5051; Pineo and T. N. Gautier, "The Wave-Frequency Dependence of the
Duration of Radar-Type Echoes from Meteor Trails," SciencL114 (1951): 460--462. Other articles by Pineo on his
ionospheric research can be found in Laurence A. Manning, Bibliography of the Ionosphere: An Annota_.d Survey
thrtmgh 1960 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 421-423.
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StanfordDeanofEngineering,accordingtohistorianC.StewartGillmor.Termanego-
tiateda contractwiththethreemilitaryservicesfor thefundingof a broadrangeof
research,includingtheSRPL'slong-standingionosphericresearchprogram.47
Helliwell,whosecareerwasbuiltonionosphericesearch,wasjoinedattheSRPLby
OswaldG.Villard,Jr.Villardhadearnedhisengineeringdegreeduringthewarforthe
designof an ionospheresounder.As an amateuradiooperatorin Cambridge,
Massachusetts,hehadnotedtheinterferencecausedbymeteorionizationsatshortwave
frequenciescalledDopplerwhistles.4s
In October1946,duringtheGiacobinidmeteorshower,Helliwell,Villard,Laurence
A.Manning,andW.E.Evans,Jr.,detectedmeteoriontrailsbylisteningforDopplerwhis-
tleswithradiosoperatingat15MHz(20meters)and29MHz(10meters).Manningthen
developedamethodofmeasuringmeteorvelocitiesusingtheDopplerfrequencyshiftof
acontinuous-wavesignalreflectedfromtheionizationtrail.Manning,Villard,andAllen
M.PetersonthenappliedManning'stechniquetoacontinuous-waveradiostudyofthe
PerseidmeteorshowerinAugust1948.TheinitialStanfordtechniquewassignificantly
differentfromthatdevelopedatJodrellBank;it reliedoncontinuous-waveradio,rather
thanpulsedradar,echoes.49OneofthoseconductingmeteorstudiesatStanfordwasVonR.Eshleman,agradu-
atestudentinelectricalengineeringwhoworkedunderbothManningandVillard.While
servingin theNavyduringWorldWarII,Eshlemanhadstudied,thentaught,radaratthe
Navy'sradarelectronicsschoolinWashington,DC.In 1946,whilereturningfromthewar
ontheU.S.S.Missouri,Eshlemanunsuccessfullyattemptedtobounceradarwavesoff the
Moonusingtheship'sradar.Supportforhisgraduater searchatStanfordcamethrough
contractsbetweentheUniversityandboththeOfficeofNavalResearchandtheAirForce.
Eshleman'sdissertationconsideredthetheoryofdetectingmeteorionizationtrails
anditsapplicationi actualexperiments.UnliketheBritishandCanadianmeteorstud-
ies,theprimaryresearchinterestofEshleman,Manning,Villard,andtheotherStanford
investigatorswasinformationabouthewindsandturbulencein theupperatmosphere.
Theirinvestigationsofmeteorvelocities,thelengthofionizedmeteortrails,andthefad-
ingandpolarizationof meteorechoeswerepartof thatlargeresearchinterest,while
Eshleman'sdissertationwasanintegralpartofthemeteorresearchprogram.
Eshlemanalsoconsideredtheuseofmeteorionizationtrailsforsecuremilitarycom-
munications.Hisdissertationdidnotexplicitlystatethatapplication,whichhetookup
aftercompletingthethesis.TheAirForcesupportedtheStanfordmeteorresearchmain-
lytousemeteorionizationtrailsforsecure,point-to-pointcommunications.TheStanford
meteorresearcht usservedavarietyofscientificandmilitarypurposessimultaneously,s°
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The meteor research carried out at Stanford had nontriviat consequences.
Eshleman's dissertation has continued to provide the theoretical foundation of modern
meteor burst communications, a communication mode that promises to function even
after a nuclear holocaust has rendered useless all normal wireless communications. The
pioneering work at Stanford, the National Bureau of Standards, and the Air Force
Cambridge Research Laboratories received new attention in the 1980s, when the Space
Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") revitalized interest in using meteor ionization trails for
classified communications. Non-military applications of meteor burst communications
also have arisen in recent years, sl
Early meteor burst communications research was not limited to Stanford and the
National Bureau of Standards. American military funding of early meteor burst commu-
nications research extended beyond its shores to Britain. Historians of Jodrell Bank radio
astronomy and meteor radar research stated that radio astronomy had surpassed meteor
studies at the observatory by 1955. However, that meteor work persisted until 1964
through a contract with the U.S. Air Force, though as a cover for classified military
research.52
Auroras provided additional radar targets in the 1950s. A major initiator of radar
auroral studies was Jodrell Bank. As early as August 1947, while conducting meteor
research, the Jodrell Bank scientists I__vell, Clegg, and Ellyett received echoes from an
aurora display. Arnold Aspinall and G. S. Hawkins then continued the radar auroral stud-
ies at Jodrell Bank in collaboration with W. B. Housman, Director of the Aurora Section
of the British Astronomy Association, and the aurora observers of that Section. In Canada,
McKinley and Millman also observed an aurora during their meteor research in April
1948. ss
The problem with bouncing radar waves off an aurora was determining the reflect-
ing point. Researchers in the University of Saskatchewan Physics Department (B. W.
Currie, P. A. Forsyth, and E E. Vawter) initiated a systematic study of auroral radar reflec-
tions in 1948, with funding from the Defense Research Board of Canada. Radar equip-
ment was lent by the U.S. Air Force Cambridge Research Center and modified by the
Radio and Electrical Engineering Division of the National Research Council. Forsyth had
completed a dissertation on auroras at McGill University and was an employee of the
Defense Research Board's Telecommunications Establishment on loan to the University
of Saskatchewan for the project. The Saskatchewan researchers discovered that the echoes
bounced off small, intensely ionized regions in the aurora. 54
Other aurora researchers, especially in Sweden and Norway, took up radar studies.
In Sweden, Gttha Hellgren and Johan Meos of the Chalmers University of Technology
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Research Laboratory of Electronics in Gothenburg decided to conduct radar studies of
auroras as part of their ionospheric research program. Beginning in May 1951, the Radio
Wave Propagation Laboratory of the Kiruna Geophysical Observatory undertook round-
the-clock observations of auroras with a 30.3-MHz (10-meter) radar. In Norway, Leiv
Harang, who had observed radar echoes from an aurora as early as 1940, and B.
Landmark observed auroras with radars lent by the Norwegian Defense Research
Establishment and installed at Oslo (Kjeller) and Troms6, where a permanent center for
radar investigation of auroras was created later. _5
These and subsequent radar investigations changed the way scientists studied auro-
ras, which had been almost entirely by visual means up to about 1950. Permanent auroral
observatories located at high latitudes, such as those at Oslo and Troms6 in Norway, at
Kiruna in Sweden, and at Saskatoon in Saskatchewan, integrated radar into a spectrum of
research instruments that included spectroscopy, photography, balloons, and sounding
rockets. The International Geophysical Year, 1957-1958, was appropriately timed to fur-
ther radar auroral research; it coincided with extremely high sunspot and auroral activity,
such as the displays visible from Mexico in September 1957 and the "Great Red Aurora"
of 10 February 1958. Among those participating in the radar aurora and meteor studies
associated with the International Geophysical Year activities were three Jodrell Bank stu-
dents and staff who joined the Royal Society expedition to Halley Bay, Antarctica. 56
To the Moon Again
The auroral and meteor radar studies carried out in the wake of the lunar radar
experiments of DeWitt and Bay were, in essence, ionospheric studies. While the causes of
auroras and meteor ionization trails arise outside the Earth's atmosphere, the phenome-
na themselves are essentially ionospheric. AtJodrell Bank, meteor and auroral studies pro-
vided the initial impetus, but certainly not the sustaining force, for the creation of an
ongoing radar astronomy program. That sustaining force came from lunar studies.
However, like so much of early radar astronomy, those lunar studies were never far from
ionospheric research. Indeed, the trailblazing efforts of DeWitt and Bay opened up new
vistas of ionospheric and communications research using radar echoes from the Moon.
Historically, scientists had been limited to the underside and lower portion of the
ionosphere. The discovery of "cosmic noise" by Bell Telephone researcher KarlJansky in
1932 suggested that higher frequencies could penetrate the ionosphere. The experiments
of DeWitt and Bay suggested radar as a means of penetrating the lower regions of the
ionosphere. DeWitt, moreover, had observed unexpected fluctuations in signal strength
that lasted several minutes, which he attributed to anomalous ionospheric refraction. 57
His observations invited further investigation of the question.
The search for a better explanation of those fluctuations was taken up by a group of
ionosphericists in the Division of Radiophysics of the Australian Council for Scientific and
Industrial Research: FrankJ. Kerr, C. Alex Shain, and Charles S. Higgins. In 1946, Kerr
and Shain explored the possibility of obtaining radar echoes from meteors, following the
55. Hellgren and Meos, "Localization of Aurorae with 10m High Power Radar Technique, using a
Rotating Antenna," 7_llu._ 3 (1952): 249-261; Harang and Landmark, "Radio Echoes Observed during Aurorae
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Echoes," Pb_netary and Space S_ience 5 ( 1961): 33-45 and 105-108.
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Alistair Vallance .Jones, Aurm'a (Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 9, 11 and 27; Lovell,
"Astronomer by Chance," manuscript, February 1988, p. 201, Lovell materials.
57. DeWitt and Stodola, p. 239.
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example of Lovell in Britain, but Project Diana turned their attention toward the Moon.
In order to study the fluctuations in signal strength that DeWitt had observed, Kerr, Shain,
and Higgins put together a rather singular experiment.
For a transmitter, they used the 20-MHz (15-meter) Radio Australia station, located
in Shepparton, Victoria, when it was not in use for regular programming to the United
States and Canada. The receiver was located at the Radiophysics Laboratory, Hornsby,
New South Wales, a distance of 600 km from the transmitter. Use of this unique system was
limited to days when three conditions could be met all at the same time: the Moon was
passing through the station's antenna beams; the transmitter was available; and atmos-
pheric conditions were favorable. In short, the system was workable about twenty days a
year.SS
Kerr, Shain, and Higgins obtained lunar echoes on thirteen out of fifteen attempts.
The amplitude of the echoes fluctuated considerably over the entire run of tests as well as
within a single test. Researchers at ITr's Federal Telecommunications Laboratories in
New York City accounted for the fluctuations observed by DeWitt by positing the existence
of smooth spots that served as "bounce points" for the reflected energy. Another possibil-
ity they imagined was the existence of an ionosphere around the Moon. s9 The Australians
disagreed with the explanations offered by DeWitt and the ITI" researchers, but they were
initially cautious: "It cannot yet be said whether the reductions in intensity and the long-
period variations are due to ionospheric, lunar or inter-planetary causes."_
During a visit to the United States in 1948,J. L. Pawsey, a radio astronomy enthusiast
also with the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research's Division of Radiophysics,
arranged a cooperative experiment with the Americans. A number of U.S. organizations
with an interest in radio, the National Bureau of Standards CRPL, the Radio Corporation
of America (Riverhead, New York), and the University of Illinois (Urbana), attempted to
receive Moon echoes simultaneously from Australia, beginning 30 July 1948. Ross
Bateman (CRPL) acted as American coordinator. The experiment was not a great success.
The times of the tests (limited by transmitter availability) were all in the middle of the day
at the receiving points. Echoes were received in America on two occasions, 1 August and
28 October, and only for short periods in each case.
Meanwhile, Kerr and Shain continued to study lunar echo fading with the Radio
Australia transmitter. Based on thirty experiments (with echoes received in twenty-four of
them) conducted over a year, they now distinguished rapid and slow fading. Kerr and
Shain proposed that each type of fading had a different cause. Rapid fading resulted from
the Moon's libration, a slow wobbling motion of the Moon. Irregular movement in the
ionosphere, they originally suggested, caused the slower fading. 6j Everyone agreed that
the rapid fading of lunar radar echoes originated in the lunar libration, but the cause of
slow fading was not so obvious.
The problem of slow fading was taken up atJodrell Bank by William A. S. Murray and
J. K. Hargreaves, who sought an explanation in the ionosphere. Although Lovell had pro-
posed undertaking lunar radar observations as early as 1946, the first worthwhile results
were not obtained until the fall of 1953. Hargreaves and Murray photographed and ana-
lyzed some 50,000 lunar radar echoes at theJodrell Bank radar telescope in October and
November 1953 to determine the origin of slow fading.
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With rare exceptions, nighttime runs showed a steady signal amplitude, while day-
time runs, especially those within a few hours of sunrise, were marked by severe fading.
The high correlation between fading and solar activity strongly suggested an ionospheric
origin. However, Hargreaves and Murray believed that irregularities in the ionosphere
could not account for slow fading over periods lasting up to an hour. They suggested
instead that slow fading resulted from Faraday rotation, in which the plane of polarization
of the radio waves rotated, as they passed through the ionosphere in the presence of the
Earth's magnetic field.
Hargreaves and Murray carried out a series of experiments to test their hypothesis in
March 1954. The transmitter had a horizontally polarized antenna, while the primary feed
of the receiving antenna consisted of two dipoles mounted at right angles. They switched
the receiver at short intervals between the vertical and horizontal feeds so that echoes
would be received in both planes of polarization, a technique that is a standard planetary
radar practice today.
As the plane of polarization of the radar waves rotated in the ionosphere, stronger
echo amplitudes were received by the vertical feed than by the horizontal feed. If no
Faraday rotation had taken place, both the transmitted and received planes of polariza-
tion would be the same, that is, horizontal. But Faraday rotation of the plane of polariza-
tion in the ionosphere had rotated the plane of polarization so that the vertical feed
received more echo power than the horizontal feed. The results confirmed that slow
fading was caused, at least in part, by a change in the plane of polarization of the received
lunar echo. 6z
Murray and Hargreaves soon took positions elsewhere, yetJodrell Bank continued to
feature radar astronomy through the persistence of Bernard Lovell. Lovell became entan-
gled in administrative affairs and the construction of a giant radio telescope, while John
V. Evans, a research student of Lovell, took over the radar astronomy program. Evans had
a B.Sc. in physics and had had an interest in electronics engineering since childhood. He
chose the University of Manchester Physics Department for his doctoral degree, because
the department, through Lovell, oversaw the Jodreli Bank facility. The facility's heavy
involvement in radio and radar astronomy, when Evans arrived there on his bicycle in the
summer of 1954, assured Evans that his interest in electronics engineering would be sated.
With the approval and full support of Lovell, Evans renewed the studies of lunar
radar echoes, but first he rebuilt the lunar radar equipment. It was a "poor instrument,"
Evans later recalled, "and barely got echoes from the Moon." After he increased the power
output from 1 to 10 kilowatts and improved the sensitivity of the receiver by rebuilding the
front end, Evans took the hmar studies in a new direction. Unlike the majority of Jodrell
Bank research, Evans's lunar work was underwritten through a contract with the U.S. Air
Force, which was interested in using the Moon as part of a long-distance communications
system.
With his improved radar apparatus, Evans discovered that the Moon overall was a rel-
atively smooth reflector of radar waves at the wavelength he used (120 MHz; 2.5 meters).
Later, from the way that the Moon appeared to scatter back radar waves, Evans speculat-
ed that the lunar surface was covered with small, round objects such as rocks and stones.
Hargreaves proposed that radar observations at shorter wavelengths should be able to give
interesting statistical information about the features of the lunar surface. 6s That idea was
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"Astronomer by Chance," p. 183.
63. Evans 9 September 1993; Hargreaves, "Radio Observations of the Lunar Surface," Proceedingsof the
Physiad ,_ciety 73 (1959): 536-537; Evans, "Research on Moon Echo Phenomena," Technical (Final) Report, 1
May 1956, and earlier reports in 1/4 "Correspondence Series 2," JBA.
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the starting point for the creation of planetary radar techniques that would reveal the sur-
face characteristics of planets and other moons.
Experimenters prior to Evans had assumed that the Moon reflected radar waves from
the whole of its illuminated surface, like light waves. They debated whether the power
returned to the Earth was reflected from the entire visible disk or from a smaller region.
The question was important to radar astronomers atJodrell Bank as well as to military and
civilian researchers developing Moon-relay communications.
In March 1957, Evans obtained a series of lunar radar echoes. He photographed
both the transmitted pulses and their echoes so that he could make a direct comparison
between the two. Evans also made range measurements of the echoes at the same time. In
each case, the range of the observed echo was consistent with that of the front edge of the
Moon. The echoes came not from the entire visible disk but from a smaller portion of the
lunar surface, that closest to the Earth and known as the subradar point. 64 This discovery
became fundamental to radar astronomy research.
Because radar waves reflected off only the foremost edge of the Moon, Evans and
John H. Thomson (a radio astronomer who had transferred from Cambridge in 1959)
undertook a series of experiments on the use of the Moon as a passive communication
relay. Although initial results were "not intelligible," because FM and AM broadcasts tend-
ed to fade, Lovell bounced Evans' "hello" off the Moon with a Jodrell Bank transmitter
and receiver during his BBC Reith Lecture of 1958. Several years later, in collaboration
with the Pye firm, a leading British manufacturer of electronic equipment headquartered
in Cambridge, and with underwriting from the U.S. Air Force, a Pye transmitter atJodrell
Bank was used to send speech and music via the Moon to the Sagamore Hill Radio
Astronomy Observatory of the Air Force Cambridge Research Center, at Hamilton,
Massachusetts. The U.S. Air Force thus obtained a successful lunar bounce communica-
tion experiment at Jodrell Bank for a far smaller sum than that spent by the Naval
Research Laboratory. 6s
The Moon Bounce
The lunar communication studies at Jodrell Bank illustrate that astronomy was not
behind all radar studies of the Moon. Much of the lunar radar work, especially in the
United States, was performed to test long-distance communication systems in which the
Moon would serve as a relay. Thus, the experiments of DeWitt and Bay may be said to have
begun the era of satellite communications. Research on Moon-relay communications sys-
tems by both military and civilian laboratories eventually drew those institutions into the
early organizational activities of radar astronomers. After all, both communication
research and radar astronomy shared an interest in the behavior of radio waves at the
lunar surface. Hence, a brief look at that research would be informative.
Before the advent of satellites, wireless communication over long distances was
achieved by reflecting radio waves off the ionosphere. As transmission frequency
increased, the ionosphere was penetrated. Long-distance wireless communication at high
frequencies had to depend on a network of relays, which were expensive and technically
complex. Using the Moon as a relay appeared to be a low-cost alternative. 66
64. Evans 9 September 1993; Evans, "The Scattering of Radio Waves by the Moon," Proceedings of the
Physical SocietyBT0 (1957): 1105-1112.
65. Evans 9 September 1993: Edge and Mulkay, p. 298; Materials in 1/4 "Correspondence Series 2," and
2/53 "Accounts,"JBA. With NASA funding, Jodrell Bank later participated in the Echo balloon project.
66. Harold Sobol, "Microwave Communications: An Historical Perspective," IEEE Transactions on
Microwave Theory and TechnulueSMTT-$2 (1984): 1170-1181.
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Reacting to the successes of DeWitt and Bay, researchers at the ITI" Federal
Telecommunications Laboratories, Inc., New York City, planned a lunar relay telecom-
munication system operating at UHF frequencies (around 50 MHz; 6 meters) to provide
radio telephone communications between New York and Paris. If such a system could be
made to work, it would provide ITI" with a means to compete with transatlantic cable car-
riers dominated by rival AT&T. What the Federal Telecommunications Laboratories had
imagined, the Collins Radio Company, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, and the National Bureau of
Standards CRPL, accomplished.
On 28 October and 8 November 1951, Peter G. Sulzer and G. Franklin Montgomery,
CRPL, and Irvin H. Gerks, Collins Radio, sent a continuous-wave 418-MHz (72-cm) radio
signal from Cedar Rapids to Sterling, Virginia, via the Moon. On 8 November, a slowly
hand-keyed telegraph message was sent over the circuit several times. The message was the
same sent by Samuel Morse over the first U.S. public telegraph line: "What hath God
wrought?"67
Unbeknownst to the CRPL/Collins team, the first use of the Moon as a relay in a
communication circuit was achieved only a few days earlier by military researchers at the
Naval Research Laboratory (NRL). The Navy was interested in satellite communications,
and the Moon offered itself as a free (if distant and rough) satellite in the years before an
artificial satellite could be launched. In order to undertake lunar communication studies,
the NRL built what was then the world's largest parabolic antenna in the summer of 1951.
The dish covered over an entire acre (67 by 80 meters; 220 by 263 ft) and had been cut
into the earth by road-building machinery at Stump Neck, Maryland. The one-megawatt
transmitter operated at 198 MHz (1.5 meters). The NRL first used the Moon as a relay in
a radio communication circuit on 21 October 1951. After sending the first voice trans-
mission via the Moon on 24 July 1954, the NRL demonstrated transcontinental satellite
teleprinter communication from Washington, DC, to San Diego, CA, at 301 MHz (1
meter) on 29 November 1955 and transoceanic satellite communication, from
Washington, DC, to Wahiawa, Oahu, Hawaii, on 23January 1956. 68
Later in 1956, the NRL's Radio Astronomy Branch started a radar program under
Benjamin S. Yaplee to determine the feasibility of bouncing microwaves off the Moon and
to accurately measure both the Moon's radius and the distances to different reflecting
areas during the lunar libration cycle. Aside from the scientific value of that research, the
information would help the Navy to determine relative positions on the Earth's surface.
The first NRL radar contact with the Moon at a microwave frequency took place at 2860
MHz (10-cm) and was accomplished with the Branch's 15-meter (50-ft) radio telescope. 69
Although interest in bouncing radio and radar waves offthe Moon drew military and
civilian researchers to early radar astronomy conferences, lunar communication schemes
failed to provide either a theoretical or a funding framework within which radar astrono-
my could develop. The rapidly growing field of ionospheric research, on the other hand,
provided both theoretical and financial support for radar experiments on meteors and
the Moon. Despite the remarkable variety of radar experiments carried out in the years
following World War II, radar achieved a wider and more permanent place in ionospher-
ic research (especially meteors and auroras) than in astronomy.
67. Grieg, Metzger, and Waer, pp. 652--663; _¢ia the Moon: Relay Station to Transoceanic
Communication," New._roezk27 (11 February 1946): 64; Sulzer, Montgomery, and Gerks, _An U-H-F Moon Relay,"
Proceedings tithe IRE 40 ( 1952): 361. A few years later, three amateur radio operators, _hams" who enjoyed detect-
ing long-distance transmissions (DXing), succeeded in bouncing 144-Mhz radio waves offthe Moon, on 23 and
27January 1953. E. P. T., "Lunar DX on 144 Me!" QST37 (1953): 11-12 and 116.
68. Gebhard, pp. 115-116; James H. Trexler, "Lunar Radio Echoes," Proc_ings of the IRE 46 (1958):
286--288.
69. NRL, _Fhe Space Science Division and E. O. Hulburt Center for Space Research, Program Review,"
1968, NRLHRC; Yaplee, R. H. Bruton, K.J. Craig, and Nancy G. Roman, "Radar Echoes from the Moon at a
Wavelength of 10 cm," Proceedings ofthelRE46 (1958): 293--297; Gebhard, p. 118.
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All that changed with the start of the U.S./U.S.S.R. Space Race and the announce-
ment of the first planetary radar experiment in 1958. That experiment was made possible
by the rivalries of the Cold War, which fostered a concentration of expertise and financial,
personnel, and material resources that paralleled, and in many ways exceeded, that of
World War II. The new Big Science of the Cold War and the Space Race, often indistin-
guishable from each other, gave rise to the radar astronomy of planets.
The Sputnik and Lunik missions were not just surprising demonstrations of Soviet
achievements in science and technology. Those probes had been propelled off the Earth
by ICBMs, and an ICBM capable of putting a dog in Earth-orbit or sending a probe to the
Moon was equally capable of delivering a nuclear bomb from Moscow to New York City.
Behind the Space Race lay the specter of the Cold War and World War III, or to para-
phrase Clausewitz, the Space Race was the Cold War by other means. Just as the vulnera-
bility of Britain to air attacks had led to the creation of the Chain Home radar warning
network, the defenselessness of the United States against aircraft and ICBM attacks with
nuclear bombs and warheads led to the creation of a network of defensive radars. The
development of that network in turn provided the instrument with which planetary radar
astronomy, driven by the availability of technology, would begin in the United States.
Chapter Two
Fickle Venus
In 1958, MIT's Lincoln Laboratory announced that it had bounced radar waves off
Venus. That apparent success was followed by another, but in England, during Venus' next
inferior conjunction. In September 1959, investigators at Jodrell Bank announced that
they had validated the 1958 results, yet Lincoln Laboratory failed to duplicate them. All
uncertainty was swept aside, when the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) obtained the first
unambiguous detection of echoes from Venus in 1961.
As we saw in the case of radar studies of meteors and the Moon in the 1940s and
1950s, planetary radar astronomy was driven by technology. The availability of military
apparatus made possible the rise of radar astronomy in Britain in the 1940s. Just as the
threat of airborne invasion gave rise to the Chain Home radar, the Cold War and its sci-
entific counterpart, the Space Race, demanded the creation of a new generation of defen-
sive radars, and those radars made possible the first planetary radar experiments. Even
British and Soviet planetary radar astronomy were not free of the sway of military and
space efforts. Thus, the Big Science efforts brought into being by the Cold War and the
Space Race provided the material resources necessary for the emergence of planetary
radar astronomy.
The initial radar detections of Venus signaled a benchmark in radar capacity that
separated a new generation of radars from their predecessors. High-speed digital com-
puters linked to more powerful transmitters and more sensitive receivers utilizing state-of-
the-art masers and parametric amplifiers provided the new capacity. As we saw in Chapter
One, initial radar astronomy targets were either ionospheric phenomena, like meteors
and auroras, or the Moon, whose mean distance from Earth is about 384,000 kilometers.
The new radars reached beyond the Moon to Venus, about 42 million kilometers distant
at its closest approach to Earth.
Radar detections of the planets, while sterling technical achievements, were inca-
pable of demonstrating the value of planetary radar as an ongoing scientific activity. As
radar astronomy already had achieved with meteor studies, planetary radar became a sci-
entific activity by solving problems left unsolved or unsatisfactorily solved by optical
means.
As they made their first detections of Venus, planetary radar astronomers found and
solved two such problems. One was the rotation of Venus, the determination of which was
prevented by the planet's optically impenetrable atmosphere. The other problem was the
astronomical unit, the mean radius of the Earth's orbit around the Sun. Astronomers
express the distances of the planets from the Sun in terms of the astronomical unit, but
agreement on its exact value was lacking. Radar observations of Venus provided an exact
value, which the International Astronomical Union adopted, and revealed the planet's
retrograde rotation.
While the astronomical unit and the rotation of Venus interested astronomers, they
also held potential benefit for the nascent space program. In many respects, the problems
solved by the first planetary radar experiments needed solutions because of the Space
Race. By February 1958, when Lincoln Laboratory first tried to bounce radar waves off
Venus, Sputnik 1 and the Earth-orbiting dog Laika were yesterday's news. The Space Race
was hot, and so was the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.
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Planetary radar astronomy rode the cresting waves of Big Science (the Space Race) and
the Cold War well into the 1970s.
From the Rad Lab to Millstone Hill
Scientists and engineers at MIT's Lincoln Laboratory attempted to reach Venus by
radar in 1958, because they had access to a radar of unprecedented capability. The radar
existed because MIT, as it had since the days of the Radiation Laboratory, conducted mil-
itary electronics research. Lincoln Laboratory did not emerge directly from the Radiation
Laboratory but through its direct descendant, the Research Laboratory of Electronics
(RLE).
The RLE, a joint laboratory of the Physics and Electrical Engineering Departments,
continued much of the fundamental electronic research of the Radiation Laboratory. The
Signal Corps, Air Force, and the Office of Naval Research jointly funded the new labora-
tory, with the Signal Corps overseeing the arrangement. Former Radiation Laboratory
employees filled research positions at the RLE, which occupied a temporary structure on
the MIT campus erected earlier for the Radiation Laboratory. The two leaders of the
Lincoln Laboratory Venus radar experiment, Robert Price and Paul E. Green, Jr., were
both student employees of the RLE. Price also had an Industrial Fellowship in Electronics
from Sperry. Among the other early RLE fellowship sponsors were the General Radio
Company, RCA, ITT, and the Socony-Vacuum Oil Company.
In September 1949, the Soviet Union detonated its first nuclear bomb; within
months civil war exploded in Korea. The need for a United States air defense capable of
coping with a nuclear attack was urgent. Project Charles, a group of military and civilian
experts, studied the problems of air defense. Its findings led directly to the creation of
Lincoln Laboratory in the Autumn of 1951)
MIT was, in the words of Hoyt S. Vandenberg, U.S. Air Force chief of staff, "unique-
ly qualified to serve as contractor to the Air Force for the establishment of the proposed
[Lincoln] laboratory. Its experience in managing the Radiation Laboratory of World War
II, the participation in the work of ADSEC [Air Defense Systems Engineering Committee]
by Professor [George E.] Valley and other members of the MIT staff, its proximity to
AFCRL [Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories], and its demonstrated competence
in this sort of activity have convinced us that we should be fortunate to secure the services
of MIT in the present connection. "2
Lincoln Laboratory was to design and develop what became known as SAGE (Semi-
Automatic Ground Environment), a digital, integrated computerized North-American
network of air defense. SAGE involved a diversity of applied research in digital computing
and data processing, long-range radar, and digital communications. The Army, Navy, and
Air Force jointly underwrote Lincoln Laboratory through an Air Force prime contract.
The Air Force provided nearly 90 percent of the funding. In 1954, Lincoln Laboratory
moved out of its Radiation Laboratory buildings on the MIT campus and into a newly con-
structed facility at Hanscom Field, in Lexington, Massachusetts, next to the Air Force
Cambridge Research Center.
1. "President's Report Issue," MITBuUetin vol. 82, no. 1 (1946): 133-136; ibid., vol. 83, no. 1 (1947):
154-157; ibid., vol. 86, no. 1 (1950): 209; "Government Supported Research at MIT: An Historical Survey
Beginning with World War II: The Origins of the Instrumentation and Lincoln Laboratories," May 1969, typed
manuscript, pp. 15--19 and 30-31, MITA; George E. Valley, Jr., rough draft, untitled four page manuscript, 13
October 1953, 6/135/AC 4, and MIT Review Panel on Special Laboratories, "Final Report," pp. 132-133, MITA.
James R. Killian, .Jr., "/'he.Fdu,ntion t?[a C_dlegePre.*ident:A Memoir (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1985), pp. 71-76,
recounts the founding of Lincoln Laboratory, too.
2. Vandenberg to James R. Killian,Jr., 15 December 1950, 3/136/AC 4, MITA. A portion of the quote
also appears in Killian, p. 71.
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LincolnLaboratoryquicklybeganworkontheDistantEarlyWarning(DEW)Line
in thearcticregionofNorthAmerica.ThefirstexperimentalDEW-lineradarunitswere
inplacenearBarterIsland,Alaska,bytheendof 1953.Theradarantennaswereenclosed
byaspecialstructurecalledaradome,whichprotectedthemfromarcticwindsandcold.
InterContinentalBallisticMissiles(ICBMs)challengedtheDEWLineandtheNorth
Americancoordinateddefensenetwork,whichhadbeendesignedtowarnagainstair-
planeattacks.ICBMscouldcarrynuclearwarheadsabovetheionosphere,higherthanany
pilotcouldfly;existingwarningradarswereuseless.InordertodetectandtrackICBMs,
radarswouldhavetorecognizetargetsmallerthanairplanesataltitudeseveralhundred
kilometersabovetheEarthandatrangesofseveralthousandkilometers.Thenewradars
wouldhavetodistinguishbetweentargetsandauroras,meteors,andotherionospheric
disturbances,whichexperiencealreadyhadshownwerecapableof cripplingmilitary
communicationsandradars.3
In 1954,LincolnLaboratorybeganinitialstudiesofAnti-InterContinental Ballistic
Missile (AICBM) systems and the creation of the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
(BMEWS). By the spring of 1956, the construction of an experimental prototype BMEWS
radar was underway. Its location, atop Millstone Hill in Westford, Massachusetts, was well
away from air routes and television transmitters and close to MIT and Lincoln Laboratory.
The Air Force owned and financed the radar, while Lincoln Laboratory managed it under
Air Force contract through the adjacent Air Force Cambridge Research Center.
Herbert G. Weiss was in charge of designing and building Millstone. After graduat-
ing from MIT in 1936 with a BS in electrical engineering, Weiss conducted microwave
research for the Civil Aviation Authority in Indianapolis and worked in the MIT Radiation
Laboratory. After the war, Weiss worked at Los Alamos, then at Raytheon, before return-
ing to MIT to work on the DEW radars.
Millstone embodied a new generation of radars capable of detecting smaller objects
at farther ranges. Thanks to specially designed, 3-meter-tall (l 1-feet-tall) klystron tubes,
Millstone was intended to have an unprecedented amount of peak transmitting power,
1.25 megawatts from each klystron (2.5 megawatts total). Its frequency was 440 MHz (68
cm). The antenna, a steerable parabolic dish 26 meters (84-feet) from rim to rim, stood
on a 27-meter-high (88-foot-high) tower of concrete and steel. Millstone began operating
in October 1957,just in time to skin track the first Sputnik.
3. Valley; "Final Report," pp. 133-137; "Government Supported," p. 33; C. L. Strong, Information
Department, Western Electric Company, press release, 1 October 1953, 6/135/AC 4, MITA; Carl EJ. Overhage
to Lt. Gen. Roscoe C. Wilson, 15 October 1959, and brochure, "Haystack Family Day, 10 October 1964,"
1/24/AC 134, MITA; E W. Loomis to Killian, 17 April 1952, 4/135/AC 4, MITA; various documents in
2/136/AC 4 and 7/135/AC 4, MITA; Overhage, "Reaching into Space with Radar," paper read at Mrr Club of
Rochester, 25 February 1960, pp. 6-7, LLLA. For a popular introduction to the DEW Line, see Richard Morenus,
Dew Line: Distant Ear_ Warning, The Miracle of America's First Line.of Defert_e(New York: Rand McNally, 1957).
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F'tgure4
The Lincoln Laboratory Millstone Hill Radar Observatory, ca. 1958. (C_rurteo_y,[ MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington,
Mtt_sachusetts, photo no. P489-128.)
Millstone furnished valuable scientific and technological information to the military,
while advancing ionospheric and lunar radar research. In addition to testing and evaluat-
ing new defense radar techniques and components, its scientific missions included mea-
suring the ionosphere and its influence on radar signals (such as Faraday rotation),
observing satellites and missiles, and performing radar studies of auroras, meteors, and
the Moon, all of which were potential sources of false alarm for BMEWS radars. 4
The Lunchtime Conversazione
The idea of using the Millstone Hill radar to bounce signals off Venus arose during
one of the customary lunchtime discussions between Bob Price and Paul Green. As MIT
doctoral students and later as Lincoln Laboratory engineers, Price and Green worked
closely together under Wilbur B. Davenport, Jr., their laboratory supervisor and disserta-
tion director. They worked on different aspects of NOMAC (NOise Modulation And
Correlation), a high-frequency communication system (known by the Army Signal Corps
production name F9C) that used pseudonoise sequences, and on Rake, a receiver that
4. Weiss 29 September 1993; "Final Report," pp. 136 and 138; Overhage, "Reaching into Space," p. 2;
Overhage to Wilson, 30 June 1961, 1/24/AC 134, MITA; Allen S. Richmond, "Background Information on
Millstone Hill Radar of MIT Lincoln Laboratory," 5 November 1958. typed manuscript, LLLA; Weiss, Space Radar
Trackers and Radar Astronomy Systems,JA-1740-22 (Lexington: Lincoln Laboratory, June 1961), pp. 21-23, 29, 44
and 64; Price, _I'he Venus Radar Experiment," in E. D. Johann, ed., Data Handling ,_rainar, Aachen, Germany,
September 21, 1959 (London: Pergamon Press, 1960), p. 81; Price, E Green, Thomas J. Goblick, Jr., Robert H.
Kingston, Leon G. Kraft, Jr., Gordon H. Pettengill, Roland Silver, William B. Smith, "Radar Echoes from Venus,"
Sc/ence 129 (1959): 753; "Missile Radar Probes Arctic," Electronics30 (1957): 19; Pettengill 28 September 1993.
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solvedNOMACmultipathpropagationproblems.Later,whatLincolnLaboratorycalled
NOMACcametobecalledspreadspectrum.
Theirworkwasvitaltomaintainingmilitarycommunicationsi thefaceofenemyjamming.OneoftheirunitswentoBerlinin 1959inanticipationofablockadetopro-
videessentialcommunicationsi caseofjamming.TheSovietUnionalreadyhaddemon-
strateditsjammingexpertiseagainsttheVoiceofAmerica.Conceivably,allNATOcom-
municationscouldbejammedin timeofwar.TheLincolnLaboratoryanti-jammingpro-jectwasadirectresponsetothatthreat.5
Radioastronomy,whichinfluencedtheriseofplanetaryadarastronomyduringthe
1960s,playedasmallrolein theLincolnLaboratoryVenusexperiment.Priceactuallyhad
workedattheUniversityofSydneyunderadioastronomerGo don Stanley and met such
pioneers as Pawsey, Taffy Bowen, Paul Wild, Bernie Mills, and Chris Christiansen. A
recently published book on radio astronomy by the Australian scientistsJ. L. Pawsey and
Ronald N. Bracewell was the subject of lunch conversation between Green and Price in
the Lincoln Laboratory cafeteria. The chapter on radar astronomy predicted that one day
man would bounce radar waves off the planets. But radio astronomy did not give rise to
the decision to attempt a radar detection of Venus. 6
What did trigger the decision was the completion of the Millstone facility. Green and
Price wondered if it was powerful enough to bounce radar signals off Venus. Gordon
Pettengill, a junior member of the team, joined the lunchtime discussions. Trained in
physics at MIT and an alumnus of Los Alamos, Pettengill had an office at Millstone. After
making calculations on a paper napkin, though, they estimated that Millstone did not
have enough detectability for the experiment, even if one assumed that Venus was per-
fectly reflective.
The lunchtime conversazione went nowhere, until Robert H. Kingston, who had a
joint MIT and Lincoln Laboratory appointment, joined the discussions. Kingston had just
built a maser. "Within an hour," Green recalled, "we had the whole damn thing mapped
out. ''7 The maser gave the radar receiver the sensitivity necessary to carry out the experi-
ment.
The maser, an acronym for Microwave Amplification by Stimulated Emission of
Radiation, was a new type of solid-state microwave amplifying device vaunted by one
author as "the greatest single technological step in radio physics for many years, with the
possible exception of the transistor, comparable say with the development of the cavity
magnetron during the Second World War." The maser was at the heart of the low-noise
microwave amplifiers used in radio astronomy. The first radio-astronomy maser
application, a joint effort by Columbia University and the Naval Research Laboratory,
occurred in April 1958. The first use of a maser in radar astronomy, however, preceded
that application by two months, in February 1958, at Millstone. While most masers
5. William W. Ward, "The NOMAC and Rake Systems," The Lincoln Laboratory Journal vol. 5, no. 3
(1992): 351-365; Green 20 September 1993; Price 27 September 1993. Green and Price acknowledged each
other in their dissertations. Green, "Correlation Detection using Stored Signals" D.Sc. diss., MIT, 1953, and
Price, "Statistical Theory Applied to Communication through Multipath Disturbances," D.Sc. diss., MIT, 1953.
A history of the subject, R. A. Scholtz, "rhe Origins of Spread-Spectrum Communications," IEEE
Trar_actior_ tm Communications COM-30 (1982): 822--854, is reproduced in Marvin K. Simon, Jim K. Omura,
Scholtz, and Barry K. Levitt, eds., Spread Spectrum Communications (Rockville, Md.: Computer Science Press, Inc.,
1985), Volume 1, Chapter 2, "The Historical Origins of Spread-Spectrum Communications," pp. 39-134. Price,
"Further Notes and Anecdotes on Spread-Spectrum Origins," IEEE Transactions on C_Jmmunication.gCOM-31
(January 1983): 85-97, provides an absorbing anecdotal sequel to Scholtz.
6. Pawsey and Bracewell, Radio Astronomy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955); Green 20 September 1993;
Price 27 September 1993.
7. Green 20 September 1993; Pettengill 28 September 1993. For a description of the maser, see
Kingston, A UHFSolid Sta_ Mas_ Group Report M35-79 (Lexington: Lincoln Laboratory, 1957); and Kingston.
A UHFSolid State Maser, Group Report M35-84A (Lexington: Lincoln Laboratory, 1958).
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functioned above 1,000 MHz, Kingston's operated in the UHF region, around 440 MHz,
and reduced overall system noise temperature to an impressive 170 K.S
Despite the maser's low noise level, Price and Green knew that they would have to
raise the level of the Venus echoes above that of the noise. Their NOMAC anti-jamming
work had prepared them for this problem. They chose to integrate the return pulses over
time, as Zolt_n Bay had done in 1946. In theory, the signals buried in the noise reinforced
each other through addition, while the noise averaged out by reason of its random
nature. 9
A digital computer, as well as additional digital data processing equipment, linked to
the Millstone radar system performed the integration and analysis of the Venusian echoes.
An analog-to-digital convertor, initially developed for ionospheric research by William B.
Smith, digitized information on each radar echo. That information simultaneously was
recorded on magnetic tape and fed to a solid-state digital computer. The experiment was
innovative in digital-signal processing and marked one of the earliest uses of digital tape
recorders.10
Venus or Bust
Kingston's maser was installed at Millstone Hill just in time for the inferior conjunc-
tion of Venus. However, a klystron failure left only 265 kilowatts of transmitter power avail-
able for the experiment. On 10 and 12 February 1958, the radar was pointed to detect
Venus, then some 45 million kilometers (28 million miles) away. The radar signals took
about five minutes to travel the round-trip distance. In contrast, John DeWitt's signals
went to the Moon and back to Fort Monmouth, NJ, in only about 2.5 seconds.
Of the five runs made, only four of the digital recordings had few enough tape blem-
ishes that they could be easily edited and run through the computer. Two of the four runs,
one from each day, showed no evidence of radar returns. The others had one peak each.
Price recalled, "When we saw the peaks, we felt very blessed.'ll It was not absolutely clear,
however, that the two peaks were really echoes.
Green explained: "We looked into our soul about whether we dared to go public with
this news. Bob was the only guy who really stayed with it to the end. He had convinced
himself that he had seen it, and he had convinced me that he had seen iL Management
asked us to have a consultant look at our results, and we did." Thomas Gold of Cornell
University looked at the peaks and said "Yes, I think you should publish this." Green and
Price then published their findings in the 20 March 1959 issue of Sc/ence, the journal of
8. J.v. Jelley, _rhe Potentialities and Present Status of Masers and Parametric Amplifiers in Radio
Astronomy," Proceedingsof the IEEE51 (1963) : 31 and 36, esp. 30; J. W. Meyer, The So//d State Maser--Pr/ndpbts,
Applicatiom, and Potential, Technical Report ESD-TR-68-261 (Lexingvon: Lincoln Laboratory, 1960), pp. 14-16;
J. A. Giordmaine, L. E. AInop, C. H. Mayer, and C. H. Townes, "AMaser Amplifier for Radio Astronomy at X-
band," Proo_ings of the IRE 47 (1959): 1062-1070; Pettengill and Price, "Radar Echoes from Venus and a New
Determination of the Solar Parallax," P/anaary and Spa_ Sc/ence5 (1961): 73. For Townes and the invention of
the maser, see Paul Forman, "Inventing the Maser in Postwar America," Os/r/s set. 2, vol. 7 (1992): 105--134.
9. Price, p. 70; Price et al, p. 751. Later, Price acknowledged the pioneering integration work of Zolt,_n
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the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 13 months after their
observations in February 1958.12
By then, despite the unsuccessful Lunik I Moon shot, the Soviet Union had achieved
a number of successful satellite launches. The United States space effort still was marked
by repeated failures. All of the four Pioneer Moon launches of 1958 ended in failure.
There was a desperate need for good news; the Lincoln Laboratory publicity department
gave the Venus radar experiment full treatment. In addition to a press conference, Green
and Price quickly found themselves on national television and on the front page of the
New York Times. President Eisenhower sent a special congratulatory telegram calling the
experiment a "notable achievement in our peaceful ventures into outer space. 'qs
Once Price and Green accepted the validity of the two peaks, the next step was to
determine the distance the radar waves travelled to Venus and to calculate a value for the
astronomical unit. They estimated a value of 149,467,000 kilometers and concluded,
moreover, that it did not differ enough from those found in the astronomical literature to
warrant a re-evaluation of the astronomical unit.14
The Lincoln Laboratory 1958 Venus experiment launched planetary radar astrono-
my; Millstone Hill was the prototype planetary radar. Its digital electronics, recording of
data on magnetic tape for subsequent analysis, use of a maser (or other low-noise
microwave amplifier) and a digital computer, and long-period integration all became stan-
dard equipment and practice. As with any experiment, scientists must be able to duplicate
results. The next inferior conjunction provided an opportunity for scientists at Jodrell
Bank to attempt Venus, too.
Jodrell Bank had a new, 76-meter (250-ft) radio telescope, the largest of its type in
the world. Although planned as early as 1951, the telescope did not detect its first radio
waves until 1957 as a consequence of a long, nightmarish struggle with financial and con-
struction difficulties. The civilian Department of Scientific and Industrial Research and
the Nuffield Foundation underwrote its design and construction, Success in detecting
Soviet and American rocket launches brought visits from Prince Philip and Princess
Margaret and fame. Fame in turn brought solvency and a name (the Nuffield Radio
Astronomy Laboratories, Jodrell Bank).
Although the design and construction of the large dish was unquestionably an enter-
prise carried out with civilian funding, radar research atJodreli Bank owed a debt to the
United States armed forces; however, that military research was limited to meteor studies
carried out with the smaller antennas, not the 76-meter (250-ft) dish. The U.S. Air Force
and the Office of Naval Research supplied additional money for tracking rocket launch-
es, while the European Office of the U.S. Air Force Research and Development Command
(EOARDC) funded general electronics research at a modest level. During the Cuban mis-
sile crisis, the 76-meter (250-ft) radio telescope served to detect missiles that might be
launched from the Soviet Union. From intelligence sources, the locations of such missiles
directed against London were known, and the telescope was aimed accordingly. No U.S.
equipment or funding were engaged in this effort, though. 15
12. Green 20 September 1993; Gold 14 December 1993; Price et al, pp. 751-753.
13. Green 20 September 1993; Price 27 September 1993; Pettengill 28 September 1993; Overhage to
Wilson, 24 March 1959, 1/24/AC 134, MITA; "Venus is Reached by Radar Signals," New York Times, vol. 108 (20
March 1959), pp. 1 and 11.
14. For their calculation of the astronomical unit, see Pettengill and Price, "Radar Echoes from Venus
and a New Determination of the Solar Parallax," Planetary and Space Sc/ence5 (1961): 71-74.
15. Lovell, 11 January 1994; LovelI, JodreU Bank, passim, but especially pp. 220-222, 224, 242, 225. On
the Foundation, see Ronald William Clark, A Biography of the Nuffie.ld FountbLtion (London: Longman, 1972).
Created in 1962, EOARDC was essentially a military operation headquartered in Brussels. h underwrote a wide
range of European scientific research, though more money went into electronics research than any other field.
Howard J. Lewis, "How our Air Force Supports Basic Research in Europe," Science 131 (1960): 15-20. From
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Fis_ 5
TheJodrell Bank 250-foot (76-meter) tele_c.opein June 1961. "/'hecontrol room in_partzally vi._iblebottom left. The 1962 and
1964 Jodrell Bank Venus radar experiments werecarriod out u._ing a U.S.-supplied c_mtinu_rus-waveradar mounted on this
telesce/pe.(Courte_yof the Director of the Nuffield Radio Astronomy Laboratories,J_lrell Paznk.)
Preparation for the 1959 Venus experiment began in 1957, as the dish was reaching
completion. The telescope, however, was not yet ready for radar work. John Evans recog-
nized that its transmitter power and operating frequency would have to be raised in order
to achieve critical extra gain for the Venus experiment. The 100-MHz (3-meter), 10-kilo-
watt Moon radar was not powerful enough. The University of Manchester Physics
Department had developed a 400-MHz (75-cm), 100-kilowatt klystron. "It was a real
kludge," Evans later recalled, "because it was basically a Physics Department experiment.
It was continuously pumped; it sat on top of vacuum pumps, which required liquid nitro-
gen for cooling. "16
Lovell had the General Electric Company of Britain supply a modulator for the kly-
stron. Evans was responsible for designing and building the rest of the equipment. As the
1958 Venus inferior conjunction approached, '_we simply were not ready, and Lovell was
quite upset," Evans explained. Out of desperation, Evans employed the 100-MHz Moon
radar enhanced with a computer integration scheme, but the equipment failed to detect
echoes. When Lincoln Laboratory announced its success, Evans recalled, "We shrugged
and felt we were beaten to the punch."
The 1958Jodrell Bank failure put all that much more pressure on Evans to produce
results during the next inferior conjunction of September 1959. The transmitter was more
August 1957, when Jodrell Bank began preliminary calibration measurements to August 1970, the telescope
gathered results for 68,538 hours. Of those, 4,877 hours (7.1% of operational time) represented "miscellaneous
use." Of that "miscellaneous use," 2,498 hours (3.6% of operational time) were directly concerned with the space
programs of the United States and the Soviet Union. Lovell, Out of the 7wnith:JodreUBank, 1957-1970 (New York:
Harper & Row, 1973), p. 2.
16. Evans 9 September 1993.
FICKLE VENUS 35
or less ready. The ldystron was mounted in one of the telescope towers. "It was a royal
pain," Evans remembered, "because we had to take liquid nitrogen up the elevator and
then a vertical ladder to get to this darn thing." As if that were not enough, a water pump
burned up, and the connectors on the coaxial cable carrying power to the dish burned
out every ten or fifteen minutes. While still struggling with the connector problem, Evans
made several runs on Venus.
Evans was a junior scientist, having just received his Ph.D. in 1957. He felt he was
under great pressure to produce positive results. Lovell was anxious to know if they had
found an echo; the Duke of Edinburgh was about to visit. Evans looked at his data, taken
from the first few minutes of each run, when he thought the apparatus was working. He
had what looked like a return, but it could have been noise. Evans decided, "Well, I think
we have an echo." The Venus detection was announced in the 31 October 1959 issue of
Nature. The Duke of Edinburgh visited Jodrell Bank on 11 November 1959; he received
an explanation and a demonstration of the technique, using the Moon as a target.
Despite the patchwork equipment, the 50-kilowatt, 408-MHz (74-cm) radar obtained
a total of 58 and three quarters hours of useful operating data, before Venus passed
beyond its range. As expected, none of the echoes were stronger than the receiver noise
level; integration techniques increased the strength of the echoesA 7 TheJodrell Bank sig-
nal processing equipment was rather limited in its ability to search. Without accurate
range or Doppler correction information, Evans had to make assumptions; he chose the
Lincoln Laboratory 1958 published value. Not surprisingly, the valueJodrell Bank derived
for the astronomical unit agreed with that determined at Lincoln Laboratory. TheJodrell
Bank confirmation of the Lincoln Laboratory results placed them on solid scientific
ground, that is, until Lincoln Laboratory repeated the experiment.
Fickle Venus
Bob Price and his fellow Lincoln Laboratory investigators were highly optimistic
about verifying their 1958 results. Millstone now had a peak transmitter power of 500 kilo-
watts, almost twice the 1958 level. In addition to using a higher pulse repetition rate,
which improved signal detectability, Price's team replaced the maser with a parametric
amplifier. Like the maser, the parametric amplifier was a solid-state microwave amplifier.
Parametric amplifiers were simpler, smaller, cheaper, and lighter than masers, and they
did not require cryogenic fluids to keep them cool. Although masers generally were less
noisy, the Millstone parametric amplifier was, Pettengill and Price reported, "gratifyingly
stable and reliable in its operation. ''Is
Over a four-week period around the inferior conjunction of Venus, the Lincoln
Laboratory team made two types of radar observations. On 66 runs, they recorded the
echoes digitally for subsequent computer processing, as they had done in 1958. The sec-
ond approach, used on 117 runs, involved initial analog processing in a series of elec-
tronic circuits, followed by digitization and integration in real time by the site's comput-
er. It was their first attempt at a real-time planetary detection by radar. OfaU the runs, only
one displayed a peak sufficiently above the noise level to he statistically significant. When
subjected to detailed analysis, though, the peak turned out to be only noise. Price and
17. Evans 9 September 1993; Jodrell Bank, Moon and VenusRadar Passive Satellite Observations: Technical
(Final) Rtport, October 1958-December 1960, AFCRL Report 1129 (Macclesfield: Nuffield Radio Astronomy
Laboratories, 1961), p. 22; Evans and G. N. Taylor, "Radio Echo Observations of Venus," Nature 184 (1959):
1358-1359; Lovell, Out of the Zenith, p. 193. The noise figure was 4.6 db. The frequency of the lunar radar was
lowered from 120 MHz to 100 MHz, when it was found to interfere with operations at nearby Manchester
Airport.
18. Pettengill and Price, p. 73.
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Pettengillconcludedthat"noneof theindividualrunsshowstrongevidenceof Venus
echoes.'19
Jodrell Bank had corroborated the 1958 results; yet with an improved radar, Lincoln
Laboratory could not confirm them. The disparity between the results was perplexing--
and bothersome. "It is difficult to explain the disparity between the results obtained at the
two Venus conjunctions. Our current feeling," wrote Green and Pettengill, "is that the
planet's reflectivity may be highly variable with time, and that the two successes in 1958
were observations made on very favorable occasions. "2°
At the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), the Lincoln Laboratory and Jodrell Bank
experiments were viewed with disbelief. As an internal report stated in 1961, "It is not
known at the present time with certainty that a radio signal has ever been reflected from
the surface of Venus and successfully detected. "tl JPL investigators intended to obtain the
first unambiguous detection of radar echoes from the Venusian surface.
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory
JPL began modestly in Pasadena, California, in 1936 as the Guggenheim
Aeronautical Laboratory, California Institute of Technology (GALCIT), rocket project,
led by Hungarian-born professor Theodore yon I_rmhn and financed by Harry
Guggenheim. Starting in 1940, with backing from the Army Air Corps, the GALCIT group
turned into a vital rocket research, development, and testing facility. A 1944 contract
signed by GALCIT, the Army Air Force, and the California Institute of Technology
(Cahech) transformed it into a large permanent laboratory called the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory, whose major responsibility was research, development, and testing of missile
technology, including the country's first tactical nuclear missiles, the Corporal and
Sergeant, for the Army.
JPL electronics arose out of the need for missile guidance and tracking systems.
William Pickering, a Caltech electrical engineering professor with a Ph.D. in physics,
became the director of JPL in 1954 and remained in that position until 1976. His special-
ization was electronics, not propulsion. Under Pickering's aegis, electronics grew in
prominence atJPL and came to the forefront in 1958, whenJPL became a NASA labora-
tory and started work on a worldwide, civilian satellite communications network known
today as the Deep Space Network (DSN)._
The communications network, known originally as the Deep Space Instrumentation
Facility (DSIF), was the home of planetary radar atJPL. The three leaders of the Venus
radar experiment were engineers involved in its design, Eberhardt Rechtin, Robertson
Stevens, and Walter IC Victor. Rechtin, the architect of the DSIE had a Ph.D. in electrical
engineering from Caltech. He also was an inventor, with Richard Jaffe (also at JPL), of
CODORAC (COded DOppler, Ranging, And Command), a radio communication system
19. Pettengill and Price, p. 73; Green and Pettengill, "Exploring the Solar System by Radar," Sky and
Telescope20 (1960): 12-13; Jelley, pp. 30 and 35. During the 1959 Lincoln Laboratory Venus experiment, over
150 runs were made, yet no echoes as strong as those of 1958 were observed. Overall system noise temperature
rose from 170 Kelvins in 1958 to 185 Kelvins with the parametric amplifier. For a discussion of parametric ampli-
tiers, see Karl Heinz Locherer, Parametric Electronics: An Introduction (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1981),
pp. 276-286.
20. Green and Pettengill, p. 13.
21. JPL, Research Summary No. 36-7, Volume l, for the periodDecemberl. 1960 to February I, 1961 (Pasadena:
JPL, 1961), pp. 68 and 70.
22. "Jet" was a broader term than rocket and avoided any stigma still attached to that word. Clayton R.
Koppes, JPL and the Amencan Space Program: A Histo_ of theJet Propulsion l.a&_rat_, (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1982), pp. ix, 4-5, 10-17, 20, 38, 45 and 65.
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thatdetected and tracked narrow band signals in the presence of wideband noise.
CODORAC, whose electronics in many ways resembled Lincoln Laboratory's NOMAC,
became the basis for much of the DSIF's electronics. Bob Stevens had an M.S. in electri-
cal engineering from the University of California at Berkeley, and Walt Victor, who assist-
ed Rechtin in developing CODORAC, had a B.S. in mechanical engineering from the
University of Texas.
JPL located its share of the DSIF antennas in the Mojave Desert, about 160 kilometers
from JPL, on the Fort Irwin firing range near Goldstone Dry Lake, where GALCIT earlier
had tested Army rockets. 23 The two antennas on which JPL investigators performed their
Venus experiment in 1961 were artifacts of the funding and research agendas of both the
military and NASA. The first was a 26-meter-diameter (85-feet-diameter) dish named the
HA-DEC antenna, because its axes were arranged to measure angles in terms of local hour
angle (HA) and declination (DEC).JPL installed it at Goldstone during the second half of
1958 to track and receive telemetry from the military's Pioneer probes. 24
F'_ 6
.]PL Gold_ttrne26-meter HA-DEC antenna erectedin late 1958 to track and receivetelemetryfrom the military's Pione_ probe_s.
It wa._ wwxlwith the. 26-meter AZ-EL antenna to detect radar echoesfrom Venus in 1961. (Courtesy of Jet tXropulsion
laboratory, photo no. 333-5968AC.)
23. Rechtin, telephone conversation with author, 13 September 1993; Stevens 14 September 1993;
Nicholas A. Renzetti, ed., A History of the Deep Space Network from Inception to January I, 1969, vol. 1, Technical
Report 32-1533 (Pasadena:JPL, 1 September 1971), pp. 6-7 and 11; William R. Corliss, A History oftheDeep S_xace
Network, CR-151915 (Washington: NASA, 1976), pp. 3-4 and 16; Craig B. Waft, "rhe Road to the Deep Space
Network," IF.F.F ._Jectrurn (April 1993): 53; Scholtz, pp. 841--843; additional background material supplied from
oral history collection, JPLA.
24. Dish diameters have been expressed in meters only recently. Initially, they were measured in feet.
For the sake of consistency, diameters are given in both feet and meters throughout the text. Victor, "General
System Description," p. 6 in Victor, Stevens, and Solomon W. Golomb, eds., Radar Exploration of Venus: Goldstone
Observatory Reportfor March-May 1961, Technical Report No. 32-132 (Pasadena: JPL, 1961); Corliss, Deep Space
Netuunk, pp. 16-17 and 20-25.
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JPL erected the second antenna for Project Echo. Echo, a large balloon in Earth
orbit, tested the feasibility of long-range satellite communications. As such, it was heir to
the lunar-repeater communication tests discussed in Chapter One. Originally funded by
NASA's predecessor, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), and the
Defense Department's space research organization, the Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA), Project Echo became a JPL, NASA, and Bell Telephone Laboratories
undertaking in an agreement signed in January 1959.
The Echo experiments used the exisdng HA-DEC antenna to receive as part of a
satellite circuit running from east to west. The west-to-east circuit, however, required the
construction of an antenna capable of transmitting. Therefore, JPL installed a second 26-
meter-diameter (85-feet-diameter) dish at Goldstone about a year after the HA-DEC
antenna for Project Echo. The axes of the second antenna measured angles in terms of
azimuth (AZ) and elevation (EL); hence, it was referred to as the AZ-EL antenna. 2s
Figure 7
Jet Propulsion Laboratory Goldstone 26-meter AZ-EL antenna built for Project Echo and used with the 26-meter HA-DEC
antenna to detea echoes from Venus in 1961. (Cx_urtesy of Jet Propulsion l_b_ratory, photo no. 332-168.)
25. Victor, "General System Description," in Victor, Stevens, and Golomb, p. 6; Corliss, Deep Spaa*
Network, pp. 25--27; Donald C. Elder, Ill, "Out From Behind the Eight Ball: Echo I and the Emergence of the
American Space Program, 1957-1960," Ph.D. dim., University of California at San Diego, 1989, passim. For a his-
tory of ARPA, see Richard J. Barber Associates, Inc., The Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1958-1974
(Washington, D.C.: National Technical Information Service, 1975). For the story of JPL and Project Echo, see
Stevens and Victor, eds., The Gold._tone ,Station Communications and Tracking System for Project Echo, Technical Report
32-59 (Pasadena:JPL, 1960); Victor and Stevens, 'q'he Role of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Project Echo,"
IRE Tmnsactwna on Spa_ Electronm_ and Telemetry SET-7 ( 1961) : 20-28.
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By August 1960, as Goldstone prepared to participate in Project Echo, the Lincoln
Laboratory and Jodrell Bank Venus experiments already had taken place. Solomon
Golomb, assistant chief of the Communications System Research Section under Walt
Victor, asked his employee, Richard Goldstein, to design a space experiment to feed the
rivalry between Eb Rechtin, JPL program director for the DSIE and A1 Hibbs, who was in
charge of space science at JPL. Goldstein suggested the Venus radar experiment. Victor,
JPL project engineer for the Echo program and recently promoted to chief of the
Communications System Research Section, and Bob Stevens, head of the Communica-
tions Elements Research Section, became the project managers. 26
Rechtin, Victor, and Stevens organized the Venus experiment as a drill of the DSIF
and its technical staff. The functional, organizational, and budgetary status of planetary
radar astronomy as a test of the DSIF originated in their conception of the 1961 Venus
experiment and defined planetary radar atJPL for over two decades. At the time, the lab-
oratory was preparing for the first Mariner missions. Consequently, as Rechtin pointed
out, JPL had "a particular interest in an accurate determination of the distance to Venus
in order that we might guide our space probes to that target. '"27
The NASA Office of Space Science approved the Mariner 1 and 2 missions in July
1960. Goldstone was to provide communications with them. The task would be more chal-
lenging than communicating with a Ranger Moon probe. While a Ranger mission
required three days, the Mariner missions would involve months of round-the-clock, high-
level technical performance. In June 1960, even before final approval of the Mariner
probes, Rechtin proposed the radar experiment to NASA, emphasizing not its scientific
value, but the "practical, purely project point of view. ''98
In order to perform the Venus experiment, JPL had to modify the Echo equipment.
Venus was a much farther object than the Earth-orbiting Echo balloon, and both differed
radically as radar targets. Victor and Stevens, moreover, wanted to avoid long-term inte-
gration and after-the-fact data reduction and analysis, that is, the Lincoln Laboratory and
Jodrell Bank approach. Instead, JPL attempted a real-time radar detection of Venus.
TheJPL antennas were unlike those of Lincoln Laboratory andJodrell Bank in many
ways. They operated in tandem, the AZ-EL transmitting and the HA-DEC receiving. This
bistatic mode, as it is called, offered advantages over the Millstone andJodrell Bank mono-
static mode, in which a single instrument both sent and received. Monostatic radars have
to stop transmitting half the time in order to receive, while bistatic radars can operate con-
tinuously, gathering twice the data in the same period of time. The Goldstone radars also
operated at a higher frequency (S-band v. UHF) and sent a continuous wave, whereas the
Lincoln Laboratory and Jodreli Bank radars transmitted discrete pulses.
JPL also boosted the transmitting power and receiver sensitivity of the two radars.
The normal output of the AZ-EL transmitter klystron tube was 10 kilowatts at 2388 MHz
(12.6 cm), but engineers coaxed a nominal average power output of 13 kilowatts out of it.
26. Golomb, "The First Touch of Venus," paper presented at the Symposium Celebrating the Thirtieth
Anniversary of Planetary Radar Astronomy, Pasadena, October 1991, Renzetti materials; Goldstein 7 April 1993;
Goldstein 14 September 1993; Goldstein 19 September 1991; Stevens 14 September 1993; biographical materi-
al andJPL Press Release, 23 May 1961, 3-15, Historical File,JPLA.
27. Rechtin, "Informal Remarks on the Venus Radar Experiment," in Armin J. Deutsch and Woffgang
B. Klemperer, eds., Space Age Astronomy (New York: Academic Press, 1962), p. 365; Golomb, "Introduction," in
Victor, Stevens, and Golomb, pp. 1-2; Rechtin, telephone conversation, 13 September 1993; Goldstein
19 September 1991.
28. Golomb, "Introduction," p. I;JPL, Re._earchSummary No. 36-7, p. 70; Rechtin, telephone conversa-
tion, 13 September 1993; Waft, "A History of the Deep Space Network," manuscript furnished to author,
ch. 6, pp. 22 and 24. Because the manuscript is not paginated sequentially, both chapter and page references are
provided.
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Raising the sensitivity of the HA-DEC receiver was a daunting challenge; the total receiv-
er system noise temperature on Project Echo had been 1570 K! _9
The technical solution was a maser and a parametric amplifier in tandem on the HA-
DEC antenna. Charles T. Stelzried and Takoshi Sato created a 2388-MHz maser specifi-
caUy for the Venus radar experiment and suitable for Goldstone's tough desert ambient
temperatures (from -12" to 43"C; 10" to ll0"F) and climate (rain, dust, and snow). The
maser and 2388-MHz parametric amplifier combined gave an overall average system noise
temperature of about 64 K during the two months of the Venus experiment, considerably
lower than the best achieved at Millstone in 1958 (170 K). As Victor and Stevens pro-
claimed, 'q'his is believed to be the most sensitive operational receiving system in the
world. -30
"No Echo, No Thesis"
Besides testing the personnel and materiel of the Goldstone facility, the JPL Venus
experiment also was the doctoral thesis topic of two employees in Walt Victor's section,
Duane Muhleman and Richard Goldstein. Muhleman graduated from the University of
Toledo with a BS in physics in 1953, then worked two years at the NACA Edwards Air Force
Base High-Speed Flight Station as an aeronautical research engineer, beforejoiningJPL.
As part of his dudes atJPL, Muhleman tested the Venus radar system and its components
during January, February, and March 1961, using the Moon as a target. For the Venus
experiment, Muhleman contributed an instrument to measure Doppler spreading, sl
Goldstein was a Caltech graduate student in electrical engineering. His task on the
Venus radar experiment was to build a spectrum measuring instrument. It recorded what
the spectrum looked like during reception of an echo and what it looked like when the
receiver saw only noise.JPL hired his brother, Samuel Goldstein, aJPL alumnus and radio
astronomer at Harvard College Observatory, as a consultant on the Venus experiment;
Samuel also helped his brother with some of the radio techniques.
Dick Goldstein wanted to use the Venus radar experiment as his thesis topic at
Caltech, but his advisor, Hardy Martel, was highly skeptical. The inability of Lincoln
Laboratory to detect Venus was widely known. Although he thought the task indisputably
impossible, Martel finally agreed to accept the topic, but with a firm admonition: "No
echo, no thesis. "-_2
29. Rechtin, p. 366; Victor, "C,eneral System Description," pp. 6-7; Stevens and Victor, "Summary and
Conclusions," p. 95; Victor and Stevens, _The 1961 JPL Venus Radar Experiment," IRE Transaaions on Spare
Electronics and Telemetry SET-8 (1962): 85-90; Charles T. Stelzried, "System Capability and Critical Components:
System Temperature Results," in Victor, Stevens, and Golomb, pp. 28-29. For a general description of the radar
system, see M. H. Brockman, Leonard R. Mailing, and H. R. Buchanan, "Venus Radar Experiment," in JPL,
Research Summary No. 36-8, Volume 1, for the period February 1, 1961 to April 1, 1961 (Pasadena: JPL, 1961),
pp. 65-73; Victor and Stevens. "Exploration of Venus by Radar," Sc/ence 134 (1961): 46. The Jodrell Bank trans-
mitter had a peak power of 50 kilowatts; Millstone's peak power was 265 kilowatts in 1958 and 500 kilowatts in
1959. However, comparing the peak power ratings of pulse and continuous-wave radars is the electronic equiva-
lent of comparing apples and oranges. One must compare their average power outputs.
30. Stevens and Victor, "Summary and Conclusions," p. 95; Sato, "System Capability and Critical
Components: Maser Amplifier," in Victor, Stevens, and Golomb, p. 17; Stelzried, "System Capability and Critical
Components: System Temperature Results," pp. 28-29; H. R. Buchanan, "System Capability and Critical
Components: Parametric Amplifier," in Victor, Stevens, and Golomb, pp. 22-25; Walter H. Higa, A Maser System
for Radar A.,tronomy, Technical Report 32-103 (Pasadena: JPL, 1961); Higa, "A Maser System for Radar
Astronomy," in IC Endresen, low Noise Electronics (New York: Pergamon Press, 1962), pp. 296-304.
31. Muhleman 8 April 1993; Muhleman 19 May 1994; Muhleman 27 May 1994; Goldstein 19 September
1991; Stevens 14 September 1993; Golomb, "Introduction," p. 3; Stevens, UAdditional Experiments: Resume," in
Victor, Stevens, and Golomb, p. 70. Muhleman's dissertation was "Radar Investigations of Venus," Ph.D. diss.,
Harvard University, 1963.
32. Goldstein 7 April 1993; Goldstein 19 September 1991; Goldstein 14 September 1993.
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On10March1961,amonthbeforeinferiorconjunction,theGoldstoneradarswere
pointedatVenus.Thefirstsignalscompletedtheround-tripof 113millionkilometersin
aboutsixandahalfminutes.Duringthe68secondsofelectronicsignalintegrationtime,
1of 7recordingstylusesonGoldstein'sinstrumentdeviatedsignificantlyfromitszerolevelandremainedatthenewlevel.
ToverifythatthedeflectioncamefromVenusandwasnotleakagefromthetrans-
mitteroraninstabilityin thereceiver,thetransmitterantennawasdeliberatelyallowedto
driftofftarget.Sixandahalfminuteslater,therecordingstylusonGoldstein'sinstrument
returnedto itszerosetting.Theexperimentwasimmediatelyrepeatedwiththesame
result.JPLhadachievedthefirstreal-timedetectionof aradarsignalfromVenus.And
DickGoldsteinhadhisdissertationtopic.33On 16March,EbRechtintelexedPaulGreen:"HAVEBEENOBTAININGREAL
TIMERADAREFLECTEDSIGNALSFROMVENUSINCEMARCH10USING10KW
CWAT2388MCATA SYSTEMTEMPERATUREOF55DEGREES."Thefollowingday,
Green,JohnEvans(thenat LincolnLaboratory),Pettengill,andPricetelexedback:
"HEARTIESTCONGRATULATIONSNYOURSUCCESSWITHTHEFICKLELADY.
MILLSTONEISONWITHTHEUSUALMODEOFOPERATIONBUTHASHADNO
SUCHLUCKASYET.PRESENTPARAMETERS2.4MEGAWATTSPEAKFOR2 MIL-
LISECONDSEVERY33MILLISECONDS190DEGREESKELVIN."34
Followingtheinitialcontact,JPLconductedadditionalradarexperimentsalmost
dailyfrom10Marchto 10May1961,collecting238hoursofrecordedradardataabout
Venus.35NopreviousVenusradarexperiment,noranyotherscarriedout in 1961,
collectedasmanyhoursofdataastheJPLexperiment.
TheJPLexperimentsucceeded,becauseit didnotdependonknowingtherangeto
Venus,pecifically;it didnotdependonpriorknowledgeoftheprecisevalueoftheastro-
nomicalunit.Ontheotherhand,LincolnLaboratory, as well asJodrell Bank, had based
its experiment on an assumed, yet commonly accepted, value for the astronomical unit,
and, consequently, for the distance between Earth and Venus during inferior conjunction.
"We Were Wrong."
The results obtained by Lincoln and other laboratories in 1961 agreed with those
obtained byJPL. That agreement led Gordon Pettengill to discern the error of the 1958
Lincoln Laboratory observations. "In view of the generally excellent agreement among
the various observations made at several wavelengths [in 1961]," Pettengill and his col-
leagues concluded, "it seems likely that the results reported from observations of the 1958
inferior conjunction are in error, although no explanation has been found. "_
Green recalled: "It was sort of devastating, when the next conjunction of Venus came
around, and we learned that we were wrong. We had the wrong value of the astronomical
unit. It wasn't over here; it was way over there someplace. In fact, it wasn't even easy to go
back and look at the original data and conclude that it was really over there. The original
33. JPL Press Release, 23 May 1961, 3-15, Historical File, JPLA; Mailing and Golomb, "Radar
Measurements of the Planet Venus,"Journal of the British Institution of Radio Engineers 22 (1961): 298; Victor and
Stevens, "The 1961JPL Venus Radar Experiment," IRE Transactionson Space Electronicsand TelemetrySET-8 (1962):
90-91. Goldstein's dissertation was "Radar Exploration of Venus," Ph.D. diss., California Institute of Technology,
1962.
34. 3-15, Historical File,JPLA.
35. Victor and Stevens, "1961JPL Venus Radar Experiment," p. 91.
36. Pettengill, Briscoe, Evans, Gehrels, Hyde, Kraft, Price, and Smith, "A Radar Investigation of Venus,"
The AstronormcalJourna16 7 (1962): 186.
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datajusthadturnedouttobetoonoisy....Itwasachasteningexperienceforus."37Price
rememberedsomeoneenteringhisofficewith"aratherlonglookonhisface"andsaying,
"Bob,I thinkwe'vebeenfoundtobewrong."Itwasanembarrassingmoment.
Pricere-examinedtheLincolnLaboratory1958tapes."Iwantedtobesurethatwe
hadn'tdetectedit. I reallymeanthat.I wantedtomakesurethatwehadanegativeresult
andthatbyaccidentwedidn'thavetwowrongsmakingaright,thatis,falseprocessingof
the1958dataledtoafalseresult,sotheproperprocessingofthe1958datawouldagree
withJPL.I wantedtoprovethatthatwasnot the case. So I went back and found the peaks,
just as I had done before. I made a meticulous measurement of their position, which is the
whole thing that the false echo hinged on. I developed with magnetic powder over and
over again those tapes, and I inspected them until my eyes were sore. I reran the Fortran
programs and checked all the programs, because you could create a timing error in the
program."
The experience reminded Price of his work in Australia. Every day, his group had
made ink-pen recordings of the radio sky over the antenna, usually recording only ran-
dom lines, but a peak appeared on two successive days. Did the peak mean a detection of
deuterium? They decided that it was a fluke and published their negative results. "If we
had behaved the same way at Millstone," Price reflected, "we might have saved ourselves
some embarrassment. But that is hindsight." The two Venus pulses arrived 2.2 millisec-
onds apart. "We just turned our back on it," Price admitted, "did a little wishful thinking,
and said, 'That's the same pulse.'...I just pulled them together, ignored the 2.2-millisec-
ond difference, and sat one on top of the other."38
Whatever the cause of the 1958 false readings, JPL was unquestionably the first to
detect radar waves reflected off Venus. The literature contains two earlier, but after-the-
fact detections. Only months after acknowledging JPL's priority, Lincoln Laboratory
found on their data tapes a detection of Venus on 6 March 1961, a few days prior to that
of JPL. Later, in 1963, Lincoln Laboratory electrical engineer Bill Smith re-examined the
1959 data tapes and found that an echo had been recorded on 14 September 1959. 39 Such
after-the-fact discoveries are not uncommon in the history of science, and radar
astronomers from both JPL and MIT thirty years later commemorated JPL's uncontested
priority in detecting radar waves reflected offVenus.
Once JPL unambiguously detected echoes from Venus, the key question planetary
radar astronomers addressed was the size of the astronomical unit. In order to determine
more precisely the Earth-to-Venus distance, JPL ran ranging experiments between 18
April and 5 May 1961. In the July 1961 issue of Science, Victor and Stevens announced a
preliminary value for the astronomical unit of 149,599,000 kilometers with an accuracy of
± 1500 kilometers. 4° That value was over 100,000 kilometers larger than the false radar
value determined by Lincoln Laboratory in 1958 and confirmed byJodrell Bank in 1959,
149,467,000 kilometers. Values obtained from preliminary analyses of radar data at
Lincoln Laboratory and elsewhere in 1961 agreed closely with that of JPL (Table 1).
When Lincoln Laboratory undertook its 1961 Venus radar experiment, Gordon
Pettengill, joined by John Evans, took over Bob Price's leadership role. Evans had left
Jodrell Bank for Lincoln Laboratory during the previous summer, after being courted by
the National Bureau of Standards and Stanford. At Jodrell Bank, Evans had had one
37. Green 20 September t993.
38. Price 27 September 1993.
39. Smith 29 September 1993; Smith, "Radar Observations of Venus, 1961 and 1959," The Astr_momical
Journal68 (1963): 17; Pettengill et al, "A Radar Investigation of Venus," p. 183.
40. Rechtin, p. 367; Victor, "General System Description," p. 7; Victor and Stevens, "1961 JPL Venus
Radar Experiment," p. 88; Victor and Stevens, "Exploration of Venus by Radar," p. 46.
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Table1
RadarValuesfortheAstronomicalUnit,1961-1964
Error of Value of
Measurement Astronomical Unit
(in kih)meters) (in kilometers)
Optiml Values
Spencer.limes
Eugene Rabe
1961 Conjunction
.let Propulsion Laboratory
July 1961 (I)
August 1961 (2)
Muhleman (3)
Lincttln Laboratory
May 1961 (4)
Corrected value (5)
Jodrell Bank (6)
RCA/Fh,wer and Cook Observatory (7)
So_qet Union
Pravda value (8)
November 1961 (9)
Revised Value (10)
Space Technolog'y Laboratories ( 11 )
1962 Conjunction
Jodrell Bank (121
Soviet Union (13)
.let Proptdsion Laboratory Muhleman (14)
1964 Conjunction
Lincoln Laboratory (15)
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (16)
Soviet Union (17)
IAU Value
-+17,(100
+ 10,0(10
+1,500
+500
-+.250
+1,50(1
+400
+5,000
+200
+ 130,000P
+3,300
+2,000
+13,7[)0
+900
+270
+670
+ 1(10
+100
+400
149,675,000
149,530,000
149,599,0(10
149,598,500
149,598,845
149,597,700
149,597,850
149,601,000
149,596,000
149,457,000
149,598,000
149,599,3(_)
149,544,360
149,596,600
149,597,900
149,598,900
149,598,000
149,598,000
149,598,000
149,600,000
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technical assistant; but at Lincoln Laboratory, as Bernard Lovell pointed out, he had "an
army of engineers and technicians together with a transmitter vastly superior to the one
at Jodrell Bank."
Evans' departure from Jodrell Bank could not have come at a worse time, in the
opinion of Lovell. "For me it was the beginning of a distressing series of losses of the bril-
liant young men who had been with me throughout the crisis of the telescope and whose
devotion and skill had been a determining factor in the immediate success of the instru-
ment. But who could expect a young man to resist a lavish red carpet reception and an
offer of a salary many times greater than any sum which we could possibly offer him? "41
During the 1961 Venus experiment, the Millstone Hill radar ran at peak transmitting
power, 2.5 megawatts. The increased transmitter power overcame the higher overall
receiver noise temperature (240 K) to make the telescope a far more capable instrument.
Pettengill and his colleagues aimed their radar at Venus on 6 March 1961, again using a
technique to provide real-time detection. No echoes appeared until 24 March.
Preliminary analysis yielded a value for the astronomical unit of 149,597,700 + 1,500 kilo-
meters in May 1961.42 That agreed closely with JPL's preliminary value, 149,599,000 kilo-
meters. Despite considerable obstacles, and chastened by their 1959 false detection,
Jodreil Bank investigators also found a value for the astronomical unit that agreed with the
JPL value.
In 1959, John H. Thomson took over the planetary radar program, and in the
autumn of 1960, Lovell added John E. B. Ponsonby, who had come toJodrell Bank to work
on a doctorate after graduating in electrical engineering from Imperial College, London.
Ponsonby had experience in meteor radar through his high school teacher and one-time
member of the Jodrell Bank group, Ian C. Browne. 4s
Working from notes and memoranda left by Evans, the new team, which included G.
N. Taylor and R. S. Roger, put together a radar system that "yielded a clear-cut and deci-
sive answer after only a few 5 minute integration periods. ''44 The first thing they did, how-
ever, was to abandon the atrocious klystron. With most of the problems that plagued the
1959 experiment overcome, with a more sensitive receiver, and with peak power output
boosted from 50 to 60 kilowatts, the 76-meter (250-ft) Jodrell Bank telescope detected
Venus beginning 8 April 1961, a few weeks after both JPL and Lincoln Laboratory had
started their experiments, and ending 25 April 1961.
Jodrell Bank calculated a value for the astronomical unit, 149,600,000 + 5000 kilo-
meters, 45 close to the preliminary values of JPL (149,599,000 kilometers) and Lincoln
41. Lovell, Out oflhe Zenith, pp. 192 and 195; Evans 9 September 1993; Green 20 September 1993; Smith
29 September 1993; Pettengill 28 September 1993.
42. The Staff, Millstone Radar Observatory, Lincoln Laboratory, "The Scale of the SolarSystem," Nature
190 (1961): 592; Pettengill et al, "A Radar Investigation of Venus," pp. 182-183; Pettengill and Price, p. 73;
Pettengill, _Radar Measurements of Venus," in Wolfgang Priester, ed., Space Rtatarch III, Proceedings of the Third
lnttrnational Space ScienceSymposium (New York: Interscience Publishers Division,John Wiley and Sons, 1963), p.
874; Overhage to Wilson, 22 May 1961, 1/24/AC 134, MIRA.
43. Ponsonby 11January 1994; I. C. Browne and I". R. Kaiser, "The Radio Echo from the Head of Meteor
Tr_ils," Journal of A traosphericand TerrestrialPhysics 4 (1953): 1--4.
44. Evans 9 September 1993; Lovell, Out of the Zenith, pp. 198-199; Thomson, Ponsonby, Taylor, and
Roger, "A New Determination of the Solar Parallax by Means of Radar Echoes from Venus," Nature 190 (1961):
519--520. TheJodrell Bank experiment was funded by Air Force contract no. AF61(052)-172. John Evans, then
of Lincoln Laboratory, privately had communicated the laboratory's results to Thomson atJodrell Bank.
45. I have calculated this value from the information provided in Thomson, Ponsonby, Taylor, and
Roger, pp. 519-520. While the authors concern themselves with the solar parallax, they also provide a figure for
the light-time of the astronomical unit, 499,011 :t-0.017 seconds, which represents the time taken by radar waves
to travel the distance of one astronomical unit, and another for the speed of light, 299,799.5 kilometers per sec-
ond, which is the same as the speed of electromagnetic waves. By multiplying the two figures, I obtained a prod-
uct of 149,599,750 kilometers.
The first published value of the astronomical unit 1 have found was in the comments given by Thomson
following a presentation by Mailing and Golomb at a convention in Oxford that took place 5--SJuly 1961. The
date of publication was October 1961. Malling and Golomb, p. 302.
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Laboratory(149,597,700kilometers),butwithafargreaterpossiblerrorof measure-
ment. Similar results came from an unexpected source. RCA's Missile and Surface Radar
Division in Moorestown, New Jersey, carded out its first and last planetary radar experi-
ment in 1961. The Division performed radar research for the Army Signal Corps and the
Navy, and in 1960, the Division performed solar radio experiments using a missile-track-
ing radar. On their Venus radar experiment, RCA investigators collaborated with the
Flower and Cook Observatory of the University of Pennsylvania. Between 12 March and 8
April 1961, RCA tracked Venus with a BMEWS experimental radar in order to measure
the astronomical unit. In over six hours of transmitted signals, they found only four peaks
from which they calculated a value for the astronomical unit of 149,596,000 + 200 kilo-
meters, 46 only 3,000 kilometers less than theJPL value. Not all Venus radar results agreed
with those of JPL, however.
In the Soviet Union, planetary radar was fundamental to the space program. One of
the main objectives of the Crimean Venus experiment was to calculate a more precise
value for the astronomical unit for use in launching planetary probes. The calculation of
the orbit of the Mars-1 probe, in November 1962, utilized a radar-based value for the astro-
nomical unit. The Institute of Radio Engineering and Electronics (IREE) of the U.S.S.R.
Academy of Sciences, in association with other unnamed (but presumably military and
intelligence) organizations and under the direction of Vladimir A. Kotelnikov, of the
Soviet Academy of Sciences, designed and built planetary radar equipment that was
installed at the Long-Distance Space Communication Center, located near Yevpatoriya in
the Crimea. The IREE installation had nothing to do with the radar work carried out in
the Soviet Union in 1946 on meteors or between 1954 and 1957 on the Moon.
The IREE planetary radar was a monostatic pulse 700-MHz (43-cm) system. For the
receiver, the IREE expressly designed both a parametric and a paramagnetic amplifier,
another form of solid-state, low-noise microwave amplifier. The noise temperature of the
entire receiver (without antenna) was claimed to be 20 + 10 K. The antenna was an array
of eight 16-meter dishes, unlike any design ever used in the United States or Britain for
planetary radar astronomy. 47
Kotelnikov and his colleagues observed Venus between 18 and 26 April 1961. Their
preliminary analysis of the data yielded an estimate of the astronomical unit, 149,457,000
kilometers, which appeared in the newspapers Pravda and Izvestiia on 12 May 1961. Over
100,000 kilometers less than theJPL and other values, the Soviet astronomical unit mea-
surement was so incredibly incongruous, that Solomon Golomb told a conference of
astronomers, "we should congratulate our Russian colleagues on the discovery of a new
46. W.O. Mehuron, "Passive Radar Measurements at C-Band using the Sun as a Noise Source," The.
Microwa_Journal 5 (April, 1962): 87-94; David K. Barton, _lae Future of Pulse Radar for Missile and Space
Range Instrumentation," IRE" Transactions on Military Electronics MIL-5, no. 4 (October, 1961): 330-351; Irving
Maron, George Luchak, and William Blitzstein, "Radar Observation of Venus," Scwnu 134 (1961): 1419-1420.
47. B.I. Kuznetsov and 1. V. Lishin, "Radar Investigations of the Solar System Planets," in Air Force
Systems Command, Radio ,SeventyYear_ (Wright-Patterson A.FB, Ohio: Air Force Systems Command, 1967),
pp. 187-188, 190 and 201; Vladimir A. Kotelnikov, _Radar Contact with Venus," Journal o/the British Institution of
RadioEng_neers 22 (1961): 293; Kotelnikov, L. V. Apraksin, V. O. Voytov, M. G. Golubtsov, V. M. Dubrovin, N. M.
Zaytsev, E. B. Korenberg, V. E Minashin, V. A. Morozov, N. 1.Nikitskiy, G. M. Petrov, O. N. Rzhiga, and A. M.
Shakhovskoy, "Radar System Employed during Radar Contact with Venus in 1961," Radio Engine_ng and
E&ctronic Physics 11 (1962): 1715--1716. For a brief history of the IREE, see Y.V. Gulyaev, "40 Years of the Institute
of Radio,engineering and Electronics of the Russian Academy of Sciences," Radiotekhnika Elektronika vol. 38, no.
10 (October 1993) : 1729-1733. Soviet investigators performed radar studies of meteors in 1946 and of the Moon
in 1954-1957, according to A. E. Solomonovich, "I'he First Steps of Soviet Radio Astronomy," pp. 284-285 in
Sullivan. Although radar astronomers recently have used the arrayed dishes of the Very Large Array in bistatic
experiments, dish arrays have not been used as transmitting antennas.
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planet. It surely wasn't Venus!" Retrospectively, Kotelnikov explained that "random real-
izations of noise were taken for reflected signals. "48
The cause of the Soviet error might have been rooted in Cold War competition,
which placed Soviet scientists under great pressure to produce results quickly for political
reasons. The Pravda and Izvestiia announcements appeared on 12 May 1961, six days after
the Jodrell Bank, but before the Lincoln Laboratory, announcements. If published
sources had guided Kotelnikov and his colleagues, they would have been the erroneous
Lincoln Laboratory and Jodrell Bank results of 1958 and 1959, with which the Izvestiia
value agreed closely (within 10,000 kilometers).
The Cold War prevented communication and cooperation among planetary radar
investigators. The Space Race in 1961 was still an extension of the Cold War; informal
communications did not exist. Lincoln Laboratory did secret military research; JPL was a
sensitive space research center with connections to ARPA, a military research agency.
Jodrell Bank did not yet have ties with their Soviet counterparts. While Lincoln
Laboratory, JPL, and Jodrell Bank personnel exchanged data, such informal links with
Soviet scientists did not and could not exist.
Kotelnikov and his associates at the IREE, after realizing their error, turned their
attention to a complete analysis of the raw radar data recorded on magnetic tape with the
help of a special analyzer. Their new value, 149,598,000 + 3300 kilometers, agreed closely
with those of the United States and Britain. 49 Although the Soviet and British errors of
measurement were greater than those of the American laboratories, they were far less
than the values obtained by optical methods. The accuracy of the radar over the optical
method and the general agreement among the preliminary results obtained in the United
States, Britain, and the Soviet Union were the basis for a re-evaluation of the astronomi-
cal unit by the International Astronomical Union (IAU).
Redefining the Astronomical Unit
The re-evaluation of the astronomical unit was part of a general movement within
the IAU to reform the en tire system of astronomical constants conventionally used to com-
pute ephemerides. On 21 August 1961, shortly after JPL, Lincoln Laboratory, andJodreli
Bank announced their first estimations of the astronomical unit, the IAU executive com-
mittee decided to organize a symposium on the system of astronomical constants. That sys-
tem rested upon observations made in the nineteenth century and values adopted at
international conferences held in Paris in 1896 and 1911.5°
By 1950, two competing opdcal methods provided more accurate values for the astro-
nomical unit. Harold Spencer Jones, Astronomer Royal of Great Britain from 1933 to
1955, used a trigonometric approach based on the triangulation of Eros. The orbit of the
48. Kotelnikov et al, "Radar System," pp. 1715 and 1721; Kotelnikov, "Radar Contact," p. 294; Malling
and Golomb, p. 300; Kotelnikov, "Radar Observations of the Planet Venus in the Soviet Union in April, 1961,"
typed manuscript, 27 February 1963, anonymous translation of a technical report of the Soviet Institute of Radio
Engineering and Electronics, DT1C report number AD-401137, pp. 41-42, Renzetti materials. The Soviet publi-
cation venue and aberrant astronomical unit value raise serious doubts about the veracity of their announce-
ment.
49. Kotelnikov et al, "Radar System," p. 1721; Kuznetsov and Lishin, p. 188; Kotelnikov, "Radar
Observations," p. 2; Kotelnikov, Dubrovin, Morozov, Petrov, Rzhiga, Z. G. Trunova, and Shakhovoskoy, "Results
of Radar Contact with Venus in 1961," Radio Engineeringand ElectronicsPhysics ! 1 ( 1962): 1722 and 1725. For a
discussion of the integration technique, see V. I. Bunimovich and Morozov, "Small-Signal Reception by the
Method of Binary Integration," ibid., pp. 1734-1740.
50. Jean Kovalevsky, ed., The L_stemof Astronomical C_nstants (Paris: Gauthier-Villars and Cie., 1965), p.
1; Walter Fricke, "Arguments in Favor of the Revision of the Conventional System of Astronomical Constants,"
inJ. C. Pecker, ed., Proctedings of the Twelfth GeneralAssembly (New York: Academic Press, 1966), p. 604.
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asteroid,iscoveredin 1898byBerlinastronomerGustavWitt,approachesEarthatregu-
larintervals.AspresidentoftheIAUSolarParallaxCommission,SpencerJonesoversaw
aworldwideoperationto recordphotographicobservationsof Erosduringits closest
approachtoEarthin 1930and1931.Throughacomplicatedanalysisofnearly3,000pho-
tographs,SpencerJonesestimatedtheastronomicalunittobe149,675,000+ 17,000 kilo-
meters. Eugene Rabe, an astronomer at the Cincinnati Observatory, applied the so-called
dynamic method to observations of Eros between 1926 and 1945. He took into account
the gravitational effects of the Earth, Mars, Mercury, and Venus on the orbit of Eros, and
arrived at a value of 149,530,000 + 10,000 kilometers. 5t
In addition, investigators at the Space Technology Laboratories (STL), a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Ramo-Wooldridge (later TRW), computed a value from data acquired
during tile Pioneer 5 mission. In figuring the probe's trajectory, STL chose Rabe's value
over that of Lincoln Laboratory in 1958. Not surprisingly, STL found a value for the astro-
nomical unit, 149,544,360 + 13,700 kilometers, in agreement with Rabe, but with a greater
error of measurement. The STL value hardly challenged the more accurate ground-based
radar measurements. Its "published accuracy," Walter Fricke, astronomer and professor at
the Heidelberg Astronomisches Rechen-|nstitut, judged, "does not yet indicate any advan-
tage over the traditional methods. ''52 The Pioneer 5 value did not play any part in the
IAU's revision of the astronomical unit.
The organizing committee of the IAU symposium on astronomical constants
brought together astronomers from the United States and Europe who were responsible
for drawing up the ephemerides. COSPAR (the Committee on Space Research) named an
ad hoc committee to participate in the symposium, and additional astronomers from the
United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Portugal, the Soviet Union, and South
Africa took part. The members of the organizing committee included Eb Rechtin, theJPL
manager of the DSIF; Dirk Brouwer, director of the Yale Observatory; and Gerald M.
Clemence, scientific director of the U.S. Naval Observatory in Washington. Both Brouwer
and Clemence had helpedJPL with the Venus radar experiment ephemerides. Among the
additional astronomers participating in organizing committee activities were two radar
astronomers, Dewey Muhleman and Irwin I. Shapiro. 53
Soon after the 1961 Venus experiment, Muhleman left JPL for the Harvard
Astronomy Department. There, under Fred Whipple, A. Edward Lilley, and William Liller,
he completed a doctoral dissertation based on Venus radar data collected at Goldstone in
June 1963. After returning to JPL, Muhleman took a teaching position in the Cornell
Astronomy Department in 1965. Shapiro had a Ph.D. in physics from Harvard and had
worked on the detection of objects with radar in a clutter environment and on ballistic
missile defense systems, before joining the team conducting radar experiments on Venus
as the "guru" who calculated the ephemerides for Lincoln Laboratory planetary radar
research. 54
51. Spencer Jones, "The Solar Parallax and the Mass of the Moon from Observations of Eros at the
Opposition of 1931," Merm,ir._ of the Royal Astromnnical ,Society 66 (1938--1941): 11-66; Rabe, "Derivation of
Fundamental Astronomical Constants from the Observations of Eros during 1926-1945," TheAstronomicalJournal
55 (1950): 112-126; Fricke, "Inaugural Address Delivered at the IAU-Symposium No. 21," in Kovalevsky,
pp. 12-13.
52. Fricke, "Inaugural Address," p. 13;James B. McGuire, Eugene R. Spangler, and Lem Wong, "The
Size of the Solar System," Scient!fic American vol. 204, no. 4 (1961): 64-72. The vahte given in the article is
92,925,100 ±8,500 miles, which 1 have converted into kilometers for consistency.
53. Rechtin, p. 368; Muhleman, D. Holdridge, and N. Block, "Determination of the Astronomical Unit
from Velocity, Range and Integrated Velocity Data, and the Venus-Earth Ephemeris," in Victor, Stevens, and
Golomb, pp. 83-92. Kovalevsky, p. 1, provides a list of their names.
54. Muhleman 8 April 1993; Muhleman 19 May 1994; Shapiro 30 September 1993; Evans 9 September
1993.
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The IAU symposium took place at the Paris Observatory between 27 and 31 May
1963. By then, Lincoln Laboratory andJPL had refined the accuracy of their calculations
even further, to ± 400 and ± 250 kilometers respectively. In his inaugural address, Walter
Fricke lauded the accuracy and general agreement of the radar measurements. As far as
Fricke and other symposium participants were concerned, the real debate was between
the radar and dynamic methods. Spencer Jones' trigonometric method contained too
many inherent sources of systematic error. In an attempt to reconcile the dynamic and
radar methods, Brian G. Marsden, an astronomer at the Yale University Observatory, con-
cluded in favor of the radar measurements. Rabe defended his method in person, argu-
ing that the radar observations were inconsistent with the observed orbit of Eros and with
gravitational theory. ,s5
Muhleman and Shapiro supported the radar method and explained the basis on
which JPL and Lincoln Laboratory had obtained their results. Additional support for the
radar method came from Britain. D. H. Sadler, Superintendent ofH. M. Nautical Almanac
Office at the Royal Greenwich Observatory, read a paper on the results of theJodrell Bank
1962 Venus experiment.
Lest it appear that there was unanimous approval of the radar method, COSPAR
raised the question of the discrepancy between the radar observations of 1958 and 1959
and those of 1961. Both Muhleman and Shapiro insisted that a discussion of the 1958
data, which they both labelled "manifestly wrong," would be too difficult and serve no pur-
pose. They explained that the 1958 technology was highly inadequate and stressed the
harmonious agreement among the 1961 measurements. 56
The participants unanimously adopted Resolution Six, which recommended that the
astronomical constants be studied by both existing and new methods, so that the results
might be compared. The IAU Executive Committee then translated Resolution Six into
Resolution Four, which recommended that a working group study the system of astro-
nomical constants, including the astronomical unit expressed in meters. Next, the IAU
Executive Committee named the Working Group on astronomical constants: Dirk
Brouwer, Jean Kovalevsky (Bureau of Longitudes, Paris), Walter Fricke (chairman),
Aleksandr A. Mikhailov (director of the Pulkovo Observatory, Soviet Union), and George
A. Wilkins (Royal Observatory of Greenwich; Secretary). The Working Group sent a cir-
cular letter and copies of the Paris resolutions to all persons, some 80 in number, who
were thought to be likely to be able to help the Group or who might be affected by the
introduction of new constants. The Working Group met in January 1964, at the Royal
Greenwich Observatory, Herstmonceux Castle, and drew up a list of constants, including
the astronomical unit, for consideration by the IAU general assembly, which met in
Hamburg later that year. 57
The Working Group met again during the Hamburg meeting on 27 August.
Muhleman and Pettengill, who read Shapiro's paper in his place, reviewed the latest radar
determinations of the astronomical unit byJPL and Lincoln Laboratory from new obser-
vations made in 1964. Pettengill reported that preliminary analysis of the new data con-
firmed a value of 149,598,000 kilometers, while Muhleman disclosed the JPL value of
55. Kovalevsky, p. 3; Fricke, _Inaugural Address," pp. 12-13; Fricke, "Arguments in Favor of the Revision
of the Conventional System of Astronomical Constants," in Pecker, p. 606; Marsden, MAnAttempt to Reconcile
the Dynamical and Radar Determinations of the Astronomical Unit," in Kovalevsky, pp. 225-236; Rabe, "On the
compatibility of the Recent Solar Parallax Results from Radar Echoes of Venus with the Motion of Eros," in
Kovalevsky, pp. 219-223.
56. Shapiro, "Radar Determination of the Astronomical Unit," in Kovalevsky, pp. 177-215, and
Muhleman, "Relationship between the System of Astronomical Constants and the Radar Determinations of the
Astronomical Unit." in ibid., pp. 153--175; Kovalevsky, pp. 298 and 311.
57. Kovalevsky, pp. 314 and 323; "Joint Discussion on the Report of the Working Group on the IAU
System of Astronomical Constants," in Pecker, p. 600.
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149,598,500kilometers.Theerrorofmeasurementreportedbybothlaboratories,+ 100
kilometers, was the smallest yet. 5s
Walter Fricke, chair of the Working Group, had misgivings about the radar method:
"One could argue that the radar results are still too fresh to deserve full confidence. My
personal distrust of them in so far as it originates in their newness has a counterpart in my
distrust of the dynamical [Rabe] result obtained from the discussion of the observations
of Eros.'59
Without any discussion of the dynamic method, however, the Working Group rec-
ommended adoption of a value expressed in meters and based on radar observations. The
IAU general assembly then adopted the recommended value, 149,600 X 106 meters
(149,600,000 kilometers), e_ It was now a matter of incorporating the new value into the
various national almanacs and ephemerides.
The Rotation of Venus
The establishment of a highly accurate value for the astronomical unit and its adop-
tion by the IAU was but one way that planetary radar demonstrated its value as a problem-
solving scientific activity. The distance from Earth to Venus as measured byJPL radar also
proved essential in keeping the 1962 Mariner 2 Venus probe on target. Early in its flight,
Mariner 2 went off course. The Pioneer and Echo antennas sent midcourse commands,
and a 34-minute maneuver put Mariner 2 on course. Had Rabe's value for the astronom-
ical unit been used in place of the radar value, Mariner 2 would have passed Venus with-
out acquiring any useful data. 61
Valuable insight into the rotation of Venus further demonstrated the problem-solv-
ing scientific merit of planetary radar. Optical and spectrographic methods failed to
reveal the planet's period or direction of rotation, because Venus' thick, opaque cloud
layer hid all evidence of its motion. Astronomers could only infer and imagine. Radar
waves, on the other hand, were quite capable of penetrating the Venusian atmosphere; yet
determining the planet's rotation by radar was still not easy. The key was methodical and
meticulous attention to the shape of the echo spectra. Although JPL, Lincoln Laboratory,
Jodrell Bank, and the Soviet Yevpatoriya facility calculated rotational rates for Venus, only
JPL and Lincoln Laboratory found its "locked" orbit and retrograde motion. 62
Evans and Taylor at Jodrell Bank published the first estimate of the planet's rota-
tional period, about 20 days, using their erroneous 1959 data. In 1964, John Thomson
reckoned a slow rotational rate, "probably" somewhere between 225 days and a similar ret-
rograde period. After seeming to be on the brink of discovery, Thomson pulled back, con-
cluding, "Future observations of the change of spectral width with time should enable the
rotation rate and rotation axis to be determined." "Retrograde rotation," he held, was
"physically unlikely. ''63
58. "Joint Discussion," pp. 591, 599 and 602-603; Shapiro, "Radar Determinations," in Pecker,
pp. 615-623.
59. "Joint Discussion," p. 606.
60. [bid., p. 606; "Report to the Executive Committee of the Working Group on the System of
Astronomical Constants," in Pecker, p. 594.
61. Renzetti 17 April 1992; Renzetti, A Histtrry, pp. 20 and 31; Renzetti, Tracking and Data Acquisition
Support [or t_ Mahner Venu._1962 Mi.*sion,Technical Memorandum 33-212 (Pasadena: JPL, 1July 1965), pp. 9,
17 and 75-76.
62. RCA did not hesitate a guess on the rotation rate or direction. Maron, Luchak, and Blitzstein, pp.
1419-1421.
63. Evans and Taylor, p. 1359; Ponsonby, Thomson, and lmrie, "Radar Observations of Venus and a
Determination of the Astronomical Unit," Monthly Notic._ of the Royal A._trontrmical.Society128 (1964) : 14-16.
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AscloseasJodrellBankcametodiscoveringVenus'retrogrademotion,theSoviets
werethatfaraway.Lookingatfrequencyshifts in their 1961 data, Kotelnikov's group per-
sistendy estimated the planet's rotational period as 11 days, if not 9 or 10 days. They
entirely missed the planet's retrograde motion. The Soviet error arose from their finding
that the spectrum had a wide base, at least 400 hertz wide, indicating rapid motion. All
British and United States workers agreed that the spectrum was far narrower. Lincoln
Laboratory, for example, found a narrow spectrum of only 0.6 hertz. After their 1962
radar study of Venus, Kotelnikov and his colleagues re-evaluated their data and conclud-
ed a retrograde rotational period of 200 to 300 days. 64
By then, though, JPL and Lincoln Laboratory already had discovered Venus' retro-
grade motion. Finding it was not easy. Along the way, both laboratories concluded that the
Venusian day was as long as its year, about 225 days. Venus was "locked" in its orbit, turn-
ing one face always toward the Earth at the moment of inferior conjunction. However,
these initial reports failed to note the planet's retrograde motion. 6._
The investigators who found it did not follow the same path of discovery. Just as the
availability of technology had made planetary radar astronomy possible, the limits of that
technology shaped the paths of discovery. JPL harvested the benefits of a powerful, low-
noise continuous-wave radar in their 1962 and 1964 Venus experiment, while Lincoln
Laboratory reaped the rewards of their computer and signal processing skills.
The Goldstone radar permitted Roland L. Carpenter to find the retrograde motion
of Venus in a rather novel fashion. Carpenter actually had a BA in psychology from
California State University at Los Angeles, but he had been interested in astronomy since
childhood, and he had worked at Griffith Observatory as a guide. Finding very litde work
available in psychology, Carpenter found a job at Collins Radio as an electrician thanks to
his friend, astronomer George Abell (known for Abell's clusters of galaxies), who had a
summer job there. Carpenter gradually worked his way up to electronics engineer, simply
through his work experience at Collins Radio. Then, when JPL began hiring people with
experience in radio communications for the Deep Space Network, Carpenter jumped at
the opportunity. Carpenter worked with Dewey Muhleman in Walt Victor's group and
took advantage of JPL's employee benefits program by pursuing an advanced degree in
astronomy at UCLA, while working full-time atJPL. His doctoral dissertation, "The Study
of Venus by CW Radar," written under Lawrence Aller and completed in 1966, used data
from the 1964JPL Venus radar experiment. 66 By then, however, Carpenter already had
published his discovery of the retrograde rotation of' Venus. 67
64. Kuznetsov and Lishin, pp. 199-201; Kotelnikov, "Radar Contact with Venus," J¢rurnal of the British
Irt_titution o[ Rrulto Enginee_ 22 (1961): 295; Kotelnikov et al, "Results of Radar Contact," p. 1732; Kote[nikov,
Dubrovin, M. D. Kislik, Korenberg, Minashin, Morozov, Nikitskiy, Petrov, Rzhiga, and Shakhovskoy, "Radar
Observations of the Planet Venus," Soviet Physi*:_--Doklady 7 (1963): 728-731; Kotelnikov, Dubrovin, V. A.
Dubinskii, Kislik, Kusnetsov, Lishin, Morozov, Petrov, Rzhiga, G. A. Sytsko, and Shakhovskoy, "Radar
Observations of Venus in the Soviet Union in 1962," S_rviet Phyxic.v---lhJkltuly 8 (1964): 644; Smith, p. 15. Rzhiga,
"Radar Observations of Venus in the Soviet Union in 1962," in M. Flol kin and A. Dollfus, eds. Life Scienc.es arul
Space I¢,esear*h II (New York: Interscience Publishers, 1964), pp. 178-189, states 300 days but still misses the ret-
rograde motion.
65. Pettengill et al, "A Radar Investigation of Venus," pp. 189-190; Pettengill, "Radar Measurement of
Venus," in Priester, pp. 880-883. The range given was between 115 and 500 days, that is, 225 (+275,-110) days.
The first JPL external announcement of that finding was made in a paper read by Solomon Golomb and
Leonard R. Mailing at a convention on radio techniques and space research held at Oxford in July 1961. Mailing
and Golomb, pp. 297-303. The paper was not published until October 196t and was preceded in print by the
internal report, Victor and Stevens, "Summary and Conclusions," pp. 94-95. See also Victor and Stevens,
"Exploration of Venus by Radar," pp. 46-47; Muhleman, "Emly Results of the 1961 JPL Venus Radar
Experiment," The A_tronornical Journal 66 (1961): 292; Victor and Stevens, "The 1961 JPL Venus Radar
Experiment," p. 94.
66. Carpenter, telephone conversation, 14 September 1993.
67. Carpenter, "An Analysis of the Narrow-Band Spectra of Venus," inJPL Re.*earch ,Summary No. 36-14for
the PeritM Fetrruary 1, 1962 t*_Alrril I, 1962 (Pasadena:JPL, 1 May 1962), pp. 56-59.
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His first announcement of the planet's retrograde motion appeared in aJPL inter-
nal report dated 1 May 1962 and was based on the 1961 Venus experiment. Carpenter sug-
gested a retrograde rotational period of about 150 days, but backed off from insisting on
his discovery. "Unfortunately," Carpenter concluded, "a definitive answer cannot be given
for the rotation period of Venus based on the present data."
Carpenter hesitated until he had the results of the Goldstone 1962 Venus experi-
ment. Between 1 October and 17 December 1962, when Venus was closest to Earth,
Goldstone made nearly daily radar observations of the planet with a 13-kilowatt continu-
ous-wave transmitter operating at 2388 MHz (12.6 cm). Equipped with a maser and a para-
metric amplifier, the system's total noise temperature was only 40 K, better than the 64 K
achieved in 1961. 68
The Goldstone radar was sufficiently powerful and sensitive that a large feature on
the planet's surface showed up as an irregularity or "detail" on the power spectrum. The
surface feature scattered back to the radar antenna more energy than the surrounding
area. Normally, most spectral irregularities resulted from random fluctuations produced
by noise. The power and sensitivity of the Goldstone radar made all the difference.
"On close examination," Carpenter wrote, "one irregularity was found to persist from
day to day and to change its position slowly....The relative permanence of the detail strong-
ly suggests that it was caused by an actual physiographic feature on the surface of Venus
and that its motion was the result of the planet's rotation. The true nature of the feature
can only be guessed at; however, it is not unreasonable to assume that it is a particularly
rough region of rather large extent."
j .... i
Figure 8
l._wer portion e_f the spectra obtained by Robtnd Carpenter
during the week ]n.irn. tcJ the 1962 conjunction _?[ Venus.
Note the "]m_si,*tent detail on the left side o[ each .spectrum.
(_irpenter followed that detail ta determine the retrograde
motion of Venu.s. (Conrte.sy o[Jet Proput$ion Lalxqratory,)
68. Carpenter, telephone conversation, 14 September 1993; Goldstein and Carpenter, "Rotation of
Venus: Period Estimated from Radar Measurements," Scien¢:e 139 (1963): 910; Carpenter, "Study of Venus by CW
Radar," The A_tronomicalpmrnal 69 (1964): 2. Details of the 1962 JPL Venus radar experiment are given in
Goldstein, Stevens, and Victor, eds., Radar Fxplcrration elf Venus: GokLstone Observattrry lCepcn.t fin" October-Dee.ember
1962, Technical Report 32-396 (Pasadena:JPL, 1 March 1965).
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Carpenter then followed the movement of this "detail" in order to deduce the plan-
et's rotational period. He calculated that Venus had either a forward period of about 1200
days or a retrograde period of 230 days from one conjunction to the other. Next, he mea-
sured the bandwidth of the lower portion of the spectra; their widths were incompatible
with a 1200-day forward rotation. The base bandwidth measurements, however, did
"strongly suggest that the sidereal rotation period of Venus is not synchronous, but rather
250 ± 40 days retrograde. '_s9
Millstone lacked the power and sensitivity of Goldstone. The discovery of Venus'
retrograde motion at Lincoln Laboratory by William B. Smith relied instead on his
computer and signal analyzing skills. Although Smith preceded Carpenter in announcing
the retrograde motion of Venus in a publication, he did not achieve recognition as its
discoverer.
Smith looked at the spectral bandwidths of radar returns on 11 separate days
between 2 April and 8June 1961. Like Carpenter, he failed to verify a synchronous rota-
tion; however, Smith came to realize that the way the signal bandwidth changed over time
could be explained only by retrograde motion. He wrote up his findings and submitted
them to his supervisor, Paul Green, for approval. Smith wanted to feature the planet's ret-
rograde motion in his paper, but Green remembered an earlier episode, when '_¢e had
been badly burned." That was the embarrassment of 1958.
Green hesitated. Uranus was the only planet then known to have a retrograde peri-
od, "but that one is way the hell out, and who would have thought that the next planet to
the Earth would have had that kind of anomalous behavior?" Green admitted, "I guess I
was working more on psychological factors than on anything else. So I had Bill tone it
down." The published article's abstract read: _'I'he (relatively weak) result implies a very
slow or possibly retrograde rotation of the planet." The article itself contained no state-
ment of the planet's retrograde motion. 70
The watered down version made all the difference. Carpenter published his explicit
and unequivocal results jointly with fellow JPL radar astronomer Dick Goldstein in the
8 March 1963 issue of Sc/ence, while the February 1963 issue of The Astronomical Journal
carried Smith's suggestive abstract. 71
Green regretted his decision. "Bill Smith is the man who discovered that Venus has
retrograde spin, and he should go down in the history books. Due to me he didn't,
because his paper didn't feature it the way it should have. If I hadn't sat on it, it would
have featured it, but as it came out, it didn't. The people that look at the fine print real-
ize that he had that message, that that was what his data showed, but it didn't make the
big splash and give him the career achievement that he deserved. "72 Fellow Lincoln
Laboratory radar astronomer Irwin Shapiro concurred: "I felt he [Smith] got a raw deal,
because he made a major discovery for which he never got credit. "73
The detection of Venus, the measurement of the size of the astronomical unit, and
the determination of the rotational period and direction of Venus formed the foundation
on which planetary radar astronomy was laid. Planetary radar advanced by solving prob-
lems left unresolved or at best unsatisfactorily resolved by optical methods. Deliberately or
not, the problems solved supported the NASA mission to explore the solar system. Driving
the new scientific activity was the availability of a new generation of radars built for mili-
tary defense (at Lincoln Laboratory) and for space exploration (atJPL). The limits of that
technology shaped the paths of discovery.
69. Carpenter, "Study of Venus by CW Radar," pp. 4--6; Carpenter, telephone conversation, 14
September 1993.
70. Green 20 September 1993; Smith 29 September 1993; Smith, pp. 15-21.
71. Goldstein and Carpenter, pp. 910-911; Smith, pp. 15--21. internal evidence indicates that ._/ence
received the paper on 15January 1963.
72. Green 20 September 1993.
73. Shapiro 30 September 1993.
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Without technology and without funding, planetary radar astronomy was impossible.
The emergence of planetary radar coincided with the creation of a national, civilian space
agency, NASA, a national, civilian agency to fund scientific research, the National Science
Foundation (NSF), and a national, military space research agency, ARPA. It also paralleled
the rise of American radio astronomy and the age of the Big Dish. Standing at the inter-
section of civilian and military research into space, the ionosphere, the Moon, and the
Sun, planetary radar offered much to potential patrons. It was a wonderful and unique
time to organize a new scientific activity.

Chapter Three
Sturm und Drang
The period between 1958 and 1964 saw the explosive growth of planetary radar
astronomy in terms of the number of active facilities and investigators. Investigators in
three countries (the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union) attempted to detect
Venus in 1961, and three facilities in the United States alone (Lincoln Laboratory, JPL,
and RCA) succeeded. During the 1969 conjunction, theJicamarca Radar Observatory, a
National Bureau of Standards ionospheric facility in Peru, made radar observations of
Venus at 50 MHz (6 meters). At the same time, the Lincoln Laboratory solar radar facili-
ty at El Campo, Texas, completed in the summer of 1960, observed Venus at 38 MHz (8
meters). 1 Thus, by 1964, five American facilities had performed radar experiments on
Venus.
The creation of radar astronomy courses, a textbook, and a conference dedicated
solely to radar astronomy also signalled the emergence of a new and rapidly growing
scientific field. As it had in carrying out planetary radar experiments, Lincoln Laboratory
took the lead in shaping the new field. In addition to organizing radar astronomy cours-
es and a textbook, Lincoln Laboratory sponsored the first, and only, radar astronomy
conference and undertook, in association with the Cambridge astronomical community,
a campaign to design and build a new radar research instrument.
MIT routinely offered summer courses and asked Lincoln Laboratory to propose
some. As John Evans explained, "Radar astronomy was in vogue, we were just entering the
Space Age, and Sputnik had been launched." So Lincoln Laboratory agreed to run a sum-
mer school in radar astronomy beginning in August 1960. In all, about twenty people gave
lectures. Evans talked about lunar radar astronomy. Jack Harrington, head of the Radio
Physics Division of Lincoln Laboratory and in charge of the summer course, promised lec-
turers that the talks would be organized into a book. As it turned out, Evans recalled, "the
lecture notes weren't that good. We were all asked to rewrite them. ''_
In August 1961, Harrington and Evans ran the radar astronomy summer course
again. The topics and lecturers were somewhat different; the course of 15 lectures lasted
only one week. Among the lecturers were Paul Green, Bob Kingston (who had designed
the maser for the 1958 Venus experiment), Gordon Pettengill, Bob Price, Herb Weiss
(who had built Millstone), and Victor Pineo (formerly of the National Bureau of
Standards). Von Eshleman (Stanford), a guest lecturer, discussed solar radar experiments.
The week ended with a two-hour tour of the Millstone Hill Radar Observatory led by
Pettengill, Pineo, and Evans "to observe firsthand a modern space radar facility and to wit-
ness a representative experiment in radar astronomy. '''_
1. W.K. Klemperer, G. R. Ochs, and Kenneth L. Bowles, "Radar Echoes from Venus at 50 Mc/sec," The
A,tremomical./trurnal 69 (1964): 22-28; Overhage to Lt. Gen..lames Ferguson, 28 March 1963, MITA; Jesse c.
.lames, Richard P. Ingalls, and Louis P. Rainville, "Radar Echoes from Venus at 38 Mc/sec," The Astronomical
]trurna172 (1967): 1047-1050.
2. Evans 9 September 1993. MITA does not have a copy of the 1960 summer course lecture notes.
3. Brochure, MIT, Radar Astronomy: SummerSe._sion 1961Aug'u._t 14-18 (Cambridge: MIT, 1961), LLLA;
MIT, Rtular A_tronomy: Summer Se._._ion MITI August 14-18, 196I, l,ecture._ 1-15, 3 vols. (Cambridge: MIT, 1961),
MITA.
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The radar astronomy summer course was not given again, "largely because the peo-
ple concerned have been occupied with other commitments," Evans later wrote. 4 Price
and Green were no longer involved in radar astronomy, and Pettengill had left Lincoln
Laboratory. Harrington himself became Director of the MIT Center for Space Research,
which he founded with funding from NASA in 1963.
At the end of the 1961 summer course, the lecture notes were assembled into a three-
volume tome. Yet, as Evans explained, "We didn't have a good set of course notes that
would constitute a book. "5 Paul Green became irritated with the lack of progress on the
project, announced that he would no longer contribute any material to the book, and
nominated Evans to take over the project from Harrington. Evans found himself in an
awkward situation; Harrington was his boss. Fortunately, Wilbur B. Davenport, Jr., one of
the Assistant Directors of Lincoln Laboratory, had an interest in radar astronomy and
pressured Harrington to get the book done quickly.
Evans recalled: "So my arm got twisted very hard by Davenport. I really didn't want
to do it. I was quite busy, and I didn't want to take over Jack's project, so I resisted. I even-
tually capitulated after enough pressure on the condition that a) I had somebody to help
me, and b) I had a secretary assigned to do typing and nothing else, because part of the
problem was just getting material out of rough draft form and into typed form. They
agreed to both of those conditions." Tor Hagfors, a graduate of Scandinavian technical
schools and the Stanford University electrical engineering program, edited the book with
Evans.
Next, the project met difficulty at the publisher. The McGraw-Hill editor who had
been handling the project left, but no one at Lincoln Laboratory knew. "I'he manuscript
sat in his drawer for almost two years," Evans related. "Meanwhile, we were thinking that
the manuscript was going through proofing and so on. Finally, we got a letter from some
guy who had inherited this desk and found this manuscript. He got it printed fairly quick-
ly, but in sort of photo-offset form rather than nice copy. At least it came out, belatedly."
Once McGraw-Hill published Radar Astronomy in 1968, radar astronomy had a text-
book, parts of which are still used to teach radar astronomy. Nonetheless, neither MIT nor
Lincoln Laboratory (which is not a teaching institution) offered a course in radar astron-
omy until 1970._ Although the Evans-Hagfors textbook and the MIT summer course might
have served to train a generation of radar astronomers, they did not. Planetary radar
astronomy was the child of a research center (Lincoln Laboratory), not an educational
institution (MIT). As a result, Lincoln Laboratory radar astronomers did not reproduce
themselves in a traditional academic fashion through graduate education, but through
employment.
Three radar astronomers came to Lincoln Laboratory during the 1960s through
employment: Stanley H. Zisk, Richard P. Ingalls, and Alan E. E. Rogers. Zisk, who created
lunar radar images for NASA in support of the Apollo program, and Haystack Associate
Director Dick Ingalls, who had been a Lincoln Laboratory employee since 1953, both had
degrees in electrical engineering. Alan Rogers, born in Salisbury, Rhodesia (now
Zimbabwe), earned a Ph.D. in electrical engineering from MIT in 1967, and was trained
in radio astronomy, before carrying out radar astronomy experiments. 7
As far as defining the field of radar astronomy, and particularly in terms of defining
actual and potential patrons, the most important step taken by Lincoln Laboratory was
4. Evans and Tor Hagfors, eds., Radar Astronomy(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. viii.
5. Evans 9 September 1993.
6. Campbell 9 December 1993; E-mail, Pettengill to author, 29 September 1994; Rogers 5 May 1994.
7. Pettengill 28 September 1993; Rogers 5 May 1994; NEROC, "Technical Proposal: Radar Studies of
the Moon (Topography)," 12 November 1971. SEBRING.
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theorganizationfaconferenceonradarastronomy.Neveragaindidanothersuchcon-
ferencetakeplace,mainlybecauseradarastronomerslocatedthemselveswithinexisting
professionalorganizations.Moreover,thesmallnumberofradarastronomersneverjusti-
fiedthecreationofaseparatesocietyorjournal.
TheconferenceunderscoredtheBigScienceenvironmentinwhichradarastrono-
mywasevolving.OnlyafewattemptsatVenushadbeenmadebyLincolnLaboratoryand
JodreliBankwhentheconferenceonvened;lunar,meteor,andionosphericradarstud-
ieswerewellestablished.Thoseradarstudieswerepartofgrowingcivilianandmilitary
programsin ionosphericandcommunicationresearch.Moreimportantlyfor planetary
radar,anewcivilianspaceagency,NASA,hadbeencreatedonlytheyearbefore.Itscre-
ation,andtheprospectofparticipatinginspaceresearch,eventuallyshapedthenewfield
ofplanetaryradarastronomymorethananyotherBigSciencepatron.
The Conference on Radar Astronomy
The National Academy of Sciences, through its Space Science Board, underwrote
the radar astronomy conference. Established in 1958, the Space Science Board main-
tained liaisons with the National Science Foundation, NASA, ARPA, the Office of the
Science Advisor to the President, and other federal agencies participating in the country's
space program. The Space Science Board solicited the opinions of scientists through dis-
cussions and summer studies and recommended space programs to federal agencies, s
Bruno B. Rossi, a member of the Space Science Board and a leading MIT physics
professor, organized the radar astronomy conference. Rossi had undertaken experimen-
tal research on cosmic rays in the 1930s, before working at Los Alamos Laboratory during
World War II. He joined MIT in 1946. In 1958, coincidentally with the creation of NASA,
Rossi began to consider the potential value of direct measurement of the ionized inter-
planetary gas by space probes. 9
Thomas Gold, recently hired to head Cornell's Center for Radiophysics and Space
Research, the parent organization for its radio and radar telescope, and MIT's Philip
Morrison, both members of the Space Science Board, assisted Rossi in organizing the con-
ference; however, the brunt of the actual work fell on Rossi's shoulders. He reserved MIT's
Endicott House in Dedham, Massachusetts, for 15 and 16 October 1959. Endicott House
had a dining area, meeting rooms, large gardens, and accommodations for 8 people; the
remainder were lodged at a nearby hotel.
Rossi saw the conference as a small group meeting to develop concrete recommen-
dations for consideration by the Space Science Board at its October meeting. The origi-
nal conference rifle, "Reflections and Scattering of Radar Signals Beyond Several Earth
Radii," by definition excluded ionospheric radar. However, the revised name,
"Conference on Radar Astronomy," was less unwieldy and did not appear to exclude those
interested in ionospheric research, l°
Holding a different vision of the conference was Stanford professor of electrical engi-
neering Von R. Eshleman. Seeking to exploit the creation of NASA, Eshleman proposed
radar studies of planetary ionospheres and atmospheres from spacecraft. Such studies
were a logical extension of Stanford's ionospheric radio and radar work of the 1950s,
which included a pioneering solar radar experiment.
8. Space Science Board, Proposal for Continuation of Contract NSR 09-012-903, 28 October 1965,
"NAS-SSB, 1965," NHO; Joseph N. Tatarewicz, ,_ace, Technology,and Planetary Astronomy (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1990), p. 38.
9. Rossi biographical information. MITA; "President's Report Issue," MITBulk.tin vol. 82, no. 1 (1946):
137-138.
10. _Conference on Radar Astronomy Program," n.d., and George A. Derbyshire, Memorandum for the
Record, 29 May 1959, "ORG, NAS, 1959 October Space Science Bd., Conferences Radar Astronomy, Dedham,"
NAS. Hereafter, Conference Program and Derbyshire Memorandum, 29 May 1959, respectively.
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In 1959,contemporarywiththefirstradarattemptsatVenus,EshlemanandPhilip
B.GallagherofStanford,withLt.Col.RobertC.BarthleoftheU.S.ArmySignalCorps,a
Stanfordgraduatestudent,attemptedtobounceradarwavesoffthesolarcorona.TheAir
ForceCambridgeResearchCenter(AFCRC)underwroteheStanfordexperiment,and
theOfficeof NavalResearchfundedthe46-meter(150-ft)dishantennaconstructedfor
ionosphericresearchunderthedirectionofOswaldVillard.AlthoughEshlemanclaimed
success,acomparisonfhisresultswiththoseobtainedshortlyafterwardbytheElCampo
solaradarcastseriousdoubtaboutheirvalidity,whichsomeradarastronomerscontin-
uetoexpress.11
Asplanningfor theradarconferencewasunderway,Eshlemanwaspreparingthe
solaradarexperimentandwasonthepointofcampaigningNASAtounderwritestudies
ofplanetaryionospheresfromspacecraft.Itwasapivotalmomentforcallingattentionto
theStanfordradarwork.EshlemansawtheconferenceasaStanfordopportunity.Inalet-
tertoRossi,heclaimedthatStanfordalready"hadbeguntoplansomekindofameeting
tobringtogetherallwhoareactivein thisfield.Howevertheseplanshad[sic]notpro-
gressedveryfar."Heproposeda largerconferencewithStanfordandtheStanford
ResearchInstitute(SRI)"asco-hosts."If theAFCRCwereinvitedtoco-sponsorthecon-
ference,Eshlemansuggested,partofthetravelexpensesforforeignvisitorsmightbecov-
ered.Conferencepaperscouldbepublishedasagroupin theProceedings of the Institute
of Radio Engineers. n_
The conference, however, was solely an MIT affair sponsored only by the National
Academy of Sciences. The spectrum of United States civilian and military scientific radar
research facilities was represented: MIT and Lincoln Laboratory, Stanford and SRI,
Cornell University, the NRL, and the National Bureau of Standards CRPL. In addition,
radio astronomers were invited from Harvard University, Yale University, the University of
Michigan, and the National Radio Astronomy Observatory (NRAO), Green Bank, West
Virginia, the country's major radio astronomy center. ARPA and the AFCRC represented
the military.
In addition to representatives of the Space Science Board, Rossi invited the National
Science Foundation program director for astronomy and NASA Space Science chief
Homer E. Newell, Jr. Unable to attend, Newell recommended Nancy G. Roman in his
place: "Although we have no program which directly involves radar astronomy, Dr. Roman
will be happy to discuss those aspects of our Astronomy and Astrophysics Programs which
are related to this field. I am sure that the results of the discussion will be valuable in our
program planning. ''j-_ Roman was a felicitous choice; she had carried out lunar radar stud-
ies at the NRL. 14
11. Eshleman, telephone conversation, 26January 1993; Eshleman 9 May 1994; Eshleman, Barthle, and
Gallagher, "Radar Echoes liom the Sun," Science 134 (1960): 329-332; Eshleman and Allen M. Peterson, "Radar
Astronomy," Se'_entific American 203 (August, 1960): 50-51; Barthle, The I)ele¢_ion t_' Rcular Echoe.* from the Sun,
Scientific Relx)rt 9 (Stanford: RLSEL, 24 August 1960); Pettengill 28 September 1993.
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the Question of Reflecting Radar Signals from the Sun ] ," Ukrair_'_, Fizy_hny Zhurnal [_/krainian.prurnal of Physit_]
2 (1957): 149-164.
12. Eshleman to Rossi, 13 May 1959, "ORG, NAS, 1959 October Space Science Bd., Conferences Radar
Astronomy, Dedham," NAS.
13. "Preliminary List of lnvitees;" "Draft Recommendations o[ the Conference on Radar Astronomy,"
Appendix A, "List of Participants;" Newell to Rossi, 18June 1959; Derbysh0e Memorandum, 29 May 1959; and
Derbyshire, Memorandum for the Record, 2 June 1959, "ORG, NAS, 1959 Ottober Space Science Bd.,
Conferences Radar Astronomy, Dedham," NAS.
14. For Roman's lunar radar work at the NRL, see, for example, Yaplee, Roman, Craig, and T. F.
Scanlan, "A Lunar Radar Study at 10-cm Wavelength," in Bracewell, ed., I'an_ _'_,Tnitn_iurn on I_dio A_tronom'_
(Stanford: Stanford University Pzess, 1959), pp. 19-28, and Ch. 1, note 69.
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Invitations to foreign radio and radar investigators went to Jodreil Bank, the Royal
Radar Establishment (Malvern, England), the Division of Radiophysics of the Australian
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organization (CSIRO), the Chalmers
University of Technology Research Laboratory of Electronics (Gothenburg, Sweden), and
the Canadian Defense Research Board Telecommunications Establishment. No Soviet sci-
entists were invited.
The conference program highlighted the work of Lincoln Laboratory. After a talk by
Thomas Gold (Cornell) on the scientific goals of radar astronomy, Jack Harrington
(Lincoln Laboratory) explained certain experimental techniques and Herb Weiss
(Lincoln Laboratory) spoke on transmitters, receivers, and antennas. Next Paul Green
(Lincoln Laboratory) discussed signal detection and processing, and James Chisholm
(Lincoln Laboratory) talked about electromagnetic propagation phenomena. In another
session, organizations represented at the conference described their research programs.
General discussion and the formulation of recommendations took up the second day. 15
These recommendations defined radar astronomy as a field especially useful to
NASA and the rapidly growing space effort. The arguments set forth appeared as attempts
to garner the patronage of the new space agency. The first recommendation, for example,
spoke directly to NASA and argued the value of radar astronomy for planetary explo-
ration. Launching spacecraft required precise measurements of interplanetary distances
and knowledge of planetary surface and atmospheric conditions, all of which radar
astronomy was capable of providing. "The importance of radar astronomy to the efficient devel-
opment of space science must not be underestimated, _ the recommendation exhorted.
Additional recommendations urged the construction of new radar astronomy facili-
ties operating at a variety of frequencies, as well as the design and construction of large
dish and array antennas, high-power high-frequency transmitters, and signal detection
and recording techniques. The construction of radar telescopes, the conference recom-
mendations argued, would be far less expensive than building and sending planetary
probes.
Conference recommendations also addressed the military and radio astronomy.
Planetary radar astronomy at Lincoln Laboratory would not have existed without the con-
struction of the Millstone Hill radar, which the military funded. However, planetary radar
experiments officially did not exist; military research was the first priority. Radar astrono-
my, the recommendations pleaded, needed facilities of its own, where it would receive top
priority and be "viewed as pure science."
Conference recommendations also targeted radio astronomers. "Where large radio tele-
scopes are being planned or built, " one recommendation proposed, "serious consideration be
given from the beginning to the incorporation of provisions for a high-powered transmitter, even if a
transmitter were not actually installed." The recommendation further suggested specifi-
cally that a radar transmitter be installed on the 10-GHz (3-cm) 43-meter (140-ft) NRAO
antenna, thereby offering "an excellent opportunity for radar investigations at very high
frequencies." While recognizing that the dissimilar needs of radar and radio astronomers
often gave rise to conflict, one recommendation stated, compromise could resolve them,_6
As we shall see later, however, those dissimilar needs were beyond compromise.
Bruno Rossi submitted the conference draft recommendations to the Space Science
Board at its October 1959 meeting. After some editing and checking that left the recom-
15. Derbyshire Memorandum, 2June 1959; Conference Program; Rossi to Derbyshire, 10June 1959,
"ORG, NAS, 1959 October Space Science Bd., Conferences Radar Astronomy, Dedham," NAS.
16. "Draft Recommendations of the Conference on Radar Astronomy," pp. 5--8, "ORG, NAS, 1959
October Space Science Bd., Conferences Radar Astronomy, Dedham," NAS. Emphasis in original text.
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mendations unaltered, the Space Science Board endorsed them for distribution to fund-
ing agencies and other interested groups. 17 Endicott House was the last conference dedi-
cated solely to radar astronomy, though radar astronomers continued to meet under an
existing organizational umbrella, one dedicated not to planetary science, since such spe-
cialized organizations did not yet exist, but to radio astronomy and electrical engineering.
L'Union Radioscientifique Internationale
Although much of the earliest radar astronomy work grew out of an interest in ionos-
pheric questions, ionosphericists and planetary radar astronomers soon went separate
ways. Planetary radar astronomers grew closer to their colleagues in radio astronomy, with
whom they shared techniques and technologies, such as antennas and low-noise receivers.
The shift of planetary radar astronomy from the ionospheric to the radio astronomy com-
munity was manifest within the Union Radioscientifique Internationale (URSI), which
quickly became the premier forum for planetary radar astronomers.IS
URSI was an international radio science organization founded in France in 1921 by
Gustave Ferri6 and other French radio pioneers. 19 Its big tent sheltered a range of fields,
including ionospheric and radio astronomy science, united by a common technical inter-
est in what might be called radio science. Lacking telescopes committed entirely to their
field, planetary radar astronomers worked side-by-side with radio astronomers at the same
observatory. As radar astronomer Donald B. Campbell has observed, "/'here is a tremen-
dous amount of cross-fertilization between planetary radar and radio astronomers in
terms of techniques and equipment. "_° These shared technical interests and instruments
brought planetary radar and radio astronomers together at URSI meetings.
Radio astronomers had had their own commission within URSI since shortly after
World War II. In 1946, at its General Assembly meeting in Paris, URSI created a special
subcommission on Radio Noise of Extra-Terrestrial Origin, which became Commission 5,
Extra-Terrestrial Radio Noise, when URSI revised its commission structure at its 1948
Stockholm meeting. On the proposal of the U.S. National Committee, Commission 5
became the Commission on Radio Astronomy two years later at the General Assembly
meeting in Zurich. Commission 5 concerned itself with radio astronomy, as well as obser-
vations of meteors and the Moon "by radio techniques," meaning by radar. Thus, for
example, at the Paris URSI symposium on radio astronomy held in July 1958, a number
of papers featured the latest lunar radar work by U.S. and British investigators._l
The first URSI meetingmat which planetary radar astronomers gave papers--took
place in San Diego, California, between 19 and 21 October 1959, immediately following
the Endicott House Conference on Radar Astronomy. The meeting included a first-of-its-
kind symposium on radar astronomy. However, presenting the panel discussion was not
Commission 5, but URSI Commission 3, Ionospheric Radio.
17. Memorandum, E. R. Dyer, Jr., to Participants, Space Science Board Conference on Radar
Astronomy, 30 October 1959, and "Report and Recommendations of the Conference on Radar Astronomy,"
"ORG: NAS, 1959 October Space Science Bd.: Conferences Radar Astronomy: Dedham," NAS.
18. Pettengill 29 September 1993.
19. URSI actually dates back to 1913 and the creation of the French Commission Internationale de TSF
Scientifique. TSF (Ttltgraphie Sans Fil) is French for wireless radio. Albert Levasseur, De ta 7X_d l'_roniq_:
Histoire des techniques mdioihariques (Paris: ETSF, 1975), pp. 79 and 87.
'20. Campbell 9 December 1993.
21. Edge and Mulkay, p. 44; Braceweli, Paris Sympasmm, passim.
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The seven panel members, all of whom had participated in the Endicott House con-
ference, were practicing radar astronomers at the NRL, Jodrell Bank, Stanford, Lincoln
Laboratory, Cornell, and the National Bureau of Standards. Von Eshleman was the panel
moderator. The speakers covered lunar, solar, meteor, auroral, and planetary radar, as well
as radar studies of the exosphere and the interplanetary medium. The symposium was of
some historical importance: Paul Green described planetary range-Doppler imaging,
which later became a central planetary radar technique._
By the URSI Tokyo meeting of September 1963, planetary radar astronomy had
moved to the newly renamed Commission 5, Radio and Radar Astronomy. Twenty institu-
tions reported on recent U.S. developments in the two fields. The meeting also brought
together individuals from related areas, such as Commission 7, Radio Electronics, where
investigators reported on parametric amplifiers, masers, and other microwave devices of
interest to planetary radar astronomers. _s
Although the electronic side of planetary radar astronomy drove it to attend URSI
meetings and to publish in such journals as the Proceedings of the IRE, the astronomy side
pulled it toward meetings of the International Astronomical Union (IAU) and the
American Astronomical Society (AAS) and to publication in astronomy and general sci-
ence journals, primarily The AstronomicalJourna_ Science, and Nature. These institutional
and publication forums, though, did not meet the need for specialized discussion of plan-
etary topics.
Sporadic workshops provided only limited forums. For example, the 1962 inferior
conjunction of Venus furnished the occasion for a symposium on radar and radio obser-
vations of that planet. Although planetary radio astronomers delivered most of the sym-
posium papers, radar astronomers Roland Carpenter, Dick Goldstein, and Dewey
Muhleman described the latest radar research on Venus. 24 Aside from a preliminary
report by National Bureau of Standards ionospheric researchers on their one-time-only
radar attempt at Venus, the symposium was strictly aJPL affair.
Starting in 1965, the need for a specialized forum for presenting and discussing
radar research began to be met through a joint URSI-IAU Symposium on Planetary
Atmospheres and Surfaces held at Dorado, Puerto Rico, 24-27 May 1965. The Organizing
Committee included radar astronomers John Evans, Dewey Muhleman, and Gordon
Pettengill, while Evans and Pettengill chaired sessions on lunar and planetary radar
astronomy. The latter session brought together practitioners from Lincoln Laboratory,
JPL, Cornell's nearby observatory at Arecibo, and the Soviet Union. 25
A conference on lunar and planetary science held during the week of 13 September
1965 and organized by Caltech and JPL also had its share of planetary radar papers.
Researchers from JPL, Jodrell Bank, and Cornell's Arecibo Observatory spoke on Venus,
while JPL and Arecibo representatives read papers on Mars. Noticeably absent, however,
were researchers from Lincoln Laboratory, which was still a major planetary radar
research center. 26
22. Ray L. Leadabrand, "Radar Astronomy Symposium Report,"Journal of C,_OhysicalResearch65 (April
1960): 1103-1115; Green 20 September 1993. P. Green to author, 21 December 1994, states that Green described
range-Doppler mapping in his earlier talk at the Endicott House conference, but the talk was not published.
23. "URSI National Committee Report, XIV General Assembly, Tokyo, September, 1963: Commission 5.
Radio and Radar Astronomy," Journal of Research of the National Bu_au of Slandard*, L_etionD: Radio Scumce.68D
(May 1964): 631-653; "Commission 7. Radio Electronics," ibid., pp. 655-678.
24. The symposium papers were published in The AstrouomicalJourna169 (1964): 1-72. The Astronomical
Journalis the publication of the American Astronomical Society.
25. William E. Gordon, "Preface," Jonrnal of Researchof the National Bureau of Standards, Section D: Radio
Sc/ence69D (July-December 1965): iii. This was a special issue containing the symposium papers.
26. Harrison Brown, GordonJ. Stanley, Duane O. Muhleman, and Guido Mfinch, eels.,/aroce,n//ngs of the
Caltech-.]PLLunar and Planetary Conference (Pasadena: Caltech andJPL, 15June 1966).
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Planetaryradarastronomyis at theconvergenceof scienceandengineering.
Attendanceof radarastronomersat bothIAUandURSImeetingsduringthe 1960s
reflectedthedichotomousnatureof radarastronomy,perchedbetweenradioengineer-
ing(URSI)andastronomicalscience(IAU).Thedichotomyarosefromthefacthatradar
astronomyisasetoftechniques(engineering)usedtogeneratedatawhoseinterpretation
yieldsanswerstoscientificquestions.
Justasvitaltothegrowthof radarastronomyasmeetingsandjournalswasaccessto
instruments,forwithoutthemtherewouldbenosciencetodiscussortopublish.Thevery
availabilityofradarinstrumentscapableofdetectingechoesfromVenushadgivenriseto
planetaryradarastronomy,andthe field has remained a technology-driven science to the
present. However, radar astronomers did not seek their own instruments. In league with
the Cambridge astronomical community, Lincoln Laboratory campaigned to design and
build a large new radar and radio astronomy research instrument. It was radio
astronomers, not radar astronomers, who performed the entrepreneurial task of promot-
ing the new facility and who carried radar astronomy interests with it. The same radio
astronomers also urged opening to outside researchers the Haystack antenna built by
Lincoln Laboratory for military communications research.
During the 1960s, radio astronomy underwent the kind of rapid growth rate that typ-
ifies Big Science. With fewer facilities and researchers than Australia or Britain, the lead-
ing countries in the field, the United States saw radio astronomy balloon into Big Science
as funding requests and antenna construction proposals increased in size and number.
Radio astronomy thus provided an emerging Big Science onto which radar astronomers
piggybacked their search for instruments free of military priorities and where radar
astronomy, as recommended at the Endicott House conference, would be 'Mewed as pure
science." The potential rewards of piggybacking were great, but the price of pursuing Big
Science patronage was equally great. In the end, the effort proved troublesome and futile.
Needles and a Haystack
The decade of the 1960s was the era of Big Science and the Big Dish in radio astron-
omy, The period of large telescope construction between 1957, when the Jodrell Bank
76-meter (250-ft) telescope reached completion, and 1971, when the 100-meter (328-ft)
radio telescope near Effelsberg (about 40 km from Bonn) began operation, has been
dubbed "the age when big was beautiful" in radio astronomy. 27 As the first Venus experi-
ment took place at Lincoln Laboratory in 1958, a host of new radar research instruments
of unprecedented size were on the drawing board or under construction thanks chiefly to
the largesse of Cold War military spending on scientific research and secondarily to the
National Bureau of Standards and NASA.
The NRL was breaking ground on a 183-meter (600-ft) antenna at Sugar Grove, West
Virginia. With funding from ARPA, Cornell had completed initial design studies of a
305-meter (1,000-ft) dish. Lincoln Laboratory had plans for a 37-meter (120-ft) antenna
at Haystack Hill, Massachusetts, as well as a solar radar facility at E1 Campo, Texas, both of
which were to be built with defense funds. 2s Stanford and SRI were soliciting military
backing for a 244-meter (800-ft) antenna. _9 In the civilian sector, the National Bureau of
27. Robertson, pp. 285-291, has a section called "When Big was Beautiful."
28. The El Campo facility later was transferred from Lincoln Laboratory to the MIT Center for Space
Research and was funded by a National Science Foundation grant. MIT, Radar Studies of the Sun and Venu._:Final
Re;tmrtto the National Scient_.F_mndation under Grant No. GP-8128 (Cambridge: MIT, June 1969).
29. Esh_eman 9 May _994; Leadabrand and Esh_eman_ A Pr_jml]_r an 8_-f_t Rndar Astr_n_my 7_leac_pe
(Stanford: Stanford Research Institute, 9 October 1959), Eshleman materials.
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Standardswasbuildingathree-stationradaratitsLongBranchFieldStation,Illinois,and
ahugearrayantennatJicamarca,Peru,tostudytheionosphere.NASA'sJetPropulsion
Laboratorystarted esigninga largeantennasystemfor its DeepSpaceNetwork.In
EuropeandAustralia,dditionallargeantennaswereonthedrawingboardorundercon-
struction.
NolessapartoftheBigDisheraweretheHaystackandCAMROC/NEROCanten-
nas.LincolnLaboratorydesignedandbuilt Haystackfor militarycommunications
research.Cambridge-areaastronomers,organizedastheCambridgeRadioObservatory
Committee(CAMROC),thenas the NortheastRadioObservatoryCorporation(NEROC),campaignedto openHaystackto outsideresearchers.CAMROC/NEROC,
againin collaborationwithLincolnLaboratory,alsosoughtfundingfor thedesignand
constructionofanewlargeradioandradartelescope.
Designingandbuildingthosebigdisheswasa nightmarishintroductionto Big
Sciencepoliticsforradioastronomers.BernardLoveli,theveteranplannerandbuilder
ofseveralradiotelescopesatJodrellBank,nottomentiononeortwoneverbuilt,in1983
wroteto EdLilley,theHarvardastronomerwhoheadedeffortsto buildthenew"CAM-
ROC/NEROCdishandtoopenHaystacktooutsideresearchers,andaskedhimtosum-
marizehisexperience.Lilleyrepliedthatthestorypresentedan"excellentexampleofthe
mixof politics,powerstruggles,fiscalproblems,technologyanddealingswithCongress,
and,ultimately,defeatfromafewscientificluminaries,"andthathewould"needacabin
overlookingathunderousseatostimulatethemoodtoundertakewritingahistoryofthe
CAMROC/NEROCcampaign.''3°
ThecampaignbeganwiththeconstructionftheHaystackantenna,whichreplaced
MillstoneastheLincolnLaboratoryplanetaryadar.On12April1962,Millstonestopped
operating,sothatLincolnLaboratorycouldupgradeitto1,320MHz(23cm;L-band)and
increaseoverallsystemcapability,aspartoftheSpaceSurveillanceT chniquesProgram.
Overtheyears,LincolnLaboratoryexpandedtheMillstonelocation.NeartheMillstone
planetaryradarwastheLincolnLaboratoryCommunicationsSite,establishedin1957to
testcommunicationequipment.Uponcompletionof thetests,theantennasweretorn
down,andthesitegivenovertoconstructionof anX-bandtransmittingdishforusein
ProjectWestFord,commonlyknownasProjectNeedles.AsimilarX-bandstationwasbuilt
atCampParks,outsideSanFrancisco.-_
On10May1963,ProjectNeedleslaunchednearly500millionhair-likecopperwires
intoEarthorbit,therebyformingabeltofdipoleantennas.LincolnLaboratorythensent
messagescoasto coastvia theorbitingcopperneedlesbetweenCampParksand
MillstoneatWesfford,Massachusetts(hencethenameProjectWestFord).Britishradio
astronomers,suchasMartinRyleandLovell,aswellasopticalastronomers,objectedfer-
ventlyto ProjectNeedles,andtheCouncilof theRoyalAstronomicalSocietyformally
protestedto theU.S.President'sScienceAdvisor.3zHaystackwasintendedofficiallyasa
state-of-the-artr darforProjectNeedles.
30. Qnoted in Ix)veil, The]odrell Bank "lklesctq_e.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 249-250.
Lovell has described his experiences in J_Mrell Bank and The.fiJdrell lkmk Telesc¢_e_.
3l. Overhage to Ferguson, 21 May 1962; Overhage to Ferguson, 28 December 1962; Overhage to
Roscoe Wilson, 30 June 1961; J. W. Meyer, 'q'he Lincoln Laboratory General Research Program," paper pre-
sented at the Joint Services Advisory Committee meeting, 19 April 1962, pp. 5-6; and W. H. Radford to B. A.
Schriever, 6 May 1964, 1/24/AC 134, MITA; Lincoln Laboratory, "Millstone Hill Field Station," April 1965,
I.LI_\.
32. Ovclhage Io Ferguson, 26June 1963, 1/24/AC 134, MITA; Overhage and Radford, "The Lincoln
Laboratory West Fo_d Piogram: An ttistorical Perspective," Proceedings of the IEFF 52 (1964): 452-454; Folder
"Ploject West Ford Releases and Reports," LLLA. Much of the Proceedings _?[the IEI_; 52 (1964): 452-606, deals
exchtsively with Project West Ford. For antagonism of radio astronomers to Project Needles, see Lovell,
A_trom_ru_ f_' (;han_e, pp. 331-334; Martin Ryle and Lovell, Interference to Radio Astronomy from Belts of
O1biting Dipoles (Needles)," Quarterly.]_mrnal o[the R_ryal A_tronomical Society 3 ( 1962): 100-108; D. E. Blackwelt
and R. Wilson, "Intelference to Optical Astronomy from Belts of Orbiting Dipoles (Needles)," ibid., pp.
1(19-117; and H. Bondi, "The _,_,k'st Ford Project," ibid., p. 99.
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b'igure 9
tXroject Needlea planned to launch nearly 500 million hair-like copper wires into Earth orbit, thereby forming a belt of dipole
antennas. Haystack Observatory original_ was built as part of Project West Ford, which was commonly known as Project
Needles. (Courtesy of MFF Lincoln Lab_rratory, Lexingtan, Massachusetts, photo rm. 1"201-229.)
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Project Needles and the Haystack radar exemplified the new research directions
taken by Lincoln Laboratory. The Laboratory had pioneered three major air defense sys-
tems: the DEW Line, the SAGE System, and the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System.
With the formation of the MITRE Corporation in 1958, Lincoln Laboratory divested itself
of manned bomber defense activity and engaged in new research programs that addressed
military problems in ballistic missile re-entry systems and ballistic missile defense radars;
military satellite communications; and the detection of underground nuclear explosions
(Project Vela Uniform). The joint services and ARPA funded this work and supported
Lincoln Laboratory's program of general research, which included radar and radio
astronomy, s3
Besides Project Needles, additional applications proposed for Haystack were track-
ing communication satellites and radar astronomy, the former justified as an adjunct to
communications research. The facility's X-band operating frequency ruled out meteor
studies. Radio astronomy was also not among the initial proposed uses but emerged later
in the earliest funding proposals submitted to the Air Force: 4
The design of Haystack was an in-house Lincoln Laboratory effort for about a year
and a half before the Air Force lent its financial support. The design progressed through
several evolutionary stages. The initial March 1958 design called for a 37-meter-diameter
(120-ft-diameter) parabolic reflector with a Cassegrainian feed, low-noise maser receivers,
and operation in the X-band, all characteristics of the earlier West Ford antennas. The
price tag was estimated to be about $5 million, which was too high for Air Force approval.
The problem was to reduce the facility's cost, while designing a reflector that would
maintain the high tolerances required for the short X-band wavelength. Exposure to wind
and the Sun would warp the dish too much to be effective at X-band. One solution would
have been to select a lower frequency range, say S-band, but participation in Project
Needles dictated an X-band operating frequency. The solution was to place the antenna
inside a radome, which not only protected the antenna from the Sun and wind, but also
reduced the weight and power needed to drive the antenna. The radome design was sig-
nificantly cheaper, too, lowering the estimated cost from $5 million to between $1.5 and
$2 million. Adding the radome raised a new design issue, however, because radomes had
never been used before at X-band.
Lincoln Laboratory had developed a radome for L-band Millstone-type radars, but it
could accommodate a dish no larger than 26 meters (85 ft) in diameter. To enclose the
Haystack 37-meter (120-ft) antenna, Lincoln Laboratory engineers raised the radome
above ground level and enlarged it from five-eighths to nine-tenths of a complete sphere.
Electrical tests carried out in March 1959 determined that a reduction in panel thickness
would permit the radome's use at X-band.
In November 1959, Herb Weiss became Haystack project engineer. The following
month, the Air Force committed financial support to the project. Lincoln Laboratory
took bids on the radar's construction and signed a contract with North American Aviation
(Ohio Division) on 1 December 1960. A separate Air Force contract procured the radome
and base extension.
Haystack was dedicated on 8 October 1964, at Tyngsboro, Massachusetts, about 30
miles northwest of Boston, but only a half mile up the road from Millstone. Haystack was
unique in its use of special plug-in boxes. Each box was 2.4 by 2.4 by 3.7 meters (8 by 8 by
12 ft) and could hold up to 2 tons of equipment. One box contained a 100-kilowatt
33. Lincoln Laboratory, The Central Re.*earchProgram, Report DOR-533 (Lexington: Lincoln Laboratory,
15June 1967). p. 1.
34. John Harrington, The Haystack Hill Station, Technical Memorandum 78 (Lexington: Lincoln
Laboratory, 13 October 1959), pp. 1 and 5-7, LLLA.
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Figure 10
Exterior view of the Haystack Observatory in 1964, when the facility was dedicated There, MIT and LincxJln Laboratory radar
astronomers imaged the. Moon and Venus and conducted a test of General Relativity. At the time of its dedication, Haystack
was one of only three, large antennas conducting radar astronomy re.search on a regular basis. (Ccmrtesy of MIT Lincoln
Laboratory, Lexington, MassachttsetU, photo no. P10.29-783.)
continuous-wave X-band (7,750 MHz; 4 cm) transmitter, cryogenic low-noise receivers,
and associated microwave circuits for planetary radar research. _5
As Haystack construction was underway, a key meeting of Harvard University
astronomers, Donald Menzel, director of the Harvard College Observatory, Leo
Goldberg, and Ed Lilley, took place on 24 May 1963. They came together in order to seek
access to this new, more sensitive telescope. As a secondary objective, they sought to
design and build a larger radio telescope in collaboration with Lincoln Laboratory.
35. Overhage to Ferguson, 14 November 1962, Overhage to B. A. Schriever, 27 January 1964, and
brochure, "Dedication Haystack Microwave Research Facility," 1/24/AC 134, MITA; Memorandum,J. A. Kessler
to Radford, 30 September 1964, LLLA; "Millstone Hill Field Station;" Harrington, Haystack Hill, pp. 2-3; Weiss
29 September 1993. For a discussion of the design and construction of Haystack, see Weiss, "The Haystack
Microwave Research Facility," IEEE Spectrum 2 (February 1965): 50-69; Evans, Ingalls, and Pettengill, .The
Haystack Planetary Ranging Radar," in L. Efron and C. B. Solloway, eds., Scu'ntific Applications of Radio and Radar
Tracking in the Space. Program, Technical Report 32-1475 (Pasadena: JPL, July 1970), pp. 27-36; and Weiss, W. R.
Fanning, E A. Folino, and R. A. Muldoon, "Design of the Haystack Antenna and Radome," in James w. Mar and
Harold Liebowitz, eds., Structures Technology for Large Radio and Radar "l;'_sc_ Sy._terg_ (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1969), pp. 151-184.
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Lincoln Laboratory radar and radio astronomers already enjoyed relatively free access to
Haystack, and Lincoln Laboratory radio astronomers often collaborated with their col-
leagues at Harvard Observatory's Agassiz Station, as well as at the NRAO. The Agassiz
Station had been training graduate students in radio astronomy for about ten years under
a National Science Foundation grant.
Gaining limited use of Haystack was not difficult. Lilley approached Lincoln
Laboratory regarding use of Haystack in July 1964. In September 1965, Lincoln
Laboratory and the Air Force reached a mutually agreeable policy on Haystack as well as
Millstone. The Air Force encouraged use of the two facilities by scientists outside the
Department of Defense and made Lincoln Laboratory responsible for scheduling time.
Lincoln Laboratory had to report all outside use of Millstone and Haystack to the Air
Force, which had final approval on all requests. Finally, outside agencies would have to pay
an hourly fee, to be determined by Lincoln Laboratory, to defray operating and upkeep
costs.
At the same Harvard meeting of 24 May 1963, Lilley also suggested that Harvard,
MIT (including Lincoln Laboratory), and the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory
(SAt) jointly undertake a cooperative, regional effort to build a large dish antenna free
of military limitations for radio astronomy research. The project sought to marry the
strength of Lincoln Laboratory in radar astronomy and the thriving Harvard program in
radio astronomy.
The proposed large antenna also would serve the interests of radar astronomers.
Although Haystack's greater power and sensitivity outclassed Millstone, Lincoln
Laboratory radar astronomers realized that radars then under construction, namely
Cornell's 305-meter (1,000-ft) antenna and JPL's 64-meter (210-ft) Mars Station, would
outperform Haystack. Lincoln Laboratory radar astronomers therefore sought a tele-
scope with Arecibo's sensitivity, but operating at a higher frequency. 36
New enthusiasm for the construction of the large telescope ignited upon the release
of the Whitford Report, which had endorsed the construction of large dish telescopes for
radio astronomy. The Whitford Report grew out of Congressional reaction to the Navy's
disastrous attempt to build an enormous steerable dish antenna in West Virginia.
Sugar Grove
The specter that haunted all large radio telescope dish projects was Sugar Grove. In
the words of a report of the Comptroller General of the United States to Congress, "rhe
complexity and unique character of the Big Dish [Sugar Grove] were underestimated
from the inception of the project. ''37 As late as 1965, Harvard astronomer Ed Lilley wrote
his colleagues, "International radio scientists still regard the U.S. Navy 600 foot
36. UAdHoc Committee on Large Steerable Antenna, Report, 8July 1963," 5/1/AC 135, Memorandum,
Lilley to File, n.d., 10/1/AC 135, Memorandum, Lilley to Sebring and Meyer, 28 July 1964, ll/1/AC 135,
Memorandum, 27 September 1965, "A Policy for the Use of the Millstone Hill and Haystack Facilities by
Agencies outside the Department of Defense," 6/1/AC 135, and "Ad Hoc Committee on Large Steerable
Antenna, Report, 8Jul}, 1963," 5/I/AC 135, MITA; Lincoln Laboratory, General Re.._arehProgram, Report DOR-
533, p. 25; MIT Research Laboratory of Electronics, Annual Re._earchReview arm Twentieth Anniversary Program,
lO-12May 1966, 23 March 1966, pp. 7-8, 13-14, NHOB.
37. Comptroller General, Report to the Congrex_of the United States: Unnecessary CosL_Incurred for the Naval
Radio Research Station Project at Sugar Grove, West Virginia. (Washington: GPO, April 1964), p. 7. For additional
background on the Sugar Grove dish, see Edward E McClain, Jr., "The 600-foot Radio Telescope," Scientific
American 202 (January 1960): 45-51; James Bamford, The Puzz_ Palace: A Rz,port on Ame_nca's&cretAgency (New
York: Penguin, 1983), pp. 218--221; and Daniel S. Greenberg, "Big Dish: How Haste and Secrecy Helped Navy
Waste $63 Million in Race To Build Huge Telescope," Scienc_ 144 (1964): 1111-1112.
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paraboloid as a 'radio telescope' fiasco, even though the project had minuscule associa-
tion with basic research. "_a
As early as 1948, NRL scientists devised a plan for a large steerable telescope for
detecting and studying radio sources. By 1956, the NRL had developed an initial propos-
al which called for a reflector 183 meters (600-ft) in diameter with accurate maneuver-
ability and precision positioning controls. The huge dish would be able to turn a full 3_a0
degrees in the horizon and dlt to any angle of elevation from the zenith to the horizon. If
completed, the 18_-meter steel-and-aluminum antenna would have stood taller than the
Washington Monument, weighed about 22,000 tons (the weight of an ocean liner), and
been the largest movable land-based structure ever constructed in the world.
The Navy began breaking ground for the U.S. Naval Radio Research Station, Sugar
Grove, West Virginia, telescope in June 1958. As construction got underway, the price tag
rose. The initial cost estimate was $20 million, but climbed to $52.2 million in February
1957, when the Department of Defense submitted requests for fiscal 1958 military con-
strucdon funds to Congress. Later in 1957, coincidental with the launch of Sputnik, the
Navy expanded the project concept and included certain (still) classified military surveil-
lance tasks. The nature of those tasks, nonetheless, was an open secret. The Navy planned
to listen to Soviet radio communications as they were reflected from the Moon, an idea
that grew out of the lunar radar work carried out by Benjamin Yaplee's group at the NRL.
Solar, planetary, and ionospheric radar experiments followed.
These new tasks inflated the estimated price tag to $79 million, and the decision to
redesign and build the telescope at the same time further ballooned the estimated cost to
more than $200 million ($300 million in some estimates), which was the total estimated
cost when the Department of Defense canceled the project in July 1962. The fatal deci-
sion to design and erect at the same time was an acknowledged "calculated risk" in order
to save roughly three or four years of construction time. The emerging new design called
for an antenna that was far too heavy for its support structure, which was already under
construction. Further complicating the project was an internal turf battle between the
Bureau of Yards and Docks and the Naval Research Laboratory. By the dme the
Department of Defense canceled Sugar Grove, the Navy had spent $42,918,914 on the
project, but with the setdement of termination claims included, the secretary of defense
estimated that the total expenditure for the telescope amounted to between $63 and $64
million.
An investigation by the comptroller general concluded that the Navy had incurred
unnecessary costs in the construction and cancellation of the big dish. s9 The Sugar Grove
fiasco raised serious questions about the spending of military research and development
dollars. AS Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.) pointed out in August 1962, Sugar
Grove had "many of the earmarks of other research and development projects which
turned out to be 'white elephants. ''4° The next month, Sugar Grove came under
Congressional scrutiny.
38. Memorandum, Lilley, August 1965, "Comments on a Regional Radio and Radar Research Facility for
the New England Area," p. 2-1, Box 7, UA V 630.159.10, PAHU.
39. NRL, C,areerJin Space C,wmmunicatiom (Washington: NRL, n.d.), p. 3, NRL, Rad/o Astronomy and ate.
600-foot D/sh (Washington: NRL, n.d.), n. p., and "The Big Dish," typed and edited manuscript, NRLHRC;
Comptroller General, pp. 2-4, 6 & 11. Early specifications for Sugar Grove did not include radar experiments.
See, for example, Spedficat/onsfor theNaval Radio Facility,Sugar Grove, W. Va.(Washington: NRL, December 1957),
and Specificatiomfor tht U.S. Naval Radio ResearchStation Sugar Gro_ W. Va. (Washington: NRL, September 1959),
NRLHRC. Later spedfications, though, did indicate radar experiments. P. Green to Robert Page, 14 April 1960,
and other documents, Green materials; Eshleman, "Sun Radar Experiment," in MIT, RadarAstnmo_, vol. 3, lec-
ture 15, p. 10. Fiscal irresponsibility was not the sole factor leading to the termination of the Sugar Grove pro-
ject; the availability of satellites to perform its espionage functions was certainly another.
40. Congresswna/Record, 87th Cong., 2d sess., 1962, Vol. 108, pt. 12, pp. 16175-16178.
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The Subcommittee on Applications and Tracking and Data Acquisition of the House
Committee on Science and Astronautics opened hearings on radio and radar astronomy
in September 1962. The Sugar Grove fiasco motivated the hearings, at which radio
astronomers defended their telescope projects. Witnesses discussed alternatives to large
dishes, such as arrays, in which a number of small antennas electronically linked to each
other acted as a single large antenna. Common to the witnesses' testimony was the asser-
tion that the United States lagged behind Australia and Britain in radio astronomy. 41
American backwardness in radio astronomy was widely accepted in the 1960s by
those involved in its funding. For example, in a speech marking the dedication of the
NRAO 43-meter (140-ft) radio telescope in 1965, Leland J. Haworth, director of the
National Science Foundation, emphasized the Australian, Bridsh, and even Dutch lead
over the United States in entering the field. 4_ While this was neither the first nor the last
time that a scientific community would use backwardness to argue for financial support,
Cold War competition was not mentioned.
As the federal agency underwriting much of the country's astronomy research, and
as the sponsor of the NRAO, the National Science Foundation (NSF) took an avid inter-
est in radio astronomy and its telescopes. In December 1959, well before the
Congressional investigation of Sugar Grove, the NSF had appointed an Advisory Panel for
Radio Telescopes to appraise current and future needs for radio telescopes. Its report,
released in 1961 before the Sugar Grove fiasco was generally realized, did not favor the
construction of large dish antennas. Instead, the Panel endorsed arrays using aperture
synthesis, a new technique first developed by Martin Ryle in Britain. The endorsement of
arrays led immediately to initial design studies of the Very Large Array (VLA), located
eventually in New Mexico. The NSF Panel report had more bad news for radar astronomy
dishes. Its first resolution stated that antenna requirements for radio and radar astrono-
my were so different, that radio astronomy antennas "should be primarily designed to
meet the needs of passive [radio] astronomy. "4s
The Whitford Report
Radio astronomers clamored for more telescopes. Anyone interested in building a
new radio and/or radar telescope dish had to take into consideration the question of par-
abolic dishes versus arrays, which were sdil quite experimental and untested, at least in the
United States. The NSF was on center stage as the primary civilian funding agency for
radio astronomy, and all design concepts and funding requests had to deal with the
omnipresent wake of the Sugar Grove disaster. The future of large radio and radar dishes
seemed precarious.
Into this situation came the Committee on Government Relations of the National
Academy of Sciences. At the suggestion of Harvard astronomer Leo Goldberg, the
Committee created the Panel on Astronomical Facilities on 14 October 1963, in order to
outline a planned approach to radio and optical telescope construction. Panel member-
ship comprised prominent optical and radio astronomers; Albert E. Whifford of Lick
Observatory served as chair.
41. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Applications and
Tracking and Data Acquisition, Report on Radio and RadarAstrorurmy, 87th Cong., 9d sess., 1969.
42. "Dedication of new 140-foot radio telescope at the National Radio Astronomy Observatory, Green
Bank, West Virginia," remarks by Dr. Leland J. Haworth, 13 October 1965, "Speeches, Leland J. Haworth,"
NSFHF.
43. Geoffrey Keller, "Report of the Advisor), Panel on Radio Telescopes," The Astrophysical Journal 134
(1961) : 927-939.
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The Panel assembled radio astronomers at a meeting held in Washington on 1 and
2 November 1963 in order to build a consensus. The result of the meeting and the Panel's
deliberations was an ambitious, 10-year plan of optical and radio telescope construction.
Nonetheless, the result of the Panel's work, known as the Wbitford Report, omitted radar
and solar astronomy. Solar astronomers protested the neglect in letter after letter. 44
The Whitford Report specifically rejected solar radar as too costly, but completely
neglected planetary radar astronomy. Radar astronomers did not protest. NASA's internal
evaluation of the Whitford Report, which Nancy Roman prepared after consulting with
those NASA committees and subcommittees responsible for developing the agency's
astronomy program, advised NASA to condnue its support of radar astronomy.
Nonetheless, she wrote, "We do not, at present, foresee NASA support for the construc-
tion of new radar facilities, although further experience with radar exploration of the
solar system may modify this conclusion." In general, Roman concluded, "Support of
astronomy is the province of the National Science Foundation," and the program of tele-
scope construction proposed by the Whitford Report was 'Xuithin the traditional province
of the National Science Foundation which should continue to retain responsibility for
them." Although Roman suggested that NASA deep space communications instruments
"should incorporate potential use by radio astronomers in their design, "45 curiously she
did not mention lending their use for radar astronomy experiments.
Roman's evaluation summed up what became, for all practical purposes, the NASA
position on funding radar astronomy. The construction of ground-based facilities was the
responsibility of the NSF; NASA would fund mission-oriented research at existing facili-
ties. The NSF embraced its role as the federal agency with primary responsibility for
ground-based astronomy. But full implementation of the Whitford Report construction
program required substantial increases in NSF spending on ground-based astronomy, and
the Foundation already was the country's major underwriter of ground-based astronomy.
In fiscal 1966, of the total federal expenditure of $46.2 million for ground-based astrono-
my, the NSF share was $21.0 million (46 percent), compared with $9.4 million (20 per-
cent) for NASA, $8.0 million (17 percent) for the Air Force, $4.5 million (10 percent) for
the Navy, and $3.3 million (7 percent) for ARPA. 46
The Whitford Report proposed to spend $224 million (about the cost of Sugar
Grove) over 10 years on a number of regional and national facilities. It endorsed 1) a large
array as a national facility under the NRAO (the VLA); 2) enlargement of Caltech's Owens
Valley Observatory (another array); 3) two fully-steerable 91-meter (300-ft) dishes as
regional facilities; 4) a design study of the largest possible steerable dish; and 5) smaller,
special purpose instruments. 47
44. Material in folders "Committees & Boards, Committee on Science and Public Policy, Panels,
Astronomical Facilities, 1963," "ADM, C&B, COSPUP, Panels, Astronomical Facilities, Radio Astronomers,
Meetings, Agenda, Nov," "Committees & Boards, Committee on Science and Public Policy, Panels, Astronomical
Facilities, 1964," and "Committees & Boards, Committee on Science and Public Policy, Panels, Astronomical
Facilities, Report, General, 1965," NAS; Gerard E W. Mulders, "Astronomy Section Annual Report," 25 June
1963, pp. 1-2, and Harold H. Lane, "Astronomy Section Annual Report," 1 .July 1964, p. 1, NSFHF; Panel on
Astronomical Facilities, GnmruLBa.wd Astronomy: A Ten-Year Proffram (Washington: National Academy of Sciences,
1964), p. 57.
45. Memorandum, Roman to Associate Administrator, Office of Space Science and Applications, 16
March 1965, "ADM, C&B, COSPUP, Astronomical Facilities Rpt Recommendations, Assessment by NSF," NAS.
46. Haworth to Donald F. Hornig, 5 April 1965, "Committees & Boards, Committee on Science and
Public Policy, Panels, Astronomical Facilities, Report, Recommendations, Assessment by NSF, 1965, _ NAS;
"Astronomy Section Annual Report, 1966," p. 1, "MPS Annual Reports," NSFHF.
47. Harold H. Lane, "Astronomy Section Annual Report," 1 July 1964, p. 2, NSFHF; Ground-Based
Astronomy, pp. 50-57. in 1955, Caltech began building a radio interferometer consisting of two 90-foot dishes at
Owens Valley, California, funded by the U.S. Office of Naval Research. Robertson, pp. 120-121; Marshall H.
Cohen, "The Owens Valley Radio Observatory: Early Years," Enl,tneering and S_Jent_ 57 ( 1994): 8-23.
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The Whitford Report favored neither arrays nor dishes, but saw a need for both. As
for large dishes, the Report recalled ttle Sugar Grove fiasco: "The design and evaluation
of these solutions are costly and very time-consuming, as has been shown in the unsuc-
cessful attempt at Sugar Grove to build a 600-foot [183-meter] paraboloid." The Report
expressed the need for "a thorough-going engineering study" to ensure the construction
of large radio telescopes and recommended spending $1 million on design studies for the
largest feasible steerable paraboloids "at an early date. ''4s
In Dish/Array
The Whitford Report understandably excited both Harvard radio astronomers and
I.incoln Laboratory radar astronomers with its endorsements of design studies for large
steerable antennas and a regional 91-meter (300-ft) dish. In order to seize the opportuni-
ties created by the Whitford Report, Harvard, MIT, and the SAO agreed to undertake a
.joint stud), of a large radio and radar telescope, and in August 1965, the group adopted
the name Cambridge Radio Observatory Committee and the acronym C_,AIVIROC. 4_
In October 1965, when CAMROC drew up a research agenda for the regional tele-
scope, planetary and lunar radar astronomy were featured uses. As Ed Lilley argued:
"American radar astronomers have also made major contributions, but in many instances
their work has been accomplished by 'borrowing time' on antennas which were mission
oriented. In the Cambridge group there are radar scientists who are keenly interested in
basic radar astronomy. The},, too, need an instrument as powerful and timely as the
Palomar 200-inch, where radar astronomy can flourish as a basic science with transmitters
and data analysis systems developed for optimum performance on ionospheric, lunar,
planetary, and solar problems. ''_°
On 29 October 1965, Harvard, MIT, Lincoln Laboratory, and the SAO signed a
Memorandum of Agreement, authorizing CAMROC to solicit up to $2.5 million to sup-
port design studies for the telescope. MIT would hold, administer, and disburse the funds
and act as (;AMROC's administrative agent. CAMROC funding was to come from a vari-
ely of sources, mostly federal. Of the estimated $2.7 million needed for fiscal 1966 and
1967, the NSF, NASA, and the Smithsonian Institution were to award $1.57 million (58
percent). MIT, Harvard, and private foundations (Kettering and Ford) would provide
additional funding. 5t
The NASA money was to come through the Electronics Research Center in
Cambridge. Unaware of NASA's evaluation of the Whifford Report, CAMROC submitted
a grant proposal m NASA for design studies of the large steerable radio and radar
antenna in February 196{5. NASA rejected the proposal. As William Brunk, acting chief of
Planetary Astronomy, explained, "Support for a project such as this is within the domain
of the National Science Foundation and it is recommended that they be approached as a
possible source of funding." NASA Deputy Administrator Robert C. Seamans, Jr.,
,t8. (;r_mml-llased A_tnmomv, pp. 56 and 75; ",,kssessment of the recommendations of the Whitford
Report, entitled '(;round-Based Astronomy: A Ten-Year Program," Table V, "ADM, C&B, COSPUP, Astronomical
Facilities Rpt Recommendations, Assessment by NSE" NAS.
4_.1. .]. A. Stratton to S. t)ilhm Ripley, 14 May 1965, and Nathan M. Pusey to Stratton, 2 June 1965,
5/I/AC 135, and Minutes _ff'Meeting, 26 August 1965, 14/1/AC 135, MITA.
50. I,illev, "Comments," p. 2-1, PA[tU.
51. Men'mlandum, 2t; October 1965, "CAMROC Support and Budget," and other documents in
6/'I/AC L35 and 12/I/AC 135, MITA.
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repeated the message: "The type of effort you proposed is clearly the responsibility of the
National Science Foundation."52
Despite the clear and consistent reply from NASA, Joel Orlen of MIT and executive
officer of the CAMROC Project Office (which was in charge of day-toMay activities) wrote
to Jerome Wiesner, MIT provost, "I believe NASA should be pushed on hard to reverse this
decision." CAMROC members came to believe that any argument made to NASA had to
take into account the risk of offending the advocates of theJPL dish design, that is, the
64-meter (210-ft) Mars Station.
Wiesner wrote to Seamans, requesting that NASA reconsider the rejected proposal;
he argued that the technology would be needed in the space effort. Seamans replied that
NASA was studying a variety of antenna designs, including arrays, "Because we foresee, in
an active and continuing space program, that our ground facilities will be required to
support multiple simultaneous flight missions, it may turn out to be more effective to rely
on a grouping of antenna systems that can be arrayed together as needed but that can also
operate independently for independent missions."ss
Seamans' reply threw CAMROC plans into disarray. From the beginning, the tele-
scope was to be a large steerable dish. But arrays were gaining popularity and were
considered a viable alternative to large radio dishes. The Whitford Report had endorsed
both the Owens Valley array and the VLA. In 1955, Caltech began building a pair of
27-meter (90-ft) dishes at Owens Valley, California, with money from the Office of Naval
Research; now Caltech proposed expanding the facility. The VLA was to consist of 27
radio telescopes mounted on railroad tracks in a Y formation whose arms were each 21
km long. When completed, each telescope would have a diameter of 25 meters (82 ft).s4
Now, NASA appeared interested in arrays. But were arrays effective in radar astronomy?
Believing that the CAMROC effort would raise questions about the merits of arrays
versus dishes, radar astronomer and CAMROC member Gordon Pettengill tackled the
question in a memorandum of 9June 1966. He concluded that arrays had a number of
advantages over a single large dish, including the ability to deliver more power to a target.
Arrays stretched technology less, promised more reliable capability, and cost less to build.
If some array elements were out of service for whatever reason, the deficiency would hard-
ly affect overall performance. Moreover, if full array capability were not needed, the
primary array could be divided into several smaller arrays and assigned to different exper-
iments. The major design challenge of arrays, Pettengill pointed out, arose from proving
the practicality of phasing a number of elements together. A minor drawback was the need
for numerous low-noise receivers and antenna feeds. 55
Lilley deflected the argument away from the merits of arrays versus dishes by
emphasizing the use of the radome. The radome set the design apart from all other radio
and radar antenna proposals before the NSE If the results of the radome tests were satis-
factory, Lilley claimed, the CAMROC studies would provide radio and radar astronomy
with a "breakthrough in antenna technology," and the CAMROC position would be
unique. "Unfortunately," he lamented, "only a small fraction of the radio and radar
52. "Proposal to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for Support of Design Studies for
a Large Steerable Antenna for Radio and Radar Astronomy," February 1966, 55/1/AC 135, and "Project Office
Report to CAMROC, Number 2," 30 August 1966, 5/1/AC 135, MITA;William E. Brunk to Director, Grants and
Research Contracts, 28July 1966, NHOB.
53. Memorandum,Joel Orlen toJerome Wiesner, 7 September 1966, Wiesner to Robert C. Seamans,Jr.,
3 October 1966, and Seamans to Wiesner, 15 November 1966, 55/1/AC 135, MITA.
54. For background on the VIA, see David S. Heeschen, "The Very Large Array," Sky and Tdescope49
(1975): 344-351; and A. R. Thompson, R. G. Clark, C. M. Wade, and P.J. Napier, "Die Very Large Array,"
Astrophysical Journal Supplemental &ties 44 (1980): 151-167. The initial theoretical development of arrays is dis-
cussed in Bracewell, _Early Work on Imaging Theory in Radio Astronomy," pp. 167-190 in Sullivan. See also
P.A.G. Scheuer, 'q'he Development of Aperture Synthesis at Cambridge," pp. 249-265 in ibid.
55. Memorandum, Pettengill to CAMROC Project Office File, 9June 1966, 18/i/AC 135, MITA.
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professional scientists in the United States understand this, and it is unlikely that the
National Science Foundation administrators have a clear understanding of the implica-
tions of the CAMROC studies."56
Although later, in April 1967, the NSF did judge the telescope's unique design
feature to be its radome, 57 in the meantime, the ability of the NSF to fund the CAMROC
telescope was limited. Lilley foresaw "a dramatic expansion of demand" for federal fund-
ing, especially from the NSF, during the summer of 1967 for large radio astronomy tele-
scopes. 5s Nonetheless, the NSF became the largest underwriter of the CAMROC design
studies. As of 26 April 1966, total CAMROC funds amounted to $410,000. The largest
share, $300,000, came from an NSF grant, with additional money from Harvard
($25,000), the SAt ($20,000), MIT Sloan Funds ($40,000), and the MIT Space Center
($25,000). An earlier attempt to raise money from the Kettering Foundation failed. The
Foundation was shifting its funding away from "science" to "education," and the CAMROC
telescope was "marginal to their interests." The likelihood of Department of Defense
support was equally bleak. ._9
In 1966, the NSF again faced a considerable number of large radio telescope pro-
posals, prompted this time by the large-scale spending proposed by the Whitford Report.
In addition to the CAMROC, VLA, and Owens Valley antennas, other projects included
"WESTROC," a joint Caltech, Stanford, and University of California at Berkeley telescope.
WESTROC was to be a 100-meter (328-ft), fully-steerable S-band radio dish located at the
Owens Valley site.
In order to campaign for their telescope, CAMROC held a Conference on Radomes
and Large Steerable Antennas on 17 and 18June 1966. Over 70 persons attended the con-
ference, which dealt exclusively with the proposed CAMROC dish. Participants came from
industry (North American Aviation, Rohr Corporation, ESSCO), the NSF, the NASA
Electronics Research Center, and the NRL, as well as from MIT, Harvard, the SAt, and
Lincoln Laboratory. Lilley also suggested using political pressure. 6° Ultimately, CAMROC
did apply political pressure, but not until after employing other tactics, including the
expansion of CAMROC into a regional organization.
NEROC
At least as early as February 1966, CAMROC was considering ways of transforming
itself into a regional association. The chief reason for the undertaking was to solicit funds
for the design, construction, and operation of a regional radio and radar telescope. A
regional base, moreover, would be useful in competing for funds against the Very Large
Array or WESTROC. 61
56. Memorandum, Lilley to Edward M. Purcell and Wiesner, 1 August 1966, 22/1/AC 135, MITA.
57. "Report of the Meeting of the Advisory Committee for Mathematical and Physical Sciences," 13-14
April 1967, p. 6, NSFHE
58. Memorandum, Lilley to Purcell and Wiesner, 1 August 1966, 22/1/AC 135, MITA.
59. CAMROC Funds, 26 April 1966, 7/1/AC 135, Orlen to Wiesner, 24 November 1965, 6/I/AC 135,
and various documents in 56/1/AC 135, MITA. NSF Grant GP-5832 was awarded to MIT for the project "Design
Studies for a Large Steerable Antenna for Radio and Radar Astronomy." For materials relating to the proposal,
see 12/1/AC 135 and 57/1/AC 135, MITA.
60. Memorandum, Lilley to Purcell and Wiesner, l August 1966, 22/1/AC 135, and various documents,
49/1/AC 135, MITA. The Institution of Electrical Engineers (London) sponsored a Conference on Large
Steerable Aerials for Satellite Communication, Radio Astronomy, and Radar, on 6-28June 1966. Herb Weiss,
William Fanning, and John Ruze from Lincoln Laboratory presented five papers: "Antenna Tolerance Theory:
A Review," "Design Considerations for a Large Fully Steerable Radio Telescope," "Performance Measurements
on the Haystack Antenna," "Mechanical Design of the Haystack Antenna," "Performance and Design of Metal
Space-Frame Radomes." 23/1/AC 135, MITA.
61. Memorandum, Orlen to Wiesner, 8 February 1966, 7/I/AC 135, MITA._
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CAMROC reached out to the entire Northeast to establish itself as a regional orga-
nization with regional interests, and with justifiable claims to funding for a regional radio
and radar telescope. One of the first steps was to choose a name, one which expressed this
regional character. The new organization, called the Northeast Radio Observatory
Corporation (NEROC), incorporated in Delaware on 26June 1967. CAMROC also con-
sidered a number of corporate arrangements, including the possibility of remaining lim-
ited to only Cambridge schools. After lengthy discussion and analysis, CAMROC settled
on a corporate structure that combined a "reasonable regional image" with local man-
agement. A committee representing qualified users would determine scientific policy,
while actual management would remain in the hands of the Cambridge group. 6_
After a detailed study of university astronomy departments in the six New England
states, the five adjacent Midatlantic states (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland,
and Delaware), and Washington, DC, NEROC recruited its first members: Boston
University, Brandeis University, Brown University, Darunouth College, Harvard, MIT, the
Polytechnic Institute of Brooklyn, the Smithsonian Institution, the State University of New
York at Buffalo and Stony Brook, the University of Massachusetts, the University of New
Hampshire, and Yale. 63
Among the universities declining the NEROC invitation was Cornell, which in 1967
managed the world's largest radio and radar antenna at Arecibo, Puerto Rico. Franklin A.
Long, vice president for Research and Advanced Studies at Cornell, replied to the MIT
invitation to join NEROC on 27 June 1967. Cornell radio astronomers supported the
NEROC initiative, he explained, but they did not feel tile telescope deserved top priority.
The greatest need was for increased resolution, which the "_q.A promised to deliver.
Moreover, they were "still uncertain about the relative advantages of a large steerable dish
in the Northeast as compared to the same dish in the Southwest (or Southeast)." Having
their own dish as well as an international agreement to use facilities overseas, Cornell was
"concerned as to whether formal participation in NEROC would not carry the air of
excessive Cornell greediness in this field. ''64
As CAMROC transformed itself into NEROC in 1967, the business of securing addi-
tional funding continued. In January 1967, NEROC won a third NSF grant ($675,000) for
telescope design studies, bringing the amount of total NSF support to $1,115,000.
Nothing guaranteed the continuation of NSF support, however; the Foundation was faced
with a multitude of design and construction proposals, and its budget was limited. 6_
In April 1967, the NSF Advisory Committee for Mathematical and Physical Sciences
had four radio astronomy projects, including the CAMROC design study, under consid-
eration with a total price tag of $120 million. Funding for all four was not available; the
Foundation had to establish which ones to fund. The NSF had no general way to budget
for major projects; usually, it treated requests for instrumentation, design studies, or facil-
ities as special cases. 66
62. "Outline of Organization and Management of Radio Observatoly," 20 May 1966; untitled docu-
ment, dated May 1966; and "Ahernative Organizational Arrangements," 20 May 1966, 7/I/AC 135; Agenda,
CAMROC meeting of 15June 1967, 8/I/AC 135, and documents in 61/I/AC 135, 66/I/AC 135, and 67/I/AC
135, MITA; NEROC, S¢_ent!ficObjectives_(the Pr_nJsedNEROC Rtulio-Radar 7_/_pe (Cambridge: NEROC, 1967),
p. 1; Certificate of Incorporation, 22June 1967, _NEROC," LLI2k. The annotated agenda of the first meeting of
the NEROC Board of Trustees, the minutes of that meeting, the certificate of incorpolation, and the NEROC
by-laws are in 11/64/AC 118, MITA.
63. Documents in 8/1/AC 135 and 65/1/AC 135, MITA; Certificate of Incorporation, 22June 1967,
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MITA.
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November 1966, 55/1/AC 135, MITA.
66. _Report of the Sleeting of lhe Advisory Committee for Mathematical and Physical Sciences," 13-14
April 1967, p. 7, NSFHE
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In order to evaluate the four radio telescope proposals, the NSF appointed the Ad
Hoc Advisory Panel for Large Radio Astronomy Facilities, called the Dicke Panel after its
chair, Robert H. Dicke of Princeton University. By June 1967, when the Panel convened,
the NSF had five proposals to consider: the Owens Valley array, the VLA, the Arecibo
upgrade, the NEROC antenna, and the WESTROC dish.
The Dicke Panel met in Washington between 24 and 28 July 1967 and listened to
technical presentations from members of the proposing institutions. NEROC was asking
for $28 million over five years for design and construction of a fully-steerable, radome-
enclosed, 440-ft (134-meter) parabolic dish operating at 6,000 MHz (5-cm). Gordon
Pettengill wrote the NEROC presentation section on radar astronomy. The NEROC tele-
scope was not the only combined radio and radar astronomy facility looking for money.
Thomas Gold, Frank Drake, and Rolf Dyce of Cornell University advocated renovating the
Arecibo dish so that it could operate at 3,000 MHz (10-cm) or higher.
Although the Dicke Panel had focused on radio astronomy, it was not blind to radar
astronomy. The Panel recognized, for example, that "the use of radar techniques in
astronomy has for the first time enabled man to establish direct contact with the planets
and to set his own experimental conditions." In contrast to Pettengill's memorandum on
radar astronomy arrays, the Dicke Panel judged that "an array cannot be used effectively
for spectroscopic work or radar astronomy...without introducing great complications in
the electronic system."
Following its deliberations, the Dicke Panel submitted its report to the Director of
the NSF on 14 August 1967. The report approved the Owens Valley array, the VLA, and
the Arecibo upgrade. To say the least, the Dicke Panel was impressed, perhaps too
impressed, by the potential of the spherical Arecibo dish. The Arecibo "type of antenna
seems to show great promise for the future and should be considered along with the very
large, fully steerable antenna for the next step forward," the Panel ruled. It urged
appraisals of Arecibo's performance and suggested that both the WESTROC and NEROC
proposals be deferred until more was known of the performance of spherical dishes. 67 As
we shall see in the next chapter, the Arecibo antenna was considerably inefficient.
The Dicke Panel report devastated NEROC plans, not to mention planetary radar
astronomy at Lincoln Laboratory. The only radar telescope available to Lincoln
Laboratory investigators was the Haystack antenna. The Arecibo 305-meter (1,000-ft) dish
and JPL's 64-meter (210-ft) Mars Station, moreover, already outclassed Haystack. NEROC
tried to salvage its antenna project. MIT physics professor Bernard E Burke suggested that
NEROC consider a smaller, 101-meter (330-ft) dish. "We should not be so beguiled with
the idea of being temporarily the master of the world's biggest radio telescope," he wrote,
"that we cannot accept an instrument that is only one of the biggest. "6a
Technical reports and symposia papers, though, continued to support the feasibility
and desirability of the 134-meter (440-ft) design. The International Symposium on
Structures Technology for Large Radio and Radar Telescope Systems, sponsored by MIT
and the Office of Naval Research and held at MIT on 18-20 October 1967, saw participants
from the United States and six other countries discussing the latest designs for large
67. National Science Board, Approved Minutes of the Open Sessions, meeting of 8 September 1967, pp.
113:14-113:15, National Science Board; "Draft of G. Pettengill's material for CAMROC facilities proposal," 21
April 1967, 62/2/AC 135, and NEROC, "A Large Radio-Radar Telescope: Proposal for a Research Facility,"June
1967, 61/2/AC 135, MITA; "Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Panel for Large Radio Astronomy Facilities,"
14 August 1967, typed manuscript, pp. 2-4, 9-10 and 13-14, NSFL. The members of the Dicke Panel were Bart
J. Bok, Stifling A. Colgate, Rudolph Kompfner, William W. Morgan, Eugene N. Parker, Merle A. Tuve, Gart
Westerhout, and Robert H. Dicke.
68. Memorandum, Burke to Lilley, 6 October 1967, 8/2/AC 135, MITA.
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telescopes in Europe, the 100-meter (328-ft) Effelsberg antenna and the proposed 122-
meter (400-ft) dish atJodrell Bank. 69
Design studies for the NEROC radio and radar telescope continued. During an 18-
month period in 1966 and 1967, an interim agreement between MIT and the Air Force
partially underwrote the studies. Funding at Lincoln Laboratory tightened, however, and
Herb Weiss learned that Lincoln Laboratory no longer could pay for personnel doing
NEROC studies after 1 January 1968. The design work carried on thanks to modest sup-
port from its Cambridge backers. The three original NEROC members, the SAt, MIT,
and Harvard, contributed $121,241, of which MIT and Harvard gave 84 percent. 70
The NEROC project had relied on the technical expertise and financial largesse of
Lincoln Laboratory, plus a few not inconsequential NSF grants worth over $1.6 million. At
this critical point, as Lincoln Laboratory "soft" money melted and the Dicke Panel advised
deferring the NEROC telescope, getting more time on the Haystack telescope became a
higher and urgent priority.
HAYROC
In October 1967, Lincoln Laboratory asked NEROC if it were interested in assuming
responsibility for Haystack. NEROC was interested and wanted to study costs and use
management, but without impairing progress on the design of the 134-meter (440-ft)
antenna. As funding for the big dish design studies slowed to a trickle in 1968, NEROC
management of Haystack began to look even more desirable. The matter was the first item
of business at NEROC's 25 May 1968 meeting. After some discussion, NEROC unani-
mously voted to begin negotiations with Lincoln Laboratory and to explore sources of
financial support to turn Haystack into a regional observatory. 7!
Air Force support of Haystack paid for a single "shift," meaning five eight-hour days
a week. NEROC radio astronomers wanted more observing hours, a second and, if possi-
ble, a third "shift," that is, additional increments of time averaging forty hours a week. In
response to the NEROC interest, Lincoln Laboratory offered a large portion of its current
Haystack schedule to NEROC users at no charge, with "overtime" hours at minimal cost
beginning January 1969. In stages, NEROC would assume responsibility for antenna man-
agement and for securing operating funds, as available observing time increased incre-
mentally toward a maximum schedule of four and a half shifts (three eight-hour shifts
each day plus weekends for a total of about 2,000 hours per year for each shift). Lincoln
Laboratory still would be an important user of the antenna and would continue to pro-
vide substantially to the operating budget.
NEROC established subcommittees responsible for estimating costs, for drawing up
mutually agreeable plans between Lincoln Laboratory and its sponsors and between
NEROC and its sponsors, for laying out a management structure, and for pursuing fund-
ing. Among the funding sources explored were the NASA Electronics Research Center
and the state of Massachusetts, both of which encouraged further discussions but cau-
tioned that eventual support, if any, would be in modest amounts. In addition, NEROC
69. Documents in 62/1/AC 135, MITA. For theJodrell Bank 440-foot (134-meter) MARKV telescope,
see Lovell, The.JodreflBank Telesa_._, Chapters 5--6 and 9-11. For the Effelsberg telescope, see Otto Hachenberg,
_I'he 100-meter Telescope of the Max Planck Institute for Radio Astronomy in Bonn," Proceedings0fthe/EEE 61
(1973): 1288--1295, also in Mar and Liebowitz, pp. 13-27, which are the proceedings of the International
Symposium on Structures Technology for Large Radio and Radar Telescope Systems.
70. Weiss to Wiesner, 21 September 1967, 18/2/AC 135, and documents in 63/1/AC 135, MITA. MIT
contributed $72,381, Harvard $30,000, and the SAt $18,860; NEROC had received $1,615,000 from the NSE
71. "Board of Trustees: Second Meeting of the NEROC Board of Trustees, 10/22/67," 62/1/AC 135,
and "Board of Trustees: Third Meeting of the NEROC Board of Trustees, 5/25/68," 63/1/AC 135, MITA.
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approached MIT, Harvard, the University of Massachusetts, and the Environmental
Science Services Administration (for a very long baseline interferometer with their dish
at Boulder). The NSF was not left out of the search. 7_
Meanwhile, tile NEROC 134-meter (440-ft) antenna project had languished. Now,
though, the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory stepped in. The SAO had not con-
tributed technically to the design of the big dish, nor had it contributed significantly to its
financial support. But tile SAO, through its parent organization, the Smithsonian
Institution, could rally political support and make claims for the NERO(_,/Smithsonian
telescope being a national, not a regional, facility.
The possibility of the Smithsonian Institution obtaining Congressional authorization
tor the NEROC telescope was first summarized in a memorandum to the NEROC Board
on 3 September 1967. During the summer of 1968, NER()C and Smithsonian Institution
representatives discussed the possibility of the Smithsonian Institution leading the drive
to obtain funding for the NEROC telescope. The discussions led to an understanding,
which included management of the project during the design, construction, and opera-
tional phases of the iacility. 7:_
As a pivo(al preliminary step, the Smithsonian Institution organized a meeting of
radio and radar astronomers to marshall agreement on the need to build the NEROC tele-
scope. If the meeting of radar and radio scientists endorsed the NEROC telescope, then
the Smithsonian Board of Regents would be asked to approve the attelnpt to obtain
Congressional authorization for it. The meeting took place at the Museum of History and
Technolo_', as it was then called, at Constitution Avenue and 14th Street, NW, on 30
November and 1 December 1968. About three dozen invited radio and radar astronomers
and a handfifl of NSF and NASA officials attended, in response to an invitation fi-om the
Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, S. Dillon Ripley.
After Fred Whipple (Harvard) opened the meeting with a review of the Smithsonian
Institution's "historical role" in astronomy, John Findlay (NRAO) explained ltle purpose
and plan of the tneeting and pointed out that five years after the Whitford Report, none
of the recommeuded facilities had been built. Talks and discussions covered the gamut of
telescope questions, including the Arecibo spherical dish and the issue of using arrays for
radar astronomy.
James Bradley, assistant secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, laid out the plan
that his institution might follow and assuaged worries about staying on the good side of
the NSE MIT's Edward M. Purcell reviewed the basic design concept: a 134-meter-diame-
ter (440-fl-diameter) dish, enclosed in a 171-1neter (560-fl) radome, the whole costing
about $35 million. Whipple explained that the telescope would be a national, not a
regional, facility, and assured the gathering that the SAO would "absolutely not" dominate
the telescope's planning and policy committee.
()n the last meeting day, Findlay sought to bring the participants together in agree-
ment aronnd common issues. The formal "Conclusions and Recommendation," by major-
ity vote of the participants, declared that there was "an urgent need for a large filled-
aperture radio-radar telescope in the United States to assist in the solution of a wide range
72. NEROC, l'roposal 1o the National Science Foundation for I'mg_ ares in Radio and Radal .,ksuonomy
at Ibc 1laystack Obsel vamry, 8 May 197(/, p. V.2, Lt.LA; "Boa_d of Tt ustees: Third Meeting of the NEROC Board
of "I'_ustccs. 5/25/68,'" 1"13/I/AC 1?,5; "B<nud of Tnuslees: Fotul th Meeting of the NEROC Board of Trustees,
1/18/69,'" 64/1/AC 135; and NEROC, l'roposal to the National S_icnce Foundation, lot Rescal ch I'mg_ ares in
Radio Asllonomy tTsing the l tavslack Facility, for the l)Criod l July 1969 to 30,lutw 1970. p. '1, l 1/6.t/AC 118,
MITA. The proposal ran be lound in "Research Proposals in Radio Astronomy Using the llayslaq:k Facility,
7/1/69-6/30/70." 23/2/AC 135. and "Opel ating Expenses fo_ Ihc NEROC lla',slack ()bservatoly,
7/1/69-6/30/70." 24/2/AC 135, MITA.
73. Memorandum, I.illey to NEROC Board of Trustees, 21 November f968. Box 1, tIA V 630.159.10,
Pt Jt IA; Documents in 6,t/l/AC 135, MITA.
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ofimportantproblemsinastronomyandastrophysics."Thetelescopewastobeoperated
asanationalfacilityandlocated"primarilyonthebasisof scientificandtechnicalcrite-
ria."ThemeetingresolvedthattheSmithsonianI stitutionshouldsubmitaproposalto
theappropriatef deralagenciesandcarrygeneralresponsibilityforthefunding,design,
construction,andoperationof thetelescope.Finally,participantsapprovedthatthe
"NEROCdesignfora134-meter(440-ft)elescopeinaradomeiscloseinsizeandgener-
al specificationstoafeasibleoptimumdesign,"andendorsedit asthebasisforthefinal
designoftileSmithsoniantelescope.74
Themeetingwasanunqualifiedsuccess.JamesBradleywroteto Ripleyafterthe
meeting:"Wehavesucceededingainingthesupportof thirtyastronomersforourleg-
islativeproposaltoauthorizethedesignandconstructionfalarge-diameter,radio-radar
astronomicalantenna.''7_Theconferencewasonlythefirststepinpreparingtogodirect-
lytoCongress.Inthefollowingweeks,theSmithsonianInstitutionandNEROCassembled
materialsforthecampaign.Amongthosematerialswasapublicitypacketthatincludeda
photographofamodelof thecompleteddish.HerbWeissestimatedthecostof thefacil-
ityandcomparedtilecostspresentedin theNSFproposalofJune1967withprojected
costsbasedonJune1969andJune1970startingdates.
Figu_ t t
Artist's drawing of the ]nt_tJosed NFROC 440-fo*_t (134-meter), rudorne-enck_sed, [uUy-steerable antenna. This and other draw-
inK* and nuuleZ_ were prepared to raise funding for the. radi_-_adar telescope, IL_ radar was to operate at 5 cm (6,000 MHz or
6 GHz), which wa._ lower than tlawtack Oh_ervatcrry's wavelength t_ 3.8 cm (7,750 MHz). (Courtesy of MIT Lincoln
l.alurrattrry, Lexington, Ma._._achusetL_, photo no. 259646-1.)
74. James C. Bradley, Charles A. Lundquist, and Lille),, draft letter to all regents, 20 November 1968, and
Memorandum, Lilley to NEROC Board of Trustees, 21 November 1968, Box 1, UA V 630.159.10, PUHA;
"Minutes, Radio and Radar Astronomers Meeting," pp. 1-5, 8-9, 11-12, 15-18 and 24, "List of attendees and
observers," Attachment 1, and "Conclusions and Recommendations," 61/137, SIAUSC, 1959-1972;J. w. Findlay,
"Summary of a meeting to consider a large filled-aperture radio-radar telescope," 1 December 1968, "SAO 1968,"
217, SIAOS, SIA.
75. Memorandum, Bradley to Ripley, 16 December 1968, "SAt 1968," 217, SlAtS, SIA.
STURM UND DRANG 79
On 3 January 1969, STAG (Smithsonian Telescope Advisory Group), the radio
astronomy advisory committee to Dillon Ripley, met at Lincoln Laboratory and reviewed
detailed drawings of the design and the latest cost estimate. Meanwhile, the Smithsonian
Institution Board of Regents approved requesting an initial $2 million for completing the
NEROC design and authorized acquiring land for a site. The next step was to ask the
Bureau of the Budget (BOB) for approval to include the $2 million request in the
Smithsonian Institution budget for fiscal 1970. On 20January 1969, Ripley submitted the
proposed radio telescope legislation to the director of the BoB. 76
Although the intention of approaching Congress directly was to circumvent the NSF
review process, the Smithsonian Institution kept the Foundation informed. Meanwhile, in
August 1968, NEROC submitted a proposal to the Foundation for expanded radio astron-
omy research at Haystack. The purpose of the proposal was to increase radio observing
time to three shifts. It also included a three-year plan for shifting management and finan-
cial responsibility to NEROC, as well as a suggested management structure. The Haystack
Scientific Advisory Committee, consisting of MIT and Harvard scientists, would assist the
observatory director in approving experiments. Any qualified radio astronomer in the
United States could request time. 77
During what Haystack director Paul B. Sebring characterized as "the long, silent
interval following the August 68 submission of the transfer plan" on 14 March 1969,
Lincoln Laboratory, MIT, and NEROC concluded an interim agreement on the transfer
of Haystack to NEROC and established the Haystack Observatory Office to evaluate and
coordinate experiment proposals and to serve as a conduit for non-Lincoln Laboratory
auxiliary funds for Haystack. 7s
The National Science Foundation turned the NEROC proposal over to tile second
Dicke Panel, which met in June 1969, nearly a year after NEROC submitted its proposal.
The Panel recommended supporting Haystack radio astronomy. The blessing of the Dicke
report turned into a one-year NSF grant effective 15 September 1969. The grant paid for
wages, computer time, and other costs associated with adding two more shifts of observ-
ing time. Under the conditions of the grant, moreover, the Haystack telescope was opened
to all qualified radio astronomers in the United States, subject to the approval of the
Haystack Scientific Advisory Committee. 7u
The orderly transition of Haystack into a civilian radio observatory appeared on
track, until a military auditor balked at the disparity between the Department of Defense
and NSF shares of Haystack support. The NSF had bought two-thirds of the observing
time for $200,000, while the Air Force paid about $1.3 million for only one-third. The
76. Ripley to Haworth, 17 March 1969, 9/2/AC 135, documents in 10/2/AC 135, 12/2/AC 135, and
64/1/AC 135, MITA. Members of the Smithsonian Telescope Advisory Group, 18 February 1969: John W.
Findlay, NRAO, Green Bank; Alan H. Barrett, M1T; Von R. Eshleman, Stanford; Richard M. Goldstein,JPL; Carl
E. Heiles, UC Berkeley;.John D. Krauss, Ohio State University; Frank J. Kerr, University of Maryland; A. Edward
Lilley, 11arvard; Alan T. Moffet, Caltech; Gordon H. PeUengill, Arecibo; Irwin I. Shapiro, MIT; Harold E Weaver,
UC Berkeley; and Gart Westerhom, University of Maryland. "NEROC Bd. of Truslees Minutes," Box 2, UA V
630.159.10, PUHA.
77. NEROC, Proposal to the National Science Foundation, for Research Programs in Radio Astronomy
Using the Haystack Facility, for the period 1 .July 1969 to 30June 1970, pp. 1-2 and 4-5, 11/64/AC 118, MITA.
The proposal also can be found in "Research Proposals in Radio Astronomy Using the Haystack Facility,
7/1/69-6/30/70/' 23/2/AC 135, and "Operating Expenses for the NEROC Haystack Observatory,
7/1/69-6/30/70," 24/2/AC 135, MITA. The scientific ad_asory commitlee consisted of Alan H. Barrett, winiam
A. Dent, A. Edward Lilley, and Irwin 1. Shapiro.
78. Memorandum, Sebring to M. U. Clauser, 21 November 1969, 12/56/AC 118, and "Itaystack
Observatory Office, Agreement Establishing the H.O.O., 3/14/69," 31/2/AC 135, MITA.
79. "Report of the Second Meeting of Ihe Ad Hoc Advisory Panel for Large Radio Astronomy Facilities,"
15 August 1969, p. 22, NSFL; Louis Levin to Wiesner, 12 September 1969, 18/2/AC 135, MITA; NEROC,
Proposal to the National Science Foundation for Programs in Radio and Radar Astronomy at the Haystack
Observatory, 8 May 1970, p. IV.3, LLLA.
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arrangement conflicted with a Bureau of the Budget circular, and the auditor requested
a written release from the Air Force before he would pass on the funding arrangement.
Brig. Gen. R. A. Gilbert, Air Force Systems Command director of laboratories, refused to
sign a written release; such a waiver, he judged, might commit the Air Force to under-
writing Haystack through the end of fiscal 1970, a position he felt he could not take. 80
The Mansfield Amendment cut this Gordian knot. Formally known as Section 203 of
the Fiscal 1970 Military Procurement Authorization Act, the Mansfield Amendment com-
pelled the Pentagon to demonstrate the mission relevance of basic research financed
through its budget. Specifically, the Amendment stated: "None of the funds authorized to
be appropriated by this Act may be used to carry out any research project or study unless
such project or study has a direct or apparent relationship to a specific military function
of operations." Sen. Mike Mansfield's goal had been to rechannel public funding for sci-
ence through civilian rather than military agencies. 81
The Air Force announced its intention to terminate operation of Haystack no later
than 1 July 1970. The Mansfield Amendment was a key factor in that decision. Although
the Air Force expressed its willingness to cooperate with the NSF in an orderly transfer,
the decision brought chaos. With no Air Force money after 1 July 1970, Haystack was in a
perilous financial situation. Sebring, as Haystack director, obtained NSF consent to repro-
gram its grant funds to defray the entire cost of Haystack radio astronomy operations. A
small grant from the Cabot Solar Energy Research Fund supplemented the NSF money, s_
The early withdrawal of the Air Force hastened agreements on Haystack ownership,
management, and finances. The Air Force transferred Haystack to MIT, which already
owned the land. Haystack personnel remained employees of MIT. The NEROC Board of
Trustees appointed the observatory director, who reported to them through the board
chair. NEROC took responsibility for Haystack research and financing.
To continue support of radio astronomy after 1 October 1970, NEROC submitted a
new proposal to the NSF in May 1970. The proposal presented three alternative funding
levels, but the NSF awarded less than that requested for a minimal program. _3
Subsequently, the NSF annually renewed its support of Haystack radio astronomy. The suc-
cessflfl transition of Haystack from military to civilian funding and monitorship ultimate-
ly had an impact on the NEROC/SAO effort to fund the 134-meter (440-ft) telescope
through Congress.
The Big Dish Bill
On 28 January 1969, Senators Clinton P. Anderson (D-N.M.), Hugh Scott (R-Pa.),
andJ. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), all three regents of the Smithsonian Institution, introduced
a bill in the Senate (S.705) "to authorize the Smithsonian Institution to acquire lands and
to design a radio-radar astronomical telescope for the Smithsonian Astrophysical
Observatory for the purpose of furthering scientific knowledge, and for other purposes."_4
80. Brunk, Memo to the Files, 18 December 1969, NHOB.
81. James L. Penick, Jr., Carrol W. Pursell, Jr., Morgan B. Sherwood, and Donald C. Swain, eds., 7"he
Politu:* of American Scien*z 1939 to tl_ Present, rev. ed. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1972), pp. 338-349.
82. W.D. McElroy to Grant Hansen, 5 May 1970, 18/2/AC 135, tturlburt to Sebring, 20 May 1970,
18/2/AC 135, and Wiesner to Orlen, 16 July 1970, 16/2/AC 135, MITA; Hansen to Thomas O. Paine, 26
February 1970, NHOB.
83. NEROC, Proposal to the National Science Foundation for Programs in Radio and Radar Astronomy
at the Haystack Observatory, 8 May' 1970, p. IV.I, LLLA; Wiesner to Wilbur W. Bolton, Jr., 15 October 1970,
18/2/AC 135, MITA.
84. Documents in "Radio-Radar Telescope Legislation, 91st Congress, 7/1/69-12/31/69," 60, SLATS,
and "SAt 1968," 217, SIAOS, SIA; _Congress Gets 'Big Dish' Bill," Vol. 9, No. 4 "/'heSAt News (March 1969):
1 and 4, 24/1/AC 135, MITA.
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ASTAGmeetingof2April1969decidedthesitefortheNEROCtelescope.Afterset-
tlinguponanumberofsitecriteria,STAGlimitedthesitecandidatesto thecontinental
UnitedStates,adecision,FredWhipplepointedout,whichled"almostinexorablytoa
finalselectionsomewherein thesouthernborderstatesfromwesternTexasthroughNew
MexicoandArizonaintoCalifornia.''85
TheSmithsonianlegislation,knownpopularlyasthe"BigDish"bill,s6requested$2
millionforthefiscalyearending30June1970.Thebillwasreadtwice,thenreferredto
theSenateCommitteeonRulesandAdministration.On17November1969,MorristC
Udall(D-Arizona)introducedthelegislationi theHouse(H.R.14,837),whereit was
referredtotheCommitteeonHouseAdministration.
TheBigDishbillpickedupapprovalsfromNASAandtheNSEIn February1969,
.JohnNaugle,NASAassociateadministratorf rSpaceScienceandApplications,gavehis
blessingto thebill:"I'headditionof sncharadio-radartelescopeasanationalfacility
wouldsatisfyaneedfor thefutureof radioastronomyin theUnitedStates.'m7On17
March1969,RipleyaskedLelandJ.Haworth,directoroftheNSEforhisinstitution'ssup-
portoftheSmithsonianlegislation.TheNSF'sreplycamein theformof aninvitation.
RobertFleischer,headoftheNSFAstronomySection,wrotethattheDickePanelwould
reconvene,on9-11June1969,andinvitedNEROCtopreparea30-minutepresentation
onthecurrentstatusofitsradomedesign.8sIf theDickePanelagaindeferredorreject-
edtheNEROCdesigninfavorofanotherproject,passageoftheSmithsonianI stitution
billwouldbejeopardized.
TwoyearshadpassedsincethefirstDickePanelmet."Aneedthatwasthenurgent
hasnowbecomecritical,"thesecondDickeReportdeclared."Whileourcountryhas
stoodstill,GreatBritain,theNetherlands,Germany,andIndiahavestartednew,large
radiotelescopesandseveralreessentiallycompleteandread)'foroperation."ThePanel
reaffirmedtheneedtoupgradetheArecibodishandsupportedtheOwensValleyarray
andtheVeryLargeArray.AsfortheNEROCantenna,thesecondDickePanelfoundit
"clearthatthisinstrumentisnotonlyfeasible,butreadyforfinaldesignandconstruc-
tion."ThePanelrecommendedthat"thefinaldesignandconstruction...bestarted
now...withentmostdispatch."ThePanelsufferedamnesia,too;itsreportclaimedthat
it had"'highlyrecommendedforcontinuation"oftheNEROCdesignstudytwoyearsear-
lier.Initsconclusions,thesecondDickepaneldeclared:'q'heurgentneedforsuchatele-
scopeisprovenbeyondoubt.Theinstrumentisreadytogointotheconstructionphase."
Whetherfundedthroughthe SmithsonianInstitutionor the NationalScience
Foundation,"it isevidentthatthisinstrumentshouldbeoperatedasanationalfacility.''su
TheDickePanelreportwasreleasedon15August1969.AlthoughCongressinter-
pretedthereportassupportingtheBigDish,theDickePanelrecommendationsneither
changed the playing field in Congress nor clarified the issues. After a two-hour hearing on
10 September 1969, Rep. Frank Thompson,Jr., (D-NJ), chairman of the Subcommittee on
Library and Memorials, deferred the Big Dish legislation. He insisted on having reports
85. Whipple to Bradley, 3 April 1969, "Miscellaneous Correspondence and Other Material," Box 1, UA
V 630.159.10, PUHA.
86. See, for instance, "Biggest Radio-Radar Scope Asked for U.S.," Washington Evening Star, 1 April 1969,
p+ A15, in "Radar Astronomy," NHO.
87. John E. Naugle to Richard A. Buddeke, 18 February 1969, NttOB; "Radio-Radar Telescope
t,egislation, 91st Congress, 7/1/69-12/31/69," 60, SIAOS, SIA; "SAO 1968," 217, SIAOS, SIA; "Congress Gels
'Big Dish' Bill," pp. 1 and 4, 24/1/AC 135, MITA.
88. Robert Fleischer to Wiesner, 20 May 1969, I8/2/AC 135, and Ripley to Haworth, 17 March 1969,
9/2/AC 135, MITA.
89. "Report of the Second Meeting of the Ad t|oc Advisory Panel for Large Radio Astronomy Facilities,"
15 August 1969, typed manuscript, pp. 1-3 and 15-17, NSFI., The membership of Ihe second Dicke Panel was
the same as the firsl, with the exception of Merle A, Tuve, Carnegie Institution of Washington, who was unahle
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from NASA, the NSE and the Department of Defense before holding hearings. After the
submission of the reports, hearings were set for 15 September 1969, _° but the question was
not settled before the end of the Congressional session.
House hearings took place on 29July 1970, after Rep. Thompson reintroduced the
legislation (H. R. 13,024) on 22July 1970. The primary hurdle facing the bill was the tight
budget, although money was available for the war in Vietnam. As Rep. Thompson
quipped: "Maybe if we could get this [telescope] in the Defense budget it would be all
right, but then I would be against it." In April 1971, Lilley and the Smithsonian Institution
in fact did consider an amendment to the Big Dish bill that would include classified Navy
research among its duties. 91
During the 19 July 1970 hearings, astronomers argued that the telescope was need-
ed because the United States was behind the rest of the world in radio astronomy. At no
point, however, did anyone defend the telescope's radar research program. The bill went
to the Subcommittee on Library and Memorials, which unanimously voted to report the
bill to the Committee on House Administration with the recommendation that it be
reported to the Congress for enactment into law.
The BoB torpedoed the Big Dish bill, however, citing the findings of a special NSF
review committee, which had assigned higher priority to two other projects. The proposed
expenditure, moreover, was not consistent with Nixon Administration efforts to limit fis-
cal 1970 funding to items of the highest priority and to avoid commitments for fiscal 1971
and beyond. Among other issues, the BoB pointed out that the bill raised basic questions
about the appropriate roles of the Smithsonian Institution and the NSE 9"J
The Big Dish bill returned to Congress in March 1971. On 31 March 1971, Rep.
Thompson told Dillon Ripley that the bill would go through tile House "with no trouble. ''93
The Greenstein Panel, however, stopped the bill. Ripley wrote to Sen. Clinton Anderson on
23June 1971 advising him to postpone action on the bill. The latest incarnation of the
Dicke Panel, chaired by Jesse Greenstein, Caltech astronomy professor, was going to rec-
ommend three facilities: the VLA, a large centimeter-wave antenna, and a large millimeter-
wave antenna. It also was going to recommend that the VI_ be started first. "In view of the
priorities to be established by the Committee," Ripley wrote, "it does not seem wise to seek
authorization now for the Smithsonian telescope. The three projects a,e all of great value
to radio-radar astronomy and should not be put into a competition for limited Federal
funds. If the array project is authorized on a reasonable time-scale, we look forward to a
timely resumption of our efforts with you on the large Smithsonian telescope. ''94
The saga of the NEROC radio-radar telescope ended not in Congress, but within
NEROC itself. Once Haystack was opened to radio astronomers from NEROC and other
institutions, thanks to fimding from the NSF, pressure to build the NEROC telescope
eased. NERO(: board tnembers had come to realize, too, that the Big Dish bill was a lost
90_ "Radio-Radal "I't.les¢ ope Legislation, 91st Congress, 7/1/69-12/31/69," Sb'_OS, 60, SIA; "Statement
by lterbert G. Weiss for CongressioHa[ Subcommittee Hearings, October 1969," 9/2/AC 135, MITA.
91. Transcript of Congressional hearing of 29.July 1970, Subcommittee on Library and Memorials of
Ihe Conuniuee on House Administration, pp. 381-382 and 393, "Miscellaneous Correspondence and Other
Material," Box 1, and "Mist ellaneous Correspondence and Other Material," Box 2, UA V 630.159.10, PUHA.
92. Transcript of heaning, pp. 381-382 and 393, "Miscellaneous Correspondence and Other Material,"
Box 1; Memorandum tor the record..James Bradley, 16 September 1969, and James M. Frey to Frank Thompson,
Jr., 2 September 1969, "Mis, enaneous Correspondence and Other Material," Box 2, UA V 630.159.10, PUHA;
"SAO Radio-Radar Telescope, 1970/ and Ripley to Lucien N. Nedzi, 2 April 1971, SIAOS, 61, SIA;
Memorandum, Orlen to Wiesne_, 4 February 1969, 9/2/AC 135, MITA.
93. Ripley to Nedzi, 2 April 1971, "SAO Radio-Radar Telescope, 1971," 61, SIAOS, SIA.
94. Ripley to Anderson, 23 June 1971, "440' Congress Suspension," Box 1, UA V 630.159.10, PUHA. The
subpanel for radio telescopes included David S. Heeschen, NRAO; Geoffrey R. Burbidge, UC LaJolla; Bernard
F. Bmke, MIT; Frank Drake, Cot nell: Go_don Pettengi[I, MIT; and Gart Westerhout, University of Maryland.
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cause. In addition, radio astronomy was changing; millimeter frequencies were the newest
frontier. So at an ad hoc meeting of 25 April 1972, Ed Lilley and the other NEROC mem-
bers voted to terminate the Big Dish project. Instead, NEROC would concentrate on an
NSF proposal to upgrade Haystack, so that it could operate at a wavelength of three
millimetersY 5
In retrospect, Herb Weiss, who voted at the ad hoc meeting, retlected on the demise
of the NEROC project: "It's very difficult to judge the absolute priorities; it's a moving ter-
ritory. I really felt that the country made the wrong decision not to pursue NEROC. Even
though they might have dragged it out, they might have done something, but it's such
small money and such a great step in the right direction, and not the ultimate. I mean you
can go beyond that, but it'll take a long time; you've got to get new materials. '_°*_
For planetary radar astronomy, here was a lesson in Big Science. The need fi)r the
NEROC telescope, the decision to design and huild it, and the entrepreneurial skills and
energy to push the project all came flom radio astronomers, not radar astronomers.
Piggybacking onto a Big Science (radio astronomy) telescope helped to overcome many
obstacles, hut in the end, the loss of control that is inherent in piggybacking cost radar
astronomy the telescope. Also, the episode illusuated that ultimately the instrument
needs of radio and radar astronomers can be inharmonious.
Literally, they operate at different wavelengths. Whereas radio astronomers found a
wavelength of three millimeters exciting, planetary radar astronomers could not operate
at such short wavelengths. The generation of sufficient power to conduct radar experi-
ments at millimeter wavelengths was, and remains, an insurmountable technological
obstacle.
The Nadir of Radar
Three years after NEROC voted to terminate the Big Dish bill, all planetary radar
stopped at Haystack; Ifincoln Laboratory was out of the planetary radar business. The last
Haystack planetary radar transmission traveled to Mercury on 22 March 1974. 'j7 The NSF
supported radio astronomy at Haystack, but planetary radar depended on mission-orient-
ed NASA grants. Topographical studies of the Moon and Mars supported the Apollo and
Viking missions. In an exceptional move, when the hasty departure of the Mr Force imper-
iled the telescope's finances, NASA patched together the required amount from the
NASA Planetary Astronomy, Viking, and Manned Spacecraft Center program budgets. '_x
The obvious explanation for the end of planetary radar at Haystack is that the
upgraded Areciho telescope outclassed it. Yet reality was neither so obvious nor so simple.
The upgraded Areciho radar, in fact, was not operational until almost a year and a half
after Haystack carried out its last planetary radar experiment. Although the upgraded
Arecibo telescope was far more sensitive, it could look at a target for only two hours and
forty minutes at best. With an ability to track targets for many more hours, Haystack could
95. Memo_ andum, Lilley Io Bradley, l May 1972, "SAO Radio-Radar 'Ik'lescopc, 1971," 61, SIAOS, SIA.
Those attending the meeting included: Alan BarretL MIT; Bernard Bulke, M1T; Irwin Shapiro, MI'I': Paul
Sebring, Haystack and Lincoln Laboratory; Edward Purcell, 1lalwud; I le_belt Weiss, Lincoln Laboratory; and
Ed l.illey, Itarvard and SAO.
A footnote to the NEROC story: a ttaystack upgrade completed in ,lanual y 199,1 made it the i)rclniel
United States radio ot)s(q wttory at 3 millimeters. An NSF review of I taystack cart icd out in the summet of 199'1,
only months after the NSF-fimded upgrade, put fimding for ltays[ack radio astronomy in jeopardy. Rainy A.
Amaout, "NSF Review Puts Ftmding f¢)l t [ayslack in Jeopardy," The "lech vol. 11,t, no. 18 (5 April 199,t): 1 and 9.
96. Weiss 29 September 1993.
97. Photo(ot)y of tlaystack Iogt)o_k entry provided by Richard P. lngalls and Alan E. E. Rogels.
98. Memorandum, llenry.]. Smith, 15 Dcccml)er 1969, and memorandum, Blunk to l)is1_ibution List,
10June 1970, NIIOB.
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compensate for its lack of sensitivity by increasing signal integration time. Hardware alone
was not the only reason for the end of planetary radar at Haystack.
Haystack radar use, hea_y at first, did not stop suddenly in 1974, but declined grad-
ually over the ),ears. In 1970, radar accounted for about a third of observing time, 99 far
more than at Arecibo or JPL. An optimistic NEROC proposal submitted to the NSF in
1971 stated: "It is believed that, for the next several years, the Planetary Radar instru-
mentation should continue to occupy the Haystack antenna fi)r roughly 40 to 50 percent
of the available time. 'q°° In fact, the actual total antenna time (exclusive of maintenance
and improvements) tot planetary radar observing fell from 17 percent in 1971 to 14 per-
cent in 1972, then to 12 percent in 1973. n°_
Part of the problem was intense competition among radio astronomers for telescope
time. The search for molecular spectral lines was frenetic and intensely competitive.
Figure 12
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l)cccmbcr 1973, out ot 5,,t62.5 hours of total scientific use, planetary radar actou_ted for 658 hours, or abotlt
12 pe_ cent. "1 la_,s_ack Notes June 73-1)ec 74/' SEBRING
STURM UND DRANG 85
Although Haystack installed radio astronomy equipment on the planetary radar box in
early 1970 to increase observing time for radio astronomers, complaints about the box
continued. Indeed, the planetary radar box could sit on the antenna for months at a time.
In the second half of 1972, for example, planetary, radar work kept the box on the anten-
na from 13 July to 24 September and fro,n 9 October to 12 November. l°z As radar
astronomer Gordon Pettengill reflected, "It wasn't convenient to make a change for a few
hours from one box to another, and that's what really did it [Haystack] in I think. ''1°3
Another factor was NASA's decision to not fund research facilities. As the Air Force
began withdrawing financial support from Haystack, NASA seemed to be a natural source
of at least some operational fimding. In his reply to the Air Force, NASA Deputy
Administrator George M. Low explained that at NASA, "We consider, however, that with-
in the present budgetary limitations and compared to other ongoing programs, the
research programs that could be performed at the Haystack Facility have too low a prior-
ity to claim NASA support of the overall operational cost of the Facility." If another agency
were to provide general operational support, NASA would be happy to underwrite spe-
cific, mission-oriented research, such as the topographic studies of Mars and the Moon.l°4
The Haystack radar transmitter klystron tubes, without which planetary radar could
not be carried out, suffered from internal arcing on occasion. "At times," Haystack
Associate Director Dick Ingalls explained, "it was hairy. ''1_5 In 1973, Haystack asked NASA
for a replacement klystron tube. NASA refitsed, accepting the risk that klystron failure
meant the end of planetary radar research. 1°6 Of the two NASA missions for which
Haystack conducted planetary radar research, Apollo and Viking, Apollo was over by
1973. Once Haystack radar data ceased serving the needs of the Viking mission, NASA no
longer had any mission interest in Haystack planetary radar research. 107
Thus, temperamental klystrons, complaints from radio astronomers, the end of
NASA mission funds, and NASA's policy of not funding facility operations all contributed
to bring Haystack planetary radar to its nadir and demise. Despite that demise and the
fate of the NEROC telescope, planetary radar astronomers at I.incoln Laboratory and
MIT were not without an instrument. The future was at the Arecibo Observatory.
102. Sebring to thtrlburt, 27 March 1970, 18/2/AC 135; NEROC, Semiannual Rqnrrt qf the Hay.stack
Observat¢rry, 15 Attgust 1975, p. iii; and lind., 15January 1972, p. 1, MITA. Also, see the references to complaints
by radio astronomcr William A. Dent in Memorandum, Sebring to Haystack Observatory Office Members,
2 February 1971, 44/2/AC 135, MITA.
103. Pettengilt 28 September 1993.
104. George M. Low 1o Grant L. Hansen, 2 April 1970, NIIOB.
105. Ingalls 5 May 199,t.
106. Memorandum, Brunk toJoyce Cavallini, 25July 1973, NHOB.
107. |taystack Obserw_tory, Final 15"ogres._ lCep_rrt: Rcular Studie.s _( the l'hznet_ (Wesffoid: NEROC, 29 August
1974). This was for NASA grant NGR-22-174-003.

Chapter Four
Little Science/Big Science
Lincoln Laboratory was not the only center where planetary radar took root. Cornell
University had its Arecibo Observatory; JPL had its Goldstone facility. At each center,
radar astronomy developed in the shadow of military, space, radio astronomy, and iono-
spheric Big Science. In fact, without those Big Science activities, planetary radar astrono-
my would not have had instruments to carry ont research and, in short, would not have
existed.
In 1961, when the first successful detections of Venus took place, virtually the sole
funder of planetary radar astronomy in the United States was the military. The one excep-
tion was JPL's Goldstone facility, which NASA funded. Ten years later, the NSF took over
the role of prime underwriter of the Arecibo Observatory from ARPA, and NASA agreed
to support a major S-band upgrade of the facility's radar. As a result, NASA became the
de facto patron of planetary radar astronomy at Arecibo, Goldstone, and Haystack. NASA
supported planetary radar at those three centers through a variety of financial arrange-
ments. Only at Arecibo, however, did NASA formally agree to support a planetary radar
facility, as well as the research conducted with it. That agreement, moreover, was an obvi-
ous departure from its policy formulated in the wake of the Whitford Report.
The shift from military to civilian sponsorship at Arecibo, just as in the case of
Haystack, was not in response to the Mansfield Amendment. Under the Kennedy
Administration, the military, mainly the Office of Naval Research, already had started
transferring research laboratories, especially nuclear physics facilities, to the NSE The
budgetary reforms introduced under Defense Secretary McNamara, whose first major
reform was to make the DoD's budget reflect the military missions for which it was respon-
sible, probably provided the initial impetus to those transfers)
The emergence of NASA as the patron of planetary radar astronomy is obvious only
in hindsight. Throughout the 1960s, NASA refused to fund radar construction, except for
the Deep Space Network. The NSF was the prime underwriter of astronomy facilities, but
did not support planetary radar research. Consequently, during the 1960s, planetary
radar astronomers depended on the kindness of Big Science, whether the radio
astronomers at Haystack, or the NASA space programs at Goldstone, or ARIA (the mili-
tary sponsor of Arecibo), for its instruments.
But in 1971, NASA broke with its established policy and paid for S-band radar
equipment and underwrote the research conducted with it at Arecibo. The result was not
just a new NASA policy but also the creation of a permanent institutional and financial
home for planetary radar astronomy that the field lacked elsewhere. This unique
arrangement came about through the complex politics of science t)_ical of Big Science
facilities. Complicating relations between the Arecibo Observatory and its parent organi-
zation, as well as relations with its funding agency, were turf battles between competing
Big Science fields (radio astronomy and ionospherics) and personality conflicts.
1. Emilio Q. Daddario, "Needs for a National Policy," Phy_i¢_"l'_ulay22 (1969): 33-38; James E. liewes,
.]r., From Root to McNamara: Army Organization arul Admini,_tration, 1900-1963 (Washington: U.S. _Mmy Center of
Military History, 1975), pp. 299-315.
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The Arecibo Ionospheric Observatory
Cornell University's 1,000-ft (305-meter) Arecibo dish began as a UHF radar man-
aged by a civilian institution, Cornell University, but funded by the military. The (Air
Force) Rome Air Development Center largely funded Cornell ionospheric research, and
the original purpose of the Arecibo telescope was to conduct ionospheric research. The
Arecibo facility started in the mind of William E. Gordon, Cornell professor of electrical
engineering, who had devised a new incoherent scatter technique for studying electrons
in the upper levels of the ionosphere by bombarding them with powerful radar waves. He
worked on the technique with Cornell electrical engineering colleagues Henry Booker,
his dissertation advisor, and Ben Nichols, both of whom shared Gordon's interest in iono-
spheric research. A Cambridge graduate, Booker had worked in the radio section of the
Cavendish Laboratory, and during World War II he led the theoretical division of the
radar effort at the Telecommunications Research Establishment. 2
In order to apply his technique, Gordon realized he needed a powerful radar, which
he proposed to build with state-of-the-art components. Gordon also realized that the
instrument would be costly, too costly to have a single purpose. He proposed, therefore,
that it also do radar astronomy experiments. Henry Booker added radio astronomy, a field
that interested him.
Funding for the initial radar design studies, completed by Gordon, Booker, and
Nichols in December 1958, came from the military: the Office of Naval Research, the
Rome Air Development Center, and the Aerial Reconnaissance Laboratory, Wright Air
Development Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. The studies outlined the
radar parameters: a pulse radar with 2.5 megawatts of peak power and 150 kilowatts aver-
age power (essentially the Millstone radar transmitter), a low noise temperature, and an
operating frequency around 400 MHz (430 MHz; 70 cm in the final design). The avail-
ability of components and antenna technical limits largely determined the operating fre-
quency. The antenna itself was to be a parabolic dish 305 meters (1000 ft) in diameter
fixed in a zenith-pointing position and fed from a horn on a 152-meter (500 ft) tower. 3
Concurrent with these design studies, Bill Gordon sought funding. The budget of
the NSF, the agency of choice for basic research, was not large enough for the project, and
NASA was interested in building spacecraft. The National Bureau of Standards already
had built ionospheric radars and was building a dipole array radar in Jicamarca, outside
Lima, Peru, that incorporated Gordon's incoherent scatter technique. Its director, Ken
Bowles, a Cornell graduate, had demonstrated the feasibility of Gordon's technique with
a Bureau of Standards meteor radar in Illinois.
Gordon first presented his project to ARPA in the summer of 1958. ARPA was an
entirely new agency. Although Gordon was not aware of it at the time, ARPA's Defender
Program was an effort to research, develop, and build a state-of-the-art defense against
2. Gordon 28 November 1994; Benjamin Nichols, telephone conversation, 14 December 1993;
"Cornell University Center for Radiophysics and Space Research," typed manuscript, 12 August 1959, Office of
the Administrative Director, NAIC; Gordon, "Incoherent Scattering of Radio Waves by Free Electrons with
Applications to Space Exploration by Radar," Proceedings of the IRE46 (1958): 1824-1829; George Peter, Evolution
_¢ Receivers and Feed Sy_tent_ J_rr the Arecit_o Observatory (Ithaca: NAIC, 1993), pp. 4-5; SCEL JournalVol. S-I, no. 32
(6 August 1953): 2, "Signal Corps Engineering Laboratory Journal/R&D Summary," HAUSACEC; Gillmor,
"Federal Funding," p. 126.
3. Gordon 28 November 1994; Benjamin Nichols, telephone conversation, 14 December 1993;
Gordon, Booker, and Nichols, l)e_ign Study of a Radar to Explore the Earth's Ionosphere. and Y_urrouuding ,Space.,
Research Report EE 395 (Ithaca: Cornell School of Electrical Engineering, 1 December 1958), pp. 1 and 10-11;
Gordon, Antenna Beam Swinging a_ul the Spherical Reflector, Research Report EE 435 (Ithaca: Cornell School of
Electrical Engineering, 1 August 1959), pp. 1 and 8; CRSR, Cor,._truction o[ the Department of Defense Ionospheric
l_._earch Facility - Final, Research Report RS 55 (Ithaca: CRSR, 30 November 1963), p. 2; Gillmor, "Federal
Funding," p. 127.
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Soviet missiles. Though some ARPA scientists saw the scientific value of Arecibo, ARPA's
main interest in the project was as part of the Defender Program to track the ion trails cre-
ated by missile exhaust. 4
Gordon campaigned in Washington for two years. ,The Sugar Grove dish was a bar-
rier to gaining approval; reviewers wanted to know why he needed to build the 305-meter
(1000-ft) dish, when the Navy had a fully-steerable antenna under construction. Finally,
Gordon met Ward Low of the Institute for Defense Analysis and an ARPA adviser, and
ARPA agreed to finance the engineering and construction of the dish. The Air Force
Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR), through the EleCtronics Research Directorate, Air
Force Cambridge Research Laboratories (AFCRL), Bedford, Massachusetts, monitored
the contract. The AFCRL now influenced the design of the telescope. Low introduced Bill
Gordon to the AFCRL antenna group, which had been studying spherical reflectors for
over a decade. They redesigned the fixed, zenith-looking paraboloid into a spherical
reflector with a movable antenna feed mounted on a suspended platform. 5
The antenna was larger than any other attempted for radar or radio astronomy, larg-
er even than the Sugar Grove dish. The size required an unprecedented support struc-
ture. Cornell civil engineering professors proposed placing the dish in a natural bowl in
the earth. The proposal was practical from an engineering perspective and cut costs,
according to preliminary studies by William McGuire and George Winter, Cornell School
of Civil Engineering.
Topographical, political, and scientific factors influenced the choice of a site. In the
tropics, the planets would pass nearly overhead and into the antenna's cone of view. After
considering sites in Hawaii, central Mexico, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and some smaller
Caribbean islands, the search narrowed to the Island of Kauai, the Matanzas area of Cuba,
and northern Puerto Rico. Political and import problems eliminated Cuba; Hawaii was
too far and too remote. Puerto Rico had a favorable location, political stability, and mini-
mum distance, as well as a karst topography full of sinkholes in which to locate the giant
reflector. After looking at locations in Puerto Rico, Cornell chose a natural bowl in the
mountains south of the city of Arecibo. 6
With feasibility and location established, ARPA and Cornell signed a contract on 6
November 1959 in which the University agreed to perform three tasks: 1) conduct design
studies on a vertically-directed ionospheric radar probe; 2) consider ionospheric and
other scientific uses for the instrument, then propose a priority list of the first experi-
ments; and 3) lay out structures and buildings needed f6r the initial facility. 7
Meanwhile, also in 1959, Henry Booker launched the Center for Radiophysics and
Space Research (CRSR), an umbrella organization for mainly astronomy and electrical
engineering faculty research, as well as management of the Arecibo facility. Booker shared
its administration with fellow Cambridge graduate Thomas Gold. Like Booker, Gold had
4. Gordon 28 November 1994; Nichols, telephone conversation, 14 December 1993; Jack P. Ruina,
+'Arecibo," Electroni_ 7 April 1961, n.p., article in publicity foldel; Office of the Administrative Director, NAIC;
CRSR, hmo_phehc Re_earch Facility, p. 2; Herbert E York, Making Weapon.t, Talking Peac_: A Phy._it'i._t's Ody._wy fr_m
Hiro_hima t¢J (;ene_a (New York: Basic Books, 1987), pp. 142-143; GiUn3or, "Federal Funding," p. 126.
5. Gordon 28 November 1994; Philip Blacksmith, "DODIRF 1000-foot Spherical Reflector Antenna,"
and Alan E Kay, A Line S¢mrce Feed firr a Sphe'rical Reflector, Technical Report 529 (Hanscom AFB: AFCRL, 29 May
1961), Phillips Laboratory; Roy C. Spencer, Carlyle J. Sletten, and John E. Walsh, "Correction of Spherical
Aberration by a Phased Line Source," Proc.eedings of the National E_ctronica Conferenc_ 5 (1949): 320-333; Gillmor,
"Federa| Funding," p. 127.
6. Gordon 28 November 1994; Gordon, "Arecil)o Ionospheric Observatory," S¢'imz¢e 146 (2 October
1964): 26; Gordon, "Arecibo Ionospheric Observatory," p. 26; Gordon, Booker, and Nichols, pp. 12-13; Donald
J. Belcher, "Site Locations for a Proposed Radio Telescope," Appendix C in ibidem; R. E. Mason and W.
McGuire, "The Fixed Antenna for a Large Radio Telescope: Feasibility Study and Preliminary Cost Estimate,"
Appendix B in ibidem.
7. CRSR, I)e._+gn Studie._ firr the Arecitm Rtulio Oh_ervrttor),, Research Report RS 9 (Ithaca: CIL_;R, 30 June
1960), NAIC, p. 1.
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worked on radar during World War II, but at the Admiralty Research Establishment. After
the war, Cambridge, the Cavendish Laboratory, and the Royal Observatory in Greenwich,
Gold arrived in the United States in 1957 and taught astronomy at Harvard. Booker
thought Gold ideal for running the CRSR.S
The CRSR staff, professors from the astronomy, electrical engineering, and physics
departments, drew up a research program for the Arecibo telescope. Following ARPA
guidance, they listed 20 experiments arranged in order of priority. The first three
explored the ionosphere. Then came proposals for planetary, lunar, solar, and other radar
work, followed by three more ionospheric experiments. The last 10 were all radio astron-
omy experiments. The first 10, the CRSR staff concluded, were "clearly within the scope
of the ARPA missions," but the "relation of experiments 11 through 20 [in radio astrono-
my] to the ARPA mission is not so clear." ARPA did not appear interested in radio astron-
omy. Well before the telescope's inauguration, however, radio astronomy had been
assigned a major role in its scientific mission.9
Cornell next began building the Department of Defense Ionospheric Research
Facility, as the telescope was named originally. Construction of the structure, antenna,
concrete towers, and electronics were let out to over a half dozen commercial subcon-
tractors, while the Army Corps of Engineers supervised the construction and civil engi-
neering. The raising of the 300-ton feed platform from the bottom of the bowl, where it
had been assembled, to its approximate final position 152 meters (500 ft) overhead, was
an awe-inspiring sight. As Bob Price recalled, the raising of the pylons was also '_Very
impressive....They had all these very strong Puerto Ricans pulling at cables. It was like
some 1930s Mexican mural painting. Labor at its best. All coordinated pulling at these
cables, and pouring cement at the same time, and getting the right tension on every-
thing."m
8. C;oM 14 l)ecember 1993; Nichols, telephone conversation, 14 December 1993; "Center for
Radiophysics;" Annual Summar) Re].rrt, (_enter firr lh_di_Jhy_i¢_ and Spa_e l_._earch, ]u b I, 1965--June 30, 1966,
30June 1966, p. 10: A_eciln_ Ob_ervat_rry I'n_gram t'bm, O_totn.r 1, 1970---Scptemtu.r 30, 1971, May 1971, pp, 62-63,
AOL.
9. CRSR, Sdentific l"xperiment_ fin- the Arecil._J Radio Oh_ervaarry, Research Report RS 5 (Ithaca: CRSR,
31 March 1960), pp. vii and 31-33; AIO, I_'.warch in hmmphenc Phy._i¢._, Resealch Report KS 41 (Ithaca: CKSR, 30
.June 1962), p. 7.
10. Price 27 September 1993; CRSR, Construction o/the Dqmrtment o/De[ense hmo._pheric Re.watch Facility,
Research Report KS 22 (Ithaca: CRSR, 30June 1961), pp. 1-2; ibid., Research Report KS 34 (Ithaca: CRSR,
31 December 1961): rind., Research Report KS 40 (Ithaca: CRSR, 30June 1962), pp. 12-t5; ibid., Research
Reporl RS ,t5 (hhaca: CP..SR, 31 December 1962), pp. 1 and 11-12; various items m publicity binder, Office of
the Administrative Direcmz, NAlC; Thomas C. Kavanagh and David El. tl. Tung, "Arecibo Radar-Radio Telescope
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F/gure t3
Aerial view q" the A recibo Ob._ervatrny showing iL_ h_cation in a natural sinkhole in the hilt_ of n_rrth central I_uerto Rico. The
antenna i._ .to large that iu can only be ._een in iu entirety from above. (C_urtexy of National Astronomy and Ionosphere Center,
which is olmrated ky Cornell Univer_ffy under contract with the National Scienc.e Fcmrulation.)
After its inauguration on 1 November 1963, the Arecibo Ionospheric Observatory
(AIO) was not just a Cornell-ARPA facility; it also became part of an international agree-
ment for the exchange of faculty and graduate students between Cornell and the
University of Sydney, signed in September 1964. The University of Sydney was a major,
worldwide center for radio astronomy. The agreement gave Americans access to some of
the most advanced radio astronomy instruments in the world, as well as some of the most
renowned researchers._l
Bill Gordon directed the observatory at Arecibo. After meeting Gordon Pettengill at
Millstone, Thomas Gold "twisted his arm" to get Pettengill to take the position of associ-
ate director. At Lincoln Laboratory, Pettengill had carried out radar astronomy experi-
menus, but more as a hobby. When he arrived at Arecibo in July 1963, "A totally new world
opened up down there. This was a university-operated facility....And there was no direct
military work!" Pettengill devoted his entire time to planetary radar and achieved recog-
nition in the field. 12
What made the Arecibo world so different, apart from the lack of "military work"
that was the bread and butter of Lincoln Laboratory, was the fact that planetary radar
astronomy was an integral part of the scientific agenda. Arecibo's university connection
would supply graduate student researchers. Moreover, as associate director, Pettengill
could hire people to do planetary radar. Thus, the earliest Arecibo planetary radar
11. Cf_gR Summary lCaeport, July 1, 1964--June 30, 1965, 1 July 1965, CRSR, p. 5; Carrnell_ydney University
Astrontnny Center, 1965, p. 4, AOL; Gold and Harry Messel, "A New Joint American-Australian Astronomy Center,"
Nature 204 (1964): 18-20.
12. Pettengill 28 September 1993; Gold 14 December 1993.
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astronomer was not trained in the traditional way, as a graduate student in an academic
setting, but was hired to do planetary radar. The first such hire was Rolf B. Dyce.
Pettengill first met Dyce years earlier, when Dyce was with the Rome Air
Development Center, Griffiss Air Force Base, in Rome, New York. Dyce had a B.A. in
Physics and a Ph.D. fiom Cornell, where he did radar studies of auroras. Dyce eventually
landed a job with the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) at Menlo Park, California, where
he worked on classified ionospheric and radar research, including auroral, meteor, and
lunar studies. Dyce and Pettengill also toured Europe together and visited key radar
research centers, including Jodrell Bank, the Dutch facility at Dwingeloo, the Chalmers
Institute in Gothenburg, Sweden, and the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment.
Pettengill hired Dyce in January 1964, just weeks after the Arecibo dedication in
November 1963.13
Arecibo was different from Lincoln Laboratory and Haystack in many other ways,
too, because of the relationships between Arecibo and Cornell and between Arecibo and
Lincoln Laboratory. While MIT did not train radar astronomers to work at Lincoln
Laboratory, Cornell sent graduate students to Arecibo to work on doctoral dissertations
in radar astronomy. MIT students also carried out radar astronomy dissertation research
at Arecibo. As a result, Aiecibo became a training ground for future radar astronomers.
Some of the earliest graduate student radar research was done on the Sun and
Moon, not the planets. Vahi Petrosian, a Cornell graduate student working on a masters
thesis, attempted some solar radar work in July and August 1964. After later attempts by
two other graduate students, solar echo experiments were abandoned; the results were
neither as good nor as productive as those achieved by the E1 Campo solar radar. 14
On the other hand, starting in 1965, Arecibo undertook a far more vigorous and pro-
ductive program of lunar radar research with supplementary funding from NASA, which
hoped to use the results to help select Apollo landing sites, l_ Carr_4ng out the lunar work
in collaboration with Dyce and, occasionally, Pettengill was Cornell graduate student
Thomas W. Thompson. Tile research formed the basis of his 1966 doctoral dissertation.
Thompson worked briefly at Haystack, then again at Areciho, before he found a position
atJPL. He returned to Arecibo occasionally to make hmar radar observations.16
13. Dyce 22 November 1994; Pettengill 28 September 1993.
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D. Parrish, a NASA Trainee, and Campbell made more solar observations in 1967. ibid., Research Report RS 71
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71 ( 1966): 4843-4853; Thompson, "Radar Studies of the Lunar Surface Emphasizing Factors Related to Selection
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1968m]une 30, 1969, 30 June 1969, p. 4; A/O, I_search in hmo._pheric Phygics, Research Report RS 61 (Ithaca:
CRSR, 31 De(:etnbel 1964), pp. 39_tl.
16. Thompson 29 November 1994; NAIC QR Q2/1970, n.p.; Thompson, "The Study of Radar-
Scattering Behavior of Ltmal Craters at 70 Cm," Ph.D. diss., Cornell, February 1966; Thompson, "Radar Studies
of the I.unar Surface Emphasizing Factors Related to Selection of l.amling Sites," Research Report ILS 73
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The next graduate student was Raymond E Jurgens, whose 1969 dissertation used
Arecibo radar data to form some of the first range-Doppler images of Venus. Then came
Donald B. Campbell, originally from Australia. Using the radar interferometric method
developed at Haystack, and working under both Dyce and Aaecibo director Frank Drake,
Campbell began a lifelong career devoted to the radar imaging of Venus. 17 Both he and
.]urgens later were key figures in planetary radar astronomy.
While its relationship with Cornell turned Arecibo into a breeding ground of radar
astronomers, its relationship with Lincoln I.aboratory and Haystack, forged through the
presence at Arecibo of Gordon Pettengill, provided entree to tim software, techniques,
and ephemerides developed by Lincoln I.aboratory. Pettengill was a vital factor not only
as associate director from 1963 to 1965, but also as Arecibo director from 1968 to 1970.
At the heart of that relationship was the business of creating radar ephemerides. The
standard planetary ephemerides issued by the U.S. Naval Observatory were simply not
accurate enough for radar work, so special ephemerides computer programs had to be
developed. In order for them to be as accurate as possible, these radar ephemerides had
to draw on a data base of radar observations. At 15ncoln Laboratory, Irwin Shapiro start-
ed such a radar ephemerides computer program. Haystack provided a large amount of
the ephemerides data, and so did Arecibo at the instigation of Gordon Pettengill, with a
modest grant from NASA. Pettengill recalled the speed with which radar observational
data arrived at Lincoln Laboratory: "I remember we used to send it back by special deliv-
ery mail. We would mail it by six in the evening at Arecibo, and it would be delivered in
Lexington, Massachusetts, at nine the next morning. Very efficient. Then it would be put
into the Lincoln I.aboratory ephemeris program. 'q_ In addition to the ephemerides,
I.incoln Laboratory supplied Arecibo with software and techniques. As mentioned earlier,
Don Campbell adopted the Haystack radar interferometry technique at Axecibo, and the
special fast Fourier transform software created for the Haystack interferometer also
migrated to Arecibo.l_
When Pettengill left Arecibo in 1970, he returned not to Ifncoln Laboratory, but to
MIT, where he became professor of planetary physics in the Department of Earth and
l'lanetary Sciences. The change fiom Lincoln Laboratory to MIT was as stimulating to
Pettengill as the original move to Arecibo. He continued planetary radar research, using
both Haystack and Arecibo. He was not alone; both Tommy Thompson and Don
Campbell used both telescopes, z° Moreover, Pettengill, who already had guided the radar
astronomy dissertations researched at Arecibo, began offering a course in radar astron-
omy at MIT and sending MIT graduate students to Arecibo to do their doctoral research.
The fruit of this cross-fertilization between Arecibo and MIT and Lincoln Laboratory
was that Arecibo ew)lved into a common research facility for both Cornell and MIT, so
that by the time planetary radar astronomy research ended at Haystack, Arecibo already
was in position to continue the research programs underway at Haystack. That did not
mean, though, that the Arecibo telescope provided the same amount of observing time as
Haystack.
At Haystack, planetary radar astronomy accounted for a greater percentage of
observing time than at Arecibo. Although planetary, hmar, and solar radar experiments
occupied roughly 9 percent of Arecibo antenna time for the period December 1965
through September 1969, only 2.4 percent of total observing time was given over to radar
17. CRSR, "Proposal to National Science Foundation fi_r Research Ionospheric Physics, RadaI-Radio
Astronomy, October t, 1969 through September 30, 1971," April 1969, Office of the Administrative Director,
NAIC, pp. 138-140; Jutgens, "A Study of the Average and Anomalous Radar Scattering from the Surface of Venus
at 70 Cm Wavelength," PhD. diss,, Cornell,June 1968.
18. Peltengill 28 September 1993.
19. Rogers 5 May 1994: }line 12 March 1993. For a discussion of radar interferometry at lIaystack and
Arecibo, see Chapter Five.
213. Peltengill 28 Sepleml_r 1993.
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astronomyin1970,whileradaraccountedforaboutathirdofHaystackantennatimein
thesame year. 21 Moreover, as radar astronomy use of Haystack declined from 17 percent
in 1971 to 12 percent in 1973, radar use of the Arecibo telescope increased, but not pro-
portionally, and peaked in 1972 at 9.5 percent, somewhat lower than the lowest use at
Haystack. The combined absolute number of total observing hours on the two telescopes
suggests that planetary radar astronomy activity in the early 1970s was not increasing or
even remaining stable, but was declining. It was Little Science becoming smaller.
From ARIA to the NSF
In November 1974, eleven years after the dedication of the Arecibo Ionospheric
Observatory (AIO), a second dedication ceremony took place to denote the instrument's
upgrading to S-band. The upgrade was not achieved by simply adding higher-frequency
equipment. The reflector surface had to be refinished, the suspended platform accom-
modated to the new equipment, a new power supply provided, and the S-band transmit-
ter and maser receiver designed, built, and installed. Each component of the instrument
had to be adapted in order that the whole might function in the higher frequency range.
For planetary radar astronomy, the upgrade essentially created a new instrument with
entirely different and expanded capabilities. Nonetheless, however critical the upgrade
was for radar astronomy, both radio astronomy and ionospheric research benefited sig-
nificandy from the resurfacing and equipment improvements, too.
The conversion of the AIO into an S-band radar telescope was a long, indirect, and
difficult process, even if considered only as a technological feat. The conversion paralleled
and was inextricably enmeshed in the transformation of the AIO into a National Science
Foundation National Research Center. That transformation was set in motion by cutbacks
in the ARPA budget, not the Mansfield Amendment.
The realization that the S-band upgrade was possible is said to have been born in
August 1966, during Hurricane Inez. The 100-kilometer-per-hour (62-mile-per-hour)
winds moved the telescope less than a half inch (1.27 cm), instead of the foot (30 cm) it
was feared. A subsequent study of the telescope structure showed that it was sufficiently
stable to operate at wavelengths of the order of 10 cm (3,000 MHz). Optimistically, Frank
Drake, successor to Bill Gordon as observatory director, thought that the dish could be
resurfaced in less than two years for under $3 million. 2')
But funds were not readily available. Moreover, the annual budget allotted by ARPA
started to shrink, from over $2 million initially to $1.8 million in the period 1965 through
1969. Although ARIA was cutting back all research in order to support the Vietnam War, 23
21. Sebring to Hurlburt, 27 March 1970, 18/2/AC 135, MITA; AIO, Research in Ionospheric Physica,
Research Report RS 69 (Ithaca: CRSR, 30June 1966), p. 87; ibid., Research Report RS 70 (Ithaca: CRSR, 31
January 1967), pp. 124-125; ibid., Research Report RS 71 (Ithaca: CRSR, 31 July 1967), pp. 113-124; ibid.,
Research Report RS 72 (Ithaca: CRSR, 31 January 1968), pp. 125-134; ibid,, Research Report RS 74 (Ithaca:
CRSR, 31 July 1968), pp. 137-145; ibid., Research Report RS 75 (Ithaca: CRSR, 31 March 1969), p. 51; ibid.,
Research Report RS 76 (Ithaca: CRSR, 30 September 1969), p. 44; NAIC QR Q1-Q4/1970, passim, The Arecibo
Observatory quarterly reports for the years 1971 to 1975 indicate the fraction of radar astronomy use of the
antenna: 2.9 percent in 1971:9.5 percent in 1972; 6.9 percent in 1973:1.9 percent in t974; and 7.2 percent in
1975. At Haystack, in March 1970, for example, of the 290 hours scheduled, 90 (31 percent) were spent on radar
observations. See Chapter 3 for Haystack radar use.
22. Peter, p. 12; AIO, Re_earchin lono._phericIJhysi_:_, Research Report RS 70 (Ithaca: CRSR, 31 January
1967), p. 1.
23. John Lannan, "An Example of Scientific Research under Scrutiny," The Sunday [14÷L_hington]Star, 30
March 1969, p. F-3. For the AIO budget, see CtL_RSummary lOfmrt,July 1, 1964--June 30, 1965, 1July 1965, CRSR,
p. 1; Annual Summary l¢.etmrt,Centerf_rrRtMiophysic_aml Space Research,July 1, 1965-June 30, 1966, 30 June 1966,
pp. 2 and 7; ibid.,July 1, 1966--June 30, 1967, 30June 1967, pp. 8, 10 and 12; ibid.,July 1, 1967--June 3(I, 1968,
30June 1968, pp. 1, 11 and 13; ibid.,July 1, 1968--June3(1, 1969, 30June 1969, pp. 1 and 15. AFOSR contract
F44-620-67-C0066 allocated $5,210,200 for the term 1 February 1967 through 30 September 1969.
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theArecibobudgetsufferedbecauseARPAfeltthatthetelescoperformedbelowexpec-tations.
Theantennafeedoperatedatonly21percentefficiency;thedishreceivedlessthan
halfthepoweritshouldhavereceived.Thatwasahugedollarloss,too;thecostofbuild-
ingadishhalftheareawouldhavebeenmuchless.Nonetheless,itwas tillanextremely
sensitivetelescope.Theinefficiencyof theantennafeedbecameasourceof friction
betweenThomasGoldandBillGordon,whoinsistedthatthefeedcouldbeimproved,
andbetweenAIOmanagementa dARPA.24
Figure 14
Linear anten na [eed_attathed to the _u_pendedplat[m'm o[ the Arecilm Oh_ervat_rry.(Courte_yO[National Astrcmomy and
r r
Ionosphere (_nt_ which is ¢rperated hy C_wneU _ niversi(_ u n_b,r contract with the 1_ ational Science F_mndation.)
2,1. (;ordon 28 November 199,t; Gold 1,t December 1993; Campbell 7 December 1993; L. Merle
Lalonde and Daniel E. Harris, "A tligh-Performance Line Source Feed for the AIO Spherical Reflector,"//'2ff_
7"ransa_tzon_ on ,4ntenn_t._ and I_r_rpal,_ation AP-18 (January 1970): 41.
96 TO SEE THE UNSEEN
The line feeds were an ongoing serious problem. After a three-day visit to Arecibo in
October 1967, BartJ. Bok, director of the Steward Observatory, Tucson, observed that the
line feed problem "seems to be the most critical one facing the Arecibo-Cornell group."
A number of Ithaca researchers attempted to improve the feeds. One Cornell graduate
student considered the use of Gregorian optics, an option also studied by the AFCRL's
Antenna Laboratory. However, not until 1988 was the first Gregorian feed tested and
installed at Arecibo.
Arecibo had three feed research programs going on at the same time. Only one, for
a high-powered, 430-MHz radar feed operating at both circular polarizations, was vital to
its radar functions. Of two competing radar feed designs, the AIO selected that of Man
Love of the Autonetics Corporation, a subsidiary of North American Rockwell. Love
worked with Cornell's L. Merle Lalonde to construct an appropriate feed, which was
installed on the antenna in early 1972. The new radar feed was a success. _5
ARPA's funding of the AIO dropped to a great extent because of the inefficient feed.
Too, radio astronomy at the AIO was expanding rapidly in the wake of the discovery of
pulsars (the AIO had tremendous advantages for investigating them), and ARPA felt more
and more that it should support just the facility's ionospheric work, which was the only
research relevant to Department of Defense interests. The AIO, though, hoped that ARPA
would pay for the resurfacing and a new radar feed.
Although the ARPA contract did not allow the AIO to seek funding from other agen-
cies, ARPA was now receptive to the idea of sharing the AIO budget with the NSE So with
ARPA's blessing, Thomas Gold and Frank Drake approached the National Science
Foundation about civilian operational money for the AIO. The AIO also submitted a
proposal to the NSF in early 1967 for detailed engineering studies and a cost estimate to
resurface the reflector. _6 The search for both resurfacing and operational funds thus
proceeded concurrently and was boosted by the report of the Dicke Panel.
Thomas Gold, Frank Drake, and Rolf Dyce pitched the Arecibo resurfacing project
before the Dicke Panel. The Panel gave the project highest priority. As a result, Cornell
obtained an NSF grant for a study and cost estimate of the reflector resurfacing. The AIO
selected the Rohr Corporation, which also buihJPL's Mars Station, to conduct the study.
Rohr planned to install light aluminum panels for the reflector surface at a total cost of
$3.5 million. 27
The NSF, however, did not ask Congress to underwrite the resurfacing of the Arecibo
reflector. The feed problem stood in the way. At its meeting of 16-17 October 1967, the
NSF Astronomy Advisory Panel resolved: _8
The NSF Advis_y Panel will be hesitant to favor the improvements of the surface of
the Arecibo dish or the undertaking of substantial operating expenses for Arecibo until a
successful radio astronomy feed has been constructed and made operational at frequencies
low enough that the surface is not critical.
25. Bok to George B. Field, "Arecibo," NSFHF; Kay, A Line Sourc_e Feed; J. Pierluissi, A Theoretical Study _
Gregorian Radio Telewapes with Applications to the Arecibo Ionospheric Observatory, Research Report RS 57 (Ithaca:
CRSR, 1 April 1964), NAIC; Peter, p. 18; Campbell 7 December 1993.
26. Diary note, Hurlburt, 15 December 1967, and Long to Haworth, 27July 1967, "Arecibo," NSFHF;
annual Summary Rt/,errt, (_nterfirr Radiophy_ica and ,_par.e Research, Jury 1, 1965--:I,,,,* 30, 1966, 30 June 1966,
pp. 12 and 18; ibid.,July 1, 1966----June 30, 1967, 30June 1967, p. 8; AIO, Re._arch in lonospheric Phyaics, Research
Report RS 71 (Ithaca: CRSR, 31 July 1967), p. 1; Gold 14 December 1993.
27. National Science Board, Approved Minutes of the Open Sessions, pp. 113:14-113:15, National
Science Board; "Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Panel for Large Radio Astronomy Facilities," 14 August 1967,
typed manuscript, pp. 2-3, NSFL; Lalonde and Harris, p. 42; AIO, I{e._earch tn hmo$phenc Physics, Research Report
RS 72 (Ithaca: CRSR, 31 January 1968), p. 4; AIO, lind., Research Repolt RS 74 (Ithaca: CRSR, 31 July 1968),
pp. 8-9.
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In short, if an adequate feed design were not feasible, investing in an expensive
resurfacing of the reflector for operation at higher frequencies made no sense. The feed
problem held up the resurfacing and by implication the entire S-band upgrade.
Consequently, Cornell undertook an in-house effort to design a 327-MHz feed at its own
expense.
Although the reflector resurfacing project came to a temporary halt, the drive to
secure NSF operational support succeeded in the wake of the Dicke Panel report. In July
1967, as the Dicke Panel was meeting in Washington, Cornell Vice President for Research
and Advanced Studies Franklin A. Long asked Leland Haworth, director of the NSF, for a
meeting about the possibility of jointly funding the operation of the AIO with ARPA. The
NSF and ARPA soon entered into discussions and, by late August 1967, the NSF was agree-
able to replacing the AFOSR as the government agency monitoring the Arecibo con-
tract. _9 This was the first step in converting the AIO into a civilian observatory.
ARPA was prepared to underwrite the full AIO budget to the end of September 1968.
Beginning 1 October 1968, for fiscal years 1969 through 1972, ARPA would pay for a third
of the AIO budget, representing the portion of telescope time spent on ionospheric work.
"It is very much hoped," the ARPA negotiator expressed, "that the entire facility will be
identified as a National Science Foundation Observatory with ARPA as one of several
users.'30
In December 1967, well before passage of the Mansfield Amendment, Cornell and
ARPA came to an agreement on the AIO contract. Cornell, NSF, and ARPA would nego-
tiate a one-year contract for AIO operation from 1 October 1968 through 30 September
1969. The ARPA-NSF Memorandum of Understanding, signed in late April 1969, left the
AIO under ARPA and the AFOSR until 1 October 1969, when the NSF took over, thereby
anticipating the effect of the Mansfield Amendment. For the fiscal year starting 1 October
1968, each agency agreed to pay half the facility's annual budget. For the two years begin-
ning 1 October 1969, ARPA agreed to transfer to NSF a third of the annual budget to sup-
port just ionospheric research. ARPA did not commit any funding after 1 October 1971,
but left the door open to the possibility.
The Memorandum of Understanding defined ARPA's step-by-step divestment of
Arecibo. Mthough ARPA initially had funded Arecibo for Project Defender, the telescope
was never engaged in classified military research. Moreover, one clause in the
Memorandum of Understanding specifically forbade the participation of the AIO in
secret work: 'q'he Observatory shall not be used to make measurements which are them-
selves classified nor be used as a repository for classified information. "3j The AIO was on
the rocky road to civilian supervision and funding.
What's In a Name?
The transformation of the AIO into an NSF National Research Center involved two
interconnected issues, the observatory's management structure and the status of ionos-
pheric research, both of which were complicated by personality conflicts and turf fights
between Big Science fields. Implicit in being a National Research Center was free access
to the telescope for all qualified scientists. The AIO always maintained that it operated as
29. Hurlburt diary note; Long Io Peter Franken, 23 August 1967, and Long to Leland Haworth, 27 July
1967, "Arecibo," NSFHE
30. Franken to William Wright, 23 August 1967, "Arecibo," NSFHE
31. S.J. Lukasik to Long, 12 December 1967; Memorandum of Understanding, AIO, attached to letter,
Haworth to John Foster, 30 April 1969; and Memorandum of Understanding, AIO, attached to letter, S. E.
Clements to ltaworth, 12 May 1969, signed by Haworth and Foster, "Arecibo", NSFHE
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a national center, and the Cornell-Sydney agreement opened the observatory to foreign
scientists. The real problem was that radio astronomy use of tile telescope had skyrocket-
ed, especially in contrast to ionospheric research. From December 1965 through
September 1969, for example, ionospheric research accounted for 30 percent, while radio
astronomy took up 50 percent of antenna time. _2
Ionospheric research had been the reason for creating the AIO in the first place, and
it was more interesting to the electrical engineering than to the astronomy department.
The name of the facility changed to the Arecibo Observatory, discarding the "ionospher-
ic" of the original name. To some individuals, the name change did not reflect the facili-
ty's multiple research agenda, which was the intent of the change, but instead signified
lack of interest in ionospheric work. As Gordon Pettengill _xplained: "We settled on that
name early, because it encompassed the radio astronomy, radar astronomy, and ionos-
pheric research. There was quite a group that wanted to call it the A.recibo Ionospheric
Observatory, which was the original name under Bill Gordon. '',_3 Many accused Thomas
Gold, who had fostered the expansion of radio astronomy, of thwarting ionospheric work,
but Gold insisted that no ionospheric researchers ever were turned down.
Perceptions outside Arecibo and Cornell confused the presumed reduction of ionos-
pheric studies with the rift between astronomy and electrical engineering within the
CRSR, and colored everything with the friction between Bill Gordon and Thomas Gold.
Gold found Gordon "a little difficult, because he really wanted to cut himself off from
Cornell, from everything completely, and | realized that if he did so, then the telescope
would never be used for radio astronomy and radar, and it would become merely an ionos-
pheric instrument, and that I was very opposed to, being nominally in charge of building
such a huge wonderful instrument and then finding it's not used for what it's capable
of. '':_4 Bill Gordon, for his part, stated, "If you ask me, I was mad at the time, and whatev-
er I tell you has some personal bias built in." In short, he explained, '1 thought I was
removed from a job that l deserved to have. ''_,_
Frank Drake, radio astronomer and one-time Arecibo director, explained the con-
flict rather precisely'. "I had picked up enough innuendo in Gold's tone and Gordon's
words to realize that the two of them were engaged in a bitter battle for the Arecibo turf,"
he wrote. Gold 'Wanted the Arecibo telescope freed to do more research in radio astron-
omy. He was lobbying the university administration to put it under his jurisdiction."
Gordon "could not bear to relinquish control of it." He left, however, after Gold pointed
out to the university administration that Gordon had been offcampus far longer than the
university bylaws allowed. "It was a fact people might have been willing to overlook, but
once Gold seized on it, Gordon was forced to make a choice. ''36
Feelings about the friction between Gold and Gordon, as well as the perceived
neglect of ionospheric work, also shaped how the NSF handled the AIO. The chief per-
sonality at the NSF was Tom Jones, director of the Division of Environmental Sciences. He
explained the situation to the NSF director in 1968:37
32. Maintenance and equipment improvements were 11 percent and radar astronomy 9 percent of
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35. Gordon 28 November 1994.
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The operation of AIO has been tainted by a great deal of political infighting on the
CorneU campus. Results of these confrontations included the departure from Cornell of
Drs. W. Gordon and H. Book_ both aeronomers, who were the originators of the backscat-
ter concept for probing the ionosphere and who saw the Arecibo venture through from the
proposal stage right on up to its final construction and initial operation. There are indi-
cations that, aside from accepting opportunities f or professional growth, they left Cornell
because the administrative control of AIO was removed from the director of the
Observatory and placed in the hands of another individual on the Cornell campus. We
do know, from conversations with aeronomers, that they do not want to give up the use of
the Arecibo instrument.
Jones maintained a vigil on the AIO case, as he moved from the Division of
Environmental Sciences to the Office of National Centers, which directly oversaw the
Arecibo Observatory. Thomas Gold found that Jones "kept expressing a sort of paranoia
about ionospheric work, but constantly. I mean, I couldn't talk to him without getting a
lecture that far too little ionospheric work was being done, and he couldn't support any
funding for Arecibo if this were done, even though at the time it was doing very good work
in radio and radar astronomy, but not enough ionosphericists wanted to go there. I could-
n't help it!"
According to Gold,Jones told him that he could not support funding for Arecibo if
the reduction of ionospheric research continued. As for his relations with Bill Gordon,
Thomas Gold insisted that it had nothing to do with ionospheric research. He and
Gordon disagreed over the management of the observatory. According to Gold, Gordon
wanted to operate it "in a way independent of Cornell," and he did not want to return to
Cornell. Bill Gordon "wanted to make all the decisions as to who gets what time and all
that," and Gold objected: x
Control of the observatory was the key issue dividing Gordon and Gold. The issue of
where management of the AIO should rest, at Arecibo or at Ithaca, was precisely the con-
cern of the NSF, too. The issue was clouded by both personality conflicts and the status of
ionospheric research. On 27-28 February 1968, the NSF Advisory Panel for Atmospheric
Sciences, which included Bill Gordon, issued a formal statement on the future of ionos-
pheric research at the AIO: "As the NSF assumes increasing operational responsibility, the
Panel strongly recommends that any management changes be made in such a way as to
insure the availability of the AIO for experimental research in aeronomy and solar-terres-
trial physics." Moreover, '"fhe Panel considers it important to establish a management
structure for the AIO whereby scientists from institutions throughout the United States
may use the Observatory. To accomplish this, it is suggested that the scheduling and oper-
ating policy be established by the scientific community and implemented by the resident
director. An appropriate way to assure representation of the scientific community would
be to place the management of the AIO in the hands of a consortium of interested uni-
versities."3'-_
The Advisory Panel was not alone in suggesting management by a university consor-
tium along the lines of NEROC or the NRAO. _j However, Cornell and Gold wanted to
retain control of the Arecibo Observatory (AO). Harry Messel, head of the University of
Sydney School of Physics and joint director, with Gold, of the Cornell-Sydney University
38. Gold 14 December 1993. Bill Cordon declined comment on the whole affair. Gordon 28 November
1994.
39. Statement of the National Science Foundation Advisory Panel for Atmospheric Sciences to the
Director of the National Science Foundation, 21 March 1968, "Arecibo," NSFHE
40. See, for instance, Haworth to Long, 23January 1968, "Arecibo," NSFHE
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Astronomy Center, protested to Donald E Hornig, the special presidential assistant for sci-
ence and technology, that any change in the AO management structure would affect the
Cornell-Sydney arrangement, too. Despite Hornig's assurances to the contrary, the evolv-
ing AO management structure led to the termination of the CornelI-Sydney agreement. 41
However, the crux of the management structure question--all personality and turf
conflicts aside--was separation of observatory administration from all academic depart-
ments, like the CRSR. The NSF did not want to fund National Research Centers that were
prisoners of an astronomy department or of any other academic unit. It was clear, though,
that if the AO were to become a Nadonal Research Center, with a secured budget from
the NSF, Cornell would have to draft a new management structure; otherwise, a universi-
ty consortium might take over Cornell's managerial role.
In March 1969, as the NSF looked toward assuming full responsibility for the AO on
1 October 1969, the Foundation asked Cornell to prepare a proposal for the operation of
the AO for the two-year period beginning 1 October 1969. The proposal was to discuss the
AO management structure, "bearing in mind our opinion that a director of a National
Center should report to a level of management significantly above that of a department
or similar unit. "42 The April 1969 proposal outlined a management structure drafted the
previous summer. The director of the AO reported to a policy committee, which consis-
ted of only the university provost, the director of the CRSR ((;old), and the vice president
for research and advanced studies. 43
A special National Science Foundation AIO Group reviewed the proposal. Their
major objection was the management plan: "It does not show much change from the exist-
ing management structure at Cornell and does not appear to be suitable for a National
Center. No member of the AIO group finds it acceptable." Specifically, the problem was
the three-man policy committee. '`This Committee seems clearly intended by Cornell to
be the group which runs the show. It is proposed that it be made up exclusively of Cornell
employees resident in Ithaca. The suggestion that such a group should be considered
'national management' has reduced the undersigned [Fregeau] to a conviction that his
education in the art of strong language is grossly inadequate."
The AIO Group felt that a more appropriate structure would have the observatory
director report direcdy to the vice president of research, a single individual, and not a
committee; otherwise, "the implication [is] that the committee is the AIO director's boss."
In the judgement of the AIO Group, "The Cornell proposal is not, in its present form,
suitable for review by tile scientific community. If it were to be sent out in this form, the
community reaction would probably poison the beginnings of what we expect to be a fruit-
ful venture for NSE TM
On 1 October 1969, when monitorship of the Arecibo contract passed to the NSF,
Cornell reorganized the AO's management structure to conform more closely to the
Foundation's guidance. The observatory was removed from CRSR supervision and placed
under an Arecibo Project Office headed by Assistant Vice President for Research (Arecibo
Affairs) Thomas Gold. 4_
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In the following months, Cornell and the NSF continued to consider the observa-
tory's management structure. The result was a new organizational structure effective
1 July 1971 that brought it more in line with other National Research Centers, and a new
name, the "National Astronomy and Ionospheric Center" (NAIC). The name and
acronym were intended to emulate the NRAO as a model and gave assurances of the
importance of ionospheric research.
In the new management structure, the title of Assistant Vice President of Research
(Arecibo Affairs) was discontinued. Gold had quit. Those dnties were given to the obsero
vatory director, who was responsible to Cornell, through the vice president for research,
for the overall management and operation of Arecibo. He prepared the annual budget,
annual program plan, and long-range plans for the AO. The observatory director was to
be located primarily in Ithaca and was also the director of the NAIC. The director of
observatory operations, who answered to the director, had responsibility for the opera-
tion, maintenance, administration, and improvement of the tacility, oversaw personnel
and time allocations, and helped prepare the budget. He was required to be located in
Arecibo. 46
For the new director of observatory operations, the NAIC hired Tor Hagfors in 1971.
His selection reassured those who worried about the status of ionospheric research.
Hagfors had an impressive background in ionospheric (and radar) research and admin-
istration at the Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, Stanford University, the
Jicamarca Radio Observatory (where he was director, 1967-1969), and Lincoln
l+aboratory's Millstone Hill radar. 47
The NSF and NASA Agreement
As the new management structure emerged, and as the National Science Foundation
took over the Arecibo contract, the search to fund the S-band upgrade continued. In May
1969, the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the Committee on
Science and Astronautics, headed by Emilio Q. Daddario (D-Conn.), recommended
deferring the NSF request for resurfacing money. Gordon Pettengill, speaking as Arecibo
director, pointed out that "many throughout the radio astronomy communivy' were seri-
ously disappointed at the failure of the Congress to authorize fnnds for the resurfacing of
the AO reflector." When the Dicke Panel reconvened in June 1969 and reaffirmed the
need for the resurfacing, they too expressed disappoinunent that the new reflector sur-
face had not yet been started. 4_
A major breakthrough occurred when NASA took an interest in the project.
Throughout the 1960s, NASA had fimded only mission-oriented radar research, but not
radar telescope construction. In January 1969, Harry H. Hess, chair of the Space Science
Board, wrote to.John Naugle, associate administrator of Space Science and Applications
at NASA, urging NASA to fund the Arecibo radar upgrade. The cost, estimated to be $5
million for the resurfacing plus $2 or $3 million more for the radar equipment, was "small
in comparison with the construction of a new radar facility but would make it possible to
4(;. (]ampbell 9 Deceml)el 1993; A_e+ilm Observatory Program Pimp, O_lot..r I, 1971.L-Septemlun 30, I97I,
May 1971, pl ). 35-?,_.1, ()lt](c of the Adlninistrativc l)it_'ctol. NAIC+
47. Pettengill 28 Sel)lemt)et 1993; Caml_bell 7 December 1993; Are_'ib+_ Oh_ervat_rry Prtq_am I_ln_L
()_t_dun I, 1971--September 30, 1972, January 1972, NAIC, pp. 25-31; Arecilm Obsrrvatmy I'Tol_,vam Pb_n, (htolmr 1,
1976_-Septemfu'r 70, 197I, May 1971, p. 63, AOL; NAIC QR Q3/1971, 9.
48. AIO. lCe_ear_h in hmmpheric Ph)'_ics+ Research Report RS 76 (Ithaca: CRSR, 30 September 1969), p. 1;
"Repol t of the Second Me¢'ting of lh¢" Ad I loc Advisory Panel for Large Radio Astronomy Facilities," 15 August
1969, typed manus¢ vit)c p. 3, NSFI..
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map the surface of Venus with a resolution of a few kilometers. Such a map would
obviously be a tremendous step forward in our knowledge of the planet. The NASA con-
tribution to the total cost of improving the Arecibo facility would be very small compared
to the cost of obtaining the same information from some future orbiter. ''4u
Hess's argument closely resembled that of Werner yon Braun in an anecdote related
by Don Campbell: "I don't know if it's apocryphal or not, but there is the story that
Werner yon Braun said, if you can get a two-kilometer resolution on Venus for $3 million,
which is roughly what we were talking about, that it was an immense bargain, and that
NASA should take it straight away. ''50
Indeed, NASA became interested in funding the upgrade for one major reason. The
S-band equipment could make radar maps of the Venusian surface with a resolution of two
to five kilometers. The space agency was interested in a one-megawatt radar operating at
10 cm (3,000 MHz). And as NASA chief of planetary astronomy William Brunk came to
realize, the total cost of the upgrade was a fraction of the initial cost of the facility. 51
The country was discovering that it could not afford both guns and butter, the
Vietnam War and the Great Society. NASA and NSF were under serious pressure to cut
their budgets, and in December 1969, the new Republican President shut down the NASA
Electronics Research Center in Cambridge. Budgetary austerity perhaps led NASA to sup-
port the Arecibo S-band upgrade, at a cost of a few million dollars, over the NEROC tele-
scope, with an estimated price tag of $30 million dollars. Furthermore, given the superi-
or transmitter power and receiver sensitivity of the upgraded Arecibo S-band radar over
the proposed NEROC radar, NASA would be getting a better investment for its dollars.
Budgetary belt tightening also induced NASA to realize that every planetary mission
had to do something that could not be done from the ground, and missions would have
to rely on ground-based results more than ever. The radar images obtainable from the
upgraded radar would be invaluable to the exploration of the planets. Thus, tile mission-
oriented logic of NASA, combined with budgetary restraint, led to its adopting the
Arecibo upgrade project. _ NASA now approached the NSE
When NASA and NSF representatives met on 2 December 1969, the NASA budget
for fiscal 1971 was among the topics of discussion. The space agency was going to ask for
an extra $1 million to build a major planetary research facility as part of its Planetary
Astronomy Program. Three candidate projects were under consideration: a 60-inch (1.5-
meter) planetary telescope at Cerro Tololo, Chile; a large-aperture infrared telescope;
and the Arecibo upgrade. The final choice pivoted on the NSF budget submission to the
Bureau of the Budget and Congress.
The NASA strategy was to pay for the resurfacing, if the NSF failed to win funds from
Congress, and to worry about the rest of the S-band upgrade later. Brunk knew that NASA
had to be prepared to pay for the radar equipment. Because radar equipment was "not a
high priority item for general radio astronomy," he reasoned, "the development of a high
power radar transmitter at a wavelength of 10 centimeters will be a low priority for NSF
funding and must therefore be included in the NASA Planetary Astronomy budget. "._3
Soon after the NASA-NSF meeting, in February 1970, Cornell submitted a funding
proposal for the S-band upgrade to both NASA and the NSE The proposal asked for $3
million over three years, with work to begin February 1971. Both the NSF and NASA fis-
cal 1971 budget requests contained money fox Arecibo. The NSF proposed to underwrite
49. Hess to Naugle, 27January 1969, NHOB.
50. Campbell 7 December 1993.
51. Brunk, Planetary Astronomy New Starts, FY 1971, n.d., NHOB.
52. Tatarewicz, p. 98. For the creation and demise of the NASA Electronics Research Center, see Ken
Hechler, Toward the Endle.s_ Frontier: tli_t_rry °[ the ('ommittee on S_en_e and 7;'_hnoloK_', 1959-1979 (Washington:
USGO, 1980), pp. 219-231.
53. HenryJ. Smith, Memo to the files, 11 December 1969, NItOP,.
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the reflector resurfacing, while NASA budgeted for the radar equipment :.nd its installa-
tion. Congress approved both the NASA and NSF kaecibo S-band expenditures. The NSF
funds were frozen, however, until a new cost estimate became available. The estimate,
completed in November 1970, was $5.6 million. 54
The upgrade brought together the NSF and NASA into a special relationship that
started with joint discussions in December 1970 between William Brunk, chief of the
NASA Planetary Astronomy Program, and Daniel Hunt, head of the NSF Office of
National Centers and Facilities Operations. As discussions progressed, on 6 March 1971,
NASA formally expressed its intent to enter into an agreement with the NSF for the addi-
tion of the S-band equipment. The two agencies entered into negotiations and, on 24June
1971, signed a Memorandum of Agreement, which went into effect 1 July 1971. 5-_
Under the agreement, the NSF funded the resurfacing and NASA the addition of a
one megawatt S-band radar transmitter, receivers, and associated changes to the antenna
to provide radar capability at a wavelength of ten centimeters (3,000 MHz). The project
was to be managed under the existing NSF-Cornell contract. The NSF would serve as the
monitoring agency, and NASA would transfer its portion of the funds to the NSE The
agreement deferred the issue of S-band operational costs until later, although the two
agencies intended to share those costs proportionally. 56
In this way, NASA came to fund radar instrument construction and committed itself
to supporting the research performed with the instrument. This deviation from earlier
policy was motivated by an interest in mission-oriented research, namely, to obtain radar
images in support of space missions to the planets, particularly to Venus. The conse-
quence was a permanent institutional and funding arrangement for planetary radar
astronomy at Arecibo, as well as a unique instrument.
Arecibo Joins the S-Band
The NASA-NSF agreement, backed by Congressionally-approved funds, provided the
legal, financial, and managerial framework for the actual upgrade work to take place. The
upgrade began with a search for a contractor to undertake the reflector resurfacing. Two
firms bid, the Rohr Corporation and LTV Electrosystems of Dallas, and in November 1971
Cornell awarded the contract to LTV Electrosystems, which shortly afterward changed its
name to E-Systems. The original spherical reflector consisted of 1/2-inch (1.3 cm) steel
wire mesh (chicken wire) supported by heavy steel cables. Over 38,000 thin aluminum
panels, fabricated on-site by E-Systems, replaced the chicken wire. From the beginning,
inefficiencies and equipment failure plagued panel installation, but they were overcome,
and the last panel was installed in November 1973. 57
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55. 1lunt to Brunk, 11 December 1970; NASA Deputy Associate Administrator for Space Science and
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Director of Planetary Programs, Office of Space Science and Applications, NASA, to Associate Administrator for
Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition, 20 May 1971; and Memorandum of Agreement between NASA and the
NSF for the Addition of a High-Power S-Band Radar Capability and Associated Additions and Modifications to
the Suspended Antenna Structure of the NAIC at Arecibo, 24 June 1971, NHOB.
56. Memorandmn of Agreement between NASA and the NSF for the Addition of a High-Power S-Band
Radar Capability and Associated Additions and Modifications to the Suspended Antenna Structure of the NAIC
at Arecibo, 24 June 197l, NHOB; "High Power Transmitter to Boost Arecibo Radar Capability," NSF press
release, 17 August 1971, "Radar Astronomy," NHO.
57. NAIC QR Q1/1971, p. 5; Q2/1971, p. 6; Q3/1971, p. 6: Q4/1971, p. 7; Q1/1972, p. 10; Q2/1972,
p. 13; Q3/1972, p. 11; and Q1/1973, p. 13; National Science Board, Minutes of the Open Meetings, 144:4-5,
National Science Board.
104 TO SEE THE UNSEEN
Concurrently, the NAIC oversaw the design and construction of the S-band radar
transmitter, receivers, and associated equipment; the necessary modifications to the sus-
pended feed platform; and construction of a new carriage house to hold the S-band
equipment. Ammann & Whitney, a well-known structural engineering consulting firm,
reported on the suspended structure and reflector cable anchorages as well as on the fea-
sibility of upgrading the suspended structure. They found no basic deficiencies in the
structure that would make upgrading impractical or inadvisable. 58
In order to develop specific transmitter characteristics that met scientific goals, yet
represented realistic state-of-the-art feasibility, NAIC staff discussed its design with experi-
enced radar astronomers and with experts from Varian Associates, Raytheon, and
Continental Electronics. The operating frequency, 2380 MHz (12.6 cm), appeared to be
the optimum choice for both radar and radio astronomy and was close to the JPL plane-
tary radar frequency (2388 MHz; 12.6 cm).59
Originally, the transmitter was to produce 800 kilowatts using two kiystrons. The
NAIC based the decision on the experience ofJPL Goldstone, where a single klystron pro-
duced 400 kilowatts of average continuous-wave power at 2388 MHz. Although Varian was
developing a one megawatt continuous-wave klystron, the advantages of proven reliability
and ready availability of spares militated against using a single, experimental one-
megawatt klystron. Finally, after extensive discussion with representatives of NASA and the
NSE the NAIC reduced the transmitter power requirement to 450 kilowatts, thereby low-
ering costs '_vithout impacting upon scientific goals of the program." In contrast, the orig-
inal UHF radar transmitter produced only 150 kilowatts of average power. _
The experience of JPL in operating at S-band proved invaluable to the Arecibo radar
upgrade. In addition to providing expert advice to the NAIC staff, a formerJPL employ-
ee reviewed technical matters for the NASA technical monitor. The maser receivers, more-
over, were excess Deep Space Network equipment. The agreement between the NAIC and
JPL for the transfer of the masers noted thatJPL was "a pioneer in the development of
maser systems," and that "no commercial firms have the required capability, experience
and expertise to produce an S-band maser system that would be operational at 2.38
GHz."61
The renovated reflector was dedicated on 15-16 November 1974. After delivery of
the keynote speech, Rep. John W. Davis (D-Ga.) gave the signal for the transmission of
The Arecibo Message, 1974, an attempt to communicate with extraterrestrial civilizations.
The radar upgrade, however, was not yet completed and would not be entirely ready until
the following year. 62
Yet, shortly after the resurfacing dedication, Gordon Pettengill (Arecibo) and
Richard Goldstein (JPI.) used the S-band transmitter to bounce signals off the rings of
Saturn. Because the Arecibo maser receiver was not yet installed, Arecibo sent and JPL's
Mars Station received. The bistatic experiment worked, despite line feed and turbine gen-
erator problems at Arecibo.
58. A[O, Prtrlm_alto N._: and NASA for Major Additions and Mod_Jicatiwn._to the Su._pendedAntenna Structure
arm Equipment of the Arecibo Ob_ervatm)', February 1971 through February 1973, February 1970, pp. 7-8, 11-15,
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60. Campbell8December 1993;NAICQRQ2/1970, p. 4, Q4/1970, p. 9, Q1/1972, p. 12, Q3/1972, p.
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AsDonCampbellrecalled:'q'heinitialfeedsthatweusedwiththetransmitterneed-
edcooling;wewerehavingtroubleattachingtilecoolinglines.Peoplewouldlineuplate
atnightin fiontofthecontrolroomduringthisexperiment.Wewouldturnontiletrans-
mitter,andtherewouldbethissortofflashoflight,asthingsburnedupup thereand
everybodywent'Ah!' It wasabit likefireworks.Whentheproblemfinallygotsolved,I
thinkeveryonewasratherdisappointedthattherewasn'tanyflashoflightupthere!-63
TileAreciboS-bandupgradeliterallycreatedanewinstrumentwithwhichtodo
planetaryradarastronomy,afieldwhoseouterlimitsofcapabilitystillleanedsn-onglyon
theavailabilityof newhardware.AlthoughtheArecibotelescopemadeS-bandradar
observationsofMarsbeginningAugust1975forNASA'sVikingmission,thearrangement
withNASAfreedAreciboalsotodoradaresearcht atwasnotmissionrelated.So,late
thefollowingmonth,on28September1975,theradardetectedCallisto,followedtwo
nightslaterbyGanymede,thefirstdetectionsofJupiter'sGalileanmoons.64
TheNASAagreementguaranteedplanetaryradarastronomyaninstrumentanda
researchbudget.Nowhereelsedidplanetaryadarastronomyoperatewithsuchextensive
institutionalndfinancialsupport.Theseuniqueadvantages,combinedwithitsrelations
withCornellandMIT,havesustainedAreciboasthefocalcenterof planetaryradar
astronomytothepresentday.
The JPL Mars Station
In sharp contrast to Arecibo, JPL did not formally recognize planetary radar astron-
omy as a scientific activity. Planetary radar had neither a budget line nor a program atJPL;
it was invisible. Its role was to test the performance of the Deep Space Network (DSN). Eb
Rechtin, the architect of the DSN, deliberately avoided creating a radar astronomy pro-
gram. He saw no reason, other than for science, why NASA ought to fund it. Instead, plan-
etary radar became, in the words of JPL radar astronomer Richard Goldstein, the "cow-
catcher on the DSN locomotive," financed at the "budgetary margin" of tile DSN. In
Goldstein's own words, "I was the cow-catcher and still am. ''_-_
Radio astronomy, on the other hand, held a more privileged position. Nick Renzetti,
the DSN manager responsible for links between the Network and its users (NASA space
missions), forged an agreement with NASA Headquarters that permitted qualified radio
astronomers to perform experiments on Goldstone antennas at no cost, provided the
experiments did not conflict with the antennas' prime mission, spacecraft communica-
tions and data acquisition. _
Not only wasJPL planetary radar astronomy invisible, but relations between JPL and
its oversight institution, the California Institute of Technology, were about as distant as
those between Lincoln Laboratory and MIT. JPL employees, like their peers at Lincoln
Laboratory, could not have graduate students, unless they held a joint appointment at
Cahech. Although Dick Goldstein taught a radar astronomy course at Caltech during the
1960s, his students did not become radar astronomers, but went into other fields. An
unusual case was Lawrence A. Soderblom, who took Goldstein's course in the fall of 1967.
Soderblom later joined the U.S. Geological Survey, where he interpreted planetary radar
dataY
63. Campbell 8 l)ecember 1993; Campbell 7 December 1993; NAIC QR Q1/1975, p. 4.
64. NAIC QR Q3/1976, pp. 4-5.
65. Goldstein 14 September 1993; Goldstein 7 April 1993; Rechtin, telephone conversation.
13 September 1993.
66. Renzetti 16 April 1992; Renzetti 17 April 1992.
67. Soderblom 27June 1994.
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Unlike Lincoln Laboratory or Arecibo, JPL did not hire people to do radar astron-
omy, becauseJPL officially did not have a radar astronomy program. Goldstein and Dewey
Muhleman had participated in the 1961 Venus radar experiment, not because they were
Cahech graduate students, but because they were JPL employees in Walt Victor's group.
Roland Carpenter, another JPL planetary radar astronomer of the 1960s, also worked
under Walt Victor. 68 Once Roland Carpenter and Dewey Muhlemen left JPL, Dick
Goldstein remained the sole JPL radar astronomer for several years.
Planetary radar astronomy subsisted atJPL during the 1960s on money earmarked
for various space missions and on the budget of the DSN. The NASA budget then was
more generous. NASA paid the cost of operating and maintaining the Goldstone radar as
part of the DSN, so that the costs of the radar instrument were paid. When Goldstein
needed a piece of hardware designed and built, he assigned the job to one of the employ-
ees he supervised as manager of Section 331. The Advanced Systems Development bud-
get of the DSN paid for hardware design and construction. 69
In order to obtain time on the Goldstone radar, Goldstein went from mission to
mission and explained why the mission ought to support his radar experiments. With
approval from a mission, Goldstein could then request antenna time from the committee
in charge of allocating antenna use. Mariner missions supported many of the radar obser-
vations, while Viking and Voyager supported experiments on Mars, Saturn's rings, and the
Galilean satellites of Jupiter. Officially, the experiments were done for neither radar
improvement nor the science, but for "better communications" with spacecraft. 70
If the NASA Headquarters Planetary Science Program, then headed by William
Brunk, approved of a particular set of radar experiments, getting antenna time was much
easier. As Goldstein explained, Brunk "would support me a little and I took that as a pos-
itive thing, and I guess later on he turned that off, but it wasn't very big in the first
place....It was a kind of a way to get legitimacy. If he funds you a litde, that means it's
important. If he doesn't fund you at all, that means it's not important....I would go to great
lengths to get antenna time and a little funding from Brunk was helpful. "71
Planetary radar astronomy atJPL thus came into existence and continued to func-
tion because of the Laboratory's Big Science space missions and Deep Space Network
activities. In particular, it was the idea, put forth by the DSN's chief architect Eb Rechtin,
that radar astronomy would have the dual function of testing the DSN's ability to support
interplanetary missions and developing new hardware for the DSN (that is, the justifica-
tion for having Advanced Systems Development underwrite radar astronomy hardware).
It was specifically for developing and testing new DSN hardware that, shortly after the
1961 Venus radar experiment, Rechtin arranged with NASA to set aside a Goldstone radar
for that purpose. On that instrument, Goldstein and Carpenter made Venus radar obser-
vations during the 1962 and 1964 conjunctions. Planetary radar research benefitted from
the developmental work, which increased the continuous-wave radar's average power out-
put from 10 to 13 kilowatts in 1962 and then to 100 kilowatts for the 1964 Venus experi-
mentY_
When Goldstein made observations during the 1967 Venus conjunction, however, he
used a new, more powerfitl 64-meter-cliameter (210-ft-diameter) S-band antenna, the Mars
Station. The need to handle missions at ever increasing distances from Earth furnished
68. Carpenter, telephone conversation, 14 September 1993.
69. Jurgens 23 May 1994; Goldstein 14 September 1993; Downs 4 October 1994.
70. Memorandum, Carl W. Johnson to Murray, 31 October 1977, 62/3/89-13. JPLA; Goldstein
14 September 1993.
71. Goldstein 14 September 1993.
72. Victor, "General System Description," p. 3 in Ooldstein, Stevens, and Victor, eds., Goldstone
Observatory Report for October-Detember 1962, Technical Report 32-396 (Pasadena:JPL, 1 March 1965); Waft,
ch. 6, pp. 17 & 19; Goldstein and ('at penter. "Rotation of Venus," pp. 910-911; Carpenter, "Study of Venus by CW
Radar." p. 142.
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the raison d'6tre for JPL's entry into the Big Dish arena, and incidentally supplied its
future radar astronomers with an ideal instrument for imaging and other planetary radar
work. With the Mars Station, Goldstein and his colleagues discovered three rugged sec-
tions of Venus; the largest received the name Beta. The needs of NASA space missions, not
radar astronomy, dictated the design of the Mars Station.
The Mars Station represented the DSN's commitment to the S-band and its need for
large antennas capable of communicating with probes at great distances from Earth.
Starting in 1964, all new space missions were to use the higher S-band. Despite the com-
mitment to S-band, NASA still had active missions operating at lower frequencies. The
switch to S-band throughout the Deep Space Network therefore required a hybrid tech-
nology capable of handling missions operating at either the higher or lower frequency
bands. A JPL design team devised the equipment, which was installed throughout the
DSN.
The hybrid equipment, however, was only a transitional phase before the construc-
tion of more powerful and more sensitive antennas specifically intended to handle
unmanned missions to the planets. In order to determine the essential characteristics and
optimal size for those antennas, JPL initiated a series of studies in 1959 that culminated
in the Advanced Antenna System. NASA's Office of Tracking and Data Acquisition, which
oversaw the DSN, sponsored a pioneering conference on large antennas on 6 November
1959. Speakers reported on three kinds of antennas: steerable parabolic dishes, fixed
antennas with movable feeds (e.g., Arecibo), and arrays, the same antenna types consid-
ered later by NSF panels.
NASA and JPL decided to stay with the proven design of steerable dishes. The next
decision was antenna size. JPI, engineering studies showed that antenna diameters
between 55 and 75 meters (165 and 225 ft) were near optimal and the most cost-effective.
The final choice, 64 meters (210 ft), was the same size as the recently-completed
Australian radio telescope at Parkes. This was no coincidence. JPL engineers had received
a lot of help from tile Australian designers. Their studies of the Parkes telescope provid-
ed JPE engineers with a wealth of data and ideas to use in the design of their 64-meter
(210-ft) dish.
JPL also commissioned private firms to carry out feasibility and preliminary design
studies for the Advanced Antenna System beginning in September 1960, before awarding
a construction contract to the Rohr Corporation in June 1963. Construction proceeded
after JPL analyzed and approved the Rohr design in January 1964. Rohr completed the
antenna in May 1966, following the formal dedication on 29 April 1966.
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Figure 15
flJl. (;_,ld.stone Mar_ Station (DSS-14) upon completion in 1966. (Grartes_ o] ]eL 1'7_qmL_ion Latmrat_ry, photo nr_.
333-5967BC.)
The dish was dubbed the Mars Station, because its mission was to support Mariner
on its journey to Mars in 1964, long before the antenna was operational. Nonetheless, on
16 March 1966, the big dish received its first signals from Mariner 4 and provided opera-
tional support for Pioneer 7, launched in August 1966. The Mars Station subsequently
supported several other missions, including the first Surveyor flights, and made possible
live Apollo television pictures from the Moon, not to mention planetary radar images and
topographical maps. In order to systematize its growing number of antennas around the
world, the DSN instituted a numbering system, so that each Deep Space Station (DSS)
would bear a unique number. The original Echo antenna became DSS-12, while the anten-
na used in the Venus radar experiments became DSS-13. The Mars Station was DSS-14. 7-_
The Mars Station, as part of the Deep Space Network, underwent a major upgrade
in the 1970s in order to accommodate the needs of the Viking and Mariner Jupiter-Saturn
spacecraft (later known as Voyager). For the Viking mission, each DSN station would have
to handle six simultaneous data streams from the two Viking ()rbilers and the one Lander.
73. Corliss, l)eel_ S/m_e Netw_rrh, pp. 37-38, 50, 60_1, 82, 84, 87, 129 and 131; Renzetti, A Ill,tory,
pp. 25-26, 32, 52 and 54; Robertson, pp. 255-261; The NASA JIlL 64-Meter-Diameter Antenna at (;old._tone,
CalifiJrnia: Prrqect Rep_rrt, Technical Memorandum 33-671 (Pasadena:JPL, 15July 1974), pp. 7-17; Rechtin, Bruce
Rule, and Stevens, I._rk_e (;r_mnd Antenna_, Technical Report 32-213 (Pasadena:JPL, 20 March 1962), pp. 7-10.
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Viking, in fact, was a dual-frequency craft; it used both S-band and X-band frequencies.
For the Mariner flight to Jupiter and Saturn, the telemetry rates were the same as those
for Mariner 10, but the data were coded and transmitted at X-band from distances up to
nine astronomical units. Operating in the higher X-band range gave the increased sensi-
tivity needed to remain in contact with Mariner, as it flew by Jupiter and Saturn.
Construction of the 400-kilowatt, X-band (8495 MHz; 3.5 cm) transmitter for the Mars
Station was completed by Advanced Systems Development, and the DSS-14 began opera-
ting at X-band in 1975. 74
During the 1970s, the population of JPL planetary radar astronomers grew. Jurgens
had an undergraduate and graduate degree in electrical engineering from Ohio
University and had taught electrical engineering at Clarkson College (Ohio), before pur-
suing a doctoral degree at Cornell. Sometime after he finished researching his disserta-
tion, a study of the radar scattering properties of Venus, at Arecibo, JPL hired Jurgens in
1972 to serve on the technical staff of the Telecommunications Research Section, not to
do planetary radar astronomy. 75
Also working in Goldstein's section was George Downs, who had studied radio
astronomy at Stanford University under Ronald Bracewell. Goldstein had Downs analyze
Mars radar data and make observations at Goldstone to assist in the selection of the Viking
landing site, a project funded by the Viking Project Office. The planetary radar work, how-
ever, was in addition to his regular JPL duties, which involved studying newly discovered
radio sources as potential timing sources for the Deep Space Network. v6
During the heyday of the Viking Mars radar observations, Goldstein called upon
other JPL employees, such as Howard C. Rumsey, Jr., who had a strong background in
physics and mathematics, and the hardware experts George A. Morris and Richard R.
Green. Jurgens described the atmosphere atJPL: "We all knew each other's talents. It was
very efficient. Nobody ever felt like we were working terribly hard. It was just like a big
playpen. Everybody came here, and we sort of did our thing and thought about what we
wanted to do. We'd talk to each other, and we'd go out to lunch. It was the period of the
long lunches sometimes. We had the Gourmet Society. The Gourmet Society was really
headed by Howard Rumsey, who really liked good food. He would read the Sunday
gourmet page and the Thursday gourmet page in the L. A. Times, and pick out interest-
ing restaurants. At least one day a week, we went trudging off-lab to eat decent food at
some interesting place that Howard had selected. These things often involved bicycle trips
as far as Long Beach. "77
Once Viking project funding ended in 1976, JPL radar astronomy hit hard times.
Getting time on the DSN become more difficult. It was easy to get time in the early and
middle 1960s, when the DSN was tracking few spacecraft. As Dick Goldstein explained:
"Back in the sixties I thought of myself as director of the Goldstone Observatory. I got to
choose what we could do, if I could get support for it. ''7s During the 1960s, the JPL radar
experiments conducted on Venus involved hundreds of hours of runs; for example, the
1961 Venus experiment involved 238 hours of data collected over two months. But by the
end of the decade, the amount of time available had declined. The JPL 1969 Venus obser-
vations were not made daily for a period of months during inferior conjunctions, but only
"on 17 days spaced from 11 March to 16 May 1969. "79
74. Rob Hartop and Dan A. Bathker, "I'he High-Power X-Band Planetary Radar at Goldstone: Design,
Development, and Early Results," IF_2E"l'ran._action.*_mMicrowave Tht_rryarul 7_chniques MIT-24 (December 1976) :
958-963;JPL Annual Reporl, 1974-1975, p. 22,JPLA.
75. Jurgens 23 May 1994.
76. Downs 4 October 1994.
77. Jurgens 23 May 1994.
78. Goldstein 14 September 1993.
79. Golomb, "Introduction," in Victor, Stevens, and Golomb, p. 4; Goldstein and Howard C. Rumsey, Jr.,
"A Radar Snapshot of Venus," Scienoe 169 (1969): 975.
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Thereductioninavailableantennatimewasin direct proportion to the increasing
number of spacecraft with which the Deep Space Network communicated. By 1977, the
DSN was in communication with a record 14 spacecraft. In addition to the three Viking
craft (two orbiters and one lander), the DSN communicated with Helios 1 and 2, Pioneer
11 (Saturn), Pioneer 10 (which was leaving the solar system), Voyagers 1 and 2, and
Pioneers 6, 7, 8, and 9. That number grew to 19, a new record, the following year, when
the DSN also handled communications with Pioneer Venus, which was an orbiter and four
probes. 8°
Then the Deep Space Network stopped funding radar astronomy hardware. The abil-
ity to carry out radar astronomy without official recognition was maintained thanks to the
presence at high levels of JPL management of Eb Rechtin and Walt Victor, who watched
over planetary radar activities. But Rechtin leftJPL, and Victor transferred in December
1978 from the DSN to the Office of Planning and Review. sl Without their guardianship,
JPL radar astronomy was vulnerable.
As Goldstein explained: "From a chauvinistic point of view, it was a disaster, because
the rest of the world passed us by....We went from being a couple years ahead to being a
couple years behind. ''82 Without funding for hardware, the radar system was at risk.
Moreover, the Goldstone Mars Station was in desperate need of repairs, and the equip-
ment was becoming harder and harder to maintain. In 1976, the antenna already was ten
years old, and the electronic equipment transferred to the Mars Station from the Venus
Station (DSS-13) was even older.S3
The termination of Deep Space Network funding of planetary radar astronomy grew
out of two concerns, one within JPL and the other within the Deep Space Network. One
of Bruce Murray's chief concerns after taking over as laboratory director was the state and
status of science and scientists at JPL. The basic criticism was that JPL lacked a commit-
ment to scientists. But the problem had a cultural side; technologically-centered team-
work dominated laboratory culture. Also, many of those doing science were like Dick
Goldstein and Ray Jurgens; trained and hired as electrical engineers, they carried out
radar astronomy science experiments. Murray made the problem the topic of mini-
retreats, meetings, and seminars and, as a first step in elevating the status of science atJPL,
appointed in October 1977 the firstJPL chief scientist, Caltech physics professor Rochus
E. Vogt, who had authored a report on relations between Cahech andJPL, another topic
of great concern, s4
Despite, or rather because of, Murray's concerns for science atJPL, planetary radar
astronomy did not fair well under his reign as laboratory director. Goldstein was trans-
ferred out of the section where he had guided and supported the JPL planetary radar
effort. JPL management decided that it was not proper to do science under the guise of
improving the DSN. Radar astronomy should compete with other JPL science activities,
and the Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA; now the OSSI, Office of Space
Science and Instruments) at NASA Headquarters should fund it, they ruled. 85
At the same time, the DSN budget was suffering from monetary and manpower lim-
itations. 86 To make matters worse, a routine review of the Deep Space Network, chaired
80. JPL Annual Report, 1976-1977, p. 22, and itnd., 1978, p. 20, JPLA.
81. Murray to Alien M. Lovelace, 30 November 1978, 75/5/89-13,JPLA.
82. Goldstein 14 September 1993.
83. Jurgens 23 May 1994.
84. Agenda, Director's Mini-Retreat, "How Does Science Fit In atJPL?," 22 March 1977, 55/3/89-13;
Director's Letter, no. 22, 30 September 1977, 61/3/8%13; Roger Noll to Murray, 23 November 1977, 63/3/8%
13; and typed manuscript, First Annual "State of the Lab" Talk by Murray to Management Personnel, 1 April
1977, 55/3/89-13, JPLA.
85. Goldstein 14 September 1993.
86. Notes from a discussion of TDA problems discussed during a mini-retreat held 8 November 1977,
63/3/8%13, JPLA;Jurgens 23 May 1994; and Stevens 14 September 1993.
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byEbRechtin,declaredthatradarastronomywasnolongerthe"cow-catcher"oftheDSN,
meaningthattheroleofradarastronomyincreatingnewhardwaretohelpdriveforward
theDeepSpaceNetworkhadcometoanend.It was,therefore,timetopulltheplugon
planetaryradarastronomy,afterpreviousreviewshadlaudedit.
Fromtimeto time,actingunderinstructionfromNASAHeadquarters,theDeep
SpaceNetworkcalledintoexistencetheTDA(TrackingandDataAcquisition)Advisory
PaneltoreviewDSNlong-termplans.Planetaryadarwasheldhighasanintegralpartof
DSNdevelopmentactivitiesbyEdPosner,aDSNmanager.Amongthehardwarecontri-
butionsofradarastronomyhelistedweremicrowavecomponents,signalprocessingtech-
niques,andstationcontrolconcepts,allofwhichweretestedina"realisticenvironment."
Planetaryadarfellfromthatfavorablepositionduringthe1978review.Theheadofthe
reviewpanel,nowcalledtheDSNAdvisoryGroup,wasnoneotherthanEbRechtin,the
architectoftheDeepSpaceNetworkandtheoneresponsibleformakingplanetaryradar
atestbedofDSNtechnology.DSNmanagementaskedthepaneltoconsider,amongmany
otherquestions,radarastronomy.In theopinionof theAdvisoryGroup,whichEb
Rechtinwrote,"AnotherDSNtechnologywhichmayhavehaditsdayasafoundationfor
DSNtechnologyisDSNradarastronomy.RadarastronomyservedtheDSNverywellfor
manyears.TheAdvisoryGroupwonderswhathenextareamightbe.''_7Radarastrono-
mynolongerproducedthecuttingedgehardwarethatjustifiedthesupportofAdvanced
SystemsDevelopment.Asaresult,planetaryradarastronomyatGoldstonewentbegging
formoney.
A goodpartoftheproblemwastheperceptionof planetaryradarasjust a testbed
for DSN technology. The value of the sc/ence was simply not recognized by either DSN
management or NASA Headquarters. After all, in accordance with Eb Rechtin's plan,
planetary radar was not to occupy a budget line nor to have program status; it was simply
a DSN activity to assist in the development and testing of new technology.
The lack of money to even maintain the Goldstone radar, whose age and one-of-a-
kind design engineering made it all that much harder to maintain, began to frustrate the
performance of experiments. By 1980, the Goldstone radar was in such bad shape that
planetary radar astronomy experiments were no longer carried out on a regular basis. The
radar was resurrected for attempts at asteroid 4 Vesta on 28 May 1982 and comets IRAS-
Araki-Alcock and Sugano-Saigusa-Fujikawa in 1983, but only Comet IRAS-Araki-Alcock was
detected successfully. As RayJurgens reflected on the situation: "Basically, it looked like it
was the end of the radar."88
Goldstack
In discussing radar systems available for planetary research, an instrument that one
must not overlook is the bistatic Goldstack radar, which used Haystack as the transmitting
antenna and theJPL Goldstone DSS-14 radar as the receiving antenna. In the past, plan-
etary radar astronomers seldom used bistatic radars, let alone radars requiring the
coordination of two unrelated institutions. Bistatic radars require a daunting amount of
coordination on both the technical and institutional level. Nonetheless, transmitting
power and antenna receiver sensitivity can combine to create a radar capable of doing
more than either facility operating monostatically. In theory, Goldstack could outperform
either Haystack or DSS-14 separately and achieve a nearly tenfold increase in overall radar
performance.
87. "TDA Advisory Panel, 1971-1972," and "TDA Advisory Council, 1978-1981 ,"JPLPLC.
88. Jurgens 23 May 1994;Jurgens, "Comet Iras," pp. 222 and 224.
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When radar astronomers Irwin Shapiro and Gordon Pettengill pitched Goldstack to
NASA in 1968, they outlined an ambitious program of research: 1) observations of the
Galilean satellites Ganymede and Callisto; 2) maps of the surfaces of Mercury and Venus;
3) a Moon-Earth-Moon triple-bounce experiment to study the Earth's radar-reflecting
properties; 4) topographical studies of Mars at a resolution of 150 meters; and 5) a radar
test of General Relativity. 89 Haystack and JPL engineers worked out the technical details
of those experiments, and by May 1970JPL had installed an X-band maser tunable to the
Haystack frequency. The demands of the space program on the Mars Station, however,
forced postponement of the experiments. As Shapiro recalled: "DSN always had schedul-
ing problems. Scheduling was the biggest pain in the neck. From the point of view of sci-
ence, I never felt the best things were done with scheduling; the engineering and mission
pressures were too enormous. It always seemed to be as impossible as possible to schedule
ground-based science experiments, but good science, in fact, was done." Goldstack even-
tually searched for Ganymede and Callisto in late May and early June 1970. 9o
Jodrell Bank
Several years before planetary radar astronomy ended at Haystack and declined at
JPL, radar research at Jodrell Bank came to an end, too. In contrast toJPL, Jodrell Bank
officially recognized and funded its radar astronomy program, and Sir Bernard Lovell
proudly and, in the face of adversity, stubbornly maintained radar research. The Jodrell
Bank facility was an example of British Big Science; private and civilian governmental
funding underwrote the building of the large dish. While the U.S. military funded some
meteor radar research,Jodrell Bank radar astronomy was not, in any sense, an extension
of American Big Science. The demise of planetary radar astronomy at Jodrell Bank was a
lesson in the dangers inherent in Litde Science, not Big Science.
Thanks to NASA and the American military, Jodrell Bank did not lack for radar
equipment. The still secret agreement between Loveli and an unidentified Air Force offi-
cer had as its immediate objective the sending of commands to the Pioneer 5 spacecraft.
The U.S. Air Force funded Space Technology Laboratories (STL), a Los Angeles-based
wholly-owned subsidiary of Ramo-Wooldrige (later TRW), to install a continuous-wave
410.25-MHz (73-cm) radar transmitter and other equipment on the Jodrell Bank tele-
scope in order to track lunar rocket launches. Although the STL transmitter had only a
few kilowatts of power, it was stable, reliable, and free of the problems that plagued the
pulse radar apparatus pieced together by John Evans. Ownership of the STL transmitter
passed to NASA, which provided operational funds between 1959 and 1964 to track rock-
et launches, not to perform radar experiments. NASA left the equipment on the Jodrell
Bank antenna "on an indefinite loan basis," so that the University of Manchester might
use it for scientific research, ul
89. Memorandum, NEROC Project Office to Wiesner, 19 September 1968, regarding "Proposed
Contact with Newell Regarding Possible Partial Support of Haystack by NASA," 8/2/AC 135, MITA; NEROC,
Proposal to the National Science Foundation for Programs in Radio and Radar Astronomy at the Haystack
Observatory, 8 May 1970, pp. Ill.8-111.10, LLLA; Brunk to Distribution List, 4 October 1968, NHOB.
90. Shapiro 4 May 1994; Shapiro t October 1993; _Funding Proposal, 'Plan for NEROC Operation of
the Haystack Research Facility as a National Radio/Radar Observatory,' NSE 7/1/71-6/30/73," 26/2/AC 135,
and Sebring to Hurlburt, 27 March 1970, 18/2/AC 135, MITA; NEROC, Proposal to the National Science
Foundation for Programs in Radio and Radar Astronomy at the Haystack Observatory, 8 May 1970, pp. lll.8-
IIl. 10, LLLA;JPL 1970 Annual Report, p. 14,JPLA.
91. Lovell, 11 January 1994; Evans 9 September 1993; Ponsonby 11 January 1994; Lovell, "Astronomer
by Chance," pp. 322-325 and 328-329; Edmond Buckley to R. G. Lascelles, 8 November 1961, and related doc-
uments in 2/53, Accounts; Able, Thor, and Pioneer 5 materials in 4/16,Jodrell Bank Miscellaneous; materials
in 1/4, Correspondence Series 2; 2/53, 2/52, 2/55, 7/55, 8/55, 1/59, and 3/59, Accounts; and 4/16, Jodrell
Bank Miscellaneous, JBA.
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In 1962,theJodrellBankradargroupconsistedofonlyJohnThomsonandhisgrad-
uatestudentJohnE.B.Ponsonby.EvanshadsoughthisfortuneatLincolnLaboratory.As
Ponsonbycharacterizedtheradargroup,"Wewerealwaystwomenanda boy[K.S.
Imrie]."WhenPonsonbyarrivedatJodreliBankin 1960,hewashockedtodiscoverthat
hewastheonlyonein theradargroupwithaflareforelectronics;Thomson,according
toPonsonby,washappydoingcomputations.JodrellBankradarastronomywasmallnot
onlyin termsofstaff,butalsoinobservingtime,whichvariedbetween1and10percent.92
ThomsonandPonsonbyabandonedmuchoftheequipmentEvanshadbeenusing;
theyusedasimplerapproachwithlesstechnicalrisk.Theoldapparatususedvacuum
tubes;thenewwasallsolid-statedigitalelectronics.AgrantfromtheDSIRunderwrotehe
costofthesemodifications,a wellasthepurchaseofaparametricamplifierandsparekly-
strontubes.The1962and1964JodrellBankVenusradarexperimentswerecarriedout
withthisdigitalconlinuous-waveequipmentP3
ThefocusofJodrellBank'sVenusradaresearchafter1962wasabistaticexperiment
withtheSovietLong-DistanceSpaceCommunicationCenterlocatednearYevpatoriyain
theCrimea.TheexperimentwaspossibleonlybecauseLovellhadsucceededin thawing
ColdWarelations.TheopportunitycameinMarch1961,whenSovietspacetrackerslost
contactwithaVenusprobelaunchedthepreviousmonth.TheSovietAcademyofSciences
approachedLovelltousetheJodrellBanktelescopetosearchforsignals.Asthemonths
passed,andJodre[lBankattemptedtomakecontactwiththeprobe,communicationsbetweentheBritishandSovietsincreased.Thecollaborationledtotheestablishmentof
atelexlinkbetweenJodrellBankandtheYevpatoriyaradarstation,aswellasaninvitation
forLovelltovisittheSovietUniontwoyearslater.
Theideaof doingthebistaticexperimentcameto Lovellduringhisvisit to
Yevpatoriya,whenhediscoveredtheextremelypowerfulSovietransmitter.Vladimir
Kotelnikov,whoheadedtheSovietplanetaryradareffort,joinedLovellastheothermov-
ingspiritbehindthebistaticproject.AnIronCurtainofsecrecyhinderedtheproject,
however.Inordertosetupthebistaticradar,JodrellBankhadtoknowthefrequencyand
precisecoordinatesoftheYevpatoriyaradar.TheSovietswereloathetodisclosetheirfre-
quency,transmittersize,location,orevenantennadimensions,buttheBritishestablished
thoseparametersstepbystep.Nonetheless,theexperimentdidnotworkinitially,because
JodrellBanklackedthecorrectDopplershift.Aftertestingthebistaticarrangementon
theMoon,theYevpatoriyafacilitybeganto transmitradarsignalstoVenus,andJodrell
BankreceivedthemfromJanuarythroughMarch1966.Datatapesweredeliveredto
KotelnikovbywayoftheBritishEmbassy.ASalong-distancebistaticradarexperiment,the
effortwasafirst.However,it wasanopportunitylost.04
Ponsonbysetfi_rthacogentanalysisofthebistaticVehusexperimentinhisdisserta-
tion:"Planetaryadarhasprovedtobeafieldinwhichnewresultsareonlyobtainedby
thegroupswhichhavethemostsensitivesystemsandthedataprocessingcapacityomake
thebestuseof thedataacquired.In bothrespectshegroupatJodrellBankhasnever
beenina leadingposition.''_
Lovelldisagreed;thebistaticexperimentwas'_justtoo late."JPLandLincoln
Laboratoryalreadyhaddeterminedtherateanddirectionof rotationofVenus."Butif
92. Ponsonby11January1994;summariesoftelescopeusin1/2,CorrespondenceSeries.JBA.93. Ponsonby11January1994;2/51,Accounts,JBA;Ponsonby.Thomson,andImrie,"RadarObservationsof Venus," pp. 1-17; Ponsonby, Thomson, and Imrie, "Rotation Rate of Venus Measttred by Radar
Observations, 1964," Nature 204 (196,1): 63-64.
94. Lovell, 11 January 1994; Ponsonby 11 January 1994; Lovell, "Astronomer by Chance," pp. 370-372;
Lovell, (_t o] the Zenith, pp. 186-188 and 201-204; Ponsonby and Thomson, "U.S.S.R.-U.K. Planetary Radar
Experiment," pp. 661-671 in R. W. Beatty, J. 1lerbstreit, G. M. Brown, and F. llorner, eds., t'7o_,,e._sin Rtulzo Scienr_',
1963-19,56 (Berkeley: URSI, 1967) ; Ponsonby, "Planetary Radar," pp. 6.11-6.22.
95. Ponsonby, "Planetary Radar," p. 6.21.
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onlymy1963conversationsandagreementwiththeSovietUnioncouldhavebeenfacili-
tatedwithoutroubleatthisendandwithoutroubleatthetransmitter,"Lovellargued,
'Mewouldhavebeenfirstonthat."_6
Loveil'sanalysis,aswellasthatofPonsonby,raisesthevitalquestionoftheabilityof
theJodrellBankradargrouptoeffectivelycompeteagainstAmericanradarastronomers.
TheSTLtransmitteroperatedin theUHFband(410.25MHz;73cm).Althoughthe
AreciboObservatoryoperatedin thesameband,thetrendinplanetaryradarastronomy
wastowardhigherfrequencyranges,theS-bandatJPL(andlateratArecibo)andtheX-
bandat Haystack.Thehigherfrequenciesallowedtheradartodomuchmoreradar
astronomysciencethanwaspossibleatUHE
Ponsonbyraisedanotherpointinhisdissertation:"Ifatruestate-of-the-arttransmit-
terwereacquiredit wouldcostanappreciablefractionofthecostofthetelescope,and
clearlytojustifyinvestmentonthatscaleitwouldhavetobeusedmuchmoreextensively
thanwouldbecompatiblewiththepredominantlypassiveradioastronomicalprogramsat
JodrellBank.Passiveradio-astronomyayappropriatelybedoneasasecondarylineof
researchataprimarilyradarinstallation,butexperiencehasshownthatthetwoactivities
donotcombinewelltheotherway.Appreciatingthis,theresearchreportedin thisthesis
isnot,atleastforthepresent,beingpursuedfurther."Indeed,Ponsonbycontinued,'q'he
limited computing facilities available in the University and the lack at the time of on-line
computers at Jodrell Bank in effect prevented a thorough analysis of the data that was
acquired, and this took away much of the value of the observations.'_7
The acquisition of new radar and computer equipment certainly would have consti-
tuted a significant expenditure, but Lovell probably could have raised the necessary
money. Could Jodrell Bank have kept up with the development of planetary range-
Doppler mapping in the United States? Thomson was working on an aperture synthesis
technique for making lunar radar maps. The mathematical process for constructing the
image was analogous to that now used for tomographic brain scanners and differed entire-
ly from that used in the United States to construct range-Doppler maps. The technique
was not very practical, however; it required computer capacity not then available atJodrell
Bank and ultimately could not be generalized to the planets. 9_
In the end, the small scale of planetary radar astronomy at Jodrell Bank did it in.
Thomson and Ponsonby grew tired of the Soviet bistatic Venus experiment. They carried
the main load of the work at irregular hours of the day and night. Finally, on 18 March
1966, Thomson and Ponsonby could take no more. They handed Lovell a list of ten good
reasons for ending the experiment. Kotelnikov agreed to "an interval" in the observations,
which never resumed. 99 Ponsonby remained rather cynical about the venture, which he
has characterized as a political exercise. "I'he signals were recorded on magnetic tape and
sent off to Russia, and I never heard from them again! ''l_J
Ponsonby already was tired of the bistatic experiments, when the death of John
Thomson from an inoperable brain tumor in August 1969 devastated the Jodrell Bank
planetary radar program. Without Thomson, and certainly without Ponsonby's interest,
Jodrell Bank had no radar group. Through sheer stubbornness, however, Lovell tried to
keep the radar program going. In October 1969, he and hisJodrell Bank colleagues drew
up a scientific program for a proposed 122-meter (400-ft) telescope, the Mark V. The pro-
gram included a series of planetary radar experiments outlined by Ponsonby. Was this the
96. Lovell 11 January 1994.
97. Ponsonby, "Planetary Radar," pp. 6.21-6.22.
98. Ponsonby 11 .January 1994; Lovell, "Aslronomer by Chance," pp. 373-375; various documents in
2/51, Accounts, JBA.
99. Lovell, Out of the Zenith, pp. 207-208.
100. Ponsonby 11 january 1994.
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telescope that could have revived Jodrell Bank radar research? Like its American cousin
the NEROC telescope, the Mark V was never built. In retrospect, Lovell realized that "It
was now out of the question for us to continue....I saw the passing of radar as inevitable,
but with regret. 'q°l
The sixties was the era of the Big Dish; large antenna projects came and went, and
so did planetary radars. In 1965, four antennas supported planetary radar experiments:
Arecibo, Haystack,Jodrell Bank, and the Goldstone Mars Station. A fifth dish, the NEROC
telescope, was on the drawing board. But ten years later, the NEROC telescope had not
been built; Haystack and Jodrell Bank no longer performed planetary radar experiments.
By 1980, Goldstone had joined their number. Only Arecibo remained. Planetary radar
astronomy appeared to be a collapsing field.
At Arecibo, nonetheless, radar astronomy had found a patron in NASA. Planetary
radar there also had a recognized and guaranteed budget, as well as a world-class research
instrument, and both Cornell and MIT fed graduate students to the Arecibo facility. Given
the financial, institutional, technological, and other resources available at Arecibo for
planetary radar astronomy, one would have expected the field to have occupied an
increasing amount of antenna time from 1974, when Haystack ceased radar astronomy, to
1980, when JPL activity virtually ended. Instead, antenna use remained relatively stable,
averaging about six percent between 1971 and 1980 and passing seven percent concur-
rently with the inferior conjunctions of Venus. 102
In terms of personnel, one could count the field of planetary radar astronomy as
consisting of nine individuals. At MIT was Gordon Pettengill; atJPL, Dick Goldstein, Ray
Jurgens, and George Downs. The Arecibo Observatory supported four radar practition-
ers: Don Campbell, associate director at the Arecibo Observatory since 1979; John
Harmon, AO research associate since 1978; Steven J. Ostro, Cornell assistant professor of
astronomy since 1979; and Barbara Ann Burns, a graduate student of Don Campbell.
In 1980, planetary radar astronomy was indeed a small field in terms of available
instrnmentation and active practitioners. It was an example of Little Science, but one
which depended on Big Science for its very existence. Moreover, although that Big
Science had been as diverse as military, space, ionospheric, and radio astronomy research
at the emergence of radar astronomy, by 1980 Big Science had come to mean one thing:
NASA. The financial and institutional arrangements with NASA influenced the kind of sci-
ence done. In order to tmderstand how that science was influenced, we must first look at
the evolution of planetary radar astronomy as a science.
101. Loven 11 January 1994; Ponsonby 11 January 1994; Lovell, Out of the Zenith, p. 203; Lovell, TheJodreU
Bank 7klesctqJe, Chapters 5_5 and 9-10, especially pp. 55-56 and 257. In analyzing the demise of radar astronomy
at Jodrel| Bank, though the smallness of the active radar astronomy staff, technical and technological factors,
and the American lead had a more determinant role, to be sure, one must not overlook the lure of radio astron-
omy.
102. These figures are based on the NAIC quarterly reports for the years 1971-1980. The percentage of
radar use annually was 2.9 percent in 1971; 9.5 percent in 1972; 6.9 percent in 1973; 1.9 percent in 1974; 7.2 per-
cent in 1975; 5.8 percent in 1976; 7.3 percent in 1977; 4.7 percent in 1978; 5.0 percent in 1979; and 7.8 percent
in 1980. The average percentage for the period 1971-1980 was 5.9, while the average for 1971-1975 was 5.68 per-
cent and for 1976-1980 6.12 percent.

Chapter Five
Normal Science
Starting with the initial detections of Venus in 1961, planetary radar astronomy grew
rapidly by discovering the rate and direction of Venus's rotation, by refining the value of
the astronomical unit, and by rectifying the rotational period of Mercury. Data gathered
from radar observations made at Haystack, Arecibo, and Goldstone formed the basis for
precise planetary ephemerides atJPL and Lincoln Laboratory. In sum, the results of plan-
etary radar astronomers served the needs of the planetary astronomy community. In addi-
tion, radar also served to test Mbert Einstein's General Theory of Relativity.
Planetary radar astronomy concerned itself with two different but related sets of
problems. One set of problems related to planetary dynamics and ephemerides, for
instance, orbits, rotational and spin rates, and the astronomical unit. A second set related
to the radar characteristics, or what is called the radar signature, of the planets, such as
surface scattering mechanisms, dielectric constants, and radar albedos. The latter prob-
lems are epistemological; that is, they deal with how radar astronomers know what they
know.
What defines this second set of epistemological problems is the fact that planetary
radar astronomy is based on the use of techniques particular to radar. These problems
have remained unchanged over time. In contrast, the first set of problems, those dealing
with planetary and dynamics ephemerides, have changed over time. The nature of that
change has been additive; at each stage of change, new problems are added to the old
problems, which remain part of the set of problems radar astronomers seek to solve.
Both the epistemological and scientific sets of problems are interrelated. For exam-
ple, planetary radar astronomers derive the ability to solve astronomical problems out of
the resolution of epistemological questions. The development of range-Doppler mapping,
for example, led to the solution of a set of problems entirely different from ephemerides
problems, yet the solution of ephemerides problems was sine qua non to the creation of
range-Doppler maps. Conversely, the attempts to solve certain scientific questions
required reconsideration of the radar techniques themselves.
The philosopher of science Thomas S. Kuhn has attempted to explain the conduct
of scientific activity, j Although Kuhn has used the term "paradigm" differently over time,
initially it had a limited meaning. Stated simply, a paradigm, as used by Kuhn, is a core of
consensus within a group of practitioners. The essence of the paradigm consensus is a set
of problems and their solutions. Planetary radar astronomy quickly achieved and main-
tained a paradigmatic consensus on which problems to solve.
Moreover, the field often achieved scientific success by solving problems left
unsolved or unsatisfactorily solved by optical means. Just as radar astronomy had resolved
earlier that meteors were part of the solar system, so the determination of the rotational
rates of Venus and Mercury and the refinement of the astronomical unit were astronomi-
cal problems inadequately solved by optical methods, but resolved through the analysis of
radar data.
1. The works of Kuhn, which span over thirty years, have been summarized, explained, and analyzed
in Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Recon._tructing Scientific Revolution._: Thonut._ S. Kuhn _ l)hib_eq_hy of Scienc_e, trans.
Alexander T. Levine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). Especially relevant to the discussion here are
pp. 134-135, 143-154, 169, 188-190 and 193-194.
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For Kuhn, "normal science" was a specific phase of scientific development distin-
guished by universal consensus within a given scientific community over the problems to
be solved and the ways of solving those problems. In other words, normal science was
paradigm science. Preceding its evolution into normal science, according to Kuhn, a
scientific activity passes through a developmental phase in which the problem-solving
consensus that characterizes normal science does not yet exist. In this "preconsensus" or
"pre-paradigm" phase, and immediately before a phase of normal science, groups of inves-
tigators addressing roughly the same problems but from different, mutually incompatible
standpoints compete with each other. As a consensus emerges, members of the compet-
ing schools join the group whose achievements are better, as measured by scientific values.
Planetary radar astronomy did not pass through Kuhn's "preconsensus" phase, how-
ever. Complementary, not competing, groups marked the emergence of the field. The
"bistatic radar" approach of Von Eshleman at Stanford University complemented the
efforts of ground-based planetary radar astronomers, and that complementarity had been
Eshleman's intention. '_ Ground-based planetary radar astronomers distinguished them-
selves from the Stanford approach. In a review article on planetary radar astronomy
published in 1973, Tor Hagfors and Donald B. Campbell, both at the Arecibo
Observatory, explained, "We have, however, chosen to omit this work [space-based radar]
here since it is our opinion that it properly belongs to the realm of space exploration
rather than to astronomy. "3 Space exploration versus astronomy, then, was how planetary
radar astronomers established turf lines.
Planetary radar astronomy was, above all else, a set of techniques used with large-
scale ground-based radar systems. As a result, planetary radar was an algorithm in search
of a problem, a data set in search of a question. Hence, the success of planetary radar inex-
orably depended on its ability to link its techniques and results to the problem-solving of
a scientific discipline. Initially, those problems came from planetary astronomy, but as the
types of techniques accumulated, radar came to solve new problems posed by planetary
geology. Furthermore, the solving of those problems tied planetary radar astronomy to
NASA's space missions.
Despite its mercurial nature, planetary radar astronomy did exhibit an essential char-
acteristic of Kuhn's normal science, a paradigm. The paradigm consisted of a consensus on
a particular set of problems (e.g., orbital parameters) and agreement on a particular way
of solving those problems (the analysis of range, Doppler, and other radar data obtained
with ground-based radars from solar system objects). The detections of Venus, Mercury,
and Mars between 1961 and 1963 opened the field, but rotational rates, as well as the
refinement of the astronomical unit, established the field. With the successful application
of range-Doppler mapping to Venus, the paradigm began to shift in a new direction.
Around the Sun in 88 Days
The first radar detection of Mercury was announced by the Soviet scientists working
under Vladimir A. Kotelnikov and associated with the Institute of Radio Engineering and
Electronics (IREE) of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Long-Distance Space
Communication Center near Yevpatoriya, in the Crimea. Kotelnikov's group made 53
radar observations of Mercury during the inferior conjunction with that planet in June
1962. At that time, the distance from Earth to Mercury was between 83 and 88 million
2. Eshieman 9 May 1994.
3. Hagfors and Campbell, "Mapping of Planetary Surfaces by Radar," Proceedings o[ the II'2PJ"61
(September 1973): 1219-1225, esp. 1224.
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kilometers,twicethedistancetoVenusduringinferiorconjunction.Althoughtheweak-
nessof thereturnechoespreventedtheiruseasareliableindicatoroftheastronomical
unit,Kotelnikovandhiscolleaguesclaimedatechnicaltourdeforceandafirstinplane-
taryradarastronomy.4
RichardGoldsteinandRolandCarpenteratJPLtookuptheSovietchallengeand
bouncedradarwavesoffMercurythefollowingyearinMay1963usingtheGoldstone
experimentalr dar.Theexperimentestablisheda istancer cordthatovershadowedthe
Sovietclaim.MercurywasthenfartherfromEarth,over97millionkilometersaway.In
addition,theJPLexperimentconfirmedwhatastronomersalreadyknewaboutMercury,
thatitsperiodof rotationwas88days.Goldsteinhadnoreasonto believeit wasother-
wise.5
However,whenGordonPettengillandRolfDyceobservedMercuryinApril 1965
withthenewArecibotelescope,theyreportedarotationalrateof59+ 5 days. This dis-
covery, one of the earliest major achievements of planetary radar astronomy, astounded
astronomers, who sought to explain the new, correct rotational rate. As Pettengill and
Dyce concluded, 'q'he finding of a value for the rotational period of Mercury which dif-
fers from the orbital period is unexpected and has interesting theoretical implications. It
indicates either that the planet has not been in its present orbit for the full period of geo-
logical time or that the tidal forces acting to slow the initial rotation have not been cor-
rectly treated previously. ''6
Pettengill, Dyce, and Irwin Shapiro next published a lengthier discussion of their
radar determination of Mercury's 59-day rotational period based on additional observa-
tions made in August 1965. 7 Working with Giuseppe "Bepi" Colombo, an astronomer
from the University of Padova visiting the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory, Shapiro
began to develop an explanation for the new rotational period. Colombo, Shapiro
recalled, "realized almost immediately that 58.65 days was exactly two-thirds of 88 days.
Mercury probably was locked into a spin such that it went around on its axis one-and-a-
half dines for every once around the planet. The same face did not always face the Sun.
That meant that near Mercury's perihelion, that is, when its orbit is closest to the Sun,
Mercury tends to follow the Sun around in its orbit. Near perihelion, then, the orbital
motion and spin rotation of Mercury were very closely balanced, so that Mercury almost
presented the same face to the Sun during this period. "8
In a joint paper, Colombo and Shapiro analyzed Mercury radar data, as well as opti-
cal observations from the past, and presented a preliminary model. 9 In a seminal paper,
Peter Goldreich and Stanton J. Peale pointed out the need to consider the capture of
Mercury into the resonant rotation as a probabilistic event. If initial conditions during the
4. Kotelnikov, G. Ya. Guskov, Dubrovin, Dubinskii, Kislik, Korenberg, Minashin, Morozov, Nikitskiy,
Petrov. G. A. Podoprigora, Rzhiga, A. V. Frantsesson, and Shakhovskoy, "Radar Observations of the Planet
Mercury," S*rv/etPhysics--Doklady 7 (1963): 1076-1072. Given the stated weakness of the Mercury echoes, as well
as their difficulty in obtaining accurate and verifiable Venus results, the Soviet announcement of a detection of
Mercury, a much farther radar target than Venus, raised doubts in the United States about the validity of the
Soviet claims.
5. Carpenter and Goldstein, "Radar Observations of Mercury," Science 142 (1963): 381.
6. PettengDI and Dyce, "A Radar Determination of the Rotation of the Planet Mercury," Nature 206
(19June 1965): 1240.
7. Dyce, Pettengill, and Shapiro, "Radar Determination of the Rotations of Venus and Mercury," The
Astronomical Journal 72 (1967) : 351-359.
8. Shapiro 30 September 1993; Giuseppe Colombo, "Rotational Period of the Planet Mercury," Nature
208 (1965): 575.
9. Colombo and Shapiro, "The Rotation of the Planet Mercury," The Astr_rphysicalJ_mrna1145 (1966):
296-307. Earlier, it had appeared as an internal SAt publication: Colombo and Shapiro, The l:tot_tion of the Planet
Mertatry, SAt special report no. 188 (Cambridge: SAt, 13 October 1965).
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formationofthesolarsystemhadbeenslightlydifferent,hecapturemaynothavetaken
place.10
IrwinShapiro'sgraduatestudent,CharlesC.CounselmanIII, thendidhisdoctoral
thesison therotationofMercury.Counselmandevelopeda theoryofcapture,escape,
recapture,andescape,astheeccentricityof Mercury'sorbitchanged,in atwo-dimen-
sionalstatisticalmodelof thecaptureproblem.Later,NormanBrenner,agraduatestu-
dentworkingwithbothShapiroandCounselman,expandedtheanalysisntoa three-
dimensionalmodelinhis1975doctoraldissertation.Meanwhile,StantonPealepublished
hisownthree-dimensionalanalysis.ll
The Outer Limits
Although Venus became the prime target of planetary radar astronomers, other
planets drew their attention from the earliest opportunity to detect echoes from that plan-
et. Richard Goldstein made the first radar detection of Mars during the opposition of
February 1963, when the distance to Mars from Earth was over 100 million kilometers.
Goldstein found Mars "a very difficult radar target because of its great distance from Earth
and rapid rate of rotation. 'qz
Mars defined the farthest limits of planetary radar detections until after the addition
of the _band radar to the Arecibo telescope and the X-band upgrade of the Goldstone
Mars Station. Farther out, neither American nor Soviet efforts ever resulted in an unam-
biguous radar detection of Jupiter. Certainly no echoes returned from any solid surface
features. Nonetheless, US and Soviet investigators claimed detections. The case of Jupiter
demonstrates the difficulty of obtaining radar echoes from a "soft" target, that is, one that
is not a solid body, especially at such an extreme distance.
Soviet investigators working with Vladimir Kotelnikov at the Yevpatoriya radar center
claimed to have detected radar echoes from Jupiter as early as September 1963 in the 29
December 1963 issue of Pravda. The planet was in opposition at a distance of about 600
million kilometers, six times farther than Mars at opposition in 1963. Not surprisingly,
Kotelnikov and his colleagues reported that the echoes were weak.13
Between 17 October and 23 November 1963, during the same opposition of Jupiter,
Dick Goidstein attempted observations of the planet with the Goldstone experimental
radar. He found few if any echoes. Occasionally, though, a single run did indicate a "sta-
tistically significant" return. Goldstein noticed that the time interval between these "sig-
nificant" returns were most often a multiple of the rotation period of Jupiter, about 10
hours. It seemed that a single localized area on Jupiter, which did not coincide with the
celebrated red spot, was both a good and a smooth reflector of radar waves.
10. Shapiro 30 September 1993; Peter Goldreich, "Tidal De-spin of Planets and Satellites," Nature 208
(1965): 375-376; Goldreich and Stanton Peale, "Resonant Spin States in the Solar System," Nature 209 (1966):
1078-1079; Goldreich, "Final Spin States of Planets and Satellites," The A.*tr_momiralJournal 71 (1966): 1-7;
Goldreich and Peale, "Spin-Orbi! Coupling in the Solar System," The Astr_momicalJournal 71 (1966): 425-438.
Also, in a joint paper, Peale and Gold attempted to explain the rotational period of Mercury in terms of a solar
tidal torque effect. Peale and Gold, "Rotation of the Planet Mercury," Nature 206 (1965): 1241-1242.
11. Shapiro 30 September 1993; Counselman, "Spin-Orbit Resonance of Mercury," Ph.D. diss., MIT,
February 1969. See also Counsehnan, "The Rotation of the Planet Mercury," Chapter 14, pp. 89-93 in R. G.
Stern, ed., Ira,view of NAS, A 5;']xms_rred Re.warch at the Experimental Astronomy Laboratory (Cambridge: MIT, 1967).
12. Goldstein and Willard E Gillmore, "Radar Observations of Mars," Sctenr.e 141 ( 1963): 1171-1172.
13. Memorandum, O. Koksharova to I. Newlan, 9January 1964, translation of Pravda article, microfilm
22-314,JPL Cx_ntral Files. The article later appeared as Kotelnikov, Apraksin, Dubrovin, Kislik, Kuznetsov, Petrov,
Rzhiga, Frantsesson, and Shakhovskoi, "Radar Observations of the Planet Jupiter," Soviet Physica-Doklady 9 ( 1964):
250-251.
NORMAL SCIENCE 121
To investigate further, Goldstein divided Jupiter into eight "time zones" and aver-
aged all the runs which illuminated a single "time zone." The zone centered about the
Jovian longitude 32 ° gave a response that Goldstein characterized as "statistically signifi-
cant," although, he admitted, "this detection cannot be considered absolutely conclusive."
The amount of return was simply too high to be believable. Goldstein later attempted to
obtain echoes from Jupiter, using a Goldstone radar that was "a hundred times better," but
he did not find any echoes. "We never were able to repeat it," he confessed) 4
During the next oppositions of Jupiter, in November 1964, December 1965, and
February 1966, Gordon Pettengill, Rolf Dyce, and Andy Sfmchez, from the University of
Puerto Rico at Rio Piedras, bounced radar waves off Jupiter using the 430-MHz Arecibo
telescope. They designed their experiments to duplicate both the Soviet and JPL
approaches; however, they failed to validate either the Soviet orJPL claims.
The Arecibo investigators obtained results that were many times smaller than those
reported by Goldstein. As for the Soviet results, which were close to the noise level, the
Arecibo investigators concluded: "The results reported in the U.S.S.R., which exceed the
associated system noise by only 1.3 standard deviations of the fluctuations in that noise,
should probably not be taken seriously." The Arecibo investigators suggested that the
echoing mechanism was located in the upper levels of Jupiter's atmosphere "and that
echoes might be returned only in exceptional circumstances." They concluded: "Many
more observations of Jupiter spanning a long period of time and carried out at many wide-
ly separated frequencies must be made before the behavior of Jupiter as a radar target can
begin to be understood. 'q5
Those observations never took place. Jupiter remained a misunderstood and disre-
garded radar target. The outer reaches of planetary radar astronomy remained confined
to the terrestrial planets. Jupiter and Saturn had to await the Arecibo S-band and the
Goldstone X-band upgrades. Even then, however, planetary radar astronomers focused on
solid targets,Jupiter's Galilean moons and Saturn's rings.
Icarus Dicarus Dock
In contrast to the attempts on Jupiter, the radar detection of Icarus was unambigu-
ous. Icarus is an Earth-crossing asteroid, meaning its orbit around the Sun crosses that of
Earth. On occasion, Icarus comes within 6.4 million kilometers of Earth, as it did in June
1968. Nonetheless, Icarus was a difficult radar target, because of its small size. Its radar
detectability was extremely small, one thousandth that of Mercury at its closest approach
and only 10 -v_ (one trillionth) that of the Moon. u_
Only Haystack and the Goldstone Mars Station succeeded in detecting the asteroid.
Although Icarus was within the declination coverage of Arecibo, attempts on 15 and 16
June 1968 yielded ambiguous results. "A successful search would have been more likely,"
Rolf Dyce reported, "if the full performance of the line feed had been available. ''17
Investigators at Haystack Observatory leaped over imposing hurdles to make the first
radar detection of Icarus. Irwin Shapiro and his Lincoln Laboratory colleagues prepared
an ephemeris based on 71 optical observations of Icarus between 1949 and 1967. Radar
observation began in earnest at Haystack on the morning of 12 June 1968. Late that
14. Goldstein 14 September 1993; Goldstein, "Radar Observations of Jupiter," Science 144 (1964):
842-843.
15. Dyce, Pettengill, and S_mchez, "Radar Observations of Mars and Jupiter at 70 cm," The A._tronomical
.prurna172 (1967) : 771-777.
16. Goldstein, "Radar Observations of Icarus," Science 162 ( 1968): 903.
17. Dyce, "Attempted Detection of the Asteroid Icarus," in AdO, Re.warch in lono.q_hericl'hy_ic:_,Rcsearch
Reporl RS 74 (Ithaca: CRSR, 31 July 1968), pp. 90-91.
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evening, the Haystack observers received a new set of optical positions from astronomer
Elizabeth Roemer at the University of Arizona. Michael Ash, of Lincoln Laboratory Group
63, immediately integrated the optical data into the radar ephemeris, and by midnight
Haystack was observing with the new ephemeris.
Despite these heroic efforts to organize an improved ephemeris, rain, which severe-
ly attenuates X-band radar signals, bedeviled the observations. As a result, Haystack did
not obtain a reasonably firm indication of an echo from Icarus until the afternoon of 13
June. Another particularly successful run that evening confirmed the presence of an echo,
and by the morning of 14June success was certain. Haystack terminated observations the
morning of 15June. To achieve its results, the Haystack radar had operated non-stop for
20 hours. Analysis of the data suggested that the radius of Icarus was between 0.8 and 1.6
km.
The effort to detect Icarus in spite of the rain and the difficult nature of the aster-
oid as a radar target inspired Louis P. Rainville, a Lincoln Laboratory technician who par-
ticipated in the observations, to compose the following poem: Is
Anode to Icarus
Icarus Dicarus Dock
We worked around the clock
For three straight days
We aimed our rays
And an echo showed on the plot.
But as always, there's a woe
The rain made a better show
As bleary our eyes
Stared at the skies
We hoped that the clouds would go.
Oh for the roar and yell
And the glory for old double "L "
If on that crucial day
When it came and went away
We'd had one more decibel/
Now as Icarus speeds from our sphere
These words are for all men to hear
T'was a good show men!
Let's try again --
In another nineteen years!
And so this was to be our lot
We hoped for more than we got
But we beat the worst;
We did it first!
Icarus Dicarus Dock
EURICARUS!
18. "Weekly Reports, 5/13/68-8/11/69," 36/2/AC 135, MITA. The results appeared as Pettengill,
Shapiro, Michael E. Ash, Ingalls, Louis E Rainville, Smith, and Melvin L. Stone, "Radar Observations of Icarus,"
Icarus 10 (1969): 432-435.
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AlthoughRainville'sverseimpliedacontestto detectIcarus,nosuchcompetition
existed;notwithstandingtherain,thespindirectionoftheEarthwouldassureHaystack
thefirstlookattheasteroid.AtJPL,DickGoldsteinalsosuccessfullydetectedIcaruson
14-16June1968.Goldsteinusedabistaticradar;theMarsStationreceivedsignalsfroma
newly-developed450-kilowatttransmitterinstalledona nearby26-meter(85-ft)dish.
AlthoughtheGoldstonetransmitterhadnearlytwicethepowerofHaystackObservatory,
it stillreceivedonlyweakechoes,l_
Usingopticalmethods,asteroidastronomersTomGehrels,ElizabethRoemer,and
otherscalculatedvaluesfor theperiodandthedirectionof thespinaxisof Icarusand
foundthatit appearedtobearoughstony-ironbody,nearlyspherical,withnonuniform
reflectivityoverthesurfaceandwithaspinperiodof 2hoursand16minutes.Itsradius,
theycalculated,wasatleast750meters,whichwasclosetothelowendof tileHaystack
estimate.Armedwiththeseresults,Goldsteinthenreinterpretedhisradardataandcon-
cludedthatthesurfaceoftheasteroidwasrockyandvariedinroughness.2°
Thedetectionof Icaruswasanimportantachievementof planetaryradar,thefirst
detectionofanasteroid.Icarusalsoservedtobringtogetherradarandopticalplanetary
astronomersin a specialsymposiumon IcarusorganizedbyGordonPettengilland
chairedbyArwdasKliore.HeldinAustin,Texas,on10December1968,thesymposium
waspartof thepre-inauguralmeetingoftheDivisionforPlanetaryScience(DPS)ofthe
AmericanAstronomicalSociety(AAS).Appropriately,thesymposiumpapersappearedin
thejournalofplanetaryscienceIcarus. '21
The Icarus symposium was a pivotal moment for both planetary radar astronomy
specifically and planetary astronomy in general. Previously, no organization dedicated
exclusively to planetary astronomy existed. The AAS had approved the formation of the
DPS only a few months earlier in August 1968. In 1973, the DPS opened its ranks to plan-
etary scientists other than AAS members, such as chemists, geologists, and geophysicists,
and the DPS endorsed Icarus as the primary publication for planetary research. Under the
editorial direction of Carl Sagan, a champion of radar astronomy, Icarus began to solicit
more articles in planetary astrophysics, as opposed to the earlier focus on celestial
mechanics. 27
The Icarus symposium typified the normal science paradigm of planetary radar
astronomy in the 1960s. Activity centered on detecting a solar system object with a ground-
based radar instrument and analyzing range and Doppler data to obtain information on
orbital parameters and radii and related questions. Radar astronomers then presented
these results to asteroid astronomers, echoing the fruitful joining of radar observers and
astronomers that led to the discovery of the origin of meteors.
The Planetary Ephemeris Program
Starting in the 1960s, the raw data for the improvement of planetary ephemerides
was provided by the accumulation of radar range and other data. Traditional observations
of planetary positions involved only angular determinations, which provide a position in
a two-dimensional plane (the sky). Radar added new dimensions with range and Doppler
shift data and included the astronomical unit and the radii and masses of Mercury, Mars,
19. Goldstein, "Icarus," pp. 903-904.
20. T. C,ebrels, E. Roemer, R. C. Taylor, and B. H. Zellner, "Minor Planets and Related Objects: 4.
Asteroid (1566) Icarus," The Astronomical]¢mrna175 (1970): 186-195; J. Veverka and W. Liller, "Observations of
Icarus: 1968," Icaru._ 10 (1969): 441-444; Goldstein, "Radar Observations of Icarus," Icarus l0 (1969): 430-431.
21. "Editor's Introduction to: A Symposium on Icarus," Icarus 10 (1969): 429.
22. Tatarewicz, pp. 122-123.
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and Venus. JPL and Lincoln Laboratory undertook separate radar ephemerides pro-
grams.
The Lincoln Laboratory radar ephemerides program, known as the Planetary
Ephemeris Program or PEP, had its roots in the anti-ICBM early warning systems. As a
member of a Lincoln Laboratory task force charged with the early detection of incoming
enemy ICBMs with radar, Irwin Shapiro became expert in the mathematics of deducing
ballistic missile trajectories from radar observations. He wrote up his results in a Lincoln
Laboratory report in early 1957. After the launch of Sputnik, the New York publishing
house McGraw-Hill released Shapiro's report as a book in April 1958, because his ballistic
missile techniques were applicable (with some modification) to satellite tracking. That
book then became the basis for the JPL ephemeris program._3
Shapiro and the radar group at Arecibo worked very closely on gathering data for
the Lincoln Laboratory planetary radar ephemerides. As Don Campbell explained, "He
has always been our ephemerides person, and we provide him with input. ''24 The close
connection between the Arecibo and MIT Lincoln Laboratory groups resulted from the
appointment of Gordon Pettengill of Lincoln Laboratory as the first associate director of
the Arecibo Ionospheric Observatory. Pettengill set up the program so that the Arecibo
radar ephemerides would always come from the PEP group.
Acquiring input for the PEP required extensive data taking that involved long hours
of observations, often late at night. Don Campbell and Ray Jurgens, both graduate
students at the time, did a lot of the work on Venus, Mars, and Mercury, under the super-
vision of Rolf Dyce and Gordon Pettengill. Campbell remembered the Mars observations
in particular:_5
This involved a lot of late nights, unfortunately, because the Mars opposition was
around midnight. Every time the radar system was used, you had to go up to the sus-
pended platform and actually change the receiver ov_ Then you had to go up after you
finished to change them over again. Since I was very much at the lowest end of the totem
pole at the time, it was my job to get on the cable car, go up to the str_cture, dabble with
the thing late at night, change the receivers, come back, then when we finished, go back
up and change them again. I suppose in retrospect you think of it as painful, although
at the time I don't remember being particularly worried about it. I probably thought it was
fun initially, although there were a lot fewer fences and safety devices on the platform then
than there are now. It was quite possible to fall right through the thing.
The initial PEP calculations performed with the planetary radar data served to refine
the astronomical unit. Shapiro, however, also saw the need to refine the planetary
ephemerides and the planetary masses. "It was also clear to me," he explained, "that we
should not do it the way astronomers did, that is, with analytical series expanded out to
huge numbers of terms. It seemed to me that with computers, even with those available at
that time, we should be able to do this numerically, integrating the equations of the
motions of the planets, integrating the partial derivatives, and doing everything digital-
ly. "2_
The PEP required a large computer as well as an immense computer program.
Today, the program has well over 100,000 Fortran statements. Computer programming,
23, Shapiro, Prediction o/Balli._tic Mis,_le Trajectories fi'orn Rtular Oh_ervati_m,_ (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1958); Shapiro 4 May 1994.
24. Campbell 9 September 1993.
25. Campbell 7 December 1993.
26. Shapiro 30 September 1993,
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however, was not Shapiro's forte. "I am pretty much a computer ignoramus," he confessed.
So he hired a summer student, Michael E. Ash, who was a Princeton graduate student in
mathematics. After graduating from Princeton, Ash worked at Lincoln Laboratory for
about twelve years before taking a position at MIT's Draper Laboratory. Ash was the chief
architect of the PEP computer program.John E Chandler, a graduate student of Shapiro,
took over the PEP from ASh and worked on it for over twenty years. Chandler expanded
its applications so that now, in the words of Shapiro, "it does everything but slice bread."
Originally, PEP also analyzed optical observations of the Sun, Moon, and planets,
including optical data from the U.S. Naval Observatory back to 1850. "I spent more time
than I care to admit," Shapiro confessed, "transferring to machine-readable form all the
optical observations recorded in history since 1750 of the Sun, Moon, and planets. In the
end, I didn't think it was worth it. I never published our results, to Michael Ash's chagrin.
We had this manuscript about so high [nearly seven and a half centimeters or three inch-
es], but I could never find enough time to polish it to my satisfaction. History passed us
by. That was the biggest unfinished task of my life. Michael ASh put in a lot of work on
that, though not as much as I did. But the ball was in my court to finish it off, and I did
not do it. So this is a guilt session. ''27
Today the PEP is a very complicated program that analyzes a variety of observations,
including lunar laser ranging data. When he moved to Draper Laboratory, Michael Ash
modified it for satellite and lunar work. It is still used in planetary radar and by
astronomers at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. It can process pulsar as
well as Very Long Baseline Interferometry (VLBI) observations. For a while, most of the
pulsar observers in the world used the PEP; however, they shifted to the JPL ephemeris
program in recent years. A lack of funding has left the PEP just able to keep up with the
Arecibo ephemeris work.
In contrast, JPL has had the manpower and funding to support it. JPL developed its
radar planetary ephemerides to support NASA spacecraft missions. Today, the JPL plane-
tary ephemeris program, under the direction of E. Myles Standish, Jr., employs about a
half dozen people who work on planetary, lunar, cometary, asteroidal, and satellite
ephemerides. JPL initially called their ephemeris programs DE followed by the version
number, with DE standing for "Development Ephemeris." In the late seventies, JPL sent
over fifty copies of its ephemeris DE-96 to observatories, space agencies, and astronomical
research groups around the world.
Next came the DE-200 series, which used a new equator and equinox. All major
national almanac offices, including the U.S. Naval Observatory, and the French, British,
German, Japanese, and Russian almanac offices, now use the JPL DE-200 ephemeris pro-
gram, as do many universities, the European Space Agency, and radio astronomers.
Moreover, the DE-200 program, formerly available on magnetic tape, now is distributed
through the Internet as an VI'P file. 2s
The Lincoln Laboratory andJPL planetary ephemeris programs were uses of plane-
tary radar data that did not necessarily lead to publications. Moreover, the vast amount of
data routinely collected by radar astronomers and stored in the data bases of those
ephemeris programs did not result from experiments designed to achieve a special pur-
pose. Many planetary radar experiments quickly became routine operations. A glance at
the extant Haystack radar log books indicates that radar astronomers rarely ran experi-
ments themselves; expert technicians, like Haines Danforth and Lou Rainville, operated
27. Shapiro 30 September 1993.
28. Shapiro 30 September 1993; Shapiro 4 May 1994; E. Myles Standish, Jr., telephone conversation,
20 May 1994; Paul Reichley, telephone conversation, 19 May 1994; Memorandum, Standish to R. Green, 10 May
1979,Jurgens materials.
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theradarequipment,andthesoftwareconsistedof "cookbookprograms.''_ Thisrou-
tinizationofexperimentationisoneaspectofKuhnian"normal"orparadigmscience.
Testing Albert Einstein
According to Shapiro and his colleagues at Lincoln Laboratory, the main purpose in
gathering radar data for the planetary ephemeris program was "to test Einstein's theory
of General Relativity. '':_ The Shapiro test of the gravitational time delay predicted by
General Relativity is interesting for its contribution to theoretical physics and astrophysics,
as well as a major early achievement of planetary radar. Its development underscores the
close and necessary connection between the capabilities of radar instruments and the
kinds of scientific problems that one can solve with radar. It also illustrates the emotional
intensity with which scientists struggle to assert their claims of discovery and priority of
publication.
After announcing his theory of Special Relativity in 1905, Albert Einstein spent
another ten years developing the theory of General Relativity. 31 The theory of General
Relativity traditionally has found support in three principal experimental areas. The first
came from its accounting for the precession of Mercury's perihelion, the point at which
Mercury is closest to the Sun. Traditional theoretical physics had been incapable of
explaining the precession of Mercury's perihelion without leaving certain discrepancies
unexplained. The ellipse of Mercury's orbit was turning faster than traditional physics said
it ought to by an amount of some 43 seconds of arc per century. Einstein found that his
equations gave just that amount of deviation from the measure predicted by traditional
physics. The perihelion motion came out not only with the right numerical value but also
in the correct direction.
Einstein's theory of General Relativity predicted that a gravitational field would bend
or deflect the path of light rays. For a light ray glancing the Sun, the theory of General
Relativity predicted a deflection of 1.7 seconds of arc, about 1/1,000 of the angular width
of the Sun as seen from the Earth. The theory of General Relativity also predicted that the
gravitational field would cause the speed of a light wave to slow.
Three types of experimental tests conducted over several decades confirmed the pre-
cession of Mercury's perihelion, the deflection of light rays in a strong gravitational field,
and the red shift. Consequently, Irwin Shapiro called his the Fourth Test of General
Relativity. Initially, Shapiro was interested in using radar to confirm the precession of
Mercury's perihelion. He hit upon that idea in 1959, but Shapiro was not sure whether a
check on a widely accepted physical theory would be a worthwhile experiment. So in April
1960, he asked a visiting French physicist, C_1-ano de Dominicis, about the experiment.
29. Hine 12 March 1993; Log books, Haystack Planetary Radar, HR-70-1, 9 December 1970 to 11 August
1971; HR-71-1, 16 August 1971 to 14 April 1972; HR-73-1, 27June 1973 to 26 November 1973; and HR-73-2, 9
December [970 to 11 August 1971, SEBRING. There is a lacuna in the log book records; observations made after
14 April 1972 and before 27.June 1973 are not represented.
30. Ash, Shapiro, and Smith, "Astronomical Constants and Planetary Ephemerides Deduced from
Radar and Optical Observations," 7"h_"AstrfmomicalJcmrna172 ( 1967): 338.
31. The section on Einstein's general theory of relatively draws loosely fiom Banesh ttoffmann,
Rebttivity and it._ R_mts (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1983); Peter G. Bergmann, The Riddle _f
Gravitation, revised and updated (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1987); and Mendel Sachs, l_lativity in Our
Tim_: Frf*m Physi¢:_ to Human I_lati_m._ (Bristol, PA: Taylor and Francis, 1993). See also Klaus Henlschel, "Einstein's
Attitude towalds Experiments: Testing Relativity Theory, 1907-1927," Studte_ in Hi_t_rry and Phib_s_qJhy _Science 23
( 1992): 593-624.
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Dominicis told Shapiro he thought the experiment worth doing, because scientists had so
few tests of relativity. -_2
No radar at the time, however, had the necessary sensitivity to carry out the preces-
sion experiment. At any rate, the Fourth Test was not to measure the precession of
Mercury's perihelion, but the slowing down of light waves caused by solar gravity. The new
idea came to Shapiro in the spring of 1961, as he was attending a briefing for the military
on some of the research conducted at Lincoln Laboratory and MIT with Department of
Defense funds. After his lecture on measuring the speed of light, George Stroke, in a con-
versation with Shapiro, mentioned that the speed of light is not the same everywhere, but
depends on the gravitational field through which it is passing. Shapiro was surprised. He
refreshed his memory on General Relativity and realized that there was a misunderstand-
ing: according to General Relativity, a (freely) falling observer would measure at any
location the same speed of light, independent of the (local) gravitational field. However,
Shapiro reasoned, the effect of the gravitational field on the speed of light would be
cumulative over a round-trip path (unlike the red shift) and that a radar experiment,
therefore, ought to be able to detect this gravitational time delay.
Shapiro now had the idea of testing the gravitational time delay predicted by General
Relativity, but he realized that extant radars could not measure this small relativistic effect.
Moreover, Shapiro did not write up the idea at that time. "I just kept it in the back of my
mind," he explained. 3s
The inauguration of the Arecibo Ionospheric Observatory in November 1963
revived Shapiro's interest in testing General Relativity. In July 1964, Shapiro and his wife,
pregnant with their first child, travelled to Arecibo at Gordon Pettengill's invitation to
spend the summer working at the AIO. When Charles Townes, then MIT Provost, visited
Arecibo that summer, Shapiro briefed him on his proposed relativity test and told him
that Arecibo could not perform the test. '_¢¢'e would never be able to see this effect,"
Shapiro explained. "The plasma effect of the solar corona would be of the same general
type, and the variations would be much larger than the relativistic effect we were looking
for. We would never be able to pick it out. ''34
Shapiro then returned home and learned that Haystack was to be dedicated in
October 1964. Suddenly it occurred to Shapiro that Haystack might have enough capa-
bility to do the experiment. He did some quick back-of-the-envelope calculations and con-
cluded that Haystack might be able to do the experiment. Shapiro sent his manuscript to
Physical Review Letters, and the journal received it on 13 November 1964. 35
From his realization that Haystack could do the experiment to his submission of the
paper took only one week. After doing the calculations more accurately, Shapiro realized
that the sensitivity of the Haystack radar was not good enough to detect the relativistic
effect. He and his Group Leader then requested an upgrade of the Haystack radar from
the head of Lincoln Laboratory, Bill Radford, who subsequently obtained a funding
32. Shapiro's recounting of the conception of the Fourth Test is included here, because the three-
decade-long feud that resulted from it has become a part of the lore of radar astronomy. The sources for
Shapiro's and Muhleman's versions of the story are oral histories conducted specifically for this history, namely
Shapiro 1 October 1993 and Muhleman 19 May 1994. Paul Reichley, in a telephone conversation of 19 May 1994,
refused any other comment than to state that he agreed with whatever Muhleman said.
33. Shapiro I October 1993.
34. Shapiro 1 October 1993.
35. Shapiro, "Fourth Test of General Relativity," Physical Review Lette_ 13 (28 December 1964): 789.
Although little noted at the time, Shapiro in his 1964 paper also pointed out that a possible change with
atomic time of Newton's universal gravitational constant could be tested with radar observations of Mercury.
Such a change was predicted by Paul Adrien Maurice Dirac in 1937 in his "large numbers hypothesis." Evidence
for such a change is being actively sought still from monitoring orbits, as Shapiro soggested, because any such
change would have profound effects on the evolution of the universe and the formation of structure within it.
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commitment from the Rome Air Development Center for the upgrade. The upgrade
consisted of design and construction of a new electronic plug-in unit, boosting the
continuous-wave transmitter from 100 to 500 kilowatts, and replacement of the cooled
parametric amplifier with a lower noise maser. 36
In January 1965, as the design and construction of the radar upgrade was underway,
a colleague showed Shapiro aJPL internal publication dated 31 October 1964 in which an
article by Duane Muhleman discussed using radar to measure the general relativistic
effect. 37 Shapiro was upset. He recalled vividly that in January 1964, he was walking near
Harvard Square with Muhleman. When Muhleman asked him why he was still interested
in radar astronomy, Shapiro told him about his idea to test this new effect predicted by
General Relativity. Yet Muhleman did not acknowledge that conversation in his JPL
report. Furthermore, that report only discussed the test being done near the inferior con-
junction of Venus, where such a test was, and remains, infeasible. Shapiro noted that sev-
eral years later, he approached Muhleman's co-author of the JPL report, Paul Reichley,
and asked him how he got involved in that project. To Shapiro's amazement, Reichley
responded directly that Muhleman had said to him, "Shapiro says there's an effect here,
let's look into it."
The Muhleman and Shapiro relativity experiments both involved using radar and
finding the relativistic time delay, but the design of their experiments differed widely. The
Shapiro Test sent radar waves from Earth to graze past the Sun and bounce from Mercury
(or Venus) at superior conjunction, that is, as the planet was just going behind the Sun
(or emerging from behind the Sun) when seen from Earth.
The radar waves then returned from Mercury (or Venus) and again passed near the
Sun on their return trip to Earth. The Sun's gravitational field would slow down or delay
the radar waves. General Relativity predicted that the cumulative time delay due to the
direct effect of the Sun's gravitational field might be somewhat more than 200 microsec-
onds. On the other hand, this time delay for radar waves bounced from, say, Venus at its
inferior conjunction amounted to only about 10 microseconds, s_
Muhleman's experiment grew out of his theoretical work atJPL on communications
with spacecraft flying near the Sun. Spacecraft navigation was at that time essentially a
matter of measuring Doppler shift to a high degree of accuracy. BecauseJPL also was con-
sidering ranging systems, Muhleman was studying the effects of the solar corona on both
Doppler and range signals. "While working on that problem," he explained, "I realized
that the main effect of the solar corona on the radio signal was that the signal was bent as
it went around the Sun." Muhleman considered the solar gravitational field as though it
were a lens with an index of refraction, an idea he later discovered in various relativity
books. On a practical level, the Muhleman and Shapiro relativity studies differed widely.
Whereas Shapiro intended to bounce radar waves off Mercury (or Venus) at superior con-
junction, Muhleman proposed measuring at inferior conjunction, when the relativistic
effect would not be detectable, s9
36. C. Robert Wieser to Gen. B. A. Schriever, 31 May 1966, 13/56/AC 118, MITA.
37. See Shapiro, "Fourth Test," pp. 789-791; Muhleman and Reichley, "Effects of General Relativity on
Planetary Radar Distance Measurements," in Supporting Research and Advanc_.d Devel_q_ment, Space Programs
Summary 37-29 (Pasadena:JPL, 31 October 1964), pp. 239-241. Although Muhleman's note had an earlier pub-
lication date, it was in an internal report with a tightly limited distribution, whereas Shapiro published in a wide-
ly distributed scientific journal. Paul Reichley, Muhleman's co-author, was a young college graduate recently
hired atJPL and worked with Muhleman on occultation studies of radio signals. Reichley, telephone conversa-
tion, 19 May 1994; and Muhleman 19 May 1994.
38. Shapiro, Effects of C,enerat Rtlativity on Interplanetary Time-Delay Measurements, Technical Report 368
(Lexington: Lincoln Laboratory, 18 December 1964), pp. 1-2; and Shapiro, _l'esting General Relativity with
Radar," Physical Review 145 (1966): 1005-1010.
39. Muhleman 19 May 1994; Shapiro 1 October 1993; Shapiro, _ffect._ ofC, eneral Relativity, p. 2.
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The judgement of general texts is that Irwin Shapiro originated the Fourth Test. 4°
Muhleman, for a number of reasons, dropped out of radar astronomy for over twenty
years. Shapiro and his Lincoln Laboratory coworkers eventually did perform the Fourth
Test at Haystack during the superior conjunction of Mercury in November 1966. Haystack
made subsequent measurements during the superior conjunctions of 18January, 11 May,
and 24 August 1967. The results confirmed General Relativity to an accuracy of about ten
percent. 41
Additional observations of Mercury and Venus made at both Haystack and Arecibo
during several superior conjunctions helped to refine the Fourth Test results. Subsequent
experiments carried out on spacecraft further improved the accuracy of the test. The best
accuracy yet achieved was from a combined MIT andJPL experiment on the Viking mis-
sion to Mars; it confirmed Einstein's theory of General Relativity to a tenth of a percent.
The accuracy of the measurement of the relativistic effect had improved by an impressive
factor of 100, or two orders of magnitude, in 10 years. 4_
A Shifting Paradigm
The planetary radar research discussed up to this point shared a consensus on prob-
lem-solving activities in a way typical of a Kuhnian paradigmatic science. Among the forces
driving the evolution of planetary radar astronomy was the interaction between the two
kinds of problems radar astronomers attempted to solve. One set related to the larger the-
oretical framework which the results of radar observations and analysis attempt to address;
the other related to epistemological questions and included radar techniques. Because
the two problem sets are necessarily linked to one another, the invention or adaptation of
new radar techniques impacted on the kinds of scientific problems addressed by radar
astronomy and, as a result, expanded the paradigm without altering the original problem-
solving activities and techniques.
One of the most powerful new radar techniques was planetary range-Doppler map-
ping. It added a whole gamut of answers that radar astronomy previously could not
provide. The successful application of the new technique depended on the availability of
a generation of highly sensitive radars, Haystack, Arecibo, and DSS-14. Technology con-
tinued to drive radar astronomy. Because the kinds of problems range-Doppler mapping
solved were related more to geology than to astronomy, planetary radar grew close to the
theoretical framework of planetary geology. This shift of the paradigm (without alteration
of the original astronomy-oriented paradigm) also reflected the evolving social context of
planetary radar, which in 1970 found itself a patron in NASA and its missions of planetary
exploration. Thus, changing problem sets and theoretical frameworks on the one hand
and the evolution of financial and institutional patronage on the other became inextrica-
bly linked.
Planetary Range-Doppler Mapping
Both range and Doppler were standard radar measurements long before they
united to provide range-Doppler maps of planetary surfaces. Range or time-delay
40. See, for example, Peter G. Bergmann, The Ri_blb, e_[(;ravitation, rev. ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1987), p. 158.
41. Shapiro 10clober 1993; Shapiro, Pettengill, Ash, Stone, Smith, Ingalls, and Brockehnan, "Fourth
Test of General Relativity: Preliminary Results," l'hysical R_Jiew Letter._ 20 ( 1968): 1265-1269.
42. Shapiro 1 October 1993.
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measurements determine how far away a target is by the amount of time the echo takes to
return to the radar receiver. The greater the distance to the target, the longer the echo
takes to appear in the receiver. Conversely, the shorter the distance to the target, the less
time the echo takes to appear in the receiver. Knowing that radar waves travel at the speed
of light, one can calculate the distance traveled by a radar signal from the amount of time
between transmission of a radar signal and reception of its echo.
If one assumes that a planetary target is a perfect sphere, then when a transmitter
directs radar waves at it, the waves arrive first at a circular area at the center of the planet
as viewed from Earth. The point on the planet's surface that has the radar at its zenith,
and is thus closest to the observer, is called the subradar point. Thus, the radar waves first
hit a circular area on the planet surrounding the subradar point and form what is called
a range ring. Within each range ring, the distance from Earth to the planet's surface, that
is, the range or delay in time, is the same. The longest delays (and therefore ranges) gen-
erally correspond to echoes from near the planetary limbs.
When a radar transmits, it sends a signal that contains only a very narrow band of fre-
quencies and appears almost line-like. Such would be the case, too, for the echo received
back at the radar were there no difference in the relative motion between the radar and
its target. In reality, when looking from the Earth at a planetary target, this relative motion
is always a factor. The combined motions of the Earth as it spins on its axis and orbits
around the Sun, and of the planetary target as it also spins on its axis and orbits about the
Sun, cause what is known as the Doppler effect or Doppler shift, which is the difference
between the frequencies of the radar transmission and the radar echo. The differences in
the relative motions of the radar and the target broaden the frequency of the returning
signal. Instead of a (nearly) single frequency, the returning signal exhibits a spectrum of
frequencies "shifted" or set off from the transmitted frequency.
In order to remove the Doppler shift caused by the relative motion of the observer
and the target, planetary radar astronomers generally use a radar ephemeris program.
The program automatically adjusts the incoming signal for the expected Doppler shift,
which itself changes over time because of the changes in relative motion of the observer
and the target. Thus, the predicted Doppler shift must be accurate enough to avoid
smearing out the echo in frequency. This requirement places stringent demands on the
quality of the observing ephemeris. Thus, the Lincoln Laboratory PEP and the JPL
Development Ephemeris series were of vital importance to the successful execution of
planetary range-Doppler mapping.
A given portion of the echo frequency spectrum corresponds to a slice or strip on
the planet's surface. Each slice is parallel to the plane containing the line from the observ-
er to the planet and the spin axis of the planet, and each slice has the same Doppler shift
value, because each portion of that slice of the planet's surface has the same motion rela-
tive to the observer. When Doppler shift and range data are combined, the slices of equal
Doppler shift intersect the range rings to form "cells." In general, each range-frequency
cell corresponds to two particular areas on the planet's surface. The amount of surface
area corresponding to a particular range-frequency cell represents the resolution of the
radar image on the planet's surface and varies over the planetary surface (see Technical
Essay, Figure 42).
The amount of power returned from the target for each range-frequency cell can be
converted into a two-dimensional image of the planetary surface through a series of com-
plex mathematical manipulations. Each spectrum has the attributes of power, bandwidth
(the maximum spread of line-of-sight velocities), shape, minor features, and a weak broad-
band component. The total power received depends on such instrument factors as trans-
mitter power, antenna gain, and pointing accuracy, as well as on the reflecting (backscat-
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tering)propertiesof thetargetandtheso-calledradarequation.Theradarequation
statesthattheamountofpowerinanechoisinverselyproportionaltothefourthpower
ofthedistance.Thatmeansthatheechopowerreceivedbyaradardecreasessharplywith
increasingdistanceofthetarget.Forinstance,aradarechois1/16thasstrongif thedis-
tancetothetargetisdoubled,allotherconditionsbeingequal.
Ingeneral,roughplanetarysurfacesbackscattermorepowerfromneartheplanet's
limbsthanacorrespondingsmoothsphere.Thus,aroughsurfacel adstoabroadening
ofthefrequencyspectrumoftheplanetaryecho.Asmoothplanetarysurface(relativeto
thesizeofthewavelengthoftheradarwaves)wouldbroadenthereturnsignaltoafarless-
erdegree.Theamountofpowerreturnedtothereceiverineachresolutioncelltherefore
correspondstotheplanet'surfacecharacteristics.
Theideaof combiningrangeandDopplerdatato forma radarimagecame
togetheratLincolnLaboratoryin thelate1950s.There,PaulGreenbegantoconsiderthe
calculationofaplanet'spinvelocityfromasimultaneousmeasureofrangeandDoppler
spread.AnothermemberoftheLincolnLaboratoryadargroup,RogerManasse,point-
edoutthatwhenyoulookataspinningobject,theplanesof equalDopplershiftare
parallelto theplanecontainingthelineof sightandtherotationvector.4_However,
ManassedidnotputtheslicesofDopplershifttogetherwiththerangerings.Theorigi-
natorofthatideawasPaulGreen.
Greenremembershowtheideacametohim:"Iwas ittinginmylivingroomwon-
deringwhatherelationshipwasbetweenthetwoof them.I alsohadnoticedthatBen
Yapleehadactuallymeasuredthosethings.TM Ben Yaplee and others at the Naval
Research Laboratory were using range rings to refine the Earth-Moon distance. They dis-
covered that details in the structure of the return echoes could be correlated with lunar
topography. 45
However, they did not develop planetary radar range-Doppler imaging. "It was sim-
ply an unevaluated measurement," Green explained. 'q'here was no attempt to know what
deeper message might be behind that. I was just thinking, 'Hey! Wait a minute! That's
kind of an interesting thing to do.' Maybe it was obvious, but might there not be some-
thing deep behind it? ''46
Soon after formulating range-Doppler mapping, Green discovered that classified
military radar research at the University of Michigan had led to the conception of a simi-
lar process but with significant differences. The military process involved imaging the
Earth from aircraft and relied on developing a radar "history" of the target to create an
image, while planetary range-Doppler mapping created a "snapshot" of a planetary sur-
face fiom a ground-based radar. Because of the similarities in the two methods, Green was
careful to call his planetary range-Doppler mapping. The University of Michigan radar
eftort, as we shall see in the next chapter, eventually had a profound impact on planetary
radar astronomy.
Paul Green first presented his ideas on range-Doppler mapping at the pioneering
Endicott House Conference on Radar Astronomy, then at the URSI workshop on radar
astronomy that followed immediately afterward in San Diego. An abstracted form of that
paper and the others presented at the workshop soon appeared in the Journal of
Geophysical Research. 47
,t3. Roger Manasse, The I (_e o[ Radar lnter[rrometer Measurements to Stu_(_' l'bznet_, Group Report 312-23
(l.exington: Lincoln Laboralory, March 1957).
44. Green 20 September 1993.
45. See Ch. 1, note 69, and Ch. 3, note 14.
,t6. Green 20 September 1993.
47. Green 20 September 1993; Leadabrand, "Radar Astronomy Symposium Report," pp. 1111-1115.
Earlier, a more complele exposition of the Iheory appeared as Green, A Summary t![Deteetion Theory Notitm._ in
RadarAstr_momy "lhm_, (;roup Report 34-84 (Lexington: Lincoln Laboralory, 18January 1960). See, also, Ch. 3,
note 22.
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Green did not apply his theory to actual radar mapping of the planets. Instead, it was
his Lincoln Laboratory colleague Gordon Pettengill who used it beginning in 1960.
Initially, Pettengill explored the surface of the Moon with the Millstone radar. The result
was an image that barely resembled the lunar surface. Pettengill concluded, "It is obvious
that much patient work lies ahead before detailed correlation with optical photographs
may be attempted. ''4s
Figure 16
The fir._t rant,_-l)_r]_der image of the MtJon, 7January 1960, made by (_mton Pettenloll , u._ing techniques devek_ed tT his
Lincoln l_tbcwat_rry colleague Paul Creen. The toy) of the image (shoum in range box 2) re/ree._e'nt_ the point _rn the lunar sur-
.face close._t to the rtular Pettengill, as the fir_t as._ociate direct_rr of the Are_iln_ Iono._pher_c Observatory, as it wa._ then called,
later g'uided ranged)oyrpler imaging q] the M_Km and planets at Arecit_ a._ _ll t_ at the Hay_tmk Oh.v'rvatmy. (Carurte._y _
MIT Lincoln Lab_rrat_rry, Lexington, ?,lassachu.wtt_, photo no. 261209-1D)
48. Pettengill, "Measurements of Lunar Reflectivity Using Ihe Millstone Rada=," lanu_eding_ of the IRE 48
(May 1960): 933-934.
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Lunar Radar Mapping
Pettengill made a second attempt at lunar radar mapping in June 1961, again using
the Millstone radar. Those and the previous Pettengill radar images had what radar
astronomers call north-south ambiguity. The nature of range-Doppler mapping is to cre-
ate an uncertainty (called north-south ambiguity), such that the observer does not know
from which hemisphere the echoes are returning. The range-Doppler technique creates
two points, one in the northern hemisphere and the other in the southern hemisphere,
with exactly the same range and Doppler values. The radar data cannot distinguish the
hemisphere of origin of the return echo and thus presents a confusing picture of the tar-
get's features.
Pettengill had no technique yet for distinguishing northern-hemisphere echoes
from southern-hemisphere echoes. He knew that the youngest, and therefore the rough-
est, large feature on the lunar surface visible from Earth was the crater Tycho. During a
full Moon, this crater appears to have rays emanating across the lunar surface. When
Pettengill looked at the echo spectra, he found anomalously high spikes that were consis-
tent from run to run. He assumed that they were in the southern hemisphere (the loca-
tion of Tycho) and found they matched the crater's location. 49
For the first time, a lunar surface feature and a radar return had matched. However,
the north-south ambiguity problem stood in the way of refining range-Doppler mapping
into a useful tool for exploring the solar system. One solution appeared when the Arecibo
Ionospheric Observatory began operation in November 1963. There, at the instigation of
Pettengill, who was now Associate Director of Arecibo, Thomas W. Thompson, then a
Cornell graduate student, and Rolf Dyce began range-Doppler mapping of the Moon.
In contrast to Millstone, the Arecibo radar antenna had a narrow beamwidth relative
to the angular size of the Moon. The Moon has a diameter of a half degree or 30 minutes
of arc. The width of the Arecibo antenna beam was 10 minutes. Instead of aiming the
antenna at the center of the lunar disk facing Earth, Thompson and Dyce aimed it at a
point 10 minutes of arc south from the center. The Arecibo telescope received echoes,
therefore, only from the lower or "southern" part of the Moon. The technique assuaged
the problem of north-south ambiguity, but was applicable to only the Moon. Venus was
only a speck, slightly more than one minute of arc, compared to the Moon's 30 minutes
of arc .5o
Using this approach, Thompson and Dyce explored eight regions of the lunar sur-
face and collected data on echo strength. They converted the data into "contour" lines of
relative reflectivity. Thompson placed these lines, computed and plotted on a transparent
overlay, over lunar maps made from photographs. The resultant radar contour map had
a resolution of 20 by 30 km.Sl
Thompson continued to carry out range-Doppler mapping of the Moon by taking
advantage of the increasingly narrow beamwidth of the Arecibo antenna. By reducing the
beamwidth from 10 to 7 minutes of arc, he succeeded in creating a range-Doppler map of
the crater Tycho with surface resolutions between 7 and 10 km. The output from a given
radar observation now represented a considerable quantity of data; between 10,000 (104)
and 100,000 (105) values of intensity (or pixels) constituted a single map.
49. Pettengill and John C. Henry, "Enhancement of Radar Reflectivity Associated with the Lunar Crater
Tycbo,".]_mrnal o[ (,e@hy._ical Rewarch 67 (1962): 4881-4885. Pettengill's co-author was an MIT electrical engi-
neering graduate student who used the experience in writing his master's thesis, ltenry, "An Automated
Procedure fol the Mapping of Extended Radio Sources," M.S. thesis, MI'I, 1965.
50. Source for the arc measurement of Venus: Goldstein, "Radar Studies of Venus," in Andoin Dollfus,
ed., Moon and I'lanet._ (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1967), p. 127.
51. Tbompson 29 November 1994; Thompson and Dyce, "Mapping of Lunar Radar Reflectivit T at 70
Centimeters," ]mLrnal o/(h, ophy_ical Re._earch 71 (1966): 4843-4853.
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t'/_ure 17
Radar map of the lunar crater Tycho with a resolution of I kilometer made with the 3.8-cm (7,750-MHz) Haystack
Observatory radar: The grid line._ are .$paced about 17 km apart. (Cour_sy of MIT Lincoln laboratory, Lexington,
Massachusetts, photo no. 242336-1.)
At the same time, Gordon Pettengill guided lunar radar observations at Haystack,
which had become available in late 1964. Haystack, moreover, had a narrower antenna
beamwidth, only 3 minutes of arc, and the higher operating frequency of Haystack (3.8
cm, X-band) compared to Arecibo (70 cm, UHF) helped Haystack to achieve a much finer
resolution on Tycho: between 1 and 2 krn. The Haystack radar images now approached
the quality of lunar photographs made from Earth. In the words of Pettengill and
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Thompson,'q'hemostimmediatelystrikingfeatureofthe3.8-cm[Haystack] observations
is their resemblance to the optical photograph.... ''52
The coincidental refinement of lunar range-Doppler imaging and the commitment
to place an American on the Moon before the end of the 1960s enhanced the value of the
lunar radar work done at both Arecibo and Haystack. NASA Apollo mission staff used the
radar images to help select landing sites, and Apollo funded Thompson's dissertation and
subsequent radar studies of the Moon. Once the resolution of radar images surpassed the
resolution of lunar photographs made from Earth, the value of lunar radar studies to
NASA grew even more. Thus, the new technique brought radar astronomy closer to the
scientific needs of NASA, increasingly the patron of radar astronomy.
At Arecibo, Tommy Thompson and Rolf Dyce undertook radar mapping of the
Moon at both 40 MHz (7.5 meters) and 430 MHz (70 cm) under a supplementary grant
from NASA. A joint report with Lincoln Laboratory compared the Arecibo results with
those carried out at Haystack by Stan Zisk with additional NASA funding under a contract
between MIT and the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston. NASA funded lunar studies
at both telescopes until 1972, when the Apollo program came to an end. 53
Venus Radar Mapping
In 1964, as Thompson and Zisk were starting their lunar mapping activities, Roland
Carpenter and Dick Goldstein analyzed spectra from Venus and discovered the first fea-
tures on that planet's surface. The Goldstone Venus radar lacked sufficient sensitivity to
apply range-Doppler mapping to Venus. However, once the Mars Station became avail-
able, Goldstein continued his exploration of Cytherean surface features using range-
Doppler techniques, but without resolving the north-south ambiguity. Thus began one of
the most long-lived and extensive activities of planetary radar astronomers. This scientific
niche for radar resulted from that planet's opaque atmosphere which barred exploration
with optical methods.
When Dick Goldstein observed Venus during the 1964 inferior conjunction, he
looked only at the structure of the spectra returned from the planet. This was the same
technique that Roland Carpenter had used earlier to discover the retrograde motion of
Venus; it was not range-Doppler mapping. A few topographic features were visible as
details in the return spectra. Goldstein found two features represented as peaks. They
moved slowly across the spectrogram, a graph plotting echo power density versus fre-
quency, from the high-frequency side to the low-frequency side, in synchronization with
the planet's rotation.
Goldstein then placed his two features on a coordinate system with the first feature,
named Alpha (cx), located on his zero degree meridian in the southern hemisphere. The
second feature, named Beta (1_), Goldstein placed in the northern hemisphere. His coor-
dinate system was somewhat arbitrary out of necessity, as astronomers generally had not
agreed upon any Cytherean coordinate system. Additional analysis of the 1964 data
revealed three more features around the equator. Goldstein named them Gamma (x),
Delta (_5), and Epsilon (e).
52. Thompson 29 November 1994; Pettengill and Thompson, "A Radar Study of the Lunar Crater
Tycho at 3.8-cm and 70-cm Wavelengths," lcartt_ 8 (1968): 457--471, esp. 464.
53. The research was conducted under NASA grant NGR-33-0104)24. NEROC, ,_miannual Report of the
Haystack Observatory, 15 July 1972, p. ii. See, also, Ch. 4, note 15.
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Figure 18
One of the earliest range-Doppler image.s of Venus refute t.,y Richard GolcLstein ¢J.]PL with the (k_ldst_m,e radat The notaticm
*O°" indicales the meridian in GoltL_tein _ ct_nrdina_ ostem. Vizible are the fi_t _urf_tce features identified by Gold, rein: Alpha
(_), on the meridian in th_ ._mthern hemi._phere, Beta ([J), in the far we._t _ the northern hemL_phere, and Delta (_), ju._t to
the. north of Beta. Gamma (r) arul Fp_zlon (_), two mlditi¢mal features identzfied hy Gokl_tein, are not bd_ll.ed. The rmtar
names Alpha and Beta zoere retained when a._tronomeT._ began naming the _uyJ_tce [eatur_ o[ Venu._. (('_mrte_), of Jet l'r_rImL_itm
Laboratory, photz_ no. 331-4849AA)
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Although he judged that these features were probably mountain ranges, Goldstein had
insufficient evidence. What were they? "Venus is still a mystery planet," Goldstein con-
cluded. "However, it may no longer be viewed as featureless, but rather as an exciting
object for further study. ''54
Using the data taken with the newly operational Mars Station during the 1967 Venus
inferior conjunction, Goldstein studied the Beta region in more detail, attempting to
determine its size and character, rather than searching for new features. The Mars Station,
moreover, provided sufficient sensitMty to attempt range-Doppler mapping. Goldstein
observed Beta, Delta, and an unnamed region at (his) 40 ° South latitude and made a
crude radar image of the B region. Still, Goldstein lacked sufficient data to determine
whether Beta was a mountain range or another type of feature. 55
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Figure 19
A detaib'd radar view o[ the Beta reglml qf }D_u._, 1967, made IO, Dick Gobl_tein o[flq, u_ing the (;ohl_tone radar It exem-
plifie_ the limit_ '4 re_olution avai&ble in same _( the earliest rtular imaffe_ of that pbmet, ((;ourte_v o[.]et Pr¢r]mL_ioa
l.aborah*_ y, photo no. P-8882 )
54. Goldstein, "Pteliminaty Venus Radar Resuhs,"Journal ,_] l?,e_ear_h of the National Bureau o/ Standard_,
,'_e_tmn I): Radu_ Science 69D ( 1965): 162!}.-1625; Goldstein, "Radar Studies of Venus," in Dollfus, Mo0_t and I_lanet_,
pp. 126-131. This article also appeared as Goldstein, RadarStudie_ of Venu_, Technical Repolt 32-1081 (Pasadena:
.11'I., 1967).
55. Goldstein and Shalhav Zohar, "Venus Map: A Detailed Look at the Feature B," ,\}tture 219 (1968):
357-358; Goldstein. "A Radar View of the Surface of Venus," Proceedinl.,,:_ o[the American l'hils_rphieal Society 113
(]une 1969): 224-228. Goldstein's co-aulhol. Shalhav Zohar, was a fellowJPL employee who developed much of
the software used in the experiment,
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Meanwhile, Roland Carpenter, who was now both aJPL employee and an instructor
in the Department of Astronomy of the University of California, Los Angeles, had ana-
lyzed 1964 Venus inferior conjunction radar data. Carpenter found two distinct peaks in
the return spectra that persisted day after day and moved slowly with time. On closer
examination, the first peak appeared to have three components, which he hesitated to
interpret because he felt their nature could not be determined with the available data.
Using Goldstein's coordinate system, Carpenter began to identify the most pro-
nounced features with letters of the alphabet from A to G. He labeled less probable loca-
tions as numerical extensions of nearby features, e.g., B1, C1, C2, D2, and D3.
Correlations between Carpenter's and Goldstein's features began to emerge. Carpenter's
feature F had the same location as Goldstein's 0t, and Carpenter's group B, C, and D cor-
responded to Goldstein's [3 (Table 2).56
Table 2
Radar Features of Venus
Gold.stein Carpenter Haystack Arecibo
FaradayAlpha
Beta
Beta
Beta
Beta
Beta
Gamma
Delta
Epsilon
D2
A
BI
CI
C2
D3
E
G
Haystack 1
Haystack IV
Haystack 11
Haystack III
Haystack A
(later Haystack V1)
Haystack B
Haystack V
Haystack C
Haystack D
Gauss
Hertz
Maxwell
Sources
R,M, (;oldstein, "Radar Studies ol Venus," in Audoin Dolll-ul, ed,, Mmm and p/aneta (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing
Company, 1967), pp. 1'26-131 ; R.M. Goldstein and H.C. Rumsey, Jr., "A Radar Snapshot of'Venus," Scumce 169 (1970): 974-977;
R.L. Carpenter, "Study of Venus by, CW Radar: 1964 Result&" TheAstroflo_Journa171 (1966): 142-152, espeoally pp. 148-151 ;
A.E E. Rogers, T Haglbrs, R.A Br(_kelman, R,P. Ingalh,J.I Levine, G.H. Pettengfll, and F.S Weinstein A Radarlnterfemmaer
,_ludy 6"[ Veal,lsat J b',Tin.Tet hnit al Report 444 (Lexington: Lincoln Laboratory, 14 February 1968): AE.E. Rogers, R.P, lngalh,
and G.H. Pettengill, "Radar Map of Venus at 3.8 cm Wavelength," l_rus 21 (1974) : 237-24/; D.B. Campbell. R.F.Jurgens. R.B.
Dyce. F.S, Harris, and G.H Pettengill, "Radar lnterferometric Observations of Venus at 70-Centimeter Wavelength," Staen_
170 (t 970) : 1090-1092; RF.Jurgens, "Some Preliminary Resulta of the 70-cm Radar Studies ofVenuC' Radl0 Seu,nce 5 (1970) :
435-442; and R,F Jurgens, 'A Study of the Average and Anamalous Radar Scattering from the Surface of Venus at 70 Cm
Wavelength," PhD diss., C.ornell University, June 1968, also published internally as CRSR Research Report no. 297 (Ithaca:
CRSR, May 1968).
Carpenter dropped out of radar astronomy and pursued a teaching career, while
Goldstein continued to explore Venus. The 1969 inferior conjunction of Venus provided
an opportunity to use range-Doppler mapping. Goldstein combined the 1969 data with ear-
lier data, then applied a mathematical method devised by fellowJPL employee Howard C.
Rumsey, Jr., which involved the construction of a large matrix of range and Doppler values.
The mapping process divided the surface of Venus into small cells 1/2 ° square in lat-
itude and longitude. A column vector (X) consisted of the unknown reflectivities of these
ceils, while a second column vector (S) contained all the processed data from 17 days of
56. Carpenter, "Study of Venus by CW Radar: 1964 Results," TheA_tronomicalJournal71 (1966): 142-152,
especially pp. 148-151.
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observations. Already, Goldstein and Rumsey were dealing with a large amount of data;
vector X had about 40,000 components, vector S about 120,000 components. They
expressed the relationship between vectors S and X as the equation:
AX = S,
in which A was a matrix whose components could be computed from known parameters
and the motion of Venus and Earth. Matrix A consisted of 120,000 by 40,000 components.
As the authors wrote, "Obviously, we cannot compute every component of a matrix
with over 10 _jentries." The matrix was "so big," Goldstein recalled, "that we couldn't even
read it into the computer except one line at a time. ''57 Despite the difficulty of handling
the gargantuan matrix, Goldstein produced a number of somewhat unambiguous images
of Venus. Once the 1969 data had been converted into a range-Doppler map, in which
each resolution cell represented an area on the planet's snrface, Goldstein made cumu-
lative maps by adding earlier data. The north and south areas of the cumulative maps were
similar, but not identical; however, the images suffered serious flaws, including the "run-
way" strip running more or less along the planet's equator. Nonetheless, Goldstein
succeeded in resolving ec for the first time on a map. It was a roundish feature, about
1,000 km across. 5_
Goldstein continned to map Venus with Rumsey's mathematical approach, adding
data taken during the 1970 inferior conjunction to that acquired in 1969. The 1970 data
were better, being less noisy, because the Deep Space Network had increased the trans-
mitter power of the Goldstone Mars Station from 100 to 400 kilowatts. The total system
noise temperature stood at a low 25 K. Regions c¢ and g remained the dominant features
of the JPL radar map. 59
Meanwhile, at Arecibo and Haystack, radar astronomers were creating Venus images
with their own techniques. At Arecibo, Cornell University doctoral student RayJurgens,
with support from an NSF Faculty Fellowship, undertook the analysis of radar data taken
during the 1964 inferior conjunction. Dyce and Pettengill had made the radar observa-
tions to supply the Planetary Ephemeris Program data base, not to make a range-Doppler
map of Venus? _
In correlating the radar data with the Cytherean surface,Jurgens abandoned his own
zero degree meridian in favor of a modified version of Carpenter's coordinate system that
incorporated the latest pole position and rotation rate supplied by Irwin Shapiro from the
PEP. Consequently, Goldstein's cc and Carpenter's F were not at the zero meridian but
closer to 5 ° longitude.Jurgens identified the features he found by latitude and longitude
(e.g., 20°,-102 °, in which "-" indicated South latitude or West longitude), then compared
his features with those discovered by Goldstein and Carpenter.
Jurgens gave particular attention to Goldstein's 13region (Carpenter's group B, C, D,
to which Jurgens added E), and he managed to locate most of Carpenter's features. In
addition, Jurgens spotted a new feature near Goldstein's Beta. Borrowing from Tommy
Thompson's hmar radar mapping work, Jurgens interpreted the feature as a ring struc-
ture, specifically a crater, and argued that such a crater might be caused by meteoric
impact.Jurgens admitted that "although the evidence for a ring structure is not as strong
as one might desire, it at least raises the question of whether such structures would be
expected on Venus. ''61 Indeed, it was one of the first attempts to relate radar observations
and geological interpretation.
57. Goldswin 1,t Sepwmber 1993.
58. (,oldstcin and Rumsey, "A Radar Snapshot of Venus," Sczen¢e 169 (1970): 974-977.
5(1. Goldstein and Rumsey, "A Radar Image of Venus," lcaru_ 17 (1972): 699-703.
60. Julgens 23 May 1994.
61. Jurgens, "A Study of the Average and Anomalous Radar Scattering," pp. 71 and 87-110.
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Before completing his dissertation,Jurgens observed Venus during the 1967 inferior
conjunction, when the Arecibo antenna had an improved receiver system, better data
acquisition procedures, and a lower receiver noise temperature. Jurgens combined the
1967 data with additional observations made during the subsequent 1969 conjunction. In
order to mitigate the north-south ambiguity problem, he compared observations made a
few weeks apart, thereby taking advantage of the changing Doppler geometries between
Earth and Venus.
Jurgens continued to explore the 13region, in particular, as well as new areas of the
planet's surface. On the urging of Tommy Gold, he named his features after scientists
famous for their work in electromagnetism: Karl Friedrich Gauss (1777-1855), Heinrich
Rudolph Hertz (1857-1894), Michael Faraday (1791-1867), and James Clerk Maxwell
(1831-1879). Gauss and Hertz both corresponded strongly to Goldstein's [3 region.
Faraday was Goldstein's e_. However, Maxwell, discovered during the 1967 conjunction,
had no match among previous citings of Cytherean surface features. 0"_It was an original
and enduring contribution to Venus mapping.
Figure 2O
Ray Ju_gens disc_wered a new Venus surf at.e feature, named Maxwell, from these range-Doppler images made at the Arecibo
Observatory on 4 September 1967 during inferior conjunction. The traght spot at the leading edge of the image i.g the subradar
point, while the qtxJt closest to the .sulmular txffnt is the Beta region. Max'weU is the _pot farther from the planet's leading edge.
((_mrte,_y q Ray Jurgens.)
62. Jurgens, "Some Preliminary Results of the 70-cm Radar Studies of Venus," Radio Saence 5 (1970):
435-442; AIO, Research in Ionospheric Phy._c.L Research Report RS 74 (Ithaca: CRSP,, 31 July 1968), pp. 84-85.
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Investigators at Haystack Observatory also observed Venus during the 1967 conjunc-
tion, but they used a unique technique they pioneered called radar interferometry. It
resolved the problem of north-south ambiguity in a superior fashion. An optical
interferometer is an instrument for analyzing the light spectrum by studying patterns of
interference, that is, how light waves interact with each other. Martin Ryle and other radio
astronomers had been designing interferometers since the late 1950s. These radio inter-
ferometers used two or more radio telescopes arranged along a straight line (called the
base line) and allowed astronomers to "synthesize" observations at higher resolutions than
possible with a single antenna. 63
The inventor of the radar interferometer was Alan E. E. Rogers, then an electrical
engineering graduate student at MIT. MIT Prof. Alan H. Barrett was recruiting students
to participate in his radio astronomy work on the newly discovered OH spectral line. Alan
Rogers joined him and did his masters and doctoral theses on the OH line. As part of his
doctoral thesis research, Rogers helped to develop a radio interferometer that linked the
Millstone and Haystack radars.
After graduating and spending a year home in Africa, Rogers returned to Lincoln
Laboratory, where he was hired to work in the radar group with Gordon Pettengill.
Although trained as a radio astronomer, Rogers rapidly became absorbed in planetary
radar work and proposed a radar interferometer to eliminate the problem of north-south
ambiguity that was typical of range-Doppler mapping. 64 This was not the first time that a
radar astronomy technique derived from radio astronomy.
The X-band (7,840 MHz; 3.8 cm) radar interferometer linked the Haystack and
Project Westford antennas, which are 1.2 km apart, in the so-called Hayford configuration.
In the interferometry experiments, Haystack transmitted a continuous-wave signal to
Venus, and both the Haystack and Westford antennas received. Technicians working
under Dick lngalls of Haystack reduced and analyzed the echoes to create a range-
Doppler map. The size of the resolution cell on the planet's surface was about 150 km
square.
63. See Bracewell, "Early Work on Imaging Theory," pp. 167-190 and Scheuer, "Aperture Synthesis at
Cambridge," pp. 249--265 in Sullivan.
64. Rogers 5 May 1994.
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Figure 21
(hu, of the fin_t range-D_ppler image._ of Venues made with a nular interferometer, the ttay*ta_k arm We._tfirrd antenna,_ in
tandem, in 196 7. Not only are the AIpha and Beta regl_ms di.w_mible, but the complexity of Beta i_ revealed. ( C_mrte._y o[ A lan
E. E. Roger_.)
Next, Rogers and Ingalls combined the signals from the two antennas to obtain the
fringe amplitude and phase for each range-Doppler cell. In an elaborate computer
procedure, they rotated the fringe pattern so that the lines of constant phase were normal
to the axis of apparent rotation of the planet. The lines of constant phase now were
perpendicular to the slices of equal Doppler value. Mthough each pair of resolution cells
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thatexhibitednorth-southambiguityhadthesamerangeandDopplershiftvalues,one
coulddistinguisht enorthandsouthcellsbecausetheyhadoppositephases._-_Oneofthefirstapplicationsofthisradarinterferometerwastothelunarworkbeing
carriedoutatHaystackfortheNASAMannedSpacecraftCenterbyStanZisk.Thelunar
topographicmapsthatZiskcreatedwiththeHayfordinterferometerwerecarriedout
underthename"OperationHaymoon"untilDecember1972,whentheApollomission
ended._ TommyThompsoncarriedoutasimilarinterferometricstudyoftheMoonusing
the40-MHz(7.5-meter)radaratAa'ecibo.
AlanRogersandDickIngallsalsostudiedVenusduringthe1967inferiorconjunc-
tionwiththeHayfordinterferometerandidentifiedeightsurfaceregions.Justaseach
pre_dousradarastronomerhadinventedhisownnomenclature,theylabeledfeatureswith
Romanumeralsandletters.ThefeaturesofwhichtheywerecertainbecameHaystackI
throughHaystackIV.Theprobabler gionswereHaystackAthroughHaystackD.Fiveof
theseeightregionscorrespondedto featuresalreadyobservedbyeitherGoldsteinor
Carpenter.HaystackI appearedtobeGoldstein's0tandCarpenter'sF,whileHaystackIt
matchedGoldstein'sB(Table2).Jurgens'Areciboresultshadnotyetbeenpublished.67
AlanRogersandDickIngallsthenpublishedamapofVenushowingthecorrelation
ofHaystackandJPLfeaturesina1969issueofScience. 6_ The fl region now appeared to be
large and complex. The Hayford radar interferometer confirmed and extended the
observations of Goldstein and Carpenter. With interferometer data taken during the 1969
and 1972 conjunctions using an instrument with a lower system noise temperature, Alan
Rogers and Dick Ingalls refined their map of Venus; the data continued to indicate agree-
ment among the Haystack andJPL features. 6_
The waxing tide of links between Lincoln Laboratory and Arecibo set in motion by
the appointment of Gordon Pettengill as associate director of Arecibo facilitated the trans-
planting of radar interferometry to Arecibo. In fact, investigators at Arecibo built two
additional antennas to study the Moon and Venus with the new technique. The lunar
interferometer used the 40-MHz antenna, while the planetary radar interferometer used
the 430-MHz antenna. NASA continued to underwrite Tommy Thompson's lunar radar
work through a supplementary grant. 7°
65. For a description of the radar interferometer, see Rogers, Hagfors, Brockehnan, Ingalls, Levine,
Pettengill, and Weinstein, ,4 Radar lnterferometer Study _?f Venu._ at 3.8 cm, Technical Report 444 (Lexington:
Lincoln Laboratory, 14 February 1968).
66. Rogers 5 May 1994; Documents in 44/2/AC 135; "Haystack Operations Summary,
8/ll/69-5/18/70," 37/2/AC 135; "Funding Proposal, "Programs in Radio Astronomy at the Haystack
Observatory," NSF, 10/1/72-9/30/73," 28/2/AC 135, MITA; NEROC, ,_miannual lh'p_rrt °[ the Hay_tack
Observatory, 15 July 1972, p. ii; NEROC, Final l¥ogress Ib'lurrt Rtular Studies of the Pla_et._, 29 August 1974, p. 1. A
number of techniques for extracting lunar topography from interferometric data were de_fsed. Delay-Doppler
stereoscopy was developed by Irwin Shapiro and independently by Thomas Thompson and Stan Zisk. Another
technique, called delay-Doppler interferometry, was suggested by Shapiro and developed by Zisk and Rogers;
Thompson pointed out the strength of the Hayford interferometer for this application. Shapiro, Zisk, Rogers,
Slade, and Thompson, "Lunar Topography: Global Determination by Radar," Science 178 (1972): 93%948, esp.
notes 19 and 21, p. 948.
67. Thompson, "Map of Lunar Radar Reflectivity at 7.5-m Wavelength," lcar'u._13 (1970): 36%370.
68. Brockehnan, Evans, lngalls, Levine, and Pettengill, lbflection Pr_q*ertie._t?[Venu._at 3.S cm, Report 456
(I.exington: I.incoln Laboratory. 1968), especially pp. 34-35, 44, and 49-50; Rogers and Ingalls, "Venus:
Mapping the Sm face Reflectivity by Radar Interferometry," Science 165 (1969): 797-799.
69. Rogers and Ingalls, "Radar Mapping of Venus with Interferometric Resolution of the Range-Doppler
Ambiguity," Radio Scwn_* 5 (1970): 425-433; Rogers, Ingalls, and l'ettengill, "Radar Map of Venus at 3.8 cm
Wavelength," l_aru_ 21 (1974) : 237-241.
70. AIO, I6'.war_h in lono_pher_c Phy_i_:_, Research Report P_S 75 (hhaca: CRSR, 31 March 1969), pp. 2 and
11-12; Anmzal Summary Rep,rrt, (Jenter firr Radi_rphy._u._ and Spact' Re_earch, ]u b I, 196g--June 30, 1969, 30June 1969,
p. 4.
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Figure 22
Diagram of Venu._ surface features made with the Hay_tack-Westford interferomet_ Feature._ observed with the Hayxtack-
Westfirrd inter[enrmeter are irulicated varimzs_ by capital Otters, Ronum nu._aL_, and _oordinate numbers. Goldstein _ Alpha
aru] Beta regions are indicated (lb%6_m ot and Rtr_gion fl), while the labeL_ gTt,en t0' Caq_enter are _hown in parenthes_.
((;_mrte._y of Alan E. If. l¢ogers.)
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Figure 23
The anteT_na tmilt I_ Aredt_ ()h_ervat_ emph_ee and radio amateur Sam Harris and locatevl at Higuilbde._ alumt I0 km
[rom the main dish. Ilarri_ avul his antenna are a reminder of the important role .wl[-taught engtnev'r_ and radio arrutteu_
have pbtyed in the desig'n and construction of scientific instruments, particularly in the field of astronomy. (C_mrte._y of Ray
]urg_. )
Undertaking radar interferometric observations of Venus at Arecibo was Cornell
graduate student Don Campbell. Campbell came to Cornell from Australia, his native
country, where he had studied radio astronomy at the University of Sydney, though not
through the agreement between the two universities. 71 His observations of Venus in 1969
with the radar interferometer formed the basis of his doctoral thesis. Located about 10 km
from the Arecibo Observatory at Higuillales near Los Carlos, the auxiliary interferometer
antenna was a square parabolic section, 30 meters by 30 meters (100 ft by 100 ft) with a
movable offset feed that allowed tracking up to 10 ° from the zenith. 72
71. Campbell 7 December 1993.
72. Donald B. Campbell, "Radar lnter ferometric Observations of Venus," PhD. diss., Cornell,July 1971;
AIO, Research in hmospher_c t'hy_ics, Research Repolt ILS 75 (l(llaca: CRSR, 31 March 1969), pp. 12-13; Campbell,
.]u_gens, Dyce, F. Sam Harris, and Pettengill, "Radar [nlenferometdc Observations of Venus at 70-Centimeter
Wavelength," S_ien_e 170 (1970): 1090-1092.
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Figure 24
Rtutar interJerometric image OJ Venus m_ule by l)on (;ampbell firr hii 1971 doctoral di._sertati_m, which was a study of Venus
using the Are_lu_ Oh_ervat_rry rout Higuillales antenna._ a._ a rudar inlerferometer The re._olutitm is about 150 kin. The Alpha
reg_rn can he _een in the bn_e'r right c_rrTv_; and Beta lb%rio i._ visible in the upper left c_rrner ((_mrteJy olD. B. Cxtmp_ll,
Cornell Univer_ity 0
As Don Campbell remembered, the original antenna was owned by Sam Harris, an
Arecibo employee, who used it for his backyard amateur radio Moon bounces. Harris was
a self-taught engineer well known in the "ham" community for his Moon-bounce work and
had a column in the popular ham journal QSTfor many years. "He was a real character,"
Campbell reflected. 'I always enjoyed working with him and in getting this interferome-
ter to work over the year or so that it took."73
The 430-MHz radar interferometer went into operation in March 1969. Jurgens,
Campbell, and Dyce made interferometric observations of Venus between 20 March and
27 April 1969. Unfortunately, because the interferometer antenna was so small, the radar
sensitivity fell sharply, and they achieved a surface resolution of only 300 km. The north-
south ambiguity had been resolved, but at the loss of resolution. From the data, nonethe-
less, Campbell deduced that the Faraday region was the same as Goldstein's ct and
73, Campbell 7 December 1993,
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Carpenter's E He concluded, "Despite the considerable advance that the radar interfer-
ometer represents over other methods in mapping the surface scattering of Venus at radio
wavelengths, we still know very little about the actual nature of the surface. ''74 In other
words, the images really said nothing about the planet's geology.
Campbell returned to Cornell, wrote his thesis, and graduated in July 1971. He then
returned to Arecibo as a Research Associate employed by the NAIC. An improved line
feed promised better observations during the next Venus inferior conjunction in 1972.
Although delays in manufacturing the new analog-to-digital converters, as well as power
outages, caused lost observing time, Campbell mapped Venus with the radar
interferometer and achieved a resolution of about 100 kin. "That was the last fling prior
to the upgrade," Campbell recalled. 7-_
Campbell also derived Venus topographical (relief or surface height) information
fiom the 1972 data. The most notable result was the discovery of what appeared to be a
motmtainotts zone located at a longitude of 100 ° and having a peak height of about 3 kin.
Ahhough not at the same location as Jurgens's suspected crater, which still remained
noted only in his dissertation, these mountains became the second clearly identified topo-
graphical feature on the surface of Venus, following a pioneering study by Smith and
other Lincoln Laboratory and MIT investigators at Haystack published two years earlier. 76
Dick Goldstein also observed Venus in 1972 with a radar interferometer that com-
bined tile Mars Station with a nearby 26-meter antenna. These were Goldstein's first Venus
observations with an interferometer. Because he did not suffer the obstacles thrown at
Don Campbell, Gotdstein was able to update his large-scale, low-resolution map of Venus,
which now had a resohttion of 10-15 kin. He also assembled his first altitude map. A gray
scale of only five levels, with each level representing a set of altitude values, indicated the
degree of relief. The map showed a large crater about 160 km in diameter about 36 ° West
longitude and 2 ° South latitude. Goldstein estimated the height of the crater rim to be
about 500 meters above the crater floor. This was the first distinguishable crater Goldstein
found in his radar data; several years earlier, though, RayJurgens had identified a crater
in his Cornell dissertation. 77
By the 1972 inferior conjunction of Venus, the combination of range-Doppler map-
ping and radar interferometry was beginning to reveal a general overview of the planet's
tnajor surface features. Although Venus still looked like a strange fish bowl in radar
i,nages, hmar range-Doppler images looked more like photographs. These initial tentative
steps, whatever their drawbacks, began to set in motion a shift in the planetary radar par-
adigm from astronomy to geology. Like the far more successful (because they looked like
and had greater resolution than ground-based photographs) lunar radar images, Venus
radar images showed that planetary radar astronomy could tell scientists useful informa-
tion about distant surface formations. These images were not the only techniques radar
astronomers had for describing planetary surface conditions. Coincidental with the grad-
ual evolution of planetary radar toward these geological problems, NPuSA was turning
fiom Apollo to planetary missions.
74. Campbell 7 December 1993; AIO, lOwarrh in hmo.q*heric l'hysir._, Research Report RS 75 (Ithaca:
CRSR, 31 March 1969), pp. 12-13; IbieL, Research Report RS 76 (Ithaca: CRSR, 30 September 1969), p. 23;
Campbell, [urgens, Dyce, Harris, and Pettengill, "Radar lnterferometric Observations," pp. 1090--1092.
75. Campbell 7 December 1993; NAIC QR Q2/1972, pp. 3-4, and Q3/1973, pp, 3-4.
76. Campbell, Dyce, lngalls, Pettengill, and Shapiro, "Venus: Topography Revealed by Radar Data,"
Science 175 (1972): 514-516. Smith, Ingalls, Shapiro, and Ash, "Surface-Height Variations on Venus and
Mercury," Rculio Sciem_ 5 (1970): 411-423, presented an earlier topographical study of Venus made from
tiaystack data taken over a period of years. That study was confined to the planet's equator and found a 2-kin
feature. It was remarkable for the variety of radar techniques used, as well as for its discovery of the first topo-
graphical feature on Venus.
77. Rumsey, Morris, R. Green, and Goldstein, "A Radar Brightness and Altitude Image of a Portion of
Venus," h:aru._ 23 ( 1974): 1-7; Jurgens, "A Study of the Average and Anomalous Radar Scattering," pp. 87-110.

Chapter Six
Pioneering on Venus and Mars
Range-Doppler mapping and radar techniques for determining the roughness,
height variations, and other characteristics of planetary surfaces came into their own in
the early 1970s and shaped the kinds of problems planetary radar could solve. Radar tech-
niques and the kinds of problems they solved were cross-fertilizing forces in the evolution
of planetary radar astronomy. In the early 1970s, NASA was shifting gears. The landing of
an American on the Moon, the zenith of the Apollo program, was history when in
December 1972 Apollo 17 became the last to touch down on the Moon. Now the
unmanned exploration of the planets began in earnest.
The usefulness of radar to planetary exploration had been argued by radar
astronomers as early as the 1959 Endicott House conference. However, not everyone
shared their enthusiasm. Smith and Carr, for example, in their 1964 book on radio astron-
omy, wrote: "It is inevitable that the importance of the exploration of the planetary system
by radar will diminish as instruments and men are carried directly to the scene by space
vehicles. However, that time is still to come. In the meantime, the information that radar
provides will be vital in man's great effort to conquer space. 'q Soviet radar astronomers B.
I. Kuznetsov and I. V. Lishin expressed similar sentiments in 1967: "Certainly, radar bom-
bardment of the planets gives less information than a direct investigation of them with
spaceships and interplanetary automatic stations." However, they did foresee that infor-
mation about planetary surfaces would "help designers in the development of spaceships
intended for making a 'soft' landing on the planets. ''=
As NASA came to fund planetary radar research, experiments and NASA missions
became linked. Goldstone antenna time depended on mission approval, while Haystack
radar fimding was tied to specific, mission-oriented tasks. It is not surprising, then, that
planetary radar in the 1970s evolved in point and counterpoint to the NASA space pro-
gram, at first modestly to correct data returned from Soviet and American missions to
Venus, next to help select a Mars landing site, and then to image Venus from a spacecraft.
This evolution followed from the precedent established by NASA's funding of lunar radar
imaging for the Apollo program. The Pioneer Venus radar imaging and altimetry missions
took radar astronomy off the ground and into space. Again, just as ground-based radar
astronomy had piggybacked itself onto Big Science radio astronomy facilities, so the
Pioneer Venus radar attached itself to a larger mission to explore the planet's atmosphere.
The new techniques and problem-solving activities drew radar astronomers into clos-
er contact with planetary scientists from a variety of disciplines who were not necessarily
familiar with radar or the interpretation of radar results. It was one thing for radar
astronomers to determine a spin rate for a planet or the value of the astronomical unit;
astronomers easily grasped those discoveries. However, when radar astronomers described
planetary surfaces in such abstract terms as root-mean-square slope to geologists, whose dis-
cipline rests heavily on hands-on field knowledge, a communication problem arose and
serious misinterpretations and misunderstandings of radar results ensued.
1. Smith and Carr, pp. 130-131.
2. Kuznetsov and Lishin, p. 201.
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The Radar Radius of Venus
On 18 October 1967, the Soviet Venera 4 space probe entered the atmosphere of
Venus and began to transmit data back to Earth. From that data, Soviet scientists calculat-
ed a value for the radius of Venus, 6,079 + 3 kin, on the assumption that the break in the
probe's transmissions indicated that it had reached the planet's surface. On the following
day, Mariner 5 passed within 4,100 km of Venus and conducted a series of experiments.
From the data beamed back to Earth, Mariner scientists atJPL calculated a value for the
radius of Venus that was compatible with that determined by their Soviet colleagues, 6,080
± 10 km.
The data from Venera 4 and Mariner 5 were consistent with each other and with the
latest optical data, which yielded a value of 6,089 ± 6 km. However, the space and optical
values differed markedly from the size of the radius, 6,056 ± 1.2 km, determined by Irwin
Shapiro, Bill Smith, and Michael Ash with the Lincoln Laboratory radars as part of the
Planetary Ephemeris Program. 3
If the spacecraft and optical measurements were correct, then the radar data or its
analysis were in error. The radius of Venus was a critical radar measurement; its value, for
example, could serve to study the planet's topography. Radar astronomers associated with
MIT and the Haystack Observatory, Gordon Pettengill, Irwin Shapiro, Dick Ingalls,
Michael Ash, and Marty Slade, and those at the Arecibo Observatory, Rolf Dyce, Don
Campbell, Ray Jurgens, and Tommy Thompson, took up the challenge in collectively
authored papers that appeared in Science and the Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences. The
publications embraced both a general audience and atmospheric specialists.
In addition to data collected previously at Millstone, Haystack, and Arecibo, the MIT-
Arecibo radar astronomers added data from fresh radar observations made in 1966 and
1967 as well as optical observations from the U.S. Naval Observatory from the period 1950
through 1965. The magnitude of the data base was impressive and convincing. The
Arecibo and MIT investigators analyzed their data separately and obtained radii of 6,052
± 2 km and 6,048 ± 1 km, respectively. They concluded that Mariner 5 had misjudged its
distance from the planet's center by about 10 km, and that "the simple possibility that
Venera 4 underestimated its altitude by about 35 km cannot yet be ruled out. ''4
Dewey Muhleman, now professor of planetary science at the California Institute of
Technology, with Bill Melbourne and D. A. O'Handley of JPL, made observations of Venus
between May 1964 and October 1967 with the Goldstone Mars Station. Because their data
were reported only in internal JPL reports, Lincoln Laboratory did not use that data.
Consequently, they asserted, their observations constituted "an entirely independent data
source." Mtthleman and hisJPL colleagues determined a value for the radius of Venus of
6,053.7 ± 2.2 kin, in strong agreement with the MIT and Arecibo results. 5
Ar_ydas Kliore and Dan L. Cain, twoJPL scientists on the Mariner mission, saw the
agreement between the Caltech-JPL and the Arecibo-MIT values and realized that "the
consistency between reductions from data taken by different radars and reduced by dif-
ferent investigators cannot be ignored." They discovered that the different timing systems
3. C.W. Snyder, "Mariner 5 Flight past Venus," Science 158 (1967): 1665-1669; Arvydas Kliore, Gerald
S. Lexy, Dan L. Cain, Gunnar I,]eldbo, S. Ichtiaque Rasool, "Atmosphere and Ionosphere of Venus from the
Mariner 5 S-band Radio Occultation Experiment," Scien_ 158 (1967): 168.']-1688; Gerard H. de Vaucouleurs and
Donald H. Menzel, "Resnhs of the Occultation of Regulus by Venus,July 7. 1959," Nature 188 (1960): 28-33; Ash,
Shapiro, and Smith, Astronomical]_mrnal 72 (1967): 338-350.
4. Ash, Campbell, Dyce, Ingalls, Juvgens, Pettengill, Shapiro, Martin A. Slade, and Thompson, "The
Case for the Radar Radius of Venus," Science 160 (1968): 985-987; Ash, Campbell, Dyce, Ingalls, Jurgens,
Pettengill, Shapiro, Slade, Smilh, and Thompson, "The Case for the Radar Radius of Venus," Jtmrnal _ the
Atmospheric Stlenceg 25 (1918): 560-563; Shapiro 1 October 1993.
5. William G. Melbourne, Muhleman, and D. A. O'Handley, "Radal Determination of the Radius of
Venus," ,S)ieno" 160 (1968): 987-989.
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used by the Deep Space Network to acquire Mariner 5 data, namely Station Time and
Ephemeris Time, had introduced an error into their calculations. The amount of that
error, 8.85 kin, brought the Mariner 5 value for the radius of Venus in line with the radar
results.
To explain what was now the anomalous Soviet value for the raditts of Venus, Kliore
and Cain concluded that either the Venera 4 capsule landed on a peak or plateau that was
about 25 km high and not detected by planetary radar or the capsule stopped transmit-
tins before reaching the solid surface of Venus. The problem with Venera 4, Don
Campbell ventured, %vas tied up in an ambiguity difficulty in their own radar system,
which was a pulsed altimeter radar. I think, frankly, that the scientists who reported the
results did not know how it worked. It was a military radar altimeter. They were.just pro-
vided the answer, essentially. Although I don't know, and probably didn't know at the time
either, what exactly the circumstances were, that was the impression that one got."6
"A Little Radar Knowledge is a Dangerous Thing."
Well before radar astronomers began collaborating with geologists, misinterpreta-
tions of radar data occurred. In fact, radar astronomers themselves were not immune to
misconstruing radar resuhs, as the case of the radar brightness of Mars illustrates. In ini-
tial observations of that planet, radar astronomer Dick Goldstein assumed a relationship
between radar brighmess and optical darkness. Arecibo observations appeared to confirm
that relationship, which snowballed among planetary astronomers into a hypothesis that
correlated radar brightness and topography (continental blocks and dry ocean basins). A
reconsideration of evidence showed no such correlation.
When Dick Goldstein made his pioneering radar observations of Mars in 1963, he
discovered what he thought was a relationship between radar "brightness," that is, the
average amount of power returned in the echo from a given surface area of the planet,
anti the optical darkness of that same surface area. Goldstein constructed what he called
a radar map of Mars, which showed variations in radar brightness. He noted, for example,
that the Syrtis Major region appeared bright to the radar, but dark to visual observations.
Because radar brightness is a function of surface roughness, he argued, the brightest
radar areas were regions of flatness, while dark radar areas were topographically rough. 7
In 1965, (;oldstein observed Mars at the next opposition and again looked at the
radar brightness of the planet's surface, this time at latitude 21 ° North. The average power
returned (radar brightness) reached a maximum in the region of Tri_um Charontis (an
optically dark area), then dropped off abruptly when the neighboring area of Elysium
(optically bright) was the radar target. Based on the known relationship between surface
roughness and radar brightness, Goldstein concluded the existence of a very smooth,
strongly reflecting area extending 20 ° to 30 ° in longitude and haxfng an unknown latitu-
dinal extent in the region ofTrivium CharontisY
During the same opposition, Gordon Pettengill, Rolf Dyce, and Don Campbell
observed Mars with the UHF radar at Arecibo. When they compared their results with an
optical map of Mars, the Arecibo investigators found a general tendency for weak echoes
to correlate with the (optically) lighter areas of Mars, such as Arabia, Elysium, Tharsis, and
6. Kliore and Cain, "Mariner 5 and the Radius ofVenus,"]m_rnal .]Atm_phe_w ,g+iem_ 25 ( 1968): 549-
554; Campbell 7 December 1993. Murray, pp. 90-91, provides l'mlher anecdolal accounting of Soviet embar-
l_SSlIlel'l| over t[|c inf'idelr_t+
7. Goldstein and Gillmore, "Radar Observations of Mars," Scien+_ 141 (1963): 1172.
8. (;oldstein, "Mals: Radar Observations,"S+'zemelSO (1965): 1715-1717. Ills fcsuhs wclt_ leportcd also
in (;_)klstcin, "Preliminary Mal s Radar Rcsulls," Radio ,St'zeme 691) ( 1965): 1625-1627.
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Amazonis, and a tendency for strong echoes to correspond with visually darker features,
such as the regions near Trivium Charontis and Syrtis Major. They did, however, note that
the correlation between radar brightness and optical lightness was not perfect. For
instance, the peak radar echo near Trivium Charontis occurred at 201 ° longitude, which
is on one edge of the visually dark region. Likewise, the visually darkest region of Syrtis
Major corresponded to a local minimum in echo strength. 9
The Arecibo results were rather convincing. Not only had they been obtained from
roughly the same area (22 ° North latitude) that Goldstein had studied, but the Arecibo
and Goldstone observations had been made at two different frequencies (UHF vs. S-
band). The persistence of the correlation between optical darkness and radar brightness
at both frequencies was persuasive.
Astronomers Carl Sagan and James B. Pollack, then at the Smithsonian Astrophysical
Observatory, and Richard Goldstein carried out a lengthy and detailed analysis of theJPL
1963 and 1965 radar data. They maintained and extensively documented the correlation
between high radar reflectivity and optical darkness, despite some exceptions. Not only
did radar bright and optically dark areas correlate; they claimed that topography and
radar brightness also were related. Dark areas were elevations similar to continental
blocks; bright areas were comparable to dry ocean basins) _ The notion that Martian dark
areas were elevated land masses rapidly gathered support from other planetary
astronomers in the United States and Britain. tl
Nonetheless, Pettengiil, who had participated in the earlier effort at Arecibo, now
opposed the correlation of visual darkness and radar brightness and undertook observa-
tions at Haystack, during the 1967 opposition, specifically in order to oppose the
prevailing hypothesis that now correlated topography and radar brightness. Pettengill
conducted a series of straightforward, precise range measurements to establish the
topographical variations along latitude 22 ° North. Then he compared those range mea-
surements with the average planetary radius taken from the planetary ephemeris data. He
also plotted echo power over longitude along that same latitude.
Pettengill found no significant correlation between radar brightness and topogra-
play. A direct comparison between the radar results and a inap of visible Martian surface
features revealed no clear one-to-one association between bright or dark areas and
topographical extremes. What others had observed as variations in radar brightness,
Pettengill argued, resulted from the deviant properties of relatively small regions of the
surtace near the subradar point. Moreover, he pointed out, arguments for the hypotheti-
cal correlation between elevation extremes and brightness had been based largely on
conclusions drawn from a range of disparate isolated locations. Further Haystack obser-
vations of Mars carried out under Pettengill's direction reinforced the conclusion that no
correlation existed between regions of high radar reflectivity and optically dark areas.t2
Perhaps one of the most notorious examples of misinterpreted radar results is that
of Thomas Gold of Cornell University. Gold had been developing theories about the lunar
surface since the 1950s. Long before he ever saw any radar data, Gold favored a meteoric
9. Dyce, Pettengill, and S,'inchez, "Radar Obsevvations of Mars and Jupiter at 70 cm," The A.*tronomical
J_mrna172 (1967):771-777; Campbell 7 December 1993.
10. Carl Sagan, James B. Pollack, and Goldstein, "Radar Doppler Spectroscopy of Mars: 1. Elevation
Differences between Bright and Dark Areas," The Astronomical]_mrnal 72 (1967): 20-34. This article appeared
earlier as Sagan, Pollack, and Goldstein, Rtular D_q_Jler S],_'ctr_._py o[ Ma_: 1. E_,ati.n l)![]erenc_._ tretween Bright arul
Dark Arett*, Special Report 221 (Cambridge: SAt, 6 September 1966).
11. See, for example, D. G. Rea, "The Darkening Wave on Mars," Nature 210 (1964): 1014-1015; R. A.
Wells. "Evidence that the Dark Areas on Mars are Elevated Mountain Ranges," Nature207 (1965): 735-736. Rea
was at the Univel sity of California at Berkeley, and Wells at University College, London.
12. Pettengill, Counsehnan, Rainville, and Shapiro, "Radar Measurements of Martian Topography," The
A,_tronomical]_mrnal 74 (1969): 461-482; Pettengill, Rogers, and Shapiro, "Martian Craters and a Scarp as Seen
by Radar," Sc_rn_e 174 (1971): 1324.
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explanation for lunar craters and developed an explanation for the presence of vast flat
level surfaces that did not require the deposition of volcanic lava. His hypothesis was that
these flat expanses consisted of dust from meteoric impacts. Gold interpreted radar obser-
vations of the Moon as supporting the existence of a surface layer of fine rock powder sev-
eral meters deep, which a seismic experiment carried out by Apollo 12 allegedly support-
ed. The implications for landing an American on the Moon were obvious; an astronaut
might sink several centimeters into the powder or even "wallow" in it. 13
Many scientists greeted Gold's prediction of a deep layer of powder with disbelief. As
Don E. Wilhehns wrote, "Four Surveyor and six Apollo landings established the strength,
thickness, block content, impact origin, and paucity of meteoric material in the Moon's
regolith. There is fine pulverized soil, but it is weak only for a few centimeters of its thick-
ness. Yet Thomas Gold is still fighting the battle. Still believing radar more than geologi-
cal sampling... 'u4 Wilhelms went so far as to state, "A little radar knowledge is a dangerous
thing. 'uS Gold later defended himself by insisting that although the "Gold dust" (as it has
come to be called) would be many meters thick, the idea of sinking in it was a "total mis-
conception."16
The Apollo program started the process of bringing together radar astronomers and
geologists. The hmar radar images created by Tommy Thompson and Stan Zisk from data
gathered at Arecibo and Haystack contributed not inconsequentially to America's explo-
ration of the Moon. On occasion, nonetheless, radar astronomers misinterpreted lunar
landing sites. In one instance, a landslide was mistaken for a field of boulders at the Apollo
17 landing site, while in another radar astronomers incorrectly characterized the rough-
ness of the Apollo 14 Cone Crater site. These problems, however, arose not from mistak-
en readings of radar images, but from misinterpretations of the root-mean-square slope
and dielectric constants of the surfaceJ 7
Landing on Mars
During the preparation for the Viking mission to Mars, radar astronomers encoun-
tered the challenge of making radar data understandable to NASA mission personnel
unfamiliar with the interpretation of radar results. Until Congress funded the Voyager
mission to Jupiter and Saturn, Viking was NASA's biggest and most expensive program for
planetary exploration. Viking was to land on that planet, and NASA needed a landing site
that was both safe for the lander and interesting to scientists. Radar astronomers collect-
ed and interpreted data to help with the selection of candidate sites.
The selection of the Viking lander site also brought together ground-based planetary
radar astronomy and the Stanford bistatic radar approach under the aegis of NASA.
Ground-based planetary radar astronomy had distinguished itself from "space explo-
ration" (the Stanford approach), but the boundary between ground-based planetary
radar astronomy and "space exploration" softened, as radar astronomers played an
expanding role in NASA missions of planetary exploration and as Stanford investigators
extended their field of applications.
13. Gold, "I'he Lunar Surface," Monthly Noticm of the Royal Astronomical ,_c/ety 115 (1955): 585-604;
Malcolm J. CampbelI,Juris Ulrichs, and Gold, "Density of the Lunar Surface," Science159 (1968): 973; Gold and
Steven Sorer, "Apollo 12 Seismic Signal: Indication of a Deep Layer of Powder," Scienc_ 169 (1970): 1071-1075;
Gold, "The Moon's Surface," in Wilmot N. Hess, Menzel and John A. O'Keefe, eds., The Nature of the Lunar
Sur[ace (Bahimore:Johns ttopkins University Press, 1966), pp. 107-121; Gold, "Conjectures about the Evolution
of fhe Moon." The Moon 7 (May-June 1973): 29.°-306.
14. Don E. Wi[helms, 7b A I?ockyMoon: A (;eoh_gi.st_tttstory ofl.unarExphrration (Tucson: The University
of Arizona Press, 1993), p. 347.
15. Wilhehns, p. 299.
16. Gold 14 December 1993.
17. Schaber 27June 1994; Thompson 29 November 1994.
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Imagesof Marsfromearliermissionsprovidedacluein selectingcandidateViking
landingsites.Asearlyas1965,Mariner4hadflownpastMarsandsnapped22picturesof
aboutonepercentoftheplanet'surface.Mariner6andMariner7tookabout200images
of around10percentofthesurfacein1969.ThegoalofMariner9,tomakeacomplete
photographicmapofMarswasthwarted;whenthespacecraftrrivedatitsdestination,a
planet-wideuststormconcealedmostof thesurface.Oncethestormappearedtosub-
side,Mariner9begantotransmitmagestoEarthinearly1972,andthestudyofMartian
topographybeganinearnest.TM
Unlike the Mariner flybys, Viking was to study Mars by landing on its surface. A pair
of orbiters was to focus on atmospheric studies, while a pair oflanders studied the surface,
if all went well. If the Viking landers were to touch down on a large rock or precariously
on an edge, the entire mission might be lost. The clearance under the lander body was
only 23 cm (nine inches), so a relatively smooth landing surface was a prime mission req-
uisite.
NASA selected landing and backup sites tor two landers. The sites had to be around
25 ° North latitude; at any other latitude, the orbiter solar panels would not receive suffi-
cient solar energy to keep the spacecraft's batteries charged. That power was critical to the
transmission of telemetry to Earth.
A major criteria for selecting candidate landing sites was the potential availability of
water. Water meant the possibility of finding life, which was a major mission objective.
Chryse, located at 19.5 ° North and 34 ° West, was scientifically interesting, because it is
located at the lower end of a valley where the largest group of Martian channels diverges.
The site may have been a drainage basin for a large portion of equatorial Mars and, there-
fore, would have collected deposits of a variety of surface materials, ju
Despite the scientific interest in Chryse as the prime Viking landing site, the high-
resolution Mariner 9 images lacked sufficient resolution to determine the site's safety. As
Don Campbell recalled: "NASA was very concerned about how rough the surface was at
the landing site. None of the Mariner 9 imagery had any hope of giving information at
scales of 10 cm to a meter, which was the amount of surface roughness that they cared
about. ''2° Mariner 9 images had a resolution of about 100 meters, roughly the size of a
football field, and simply did not show objects small enough to jeopardize the touchdown
of the lander, which had a clearance of only 23 cm. The radar data, in contrast, were capa-
ble of indicating surface roughness down to objects only a few centimeters across. Once
again, radar was going to try to solve a problem left unresolved by optical methods.
The Stanford Center for Radar Astronomy
In order to help select candidate Viking landing sites, NASA turned to radar astron-
omy and its ability to appraise gross and fine surface characteristics. The chief advocate
for the use of radar data was Carl Sagan. Sagan was concerned about the possibility that
the first lander might disappear in quicksand at one of the equatorial sites. In general, he
believed that too much stress had been placed on visual images with a resolution of only
100 meters and not enough on radar, which could indicate surface irregularities at the
18. Coiliss, 77u, V, king Mi_i*m l_ Ma_:*, NASA SP-334 (Washington: N¢_SA, 1974), pp. 6-8; Thomas A.
Mutch, Raymond E. ±Mvidson..]ames W. Head, Ill, Kenneth L. Jones, R. Stephen Saunders, The (;eollJl_ _fMa_:*
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
19. Martin Marietta Aerospace, The VikingMi._._itm to Mar_ (Denver: Martin Marietta, 1975), pp. lII-21 to
III-23; Edward Clinton Ezell and Linda Neuman Ezell, On Mar_: Ex'pl¢*ration _4 th_ 16,d Planet, 1958-1978, NASA
SP4212 (Washington: NASA, 1984), p. 298.
20. Campbell 8 Decembe_ 1993.
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10-cm scale. Sagan urged further study of the meaning of the radar data, so that the prop-
erties of the Martian soil could be better evaluated.
In response to Sagan's urging, on 1 March 1973, Tom Young and Gerald Soften,
Viking science integration manager and project scientist, respectively, met with Von
Eshleman and Len Tyler of the Stanford Center for Radar Astronomy. Both already were
investigators on Viking with a ,'adio scattering experiment. Young and Soften asked Tyler
to acquire, analyze, and interpret radar data and to set up a radar study team for the selec-
tion of Viking landing sites. Tyler agreed. 21
The Viking Project Office probably approached the Stanford Center for Radar
Astronomy because Eshleman and Tyler already were Viking investigators, but also
because of the Center's experience in interpreting Doppler spectra from the hmar sur-
face. The Stanford Center for Radar Astronomy (SCRA) was a.joint venture of Stanford
University and the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) created in 1962 to foster scientific
and engineering efforts and to provide graduate student training in radar astronomy and
space science. It was the umbrella organization for Eshleman and his program of bistatic
radar astronomy. A NASA grant underwrote the Center itself, while additional military
and civilian awards supported a range of theoretical and experimental radio and radar
research on space, ionospheric, and communication theory topics. 22
Len Tyler, as did his Stanford colleague Dick Simpson, brought considerable knowl-
edge of radar techniques to the effort. A graduate of Georgia Institute of Technology,
Tyler had been at the SCRA since 1967, when he received his doctorate in electrical engi-
neering from Stanford under Von Eshleman. Tyler invited Dick Simpson to work on the
Viking data. Simpson, a graduate of the MIT electrical engineering program, had joined
the SCRA in 1967 as a research assistant while working on his MS and Ph.D. in electrical
engineering2 :_
Later, during the 1978 Mars opposition, Simpson and Tyler conducted 29 bistatic
radar observations using the Viking 1 and 2 orbiter spacecraft in conjunction with the
DSN antennas at Goldstone and Tidbinbilla (near Canberra, Australia) to study Mars snr-
face roughness and scattering properties, and Simpson made ground-based monostatic
radar observations of Mars, not associated with the Viking project, at Arecibo34 Their
radar work, however, began much earlier, during the Apollo era.
For his doctoral thesis, Tyler had developed a method for creating two-dimensional
surface images of the Moon using an Earth-based transmitter and a spacecraft receiver
and based on theoretical work laid out earlier by another SCRA investigator, Gunnar
Fjeldbo (now known as Lindal). 25 Tyler first applied his bistatic imaging method on
Explorers 33 (which missed the Moon) and 35, the first U.S. spacecraft to orbit the Moon,
21. Tylel 10 May 1994; Ezel[ and Ezell, pp. 309 and 320-321; "VOIR, Proposal to the NASA Management
Section, 2/79," Box 13,JPLMM.
22. SCRA, l_._ear_h at the Stanf¢rrd C.enterfin- R_utar Astronomy, semi-annual status report no. 2 for the peri-
od 1 .July-31 December 1963 (Stanford: RLSEL, February 1964), pp. 3-4; Ibid., no. 4 for the period 1 .July -
31 December 1964 (Stanford: RLSEL, January 1965), pp. 2-3; Ibid., no. 5 for the period 1January-30June 1965
(Stanford: RLSEL,.luly 1965), pp. 5-6; Ibid., no. 6 for the period 1 July-31 December 1965 (Stanford: RLSEL,
January 1966), p. 4; lbid,, no. 7 for the period 1 January-31 .June 1966 (Stanford: RLSEL, August 1966), p. 5;
Ibid., no. 9 for the period 1 .]anuary-30.June 1967 (Stanford: RLSEL, 9 July 1967), pp. 6-8; John E, Ohlson,
,4 RtMar Investzl_ation ¢_/the Solar ('un-trna, SU-SEL-67- 071, Scientific Report 21 (Stanford: RLSEL, August 1967),
23. Simpson 10 May 1994.
24. Richard A. Simpson and G. Leonard Tyler, '%riking Bislatic Radar Experiment: Summary of First-
Order Results Emphasizing North Polar Data," /carus 46 (1981): 361-389; Simpson and Tyler, "Radar
Measurement of I teterogeneous Small-Scale surface Texture on Mars: Chryse,"flmrnal o]-(;erg*hy_ical l_'._earch 85
(1980): 6610-6614; Simpson 10 May 1994.
25. Fjeldbo, "Bistatic-Radar Methods for Studying Planetary Ionospheres and Surfaces," Ph.D. diss.,
Stanford University, 1964, especially pp. 64-82. Later published as Fjeldbo, Bistatic-Rad.r Meth_L_ fin-Studying
P&_netary hmmphere_ and Sur[aces, SR 2 (Stanford: RLSEL, 1964).
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and obtained crude meter-scale measurements of surface roughness and radar bright-
ness. 26 With Simpson, Tyler performed bistatic radar experiments on the Moon using the
Apollo 14, 15 (at 13 and 116 cm), and 16 (at 13 cm only) command service modules while
those vehicles were in lunar orbit; at the same time, they were receiving the S-band (13
cm) signals at Goldstone and the VHF (116 cm) signals at the Stanford 46-meter (150-ft)
dish. However, Tyler and Simpson did not do imaging; they were more concerned with
scattering mechanisms. _7
Mars Radar
Tyler and Simpson began working on the Viking landing site selection problem by
surveying and re-analyzing the available data. Radar data from several oppositions already
were available, and those data obtained during the 1965 opposition were from the latitude
of the preferred Viking landing sites, around 20 ° North. Radar studies of Mars made dur-
ing the 1969 opposition provided useful topographical and surface roughness measure-
ments, though not at latitudes interesting to the Viking mission. Haystack observed a
swath of the planet's surface near the equator (latitudes 3 ° and 12 ° North), while
Goldstone took observations at three latitudes (3 °, 11 °, and 12 ° North).2s
26. Tyler 10 May 1994; Tyler, The Bistatic Continuous-Wave Radar Method for the Study of Planetary Surfaces,
SU-SEL-65-096, Scientific Report 13 (Stanford: RLSEL, October 1965), which later appeared as Tyler, "rhe
Bistatic, Continuous-Wave Radar Method for the Study of Planetary Surfaces," Journal of Geophysical Research 71
(1966): 1559-1567; Tyler, Bistatic-Rtular lmaging and Measurement Techniquesfor the Study of Planetary Surfaces, SU-
SEL-67-042, Scientific Report 19 (Stanford: RLSEL, May 1967); Tyler and Simpson, Bistatie-Radar Studies of the
Moon with Explorer 35: Final Report Part 2, SR 3610-2, SU-SEL-704)68 (Stanford: RLSEL, October 1970); Tyler and
Simpson, "Bistatic Radar Measurements of Topographic Variations in Lunar Surface Slopes with Explorer 35,"
Radio Science 5 (1970) : 263-271; SCRA, Proposal to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for Bistatic Radar
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Surveyor Orbiter,Proposal RL 21--62 (Stanford: RLSEL, 7 September 1962), Eshleman materials.
27. Tyler 10 May 1994; Simpson 10 May 1994; Simpson and Tyler, "Radar Scattering Laws for the Lunar
Surface," IEEE Transactions on Antennas and Propagation AP-30 (1982) : 438--449; Simpson, ULunar Radar Echoes:
An Interpretation Emphasizing Characteristics of the Leading Edge," Ph.D. dias., Stanford University, 1973.
28. Tyler 10 May 1994; Rogers, Ash, Counselman, Shapiro, and Pettengill, "Radar Measurements of
Surface Topography and Roughness of Mars," Radio Saence 5 (1970): 465-473; Goldstein, Melbourne, Morris,
George S. Downs, and O'Handley, "Preliminary Radar Results of Mars," Radio Saence 5 (1970): 475-478.
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Outline of Mars topography at 8 ° north of the equator relea._ed by JPL in July 1969. The outer white, circle, indicates a six-mile-
hitch scale. The inner irregular line traces' topographical variations found by radar. Syrtis Major and Trivium Charontis _'-e
fimnd to be long sltrpes. The c_rrrelation of radar topographic data with known features in Mars photographic images aided
geologists' ability to interp'ret the physical and historical geology of the planet. (Courtesy of Jet Propulsion Laboratory, photo
no. 331-4539.)
The 1969 apd earlier data, moreover, were too noisy to be of any use in sorting out
a Viking landing site. The best data had been collected during the 1971 opposition, when
Mars came closer to Earth than it would again for 17 years. Goldstone achieved its high-
est resolutions to date; results showed a rugged terrain, with elevation differences greater
than 13 km from peak to valley. Altitude profiles showed heavy cratering, including
several large craters 50 to 100 km in diameter and 1 to 2 krn deep. Haystack also made
high-resolution Mars radar observations during the 1971 opposition, measured surface
heights with relative errors down to about 75 meters, and correlated craters detected by
radar with those in images taken by Mariner. 29
29. Goldstein 14 September 1993; Downs, Goldstein, R. Green, Morris, "Mars Radar Observations, A
Preliminary Report," Sctenc.e 174 (1971): 1324-1327; Downs, Goldstein, R. Green, Morris, and Reichley, "Martian
Topography and Surface Properties as Seen by Radar: The 1971 Opposition," Icarus 18 (1973): 8-21; PettengiU,
Shapiro, and Rogers, "Topography and Radar Scattering Properties of Mars," Icarus 18 ( 1973): 22-28; Pettengill,
Rogers, and Shapiro, "Martian Craters and a Scarp as Seen by Radar," Science 174 (1971): 1321-1324.
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Nonetheless, even that high-resolution data was not useful to the selection of a
Viking landing site. Because of the geometries of the Earth and Mars during that opposi-
tion, planetary radar astronomers observed the southern hemisphere of the planet. The
Goldstone radar observed Mars at latitude 16 ° South. Haystack observations during the
1971 opposition also examined southern latitudes, s° The best candidates for the Viking
mission were in the northern hemisphere.
Thus, in 1973, when Tyler undertook the interpretation of Mars radar data for the
selection of the Viking landing sites, radars had not observed the preferred Viking land-
ing area near 20 ° North since 1967, nor any of the backup sites near the equator prior to
1975. The Viking Project Office funded a round of Mars radar observations in 1973 at the
Haystack, Arecibo, and Goldstone radar telescopes at UHF, S-band, and X-band frequen-
cies. Don Campbell and Rolf Dyce provided the Arecibo data, while Dick Goldstein and
George Downs took the Goldstone data, and Gordon Pettengill furnished the Haystack
data.Sl
The 1973 Haystack Mars data was placed in the same format as that obtained at
Arecibo in order to facilitate their comparison. Although Haystack provided an abun-
dance of radar data, its signal-to-noise ratio was generally too low for a detailed study of
surface characteristics. The Haystack klystron was acting up, 32 and Haystack ceased to par-
ticipate in the Viking mission; shortly thereafter Haystack stopped all planetary radar
experiments.
The 1973 Viking Mars data provided no direct information on potential landing
sites. The orbital geometries of Earth and Mars meant that the subradar points of the
three telescopes swept areas in the southern hemisphere, between latitudes 14 ° and 22 °
South far from either the main or backup landing sites. 3,_The 1973 data, nonetheless, pro-
vided an opportunity to better understand the radar properties of the Martian surface and
for Tyler, in particular, to begin the difficult task of explaining the surface roughness of
Mars in terms of root-mean-square (rms) slope to an audience unacquainted with the
interpretation of radar data.
Radar Tutorials
Mariner images made the surface of Mars obvious to everyone. Radar data on sur-
face roughness was not at all obvious and required expert interpretation. The "rift
between believers in radar and believers in photography," in the words of Edward Clinton
Ezell and Linda Neuman Ezell, first appeared at a meeting of the Viking landing site work-
ing group on 25 April 1972, 34 well before Tyler and radar became a part of the site selec-
tion process.
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31. Simpson, Tyler, and Belinda J. Lipa, Analysis _ Radar Data from Marl SR 3276-1, SU-SEL-74-047
(Stanford: SCRA, October 1974).
32. lngalls 5 May 1994; Simpson 10 May 1994.
33. Memorandum, Sebring to Distribution, 9 December 1970, 44/2/AC 135; "Applications of High
Power Radar to Studies of the Planets, NASA, 7/1/69- 6/30/70," 67/2/AC 135; "Radar Studies of the Planets,
NASA. 7/1/726/30/73," 68/2/AC 135, MITA; NEROC, Final Progre_ I_pmt R¢ular Studte._ of the Planets, 29 August
1974, pp. 1-2; NEROC, X,'miannual Retmrt ¢(the Haystack ObservaOrry, t5July 1972, p. ii; Simpson, Tyler, and Lipa,
"Mars Surface Properties Observed by Earth-Based Radar at 70-, 12.5-, and 3.8-cm Wavelengths," Icarus 32
(1977): 148. For the radar results themselves, see Pettengill, ,John E Chandler, Campbell, Dyce, and D. M.
Wallace, "Martian Surface Properties from Recent Radar Observations," Bulletzn o/the Anwncan Astronomical
Sot/cry 6 (1974): 372; Downs, Goldstein, R. Green, Morris, and Reichley, "Martian Topography and Surface
Properties as Seen by Radar: The 1973 Opposition," lcaru., 18 (1973): 8-21; Downs. Reichley, and R Green.
"Radar Measurements of Martian Topography and Surface Properties: The 1971 and 1973 Oppositions," haru.*
26 (1975): 273-312.
34, Ezell and Ezell, p. 298.
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The key radar information on surface characteristics was not expressed visually, but
mathematically. The abstract results were neither visual nor directly accessible by any of
the senses. Moreover, the transformation of raw radar data into information on surface
characteristics involved the interpretation of the data in terms of scattering laws and their
expression as degrees of rms slope. The number of degrees of rms slope indirectly but reli-
ably described the planet's surface roughness.
When a radar wave strikes an irregular planetary surface covered by boulders or
other material with multiple sides, a complex scattering process takes place. Some power
returns to the radar, some power is deflected away from the radar return path, while some
power scatters among the boulders. The rougher the surface, the less power returns to the
radar and the flatter is the return power spectra.
Because each radar target has a different surface makeup, its scattering behavior
w_ries. Radar astronomers have sought general laws that describe scattering behavior.
These scattering laws are mathematical descriptions of how much power is reflected back
towards the radar at different angles of incidence. They are important tools for interpret-
ing planetary radar data. At Haystack and Arecibo, radar investigators used what had
become known as the "Hagfors Law," named after the Cornell University ionosphericist
and radar astronomer.
The Hagfors Law mathematically expresses the general roughness of a planetary or
hmar surface in terms of average slope. The root-mean-square is a specific type of math-
ematical average for the expression of these average slopes. When using the Hagfors Law,
the value for the slope varies up to 3 °, the upper theoretical limit for the validity of the
assumptions underlying the Hagfors Law, although in practice much higher slope values
are normal. The 1973 slope estimates for Mars ranged from 0.5 ° to at least 3 °, suggesting
that some areas, those closest to 0.5 °, were suitable for a Viking landing. However, none
of the 1973 radar experiments had observed areas of potential Viking landing sites, s5
Tyler and the members of his radar study group presented their results to the land-
ing site working group meeting at Langley on 4 November 1974. Tyler announced that his
study group had learned a great deal: overall, the Martian surface was very heterogeneous;
Mars tended to have greater variation in surface reflectivity than Earth or the Moon; and
the planet appeared smoother than the Moon to the radar. However, he concluded, data
acquired in the southern hemisphere could not be applied to northern latitudes without
variation. Also, correlation between radar features and Mariner 9 imagery was poor.
Both Tyler and Gordon Pettengill "laced their presentations strongly with tutorial
material which greatly enhanced the ability of the group to understand and correctly
interpret their findings," reported Edward and Linda Ezell. -_6After all, geologists would
rather think about rocks than about Hagfors' Law, rms slopes, or dielectric constants, and
those in charge of making the landing site selection had no knowledge of radar. 37 The
abstract nature of the radar data, as well as its complex and difficult interpretation, had
an impact on the actual use of radar in the selection of the Viking landing site.
35. Simpson, Tyler, and Lipa, "Mars Surface Properties Observed by Earth-Based Radar at 70-, 12.5-, and
3.8-cm Wavelengths," h:aru._32 (1977): 156.
36. Ezell and Ezel[, p. 322.
37. Simpson 10 May 1994; Schaber 27June 1994; Shoemaker 30June 1994; Soderblom 26June 1994;
Gold 14 December 1993.
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The Landing Site
The selection of the final landing site of Viking 1 was a long, tedious, and dramatic
process. 38 The sites under consideration at the last minute, literally during the two weeks
that Viking orbited Mars, all had been either observed by radar or photographed. Part of
the problem was the lack of overlap between the radar and optical data. Areas with good
radar data had poor photographic documentation, while sites with good photographic
views had poor radar data. Everybody wanted a safe landing; nobody wanted to take a
chance with a site confirmed by only radar or only photographs. The indecision foiled an
earlier interest in landing Viking on the Fourth of July in honor of the country's bicen-
tennial.
In order to acquire additional information on the candidate landing sites, the Viking
Project Office commissioned another round of radar observalions by Goldstone and
kxecibo. Observing conditions were not ideal, because Earth and Mars were not in oppo-
sition. However, the Areciho _band (2380 MHz; 13 cm) 400-kilowatt radar had just come
on line, and Tyler recommended making additional Arecibo observations with it. Earlier
Mars radar studies had been conducted only when Mars-Earth distances were less than
one astronomical unit. Signal strengths during the August 197B-February 1976 equatori-
al observations were good, but the Earth-Mars distance reached 2 astronomical traits in
May-July 1976. 39
38. For a fldl discussion, see Ezell and Ezell, pp. 317-346, as well as Downs 4 October 1994.
39. Simpson, Tyler, anti Lipa, Analy_i._ o]l?.adar Data [_'om Mar_. Simpson, "['ylet, and Campbell, "Arecit)o
Radar Observations of Mars Surface Characteristics in Ihe Northern I lemisphcre," lraru_ 36 (1978): 156-157.
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Arecibo observed Mars between August 1975 and July 1976 over the latitudes
between 12 ° South and 24 ° North. The results between 12 ° South and 4 ° North were rel-
evant to potential alternate (i.e., backup) Viking sites. Between October 1975 and April
1976, Goldstone observed the two regions Syrtis Major and Sinus Meridiani, particularly
a number of proposed Viking landing sites, including the prime site (called A1) near lon-
gitude 34 ° and latitude 19.5 ° North. As a result of the radar data, the A1 site was rejected
on 26June 1976, while other sites came under consideration. 4°
Simpson, Tyler, and Campbell made additional Arecibo observations for the Viking
Project Office near 20 ° North latitude, the latitude of the landing site, particularly the
Viking Chryse and Tritonis Lacus (the A2 site, first alternate to A1) landing areas. The
search for a suitable site then moved toward the northwest where a region designated
A1NW was tentatively selected because of its apparent smoothness as seen from orbit. The
A1NW site was finally abandoned because of its questionable radar properties. It was
toward the west that the Viking site selection and certification teams moved after turning
down A1NW. 41
Did Radar Help?
Had radar observations and expressions of rms slope actually helped in the selection
of the final Viking 1 landing site? Certainly, Tyler's reports to the landing site working
group did not go totally unheeded, and radar turned down some potential but suspect
landing sites. As NASA official John E. Naugle wrote in November 1976, "The choice of
the actual landing site was eventually based on a combination of the S-band [Arecibo]
radar data and high resolution photography obtained from the Viking 1 Orbiter. ''42
However, not everyone was as diplomatic as Naugle; some doubted the utility of the radar
data.
Tom Young, Viking science integration manager, believed that radar data eventually
played a role, although when the project selected initial landing site candidates, he admit-
ted that, "radar played no role, because we weren't smart enough to know how to use it."
On the other hand, James Martin, Viking Project Manager, remained skeptical about the
utility of the radar data. Radar provided no useful information, he felt, although it was "an
input and a source of information that [we] could not ignore." Frankly, he admitted, "The
fact that it [radar] was so different scared me off. ''43
It was that difference, the general unfamiliarity with radar data, that raised a barrier
to the use of radar results. "People didn't quite know what to make of us," Tyler explained.
"People were willing to listen, but it was clear that they didn't like the answer!" Farther to
the cynical side was the judgement of Dick Simpson: "I've always said that the radar con-
tribution to picking landing sites on Mars probably came out with a net result of zero....If
we'd never been involved, they probably would have had the same end result, but we got
to play in the game and sometimes that's part of it." George Downs, who analyzed the
Mars radar data atJPL, was convinced that project personnel simply looked for a site as
Viking 1 orbited Mars, ignoring the radar data entirely. The attitude of many, he felt, was
that the radar astronomers were getting their answers as if from a ouija board. 44
40. Simpson, Tyler, and Campbell, "Arecibo Radar Observations of Martian Surface Characteristics
Near the Equator," lcaru._ 33 (1978): 102-115; Downs, R. Green, and Reichley, "Radar Studies of the Martian
Surface at Centimeter Wavelengths: The 1975 Opposition," Icarus 33 (1978): 441_t53.
41. Simpson, Tyler, and Campbell, "Mars Surface Characteristics in the Northern Hemisphere,"
pp. 15.%173.
42. .John E. Naugle to H. Guyford Stever, 8 November 1976, NHOB.
43. Ezell and Ezell, p. 357.
44. Tyler 10 May 1994; Simpson 10 May 1994; Downs 4 October 1994.
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The radar data presented was indeed quite different; it was degrees of rms slope,
rather than images universally understood. Perhaps if range-Doppler mapping of Mars
had been possible, the difference would not have been so great. Still, the episode illus-
trated the kinds of challenges that radar astronomers would have to confront as they
played an increasing role in planetary exploration and sought to share their results with
scientists who lacked an understanding of radar. It was simply not enough to meet with
planetary geologists and other scientists; radar astronomers had to communicate their
results in a way understandable by other scientists.
The availability of the Mars radar data atJPL was the catalyst for the kind of inter-
disciplinary communication and collaboration that interpreting the radar results
demanded. George Downs struck up an alliance with Ladislav Roth at JPL and Gerald
Schubert at UCLA. Roth and Schubert saw value in the radar data; that is, the topo-
graphical information, not the surface roughness measurements. Roth, in fact, had
approached Downs to collaborate in interpreting the radar topographical data, and sev-
eral studies grew out of that collaboration. 45
A Venus Radar Mapper?
Concurrently with Viking preparations, NASA planned a mission to Venus. Pioneer
Venus marked a significant departure for radar astronomy. Don Campbell and Tor
Hagfors had distinguished planetary radar astronomy from space exploration, in particu-
lar, the bistatic radar work done at Stanford University. Pioneer Venus challenged that dis-
tinction; it was no longer ground-based planetary radar astronomy, and it marked a sig-
nificant entree into a new area of Big Science.
Instead of Big Science providing a large, Earth-based dish, like the Arecibo radar,
spacecraft missions furnished the opportunity, but not the hardware, to do planetary
radar astronomy from a point just above the target, not millions of kilometers away. Like
piggybacking radar astronomy onto an Earth-based facility, placing a radar experiment
and its necessary hardware on a spacecraft demanded participating in the politics of Big
Science. Radar astronomy aboard Pioneer Venus remained Little Science, though, con-
ducted by a single investigator, Gordon Pettengill, who carried out the entrepreneurial
burden of placing the radar instrument on the spacecraft and who brought fellow ground-
based radar astronomers into the project as analyzers of the radar data.
Pioneer Venus also facilitated the shift of planetary radar toward serving the plane-
tary geology community. Within the working groups established by NASA space missions,
planetary radar astronomers and planetary geologists worked together. Behind this shift,
too, was the ability of radar astronomers to solve problems of in retest to geologists. If plan-
etary radar astronomy had focused solely on refining planetary orbital parameters, the
prime users of planetary radar results would have remained astronomers. Radar
techniques that described planetary surfaces, in conuast, solved problems of interest to
geologists, especially those geologists at the United States Geological Survey (USGS) inter-
ested in planetary geology, or what the USGS called astrogeology. The shift to geology was
an educational experience for both geologists and radar investigators, and it eventually
manifested itself in the journals and professional societies attended by planetary radar
astronomers and culminated in the Magellan mission to Venus.
The idea of using radar to image Venus fiom a probe predated the Pioneer Venus
project. The official history of Pioneer Venus dates the beginning of the project to
45. Downs 40ctobel 1994; Ladislav E. Roth, Downs, Saunders, and (;elald SChubert, "Radar Altimetry
of South Tharsis, Mars," lcaru_ 42 (1980): 287-316; Roth, Saunders, Downs, and Schubert, "Radar Altimetry of
Large Martian Craters," h:aru_ 79 (1989): 289-310.
PIONEERING ON VENUS AND MARS 163
October 1967, shortly after the Venera 4 and Mariner 5 spacecraft visited Venus. Three
scientists, Richard M. Goody (Harvard University), Donald M. Hunten (University of
Arizona; Kitt Peak National Observatory), and Nelson W. Spencer (Goddard Space Flight
(;enter) formed a group to consider the feasibility of exploring the Cytherean atmosphere
from a spacecraft. The group's formation led to a study published in January 1969 by the
Goddard Space Flight Center. 46
The idea of mapping Venus with a radar started much earlier. As early as 1959, NASA
contracted with the University of Michigan to design a Venus radar. In 1961, NASA let out
three more grants and contracts to develop radars for a future Venus mission to map the
planet's snrface to investigators at the University of New Mexico, MIT, and Ohio State. 47
In 1961, for example, NASA funded a study under J. E Reintjes, Director of MIT's
Electronics Systems Laboratory, "to perform an investigation of radar techniques and
devices suitable for the exploration of the planet Venus." NASA awarded the funds
because the space agency saw radar as an attractive technique for exploring the surface of
Venus and as "a logical experiment for a Venus flyby or orbiter."
Developing a radar system appropriate for space travel presented numerous prob-
lems. The equipment had to meet certain weight, space, and reliability criteria. The MIT
goal was to design and build a space radar that required fewer than 100 watts and weighed
no more than 50 pounds. After completion of an engineering model by Reintjes and the
MIT Electronics Systems Laboratory, in October 1967, tests aboard an aircraft, the
Convair CV-990 owned by NASA Ames Research Center, began. 4s
Thronghout the 1960s, then, and well before the formation of the Goddard study
group in 1967, the idea of imaging Venus with a spacecraft-borne radar was already "in the
air." But before a spacecraft could carry a radar to Venus, NASA had to formulate and
fund a voyage of exploration to the planet. In June 1968, a Space Science Board study on
planetary exploration urged NASA to send a space probe to Venus, though without rec-
ommending inclusion of a radar experiment. 49 By June 1970, the NASA program of plan-
etary exploration still contained no significant Venus missions. The planned flyby of Venus
and Mercury was essentially a Mercury mission with only a small contribution to Venus
science. In contrast, NASA had a robust plan for exploring Mars and an ambitious
program for investigating the outer planets. 5°
In June 1970, to address the lack of a serious Venus mission, the NASA Lunar and
Planetary Missions Board and the Space Science Board brought together 21 scientists to
study the scientific potential of a mission to Venus (Table 3). Richard Goody and Donald
M. Hunten, who had helped start the Goddard study, co-chaired the meeting. Their
report, known as the Purple Book because of the color of its cover, recommended that
exploration of Venus should be prominent in the NASA program for the 1970s and 1980s.
The group presented its recommendations to NASA management, and the Space Science
Board endorsed them. 51
Significantly, the Purple Book study brought together a planetary radar astronomer,
Gordon Pettengill, then Director of the Arecibo Ionospheric Observatory, and a planetary
geologist, Harold Masursky of the USGS. Pettengill's participation in the Purple Book
46. Richard O. Fimmel, Lawrence Colin, and Eric Burgess, I'ioneer Venu_, NASA SP461 (Washington:
NASA, 1983), pp. 1,t-15; Colin, '_Fhe t'ioneer Venus Program,"]_mrnal q[Ge_rphy_ical Re._ear_h 85 ( 1980): 7575.
47. Tatarewicz, pp. 150-151.
't8. Mcn_onandum, ()tan W. Nicks, L0 March 1966, and Memorandum, Brunk, 29 November 1966,
NII()B: J. E Reintjcs and J. R. Sandison, Venu_ Rmlar ,_tertr_ htve_tilzation_ Final Re'p_rrt (Cambridge: MIT,
Electronic Systems I.aboratory, Deparnnenl of Electrical Engineering, Mmch 1970), Pettengill materials.
,t% Space Science Board, Pbznetary l:.xplm-ation, 1968-1975 (Washington: National Academy of Sciences,
1968).
5(). Spate St icnce Board, Venu_: Stmte&,'V [_rrExpbmttion (Washington: National Academy of Sciences,June
t970), p. 3.
51. (', ti. Townes, Preface, Space Science Bored, !.'enu_: Stmteg._/i_rl"xpbrration, n.p.
164 TO SEE THE UNSEEN
Table 3
Purple Book Scientists
Scientist Institution
Richard M. Goody, (:hair
Donald M_ Hunten
Don L. Anderson
W. lan Axford
Alan H. Barrett
Leverett Davis,Jr.
Thomas M. Donahue
John C. Gille
Seymour Hess
Garry E. Hunt
Robert G. Knollenberg
John S. Lewis
Michael B. McEIroy
Gordon H. Pettengill
Robert A_ Phinney
S. Keith Runcorn
Verner E. Suomi
Patrick Thaddeus
G. Leonard Tyler
James A. Wt'iman
George W. Wetherill
Harvard University
Kitt Peak National Observatory
California Institute of Technology
University of California, San Diego
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
California Institute of Technology
University of Pittsburgh
Florida State University
Florida State University
Atlas Computer Laboratory
University of Chicago
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Kitt Peak National Observatory
Arecibo Ionospheric Observatory
Princeton University
University of Newcastle
University of Wisconsin
Columbia University
Stanford University
University of Wisconsin
University of California, Los Angeles
study marked his initial involvement in Pioneer Venus. 52 By then, Pettengill, the future
Professor of Planetary Physics in the MIT Earth and Planetary Sciences Department, had
acquired stature in his field, having been one of the radar astronomy pioneers at Lincoln
Laboratory, but also as Associate Director, then as Director, of the prestigious Arecibo
Observatory.
Masursky had joined the USGS after graduating from Yale in 1947. After a number
of years as a general geologist, Masursky joined the USGS's Branch of Astrogeologic
Studies. In 1967, he became chief of the astrogeology branch, then starting in 1971 and
until his death, chief scientist of that branch. Masursky was a science investigator on
almost every NASA flight project to the Moon and the planets, including the Ranger,
Lunar Orbiter, Surveyor, Apollo, Mariner 9, and Viking missions. 53
The Purple Book meeting thus was a first step in planetary radar's shift toward geol-
ogy, providing an initial setting for planetary radar and geology to interact and to devel-
op a common approach for the study of Venus's surface, within the broader context of
NASA-sponsored research of the planet's atmosphere. As the Purple Book itself noted, the
space missions of the 1960s had given rise to new fields of study: "Very rapidly studies of
planetary meteorology, planetary aeronomy, planetology, and planetary biology emerged
which involved, in the main, research workers from the parallel terrestrial disciplines.
Earth and planetary studies suddenly merged and simultaneously diverged from astrono-
my. In some major universities, departmental and research center organization was
changed to meet this development. ''54
Images sent back from space had encouraged geologists, like Hal Masursky, to
become interested in planetary surfaces and in the processes that shaped them. However,
ground-based radar images of Venus had yet to find their audience among planetary geol-
ogists. 55
52. Pettengill 28 September 1993.
53. V-Gram no. 12 (July 1987): 15; "Harold Masursky," in R. R. Bowker, comp., American Men arm Women
of Science, 18th edition (New Providence, NJ: R. R. Bowker, 1992), vol. 5, p. 275.
54. Space Science Board, Venu._: Strategy for Expltrcation, p. 4.
55. Campbell 9 December 1993.
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As far as ground-based planetary radar was concerned, the Purple Book applauded
its success. "Virtually all our present knowledge of the radius, rotation, and surface of
Venus has been obtained using ground-based radars," the Purple Book proclaimed. With
resolutions ranging from 100 to 500 km, radar had revealed features, and even the lack of
topographic relief, in the equatorial region of Venus. Including a radar system on a Venus
probe would yield "maps similar in appearance and usefulness to photographic maps of
the same region."
Ironically, the Purple Book cautioned against imaging Venus with a spacecraft radar.
It pointed out that such radar images would be "directly competitive with ground-based
observations and would provide similar data." That point resurfaced later during plan-
ning for Magellan. Although a spaceborne radar could cover more of the planet's surface,
the Purple Book concluded that "it is not yet clear whether the high cost of the addition-
al information could be justified." Not only would a spacecraft radar require "great weight
and complexity" in order to compete with the resolution already achieved by ground-
based radars, but the "rapidly improving capabilities of radar observatories on the earth
to image Venus" made radar mapping of the planet from orbit "less important at the pre-
sent time." The report reflected the anticipated benefits of the planned upgrade of the
Arecibo telescope.
While technological and cost constraints militated against an orbiting radar, a viable
alternative, according to the Purple Book, was the Stanford bistatic radar method, specif-
ically that mode in which a radar on Earth transmitted and a receiver on the spacecraft
collected echoes. The Purple Book concluded that "bistatic-radar experiments, in con-
junction with ground-based observations, can provide a significant insight into the details
of the surface structure and electromagnetic properties of Venus."
The recommendation to conduct a bistatic experiment was not surprising; Len Tyler
of the SCRA was one of the 21 Purple Book scientists. Although Tyler planned to do some
bistatic observations with Pioneer Venus, those plans fell by the wayside. Later, as
Pettengili was writing a proposal for Pioneer Venus and was looking for scientists to join
him, he invited Tyler. Tyler turned down the invitation because of his heavy commitment
to the Voyager project.
In addition to the bistatic experiment, the Purple Book recommended using a radar
altimeter to measure surface relief. Radar altimeter readings would complement the equa-
torial topographic information available from ground-based radar observations, and a
simple, low-power orbiting radar could measure vertical relief over those portions of the
planet not covered by ground-based radars. _6 Using the altimeter to gather relief mea-
surements was the cheapest and technologically least complicated alternative. In the end,
a modified version of this approach was to fly on Pioneer Venus.
After Venera 7 succeeded in transmitting data from the surface of Venus for 23 min-
utes on 15 December 1970, a special panel reviewed the Purple Book conclusions. Their
recommendation, to make no changes in the Purple Book, opened the door for NASA to
issue an Announcement of Opportunity in July 1971 for scientists to participate in defin-
ing the Venus program. 57
NASA established the Pioneer Venus Science Steering Group in January 1972, in
order to enlist widespread participation of the scientific community in the early selection
of the science requirements for the Pioneer Venus project. The Science Steering Group
met with Pioneer Venus project personnel between February and June 1972. The Group
developed in great detail the scientific rationale and objectives for several voyages to
Venus and outlined candidate payloads. 58
56. Tyler 10 May 1994; Simpson 10 May 1994; Venus: Stra_g_ for Exploration, pp. 58-62.
57. Fimmel, Colin, and Eric, pp. 17-18.
58. Fimmel, Colin, and Burgess, p. 18.
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ThesearchformissionobjectivesstirredradarastronomerGordon Pettengill to pro-
pose a radar experiment for the mission. Pettengill recalled: "I remember doing a calcu-
lation literally on the back of an envelope. I realized that if we could get even a tiny little
antenna into a reasonable orbit around Venus, we could do an awful lot in terms of
measuring the altitude and the reflecting properties of the surface....By going around
Venus in a polar, rather than an equatorial orbit, we could get a totally new view of Venus.
We could detail the whole surt_tce, instead of just the equatorial band that we observed at
Arecibo."
Pettengill then began "beating the drums" to include a radar experiment in the
Venus program. "I'he Science Working Group studied the concept. I didn't think I was
going to survive that," he recalled. "Pioneer Venus was strictly an atmospheric mission. A
radar experiment to study the surface stood out like a sore thumb." Nonetheless, NASA
awarded Pettengill funds to conduct a feasibility study of a radar to image Venus. 5_
Above all else, the prime mission of Pioneer Venus was to study the planet's atmos-
phere. An article published in 1994 in Scientific American _° evaluated the scientific achieve-
ments of Pioneer Venus and emphasized its contributions to atmospheric science, but
failed to mention the radar experiment. Peter Ford, who collaborated with Pettengill on
the Pioneer Venus radar experiment, pointed out that the Scientific American article's
emphasis on the atmospheric science balanced the record; during the first three years of
the Pioneer Venus mission, most publicity had focused on the radar imaging, r,I
Next, the Science Steering Group published its comprehensive report, called the
Orange Book. Among the 24 areas of research advocated, only one was related to the plan-
et's surface. As the project evolved, Pioneer Venus matured into a single-opportunity mis-
sion with a multiprobe and an orbiter. In September 1972, NASA disbanded the Science
Steering Group and issued an Announcement of Opportunity for scientists to participate
in the multiprobe mission. Not until August 1973 did NASA issue an Announcement of
Opportunity for the orbiter. Over the ensuing months, the NASA Instrument Review
Committee evaluated proposals for orbiter scientific payloads, including Pettengill's radar
experiment, then presented its recommendations to NASA Headquarters in May 1974.
When NASA selected the final orbiter payloads on 4June 1974, the radar experiment was
among them.
The radar was only one of 12 scientific instruments on the orbiter. In contrast to the
spaceborne radar initially developed at MIT, which was to consume no more than 100
watts and weigh less than 50 pounds, the Pioneer Venus radar required only 18 watts and
weighed 9.7 kilograms (21.3 pounds). "You could literally put the thing under one arm
and carry it," as Pettengiil characterized it. Compared to other instruments on Pioneer
Venus, though, 9.7 kilograms was an appreciable load; it accounted for 22 percent of the
total weight (45 kilograms) of all 12 orbiter scientific instruments. _2
Although the radar experiment, in Pettengill's words, "stood out like a sore thumb,"
NASA Headquarters wanted to see the surface features of Venus through its white, sulfu-
ric-acid clouds. The information was a vital part of planning for a future mission to Venus
to map the planet's surface, known eventually as Magellan. The only reason the radar
experiment stayed on Pioneer Venus, according to Pettengill, was that Advanced
Programs at NASA Headquarters wanted it, even though its inclusion made life "a little
uncomfortable for the other experiments. ''6,_
59. Pettengill 28 September 1993.
60. .lanet G. Luhmann, Pollack, and Colin, "The Pioneer Mission Io x,k'nns," S_TentificAmerican 270 (April
1994): 90-97.
61. Ford 3 October 1994.
62. Pettengill 28 September 1993; Fimmel, Colin, and Burgess, pp. 18-21, 38 and 58.
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The key individual in NASA's Office of Advanced Programs who supported Pettengill
and the radar experiment was Daniel H. Herman. Before joining NASA in 1970 as head
of Advanced Programs in the Office of I,unar and Planetary Programs, Herman had
worked at Northrup on the development of surveillance synthetic apertnre radar (SAR)
mappers for the Na W, specifically investigating the feasibility of transmitting reconnais-
sance data in real time. At NASA, his job was to develop new missions and to "sell" them
through the NASA hierarchy and ultimately to the President and Congress. Danny
Herman's job, then, was to sell the Pioneer Venus mission. In Pettengill's words, Herman
was "an eminence grise" and "a st|persalesman." As early as 1972, Danny Herman also
hegan to put together and push the Magellan project. _4
Unlike Magellan, l'ioneer Venus strictly speaking did not have a synthetic aperture
radar; instead, the radar ahimeter had a mapping mode. The most valuable data returned
fiom the Pioneer Venus radar experiment would be the extensive topographical infor-
mation acquired by the altimeter. The mapping mode did generate crude, low resolution
images of portions of the planet's surface.
Far more impressive were the images generated by synthetic aperture radars (SARs)
mounted on aircraft and regularly utilized by geologists to study the geology and topog-
raphy of Earth. The use of SARs in Earth geology was but one part of a long and complex
history that stretched from the interpretation of aerial photographs to the emergence of
remote sensing, an all-encompassing term which has came to involve the interpretation of
infi-ared, uhraviolet, microwave, gamma ray, and x-ray images, as well as optical pho-
tographs. Radar Geology
Radar geology, as the study of geologic surface features from radar maps has come
to be called, had its roots in the military surveillance radar research of the 1950s. It began
to lind a home in NASA during the 1960s and found a common bond with planetary radar
astronomy in the 1970s, thanks largely to Pioneer Venus and Viking. The trickle of astro-
geologists converted to planetary radar images by Pioneer Venus and Viking swelled
through purposefill steps taken in the planning of Magellan to bring together planetary
geology and planetary radar investigators.
By World War I, aerial photography had become a key tool in gathering military
intelligence. The scientific applications of photointerpretation grew after the war, partic-
ularly during the 1930s. Government agencies, such as the Agricultural Adjustment
Administration, the Forestry Service, and the Tennessee Valley Authority, began to use
aerial photographs, and the USGS entered the field of photogrammetry, the making of
maps from photographs, with a series of geologic and topographic maps constructed from
aerial photographs. I_
After World War II, the military sponsored research on two types of Side-Looking
Airborne Radar (SLAR) nsed in remote sensing and especially for surveillance. One type,
known as real-aperture or incoherent radar, relied on transmission of a narrow beam to
provide tine image resolutions in the direction parallel to the flight of the aircraft. The
other type, known as synthetic aperture radar (SAR), relied on coherent data processing
to synthesize a very large effective aperture in the direction of motion and, thereby, to
provide a very narrow corresponding antenna beam. Continuously operating SARs
achieve a surface resolution that is independent of wavelength and approximately equal
to their along-orbit physical antenna dimension. Normally, in real-aperture radars,
64. Petlengill 28 Seplember 1993; Daniel H. lterman, telephone conversation, 20 May 1994.
65. William A. Fis{her, "1listory of Remole Sensing," in Robert G. Reeves, ManualofRemote ,v,mn-ing (Falls
Clmrch, Virginia: Ammican Society of Phologrammetry, 1975), [2 volumes] vol. 1, pp. 27-39.
168 TO SEE THE UNSEEN
resolution is better the shorter the wavelength. In order to achieve high resolution, SARs
replace the need for a large aperture with a large amount of data processing. 66
The military branches developed SARs in the 1940s and 1950s under highly classi-
fied conditions in corporate and university laboratories, such as those at the Goodyear
Aircraft Corporation, the Philco Corporation, the University of Illinois Control Systems
Laboratory, and the University of Michigan Willow Run Research Center. By the late
1950s, a number of experimental SAR systems emerged, such as the one built by Texas
Instruments for the Army. In 1961, under Air Force contract, Goodyear built the first
operational SAR system; it had a resolution of about 15 meters. Throughout the 1960s,
Goodyear and other firms began to commercialize SAR applications. 67
A series of symposia underwritten by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and held
at the University of Michigan, where a great deal of SLAR work took place under contract
with the ONR, greatly stimulated and advanced radar geology. 68 The University of
Michigan symposia series grew out of a study initially recommended by a subcommittee of
the National Academy of Sciences (which soon formed the Committee on Remote
Sensing of Environment) and the Geography Branch of the ONR. A group from the ONR
and the National Academy of Sciences met in January 1961 to discuss the need for more
advanced and efficient data acquisition techniques in the Earth sciences. Although
University of Michigan faculty dominated the first symposium, held in February 1962,
subsequent symposia participants reflected the spreading commercial importance of SAR
systems in studying the Earth. By the third symposium, held in October 1964, the empha-
sis had shifted to remote sensing from weather and other satellites. 69
During the third University of Michigan symposium, held in October 1964, R. E
Schmidt of the Avco Corporation, Cincinnati, presented a theoretical study on the feasi-
bility of imaging Venus's surface with a radar. Schmidt failed, however, to address such
practical questions as weight and power requirements. 7° Nonetheless, it was clear that
those interested in remote sensing, and in radar imaging in particular, were open to the
idea of imaging Venus from a spaceborne radar.
Meanwhile, commercial applications of SARs to geology and topography expanded.
The successful radar mapping of Panama in 1967-1968 by Westinghouse in Project RAMP,
considered to be one of the major achievements in radar geology, further stimulated com-
mercial radar mapping. In late 1971, Westinghouse surveyed the entire country of
Nicaragua, and that same year the Aero Service/Goodyear RADAM Project (RADar of the
AMazon), initially intended to cover only 1.5 million square kilometers, eventually cov-
ered the entire country of Brazil, over 8.5 million square kilometers. RADAM was consid-
ered the most impressive radar mapping program ever conducted. 71
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Parallel with the development of SAR mapping of Earth was the rise of astrogeology
within the USGS in the late 1950s in response to a shortage of funds and a surplus of geol-
ogists within the Survey. Following the discovery of an abundant supply of uranium ore in
New Mexico, the USGS uranium project closed down in 1958. Eugene Shoemaker, a geol-
ogist who moved to the USGS Pacific Coast Regional Center at Menlo Park, California, fol-
lowing the closure of the uranium project, suggested lunar geologic mapping as one way
to help alleviate the money and personnel problems.
Shoemaker, who did his dissertation on Meteor Crater, sold lunar geologic mapping
to NASA, which in contrast to the USGS had funding but too few geologists. The result
was the creation of the Astrogeologic Studies Group, USGS, Menlo Park, on 25 August
1960. Later, Shoemaker led a group of astrogeologists to a new location in Flagstaff,
Arizona. v_ In 1963, geologist Peter C. Badgley came to NASA from the Colorado School
of Mines. Badgley was interested in techniques for observing Earth from space, particu-
larly to support the Apollo program. He let out contracts to firms, such as Westinghouse,
and universities, especially the University of Michigan, to carry out radar geologic studies
from aircraft. Moreover, Badgley continued to shift NASA money to the USGS to fund
lunar and planetary geology. 73 Thus, the evolution of the NASA space program and the
USGS astrogeology branch marched forward in tandem.
During the Apollo program, certain USGS astrogeologists began collaborating with
radar astronomers Stan Zisk and Tommy Thompson. Among them were Henry John
Moore II, Shoemaker's former field assistant and part of the Menlo Park Astrogeologic
Studies Group, and Gerald G. Schaber, UCLA and USGS Flagstaff. 74 These early lunar
efforts involved radar mapping and topographical data collected from ground-based
radars, not abstract data on rms slope and dielectric constant. Schaber collaborated with
Tyler on interpreting lunar bistatic radar results, which were expressed in abstract math-
ematical terms. Schaber admitted, "I never really did much with the interpretation of
bistatic radar, because it is kind of a theoretical interpretation I don't really understand
too much. ''75
The launch of SEASAT in the summer of 1978 began the era of satellite radar
imagery. SEASAT demonstrated the feasibility of radar observations of Earth on a global
basis, and initial examination of the SEASAT radar data indicated that one could fruitful-
ly apply the data to a variety of problems in geology, agriculture, hydrology, and oceanog-
raphy, as well as to planetary exploration. 7_
In order to assess the application of radar imaging to terrestrial geologic problems
and to make recommendations to NASA, JPL sponsored the Radar Geology Workshop in
Snowmass, Colorado, 16-20 July 1979, with funding from NASA. Among those on the
organizing committee were Harold Masursky, USGS, and R. Stephen Saunders, JPL, who
later played a role on Magellan. The workshop focused on radar observations of Earth,
not the planets. 77
Thus, by the launch of SEASAT in 1978, the year also of Pioneer Venus's launch, a
good number of geologists were familiar with and could interpret radar images of Earth
made from aircraft. But those geologists were more interested in terrestrial than extrater-
restrial geology. On the other hand, through the pioneering efforts of Gene Shoemaker,
the USGS Astrogeologic Studies Group already had embraced lunar radar geology. The
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Figure 27
SEAXtT inutge e( Death Valley,Earth. The brunch o[SI_4X4T in 1978 bel.ran the era o/satellite rrular irnakwry.The re.solu-
tion of image_ made by military ._urveilbtn_e _atellite._ u,a._ much finn hou_,e'r Utilizati,m ,(SEA.%4 T te_ hnoh_l. O, u,a.s a ba.*ic
._trateK,'y adt_pted byJPL in the pb_nning o]VOIR (letter Magelle_n). ( C, mrt_y o[]et l'7o[nd_i,m Laln_ratory, photo no. 1"-30224.)
potential for planetary geologists and planetary radar astronomers to work together
already had been realized in the Apollo program through the work of Stan Zisk and
Tommy Thompson. The NASA Pioneer Venus working committees brought together
additional radar astronomers and geologists.
Once NASA decided the Pioneer Venus payloads and science experiments in June
1974, the space agency created the Orbiter Mission Operations Planning Committee.
Among its members were USGS astrogeologist Hal Masnrsky and radar astronomer
Gordon Pettengill. They also worked together closely in the Surface-Interior Working
Group, one of the six mission Working Groups responsible t_r developing key scientitic
questions. Hal Masursky chaired that Working Group (Table 4).7s
78. Fimmel, Colin, and Bulgess, pp. 22 and 218.
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Table 4
Pioneer Venus Surface/Interior Working Group
Scientist Institution
Har.ld Ma.sursky
C.T. Russell
Gordon H. Pettengill
William M. Kauta
George E. McGill
Roger ]. Phillips
Irw6n l, Shapiro
US Geological Survey
University of Calitbrnia, Los Angeles
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
University of ('alitbrnia, Los Angeles
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Lunar and Planetary Institute
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Pioneer Venus
Without the radar experiment, Pioneer Venus would not have brought together
planetary geologists and radar astronomers. Attending meetings of the Working Groups,
as well as all mission meetings, was vital to the survival of the radar on a project whose
prime objectives were atmospheric. As Pettengill explained: "It was a very demanding pro-
ject that had to be watched closely. I had to make sure that we did not lose radar capabil-
ity. We were fighting with 11 other Principal Investigators on Pioneer Venus. It was very
important that I never miss a meeting. If I missed one meeting, those guys might come to
some decision that would compromise the experiment."
The Pioneer Venus atmospheric experiments competed with the radar experiment
for spacecraft parameters. The atmospheric scientists wanted a different set of orbits and
a different allocation of down link data bits. "It was a jungle out there?" Pettengill recalled.
"You had to have a certain number of bits, or you could not do your work. If you turned
your back, literally if you missed one meeting, they could make a decision to allocate 20
percent of that particular format to some experiment instead of only 10 percent. Then
you have lost that 10 percent. In 1975, especially, all of this was coming together. I could-
n't miss a meeting. It really was taking up my time. ''79
The data handling system on the orbiter integrated all analog and digital telemetry
data into formats for transmission back to Earth. Telemetry storage, playback, and real-
time rates varied. The orbiter had a total of 14 telemetry formats; some were used during
periapsis, others during apoapsis. The radar was a heavy user of two formats designed for
use at periapsis, and in fact it used more of those two formats than any other experiment.
NASA procured scientific instruments for Pioneer Venus in a variety of ways.
Normally, the principal investigator was responsible for an instrument's design and
construction. Either his own laboratory or a subcontractor built the instrument. NASA
used a different procurement method for the Pioneer Venus radar. The project office at
Ames Research Center built it for a radar team headed by Pettengiil. Carl Keller, an Ames
Research Center engineer, had overall decision-making responsibility, and the instrument
prime contractor was the Hughes Aircraft Company Space and Communications Group,
El Segundo, California, as a result of an open bid procurement. Pettengill characterized
Carl Keller as an engineer from "the old school, a seat-of-the-pants, no nonsense teuton-
ic. He woutd look at all the details. He was the right guy for the job. I enjoyed working
with him. Not everybody did. ''s°
79. Pettengill 28 September 1993.
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Both MIT's Center for Space Research, with which Pettengill was associated, andJPL
competed for the Pioneer Venus radar contract. The rivalry between MIT and JPL was
tense, "a real shootout" in Pettengill's words. AtJPL, Walter Brown had been working on
a Venus orbiter radar since the 1960s. His approach, however, differed considerably from
that of MIT.
Walter Brown's radar proposal involved placing a 100-MHz (3-meter) transmitter on
the Pioneer Venus orbiter, while Pettengill and the MIT Center for Space Research pro-
posed a 1,757-MHz (17-cm) system. The MIT antenna was directive, so that when the
spacecraft rotated, it took data for only a fraction of each 12-second rotation of the space-
craft.sl
As Pettengill reflected: "Meanwhile, JPL thought they had the inside track. They
were a NASA center, after all, and this was a NASA project. If I have a fault to lay on JPL,
it is that they think that there is no place else in the world that does things as well as they
do. They think they deserve the first cut of everything, because they are so much better
than everybody else. They don't take kindly to new ideas that are not in-house; not invent-
ed here is very much a JPL hallmark. Irwin Shapiro has fought this on the Planetary
Ephemeris Program. We fought it on radar work, and Stanford has fought it. It has been
difficult over time. JPL is so institutionalized into thinking that no one else can do any-
thing but them. It has been an uphill battle over the years. It has put grey hairs on Von
Eshleman's head; it certainly put a few on mine."
JPL lost the radar battle. Their design would have bathed the whole spacecraft, even
the solar panels, in radiation from the radar. The antenna extended all around the space-
craft, so that as the spacecraft rotated, the radar always was transmitting. To Walter Brown,
that was the advantage, but it made the electronics engineers nervous.
In the end, neither MIT norJPL built the Pioneer Venus radar, but it is typical of the
kinds of fights for hardware contracts that mark NASA space missions. The winner of the
contract was Hughes. Hughes devised a method by which the radar altimeter could image
the planet's surface at low resolution with a small, 38-cm-diameter antenna. The elec-
tronics of the MIT design were clumsy, Pettengill admitted, whereas the Hughes proposal
was '_very clever and efficient."
"If we had done the experiment," he mused, "it probably would not have stayed in.
I have to hand Hughes some credit for that. They really had a flash of insight into a clever
way of instrumenting it....They had a good team, and so did we. The main reason Hughes
won was that they were willing to take a loss." For Hughes, taking a loss on the Pioneer
Venus radar contract was a gambit to gain leverage on the Magellan radar contract, which
they ultimately won. "At the time," Pettengill recalled, awarding Hughes the radar map-
per contract "hurt a bit. I was hoping to get the hardware here at the Center for Space
Research."
In August 1974, Congress approved Pioneer Venus as a new start for fiscal 1975, and
in November 1974, NASA made the final contract award to Hughes Aircraft Company. By
1975, only three years away from launch, Pettengill recalled, "it all came together. With
the Hughes contract, we started cutting metal. "s3 On 20 May 1978, the orbiter left Cape
Kennedy, followed atop a second Atlas-Centaur rocket by the multiprobe on 8 August
1978. Both reached Venus in early December 1978. s4
The radar was a complicated instrument capable of operating in one of two modes,
altimeter or mapper. It was a 1,757-MHz (17-cm) radar with a peak output of 20 watts and
utilized relatively long pulses to improve the signal-to-noise ratio. Such a radar could not
81. Pettengill 28 September 1993; Memorandum, Brunk, 29 November 1966, NHOB.
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haveperformedplanetaryadarastronomyexperimentsfromEarth,butreducingthedis-
tancetothetargetmadeallthedifference.
ShortlyafteritsencounterwithVenus,theorbiterbeganmakingaltimetermeasure-
mentsofsurfacerelief.Thealtimetermeasuredthedistancefromtheorbitertotheplan-
et'ssurface.In ordertoascertaintheheightanddepthofsurfacefeatures,thatdistance
wasubtractedfromthespacecraft'sorbitalradius,thatis,thedistancebetweenthespace-
craftandtheplanet'scenterof mass.TheDeepSpaceNetwork,whilemaintainingtwo-
waycommunicationswiththespacecraft,generatedradiometricdatafromwhichJPL
accuratelycalculateditsorbit,andtheMITgroupthenusedboththeorbitalandradar
datatodeterminetileradiusoftheplanetatdiscretepositionsonthestu'face.
Intheradarmappermode,theinstrumentcompensatedforthecomplexmotionof
thespacecraft.Becausetheorbiterspunonitsownaxisaboutfiverevolutionsperminute,
radarobservationstookplaceonlyperiodically,aboutonesecondoutof each12-second
spinof theorbiter.TheradarmapperalsoautomaticallycompensatedfortheDoppler
shiftcausedbythemotionoftheorbiterelativetotheplanet.
Theinstrumenttookahimeterdata,whenevertheorbiterwasbelow4,700km,and
imagingdata,whentheorbiterwasbelow550kin,subjectto competitionwithother
experimentsforthelimitedtelemetrycapacity.In orderto minimizetelemetryrequire-
merits,theorbiterprocessedtheradarechoesonboardthespacecraft.Theradarmapper
achieveditsbestresolution,afootprint23kmlongand7kmwide,atperiapsis.Theradar
dataalsoprovidedinformationonsurfaceroughnessandelectricalconductivityY5
Theradarmapper'sfirstsweepsshowedaregionofVenuspreviouslyunexploredbyground-basedradar.Withtheexceptionofadeeptrenchneartheequator,thesurfaceof
Venusappearedrelativelyflat,similartotheEarth'surfaceandquitedifferentfromthe
rough,crateredsurfacesofMars,Mercury,andtheMoon.PioneerVenuscontinuedto
completeoneorbitperday,whenonthe14thorbit,theradarmapperbegantomalfunc-
tion;datawaslost.Scientistsandengineersfailedtofindaremedy.Missioncontrolturned
off theradarforaboutwoweeksaroundChristmasndtheNewYear.Whenmissioncon-
trol turnedontheradarmapper,theydiscoveredthatit worked,thoughnotquitenor-
really.
Theproblem,eventuallytracedtoatimingmalfunctionthatresultedfromadiffer-
ential"aging"ratein twointerconnectedsemiconductordevices,appearedwhenthe
instrumentoperatedlongerthantenhours.Pettengill,theexperimentteamleader,and
projectpersonneldecidedtooperatetheradarmapperintermittently.Afterabout10days
ofintermittentoperation,theinstruments artedtofunctionormallyon20January1979(orbit47).8_
Somehow, though, the mission had to recover the lost data. Data recovery was not
possible during the first extended mission (September 1979), because the Deep Space
Network was handling communications with Pioneer 11 at Saturn, so it took place during
the second extended mission, April-May 1980. The 10 other scientific instruments (the
infrared experiment failed after a few months and never ran again) continued to transmit
data back to Earth; the radar mapper, however, was turned off as planned after Orbit 834
on 19 March 1981. 87
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TheprocessingandinterpretationofPioneerVenusaltimeterandmapperdatasets
bytheMITgroupagainbroughttogetherplanetarygeologistsandradarastronomers.
PeterG.Ford,Pettengill'scolleaguein theMITDepartmentof EarthandPlanetary
Sciences,wasacentralplayerin theMITeffort.A nativeofBritain,PeterFordinitially
cametoM1TtoworkinVLBI(VeryLongBaselineInterferometry)radioastronomywith
IrwinShapiro.From1977to 1985,heworkedonvariousaspectsof thePioneerVenus
orbitingradarexperiments,includingtheirgeologicnterpretation,althoughistraining
wasin nuclearphysics.TheUSGSprocessedsomeof thedatatocreateathree-dimen-
sionaleffectwhichgraphicallyrevealeddepressionsandmountains.Keyamongtheplan-
etarygeologistswereHalMasurskyandGeraldSchaberof theUSGS,Flagstaff,and
GeorgeE.McGill,UniversityofMassachusettsatAmherst.
Thecollaborationof radarastronomyandplanetarygeologyresultedin many
importantdiscoveriesabouthesurfaceofVenus,althoughpreliminaryanalysisshowed
thatmuchmorecouldbelearnedaboutheplanet'sgeologicalhistory.Thealtimeterdata
wasusedtocreateanumberof maps,includingatopographiccontourmap,ashaded
reliefmap,andamapshowingrelativedegreesofsurfaceroughness.Thealtimeterand
radarmapperdatasetswereassembledandplacedinpositionbycomputer;however,vari-
ationsfromorbittoorbitwereeditedbyhandthensmoothedoutbycomputer.
Inpreparationforthemission,apreliminarymapwascompiledfromground-based
imagesandusedbymissionoperationsfor planning.Forthismap,Goldstoneradar
imageswerecomputermosaicked,andimagesobtainedatAreciboweremosaickedfrom
photographiccop)'.Thescaleofthismapwas1:50,000,000.OncethePioneerVenusdata
wereinhand,themapwasupdatedtocombinethespacecraftndground-baseddata.
Theradaraltimeteryieldedatopographicmapcovering93percentof theVenus
globe,witha linearsurfaceresolutionofbetterthan150km.Verticalmeasurementaccu-
racyexceeded200meters.Reliefwasexpressedasa center-of-mass-to-surfaceradius.
Extremeswentfromalowof6,049kmtoahighof6,062kin.Despitetheseimpressive
extremesof surfaceheightanddepth,thePioneerVenusdataconfirmedandgready
expandedpreviousEarth-basedobservationsontheglobalsmoothnessofVenusrelative
totheMoon,Mars,andEarth.Onlyaboutfivepercentoftheobservedsurfacewasele-
vatedmorethantwokmabovethemeanradius,6,051.5+ 0.1 km.
Radar astronomer Gordon Pettengill processed and interpreted Pioneer Venus
altimeter and mapper data sets. Don Campbell at Arecibo, and Dick Goldstein and
Howard C. Rumsey, Jr., at JPL, supplied ground-based radar images and digital tapes,
many before publication. The Arecibo and JPL radar images were compiled into a
mosaic for the Pioneer Venus Planning Chart that was used in mission operations. Their
high-resolution, Earth-based radar-imaging data also was essential for the interpretation
of the spacecraft images and altimetry data. Thus, ground-based radar astronomers were
brought into the Pioneer Venus project, and association with the project facilitated radar
astronomers' access to the Goldstone radar.
The radar brightness and elevation extremes dominated the imaging and topo-
graphic maps of the highlands province, which included Ishtar Terra, Aphrodite Terra,
and Beta Regio. The two highland regions, Ishtar and Aphrodite terrae, resembled ter-
restrial "continents" because they were high and had areas comparable to continents on
Earth. Ishtar and Aphrodite appeared to be the size of continents, roughly equivalent to
Australia and Africa, respectively. Beta, a much smaller feature initially detected with
ground-based radar, appeared to differ from Ishtar and Aphrodite in roughness char-
acteristics and possibly in age and chemical composition. Ishtar Terra was the most ele-
vated region found on Venus. It included three topographic elements: Lakshmi Planum,
a western plateau area; Maxwell Montes, the central mountainous area previously studied
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withEarth-basedradars;andacomplexeasternregion.ThehighestpointfoundonVenus
wasthesummitofMaxwellMontes.Standingt1.1kinabovetheplanet'saverageradius(inEarthterms,abovesealevel),MaxwellMonieswashigherthanMountEverest,which
reaches8.8kmabovesealevel.ThelowestpointfoundonVenuswasariftvalleyor trench
namedDianaChasma.ss
Figure 28
Pmneer !,gnu_ map o[ l'enu._, 1980, ._howing Alpha I?,egio and Maxwell Montes, al_mg the planet _ mev*dian, and Beta Reg'io
at bmgitude 280 °. Diana (;ha_ma i_ at bml, nlude 160 _. Compare this map with the !,_lu._ mosaic made [iom Are_il,_
Oh_ervatory radar ob._ervations (Fig, 30). ((2ourt_y _![.]et l'rtrlmL_ion Laturrat_my, photo no. 1"45744.)
The planetary radar and geology collaboration yielded a host of new topographical
names. In order to systematically standardize the names of Venus surface features, as well
as those discovered earlier on Mars and the Moon, on an international level, the
International Astronomical Union (IAU) created the Working Group for Planetary
System Nomenclature (WGPSN) during its 15th General Assembly at Sydney, 21-30
August 1973. The IAU established the WGPSN because of the recent rapid advance in
knowledge of the topography and surfaces of planetary bodies, as well as the necessity of
coordinating the approved systems of nomenclature among the different planets and
their satellites.
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Unlike most other IAU working groups, the WGPSN did not report through any
commission or group of commissions, but was responsible to only the IAU Executive
Committee. The WGPSN was charged with f6rmulating and coordinating all topographic
nomenclature on the planetary bodies of the solar system and had certain powers of
action in the interval between General Assemblies. Radar astronomer Gordon Pettengill
was a member of the WGPSN. The Task Group for Venus Nomenclature, responsible for
compiling the detailed material presented to the WGPSN, included Gordon Pettengill,
chair, JPL radar astronomer Dick Goldstein, USGS geologist Hal Masursky, and the Soviet
scientist M. Ya. Marov.
Although the first meeting of the WGPSN, held in Ottawa, 27-28June 1974, did not
concern itself with the naming of surface features on Venus, at the second meeting, held
in Moscow, 14-18 July 1975, the WGPSN named three valleys on Mercury Arecibo,
Goldstone, and Haystack after the radar observatories and established two themes for
naming Venus features. The first theme was the "feminine mystique long associated with
Venus." Hence, for example, the continent-sized features Ishtar and Aphrodite were
named for the Babylonian and Greek goddesses of love, respectively.
The second theme arose from the "extensive and opaque cloud cover which sur-
rounds the planetary sphere" which "requires the use of radio and other techniques in
order to study and map the surface." Therefore, the WGPSN proposed "to assign the
names of deceased radio, radar and space scientists to topographic features." One excep-
tion, Alpha, was admitted. Alpha was one of the first Cytherean features to be observed
"and which has served to help define the origin of the official IAU system of longitude for
the planet." During subsequent meetings of the WGPSN, held in Grenoble, 30-31 August
1976; Washington, 1-2 June 1977; Innsbruck, 2 June 1978; and Montreal, 13-15 August
1979, the WGPSN approved not only Alpha, but Beta and Maxwell as well. 89 Thus, the fea-
ture names first given by ground-based radar astronomers were fixed on the map of Venus.
Pioneer Venus awakened more planetary geologists to the value of radar data, espe-
cially radar images. Pioneer Venus also was a new taste of Big Science that would lead to
the Magellan mission. In turn, Magellan culminated the linking of planetary geology with
radar astronomy and further blurred the distinction made earlier in the history of plane-
tary radar astronomy between ground-based radar and space exploration.
89. Tran._actions of the. International Astronomical Union 17A (1979): 113--114; "Working Group for
Planetary System Nomenclature," Ibid. 16B (1977): 321-369; "Working Group for Planetary System
Nomenclature," Ib/d. 17B (1980): 285-304.
Chapter Seven
Magellan
Magellan culminated the shift of radar astronomy toward planetary geology kindled
by Apollo and fostered by Viking and Pioneer Venus with the creation of workshops and
microsymposia. The workshops attempted to bridge the gap between radar and geologic
knowledge among practitioners, while the microsymposia provided annual opportunities
for U.S. and Soviet geology and radar scientists interested in Venus to exchange research
results. This shifting of the planetary radar paradigm toward geology also manifested itself
in articles co-authored with planetary geologists, publication in new journals, especially
the Journal of Geophysical Research, and attendance at American Geophysical Union meet-
ings.
Furthermore, the close relationship between NASA missions and ground-based plan-
etary radar astronomy that had developed at Haystack, Arecibo, and Goldstone since 1970
continued with Magellan. The Arecibo and Goldstone radars observed Venus throughout
the two decades spanned by Pioneer Venus and Magellan, and their data contributed to
the success of those missions. In addition, the range-Doppler images created from that
data also drew geologists to planetary radar astronomy.
Magellan, like Pioneer Venus, was not ground-based planetary radar astronomy; it
was space exploration. By carrying out imaging from a spacecraft, radar astronomer
Gordon Pettengill had erased that distinction. That distinction no longer seemed to
describe the field, as Len Tyler and Dick Simpson joined the Magellan radar team. Tyler
and Simpson had not abandoned bistatic radar and radio occultation experiments; they
had simply added Magellan radar science to their wide range of research interests.
Unlike the Pioneer Venus mission, or the Goldstone and Arecibo facilities, Magellan
was not a case of radar astronomy "Litde Science" piggybacking onto a Big Science facili-
ty. Magellan was Big Science. Moreover, its single scientific instrument was a radar. The
Smithsonian push to have Congress fund the NEROC 440-ft (134-meter) dish never
reached the floor. With Magellan, then, Congress considered for the first time under-
writing construction of a facility dedicated primarily to planetary radar astronomy, albeit
one whose lifetime was rather limited. Magellan illustrates the range of factors that influ-
ence the scientific conduct and outcome of a Big Science project. The change of admin-
istration in 1980, Cold War politics, and the Challenger accident, as well as ongoing and
changing budgetary and technological constraints largely shaped the scale and scope of
the Magellan mission and its science.
Allez VOIR!
As a mission concept, Magellan began in 1972, when Danny Herman, the head of
NASA Advanced Programs, convened an informal meeting of scientists, including Gordon
Pettengill, NASA engineers, and representatives of several key aerospace companies at the
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Denverdivisionof MartinMariettaAerospace,todiscussputtingasyntheticaperture
radaronaspacecrafttoVenus.1
Subsequently,woNASAlaboratories,AmesResearchCenterandJPL,organized
studygroupsandbeganplanningthemissionandappropriatespacecraftparameters.At
Ames,ByronSwensona dJohnS.McKayputtogetherastudygroupthatworkedclosely
withMartinMariettaAerospaceinplanningaVenusSARmappingmission.Theyinitially
proposeda variationonPioneerVenuswithanellipticorbit.Duringtheperiod1972
through1974,AmesResearchCenter,MartinMariettaAerospace,andtheEnvironmental
ResearchInstituteofMichigan(ERIM),whichhadbeeninvolvedin thedevelopmentof
airborneSARsystemsforthemilitaryasearlyasthe1950s,carriedoutapreliminaryeval-
uationof datahandlingproblemsandtechniques.The1974joint reportof Martin
MariettaAerospaceandtheERIMdefinedtheproject'sciencer quirementsandarguedin favorofacircularorbit3
Atthesametime,asimilarstudywasunderwayatJPLunderLouisD.Friedman.In
ordertodistingnisht eirVenusprojectfromthatoftheAmesgroup,FriedmanandAl
LadermannamedtheJPLprojecttheVenusOrbitingImagingRadar(VOIR).Laderman
hadplayedakeyrolein thedevelopmentof heSEASATSAR.HeandFriedmani tend-
edtheacronymtoconnotethesenseoftheFrenchverb"voir,"meaningtosee.VOIRwas
goingto "see"the(optically)unseensurfaceofVenus.TheJPLgroupincludedscience,
mission,andradarpeople.R.StephenSaunderswastheprincipalstudyscientist.Later,he
becameMagellanProjectScientist,aswellasaninvestigatorintheradargroup.Saunders
hadservedontheVikingMissiontoMars,beforecarryingoutNASA-fundedr searchin
planetarygeologyandparticipatingontheShuttleImagingRadar(SIR-A)project.
TheJPLgroupdecided,mainlyontheurgingofFriedman,touseacircularorbit.A
circularorbitwouldsimplifytheradarimagingprocess.Theradarsystemalwaysdealtwith
the sameparameters,becauseit wasalwaysat thesameheightabovethesurface.
Friedmanfelt thatsimplifyingtheradarversustheincreasedpropulsionrequiredto
achieveacircularorbitwasagoodtrade-off.Althoughtheaddedpropulsioneededto
achieveacircularorbitwouldincreasetheoverallcostofthemission,atleasti wasunder-
stood.Thesyntheticapertureradarwasanewtechnology;anellipticalorbitpresenteda
hostofradaranddataprocessingproblems.JimRose'sstudygroup,chargedwithplan-
ningthespacecraft,proposedavehiclebasedontheMarinersystem.Theradarstudy
groupspecifiedaradarsystemcompatiblewiththe3-meter(10-ft)antennasbuiltforthe
Pioneermissionstotheoutersolarsystem.Already,thegoalwastoeconomizebyusing
existingtechnology._
Manyoftheinitialassumptionsconcerninglookangle,numberoflooks,variousres-
olutionassumptions,umberofbits,andotherradarsystemparameterscameundercrit-
icismbyscientistsfamiliarwithopticaldata,butnonethelessresponsibleforinterpreting
theradardata.ThosecriticismsledJPLtoredesignawayfromtheMarinerapproachand
toexploitinternalstrengthsinsyntheticapertureradarsgainedthroughtheSEASATpro-
gram.Ultimately,theSEASATexperiencegaveJPLanedgeoveritscompetitors.
1. Herman, telephone conversation, 20 May 1994.
2. Memorandum, Louis D. Friedman toJ. C. Beckman, "VOIR, Archeology, 10/79," Box 14 [hereafter
Friedman-Beckman Memorandum]; VOIR Historical Perspective, "VOIR, VOIR Mission, Briefing to NASA Code
S, 5/78," Box 8; "VOIR, A Study of an Orbital Radar Mapping Mission to Venus, \hi. 1, 9/73," Box 10; "VOIR,
Report, A Study of an Orbital Radar Mapping Mission to Venus, Vol. 2, 9/73," BOx 14; "VOIR, Report, A Study
of an Orbital Radar Mapping Mission to Venus, Vol. 3, 9/73," Box 14; and "VOIR, (NASA) Correspondence
VOIR Mission Study Books, 10/77," Box 10, JPLMM.
3. Friedman-Beckman Memorandmn; VOIR Historical Perspective; "VOIR, Report, A Study of an
Orbital Radar Mapping Mission to Venus, Vol. 2, 9/73," and "VOIR, Reporl, A Study of an Orbital Radar
Mapping Mission to Venus, _,bl. 3, 9/73," Box 14, JPLMM; Vf;ram no. 9 (October 1986): 3; Campbell
8 December 1993.
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SEASAT was an Earth-orbiting satellite equipped with a SAR and designed for
oceanographic research. In its 1977 mission and systems study, JPL proposed the SEASAT
SAR as the potential design base for the VOIR. JPL argued that SEASAT already had con-
verted the concept of a spacecraft imaging radar into a reality. SEASAT used much of the
conceptual and system design contained in the originalJPL VOIR stndy, while later VOIR
studies borrowed heavily from the SF#S,SAT experience. JPL also contributed SEASAT
staff. John H. Gerpheide, SEASAT satellite system manager, became VOIR/Magellan pro-
ject manager. Anthony J. Spear, sensor manager on SEASAT, became VOIR/Magellan
deputy manager. 4
When the Science Working Group convened at NASA Headquarters in November
1977, NASA already had selected the JPL study. NASA charged the Science Working
Group with defining the major scientific objectives and rationale for a Venus orbiter
equipped with a radar imager, as well as defining other experiments and defining the
radar-imaging requirements of the mission, including coverage, resolution, operating
wavelength, telemetry data rate, and data processing. The Science Working Group con-
sidered the merit of global coverage at lnedimn resolution and imaging selected areas at
high resolution.
The composition of the VOIR Science Working Group drew heavily on Pioneer
Venus alumni and from both the planetary radar and geology communities (Table 5). The
planetaIy radar members were Don Campbell (Arecibo), Dick Goldstein (JPL), and
Gordon Pettengill (MIT), who chaired the Group. Harold Masursky and Gerald Schaber,
both astrogeologists from the USGS, Flagstaff, and both participants in Pioneer Venus,
also served on the Science Working Group.
Table 5
VOIR (Magellan) Science Working Group
Scientist Institution
(;otd_m H. Pettengill, Chair
Harry S. Stewal t, Executive Sect etary
Donald B (:an_phell
Richard M, (;oldstein
William M. KauIa
Michael C. Malin
1larold Masursky
Norman Ness
William L. Quaide, Program Scientist
R. Keith Raney
William B. Rossow
R. Stephen Saunders, Project Scientist
Gerald (;. Schaber
Sean C. Solomon
David tt. Staelin
A. lan Stewart
Robert Strata
G. Leonard Tyler
MIT
.IPl.
NAIC, Cornell
JPL
UCLA
,]PL
US Geological Survey
Gnddard Space Flight (;enter
NASA Headquarters
(_nada Center R}r Remote Sensing
Princeton Universily
JPL
US Geological Service
MIT
MIT
University of C.Iorado
University of Arizona
Stantord University
The Science Working Group thus became a forum for reinforcing bridges between
planetary radar and geology scientists. The geologists were 'X,ery helpful in teaching us
radar people what it was that turned them on, as it were, while we were helpful to them in
terms of optimizing the operation of the radar, so as to provide them with what they want-
ed," Gordon Pettengill explained. '_Fhis interaction shaped the specifications that turned
4. Friedman-Beckman Memorandum; VOIR tlistorical Perspective; "VOIR, (NASA) Correspondence
VOIR Mission Stndy Books, 10/77," Box 10,JPLMM; Robert C. Beal, Venus Orbiter lmat_,_ngRtularFY77 Study l¢,eptnt
Radar Studie._, Report 660-60 (Pasadena:.[Pl,, 2 May 1977), pp, 5-1 through 5-18; V-(;rara no. 9 (October 1986):
2. On VOIR's SEASAT legacy, see also Murray, pp. 127-129.
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into the VOIR and later the Magellan programs. The process is ongoing. It goes on even
today. "_
NASA was particularly mindful that the Science Working Group "take full account of
the anticipated capabilities of Earth-based radar systems as well as the results expected
from the Pioneer Venus experiments."6 The Committee on Planetary and Lunar
Exploration (COMPLEX) of the Space Science Board, and in particular its chairman,
Caltech professor of geology and geophysics Gerald J. Wasserburg, was behind that
request. The request was logical, Herman judged in retrospect. Given the high cost of
VOIR, why should NASA and the Congress commit a large sum of money to a space mis-
sion, when Arecibo could acquire the same imaging data for far less money? Having the
1977 VOIR Science Working Group assess the science yield from a large ground-based
radar telescope, like Arecibo, compared to the science yield from a spacecraft was, in
Herman's words, "very necessary to yield off the devil's advocate question. "7
Herman already had emphasized to the initial JPL study group the need to consider
the capabilities of Arecibo for undertaking ground-based radar observations of Venus.
The chief weakness in the development of the Venus radar orbiter concept, he explained,
was the belief held by some scientists that upgraded ground facilities could provide data
that was almost as good at a far lower cost.
By 1977, range-Doppler imaging of Venus at Goldstone and Arecibo had advanced
considerably thanks to the refinement of interferometry techniques and the attainment
of finer image resolution. At Goldstone, for example, Dick Goldstein used a radar inter-
ferometer, the 400-kilowatt Mars Station linked to a 26-meter Goldstone DSN antenna
(DSS-13, known also as the Venus site) located about 92 km to the southeast, to observe
and image Venus in 1972 for the first time and subsequently during the winter of
1973-1974 and the summer and fall of 1975. Over that period, image resolution fell from
15 to 10 km, although in some instances Goldstein realized resolutions as low as 5 to 9 km
in the East-West direction and 7 to 10.8 km North to South. In 1977, RayJurgens and Dick
Goldstein organized a three-station interferometer; the Mars Station transmitted, then it
and two 26-meter Goldstone DSN antennas (DSS-12 and DSS-13, the Echo and Venus
sites, respectively) received. The three-station data yielded image resolutions of 10 and
even down to 8 km. 8
Planetary scientists R. Stephen Saunders and Michael C. Malin of the JPL
Planetology and Oceanography Section studied the Goldstone Venus images and con-
cluded that they revealed a complex and varied terrain. They found degraded impact
craters and evidence for volcanism. In these radar images, Beta now appeared to be a 700-
km-diameter region elevated a maximum of about 10 kan relative to its surroundings with
a 60-by-90-km-wide depression at its summit. Saunders and Malin tentatively identified
Beta Regio as a shield volcano. 9
Meanwhile at Arecibo, the radar upgrade from UHF to S-band increased the resolu-
tion of Venus radar images abundantly. In 1969, with the old 430-MHz radar operating in
an interferometric mode, Campbell, RayJurgens, and Rolf Dyce achieved a resolution of
5. Pettengill 29 September 1993.
6. "VOIR, (NASA) Correspondence, VOIR Mission Study Books, 11/78," Box 13,JPLMM.
7. Herman, telephone conversation, 20 May 1994.
8. Herman, telephone conversation, 20 May 1994; Rummy, Morris, R. Green, and Goldstein, "A Radar
Brightness and Altitude Image of a Portion of Venus," Icarus 23 (1974): 1-7; Goldstein, R. Green, and Rumsey,
"Venus Radar Images,"Jmarnal of(h,¢q_hy._ical Research rot. 81, no. 26 (10 September 1976): 4807--4817; Goldstein,
R. Green, and Rumsey, "Venus Radar Brightness and Altitude Images," lcarw_ 36 (1978): 334-352; Jurgens,
Goldstein, Rumsey, and R. Green, "Images of Venus by Three-Station Radar Interferometry--1977 Results,"
.fimrnal of Getrphysical Re_earch vol. 85, no. A13 (30 December 1980): 8282-8294.
9. Saunders and Michael C. Malin, "Surface of Venus: Evidence of Diverse Landforms from Radar
Observations," Sc/ence 196 (1977): 987-990; ibid., "Geologic Interpretation of New Observations of the Surface
of Venus," (;e_q_hysical Researth Letterv 4 (1977) : 547-550.
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only 300 kin. An improved line feed brought Venus image resolution down to about 100
km in 1972, the last Venus observations before the S-band upgrade, n°
Concomitant with the S-band radar upgrade, the NAIC constructed a second anten-
na, a 30-meter equatorially mounted reflector, at a site about 11 km to the north-
northeast of the main 1,000-ft (305-meter) dish. Data taken by Campbell and Dyce in asso-
ciation with Gordon Pettengill during the Venus inferior conjunction of late August and
early September 1975 yielded images with surface resolutions approximating those of
Goldstone, between 10 and 20 km. Especially interesting was a detailed view of Maxwell. I1
Figure 29
Radar image o[ MaxweU Monte.s made at Arecib_J. Surface re-_olution is abo_t I0 kilameter:s. Maxwell, which measures ab_mt
750 kih_meter_ from nm'th to ._outh, include_ the planet_ highe._t elevatitm: I I kilometers above the planetary nw.an. (Courtesy
.f National A,_tronomy and hmo._phere Cent_ which is operated by Ccrrnell University under c_mtract with the National Science
Foundation.)
Thanks to hardware improvements, Don Campbell and Barbara Ann Burns, his grad-
uate student, increased the resolution of Venus images to five kin during the 1977 inferi-
or conjunction. For her doctoral dissertation, Burns used these radar images to study cra-
tering on the planet. She and Campbell identified over 30 circular features in the images
and tentatively classified them as craters, but the level of resolution did not permit them
to ascertain whether their origin was volcanic or impact. 1_ Also, in conjunction with USGS
10. Campbell, Jurgens, Dyce, Harris, and Pettengill, "Radar lnterferometric Observations of Venus at
70-Centimeter Wavelength," Scie*u'e 170 (1970): 1090-1092; NAIC QR Q2/1972, pp. 3--4, and Q3/1972, pp. 3--4.
11. Campbell, Dyce, and Pettengill, "New Radar Image of Venus," Science 193 (1976): 1123-1124.
12. Campbell and Barbara Ann Burns, "Earth-based Radar Imagery of Venus,".f_mrrutl I( C.et_;hy,_ical
ICe,earth w)l. 85, no. AI3 (30 December 1980): 8271-8281; Burns, "Cratering Analysis of the Surface of Venus as
Mapped by 12.6-cm Radar," Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, January 1982.
182 TOSEETHEUNSEEN
Figure 30
Large mosaic o[ Venu._ made [n,m ,4 retilm _adar _Jb*ervation._. 7"he image i_ ¢entered _m bmkntude 320 ° (_ee Fzl_ 28). Maxwell
Alontes i_ the large while area irl the u/_/u'r right ¢,rrner l,efl tJ] _enter i_ lh_ta ICek6o (('amrte_), of National A_tronomy and
Ionosphere (_enteT, whith i_ operated I0 (5_rnell University under contract with the N_tti_mal Scieme F_mndatitm.)
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geologist Hal Masursky, Don Campbell and Gordon Pettengill studied images of Alpha,
Beta, and Maxwell made from combined 1975 and 1977 Arecibo observationsJ 3
As Campbell and fellow radar astronomers using the upgraded Arecibo telescope
achieved resolutions as fine as 5 kilometers on Venus during the 1977 inferior conjunc-
tion, the high resolution invited comparison with potential space-based radars. In order
to evaluate the capabilities of ground-based radars versus orbiting radars, the JPL study
group brought in Thomas Thompson. Thompson had conducted lunar radar work at
both Arecibo and Haystack for the NASA Apollo program. As a result of Thompson's
advice, as well as the counsel of Danny Herman, Friedman's study group framed a radar
orbiter mission that complemented, rather than competed with, ground-based radar
observations of VenusJ 4
Thompson judged that the best ground-based facility would be the upgraded
Arecibo telescope. He concluded that the Earth-based radar was a very powerful tool for
mapping the surface features of Venus. "We should encourage these efforts with great
vigor," he wrote. "It seems certain that the Earth-based mapping will show many features
that should be mapped in greater detail with the spacecraft. Also, the spacecraft will be
needed to map the hemisphere of Venus which is not pointed toward Earth at each
inferior conjunction. ''15
The combined revolutions of Venus and Earth around the Sun lead to an interval
between inferior conjunctions (known as the synodic period) that nearly matches the spin
rate of Venus about its axis, so that Venus presents almost the same hemisphere to Earth
observers at inferior conjunction, the only moment when radar astronomers have
sufficient signal-to-noise ratio to image the planet. 16 The major argument in favor of a
spacecraft imaging mission to Venus was the inability of ground-based radars to image the
planet's hidden hemisphere. A major upgrade of the Arecibo (or Goldstone) radar could
have enabled it to observe and image Venus at orbital points before and after inferior
conjunction. Such an upgrade would have cost less than the Magellan mission, and the
improved radar would have been able to carry out radar research on a variety of other
solar system targets.
In 1977, NASA asked the VOIR Science Working Group to compare the costs of
acquiring the data from a space-based SAR versus from a ground-based radar telescope,
like Arecibo. ''We knew that NASA did not want to hear that it would be cheaper, even
though if you had taken what it actually cost to do Magellan and put it into a ground-based
facility, you could have had one beautiful ground-based facility, and you could have
endowed a fund to run it for years, forever probably, if you invested the money properly,"
Gordon Pettengill explained.
Moreover, Pettengill argued, "As an investment in basic research, basic astronomy, a
ground-based observatory would be a much wiser investment than sending Magellan out
there. But that is not how things work. The money is available for the Space Station, but
not available for any ground-based system that perhaps would do some of the same
things.'q7
Pettengill assigned the tasks of comparing altimetry and radar imaging capabilities
of ground-based versus space-based radars to Don Campbell and Dick Goldstein. They
13. Pettengill, Campbell, and Masursky, _I'he Surface of Venus," Scientific American 243 (August 1980):
54-65.
14. Thompson 29 November 1994; Friedman-Beckman Memorandum.
15. Venus Orlnting Imaging Radar Study Team t_mrt (Preliminary Draft (Pasadena: JPL, 31 August 1972),
pp. 22-28, and Friedman and J. R. Rose, Final l_,_Oort of a Venu.g Orbital Imaging Radar (VOIR) Study 760-89
(Pasadena:JPL, 30 November 1973), Pettengill materials.
16. For an explanation of the relationship between Venus's spin and rotational rates, see Goldreich and
Peale, "rhe Dynamics of Planetary Rotations," Annual Review of Astronomy and Astrophysic._ 6 (1968) : 287-320.
17. Pettengill 28 September 1993.
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completed separate reports, with Goidstein considering altimetry and Campbell apprais-
ing imaging capabilities. In each case, they compared a feasible radar design (an array
located probably in Puerto Rico to have the planet nearly over head) with the current
VOIR design requirements and judged whether the radar could achieve the geologic
objectives of the Venus mission as well or better than the VOIR design.
Campbell and Goldstein concluded that the radar array could do the VOIR science
(almost). The ground-based radar would not observe Venus at the same angles of inci-
dence as VOIR, yet, because it would be able to observe Venus at a distance of 1.5 astro-
nomical units, it could see the side of Venus hidden at inferior conjunction. The 100-
meter resolution attainable from Earth was the same as that set for the VOIR mission.
Moreover, the radar array could do the job for less. Pettengili decided to not include their
conclusions in the Working Group report "for political reasons." He believed that NASA
had no interest in the project, and that the conclusions might be embarrassing. Is
Defining the VOIR
In 1978, VOIR began to come together. The concept and preliminary design studies
completed, the time had come to begin implementation studies. Radar development
began in 1978 and took place in two stages, called Phase A, lasting from June through
August 1978, and Phase B, October 1979 through June 1980. During Phase A, JPL
received three proposals to study the VOIR SAR and selected one study contractor,
Goodyear Aerospace Corporation. During Phase B, JPL received three proposals and
selected two study contractors, Goodyear Aerospace Corporation and Hughes Aircraft
Company. Participation in Phase B studies was important for those firms wishing to build
the VOIR radar; implementation phase proposals were accepted from only those compa-
nies participating in Phase B. 19
The mission, its spacecraft and radar systems, and its science experiments underwent
many revisions, and many of the risks foreseen in 1978 materialized before Magellan left
Earth. As planned in 1978, the Space Shuttle would launch the VOIR spacecraft during
the period May-June 1983. VOIR would arrive at Venus in November 1983 and spend five
months in orbit, reduced from the earlier concept of a 19-month mission. JPL considered
the possibility of the launch being delayed until 1984. Such a delay would cause an over-
lap with Galileo, complicate scheduling the Deep Space Network, and raise costs. A
delayed launch also would provide an opportunity for the Soviet Union to obtain Venus
SAR images before the United States, thereby making VOIR radar results less interesting,
if not inconsequential.
The 1978 version of VOIR also exploited the availability of extant technology. In
order to economize and facilitate selling and funding the project, VOIR would use com-
ponents with proven performance records from other missions. For instance, from
Mariner 10 VOIR borrowed its solar array and louvers, from Voyager its spacecraft elec-
tronics, from Pioneer Venus its radar altimeter, and from SEASAT its synthetic aperture
radar.20
JPL hoped to make VOIR an in-house project. NASA had other ideas. In 1979, NASA
stipulated that JPL contract out both the radar and the spacecraft to industry. NASA also
18. Pettengill 3 October 1993.
19. "VOIR, Venus Orbital Imaging Cost Review, 6/78," Box 5; _VOIR, Venus Orbiting Imaging Radar
Review, 4/80," Box 10; and "VOIR. VO1R 88, Viewgraph Presentation to NASA Administrator, 11/87," Box 10,
JPLMM.
20. WOIR, Status Briefing to Committee on Planetary and Lunar Exploration, NASA Headquarters,
6/78," and "VOIR, VOIR 84, Delayed Launch Option, 6/78," Box 3,JPLMM.
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specifiedthattheradarwouldhaveasingleindividual,fromNASA,shouldertherespon-
sibilityofmakingit work.TheNASAHeadquarters decision had an immediate impact on
VOIR design. The JPL in-house effort, which came to an end in February 1980, had con-
centrated on using SEASAT technology. Now an industrial design would serve. In order
to economize, JPL had proposed using the Galileo circular 4.8-meter antenna for both
communications and the SAR. The weight of the Galileo antenna was significantly less
than that of a competing antenna design. Instead, JPL now had to undertake a study of
the competing and differing antenna patterns proposed by the contractors Goodyear and
Hughes. _1
In planning the VOIR radar mapper, the Science Working Group took into account
the resolution of the images sent back by Mariner 9. Those images had revealed for the
first time the diversity of Martian geologic structures, including young volcanoes, liquid
cut channels, and large canyons of possible tectonic origin and had led to a fundamen-
tally new understanding of the nature of Mars. The VOIR radar mapper had to have com-
parable or better resolution than Mariner 9. Steve Saunders, project scientist, and Gerry
Schubert, a geophysicist in the Department of Earth and Space Sciences, University of
California at Los Angeles, originated the high-resolution design requirement.22
By 1978, the Science Working Group had defined four objectives for the 1984 VOIR
mission: 1) images at a resolution and image quality equivalent to the Mariner 9 Mars mis-
sion (100 percent of the surface at mapping resolution, 600 meters, and a few percent in
a high resolution mode, 100 meters); 2) a global topographic map of the planet; 3) a
global map of the gravity field; and 4) new investigations of the atmosphere and exos-
phere. With surface exploration taking pride of place over atmospheric experiments,
VOIR would be an inverse of Pioneer Venus.
In October 1978, NASA dissolved the Science Working Group and issued an
Announcement of Opportunity requesting proposals for VOIR science experiments in
three categories: 1) surface and interior properties of the planet requiring use of the SAR
and altimeter, 2) atmospheric and ionospheric and other geophysical experiments requir-
ing flight instruments other than the SAR and altimeter, and 3) other geophysical, atmos-
pheric, and general relativity experiments using existing spacecraft subsystems. 23
Schooling potential users of Venus radar images became an integral part of the
project. Project managers understood the VOIR radar image interpretation community as
consisting of 70 investigators plus 130 associates with experience interpreting
photographs of the Moon, Mars, and Mercury. In order to inculcate potential users in the
interpretation of radar images, JPL planned two radar image interpretation sessions, ten-
tatively scheduled with Goodyear, to take place in 1978 and 1979. NASA andJPL also were
to sponsor studies based on the analogy between Venus radar images and radar images
from aircraft and Earth satellites. 24
After the release of the VOIR Announcement of Opportunity, experiment proposals
began to arrive at NASA Headquarters. Gordon Pettengill submitted his proposal to use
the synthetic aperture radar to image Venus in February 1979. Pettengill defined his radar
experiment in such a way as to dovetail radar and geological science. The proposal
focused on "those processes that have shaped the surface of Venus and that have led to
the evolution of its distinctive atmosphere. A major intermediary in achieving this goal is
the preparation of a global map of the surface morphology in sufficient detail to describe
and locate the major geological types and processes exhibited by Venus."
21. Pettengill 28 September 1993; "VOIR, Venus Orbiting Imaging Radar Review, 4/80," and "VOIR,
Venus Orbiting Imaging Radar Review, 4/80," Box 10,JPLMM.
22. A. Gustaferro to W. B. Hanson, 8 May 1979, _Magellan Documentation," NHO; Friedman-Beckman
Memorandum; VOIR Historical Perspective.
23. "VOIR, (NASA) Correspondence, VOIR Mission Study Books, 11/78," Box 13; "VOIR, Status
Briefing to Committee on Planetary and Lunar Exploration, NASA Headquarters, 6/78," Box 3; and NASA,
Announcement of Opportunity no. OSS-5-78, 12 October 1978, Box 13,JPLMM.
24. "VOIR, Venus Orbital Imaging Cost Review, 6/78," Box 3, JPLMM.
186 TOSEETHEUNSEEN
Pettengill'sproposalemphasizedthegenerallackof knowledgeabouthesurface
featuresofVenus.Ground-basedobservationsofVenus,Mariners2,5,and10,theSoviet
Veneramissions,andPioneerVenusallprovidedmuchinformationaboutheplanet,but
theproposalrgued,"rhisknowledgeisheavilyweightedtowardtheatmosphereofVenus
anditsinteractionwiththesolarwind.Comparativelylitde is known about the solid sur-
face or the interior of the planet."
Pettengill's proposed team of co-investigators followed closely the membership of
the disbanded Science Working Group. Apart from Arecibo radar astronomer Don
Campbell, most co-investigators came from MIT's Center for Space Research, Pettengill's
home organization, JPL, and the U.S. Geological Survey. Representing the USGS were
Pioneer Venus veteran Hal Masursky, Gerald Schaber, then assistant chief of the Branch
of Astrogeologic Studies, and Laurence A. Soderblum, chief of the USGS Branch of
Astrogeologic Studies. Again, radar and planetary geologists associated in a common
endeavor.
Among the geologists who ultimately would be the most influential on the VOIR pro-
ject was James W. Head, III, an associate professor in the Department of Geological
Sciences at Brown University. Head had worked at NASA Headquarters for Bell
Communications, a telephone company subsidiary that provided systems analysis and sup-
port, including geologic work and landing site selection, to NASA on the Apollo missions.
His research interests included comparative planetary geology, and he had been active in
the geologic interpretation of radar data from the Moon for some years. More impor-
tantly, as we shall see, he was a guest investigator on the Soviet Venera 15 and 16 missions.
Pettengill proposed to organize his co-investigators into Task Groups that would par-
ticipate in and monitor the design and implementation of all aspects of the SAR instru-
ment, its operation during flight, and the reduction of imaging and ancillary radar data,
as well as the subsequent geological and geophysical interpretation of the data. 25
NASA received several other proposals, but they were not successful for one reason
or another. H. MacDonald, a radar geologist at the University of Arkansas, proposed inter-
preting VOIR data in the form of a radar landform adas of Venus. The project largely
duplicated the mapping contemplated in the Pettengili proposal. Another unsuccessful
proposal came from Charles A. Barth, at the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space
Physics, University of Colorado, Boulder, to act as Principal Investigator on the airglow
photometer experiment. 26 The airglow photometer was to measure the horizontal and
temporal characteristics of the nightside thermospheric circulation. That proposal failed
for reasons external to VOIR, as we shall see.
The Stanford Center for Radar Astronomy also submitted a proposal; it succeeded.
Proposing radio and radar experiments on NASA space missions was their normal mode
of conducting scientific research. Len Tyler, Dick Simpson, and John F. Vesecky proposed
to study radar backscatter from the surface of Venus, in order to infer the small-scale phys-
ical texture of the surface, and to relate that texture to the large-scale formations visible
in the VOIR images. Rather than create a separate investigative group, the Stanford
researchers proposed that they participate in the radar group with Pettengill. 27
25. "VOIR, Scientific Investigation and Technical Plan, Proposal to NASA, 2/79," Box 13, JPLMM;
V-Gram no. 11 (April 1987): 16; V(;ram no. 13 (October 1987): 14; and V-Gram no. 11 (April 1987): 11.
26. "VOIR, A Proposal to NASA, Submitted by University of Arkansas, 7/79;" "VOIR, Contract Request
for Proposal (APE) Airglow Photometer Experiment, 5/81, 12/81;" and "VOIR, Proposal to NASA, for Airglow
Photometer Experiment for the VOIR Mission," Box 13,JPLMM.
27. "VOIR, Proposal to the NASA Management Section, 2/79," Box 13,.IPLMM.
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The Venus Radar Mapper
Congress already had voted VOIR a new start in the NASA budget, when Ronald
Reagan became president in January 1981. As a result of decisions reached in the early
months of the new adminisnation, the problems foreseen in 1978---overlap with Galileo,
complication of DSN scheduling, escalated costs, and an opportunity for the Soviet Union
to obtain Venus SAR images before the United States--all came true. National politics
now took its turn in shaping the VOIR mission. Early in the new Republican administra-
tion, as a political signal that the new president was serious about cutting the budget, or
at least the civilian portion of tile budget, the budget czar David Stockman pressured
NASA to sacrifice a major project. NASA chose VOIR. '+_
Faihue to fund the project until fiscal 1984, when VOIR became a new NASA start,
led to a postponement of the launch schedule to April 1988. This postponement provid-
ed the Soviet Union an opportunity to obtain the first SAR images of Venus. In this case,
the Cold War rhetoric of tile White House did not have its equivalent in the Space Race.
The Space Race was dead. Starting in the early 1970s, as the United States withdrew from
the war in Vietnam and the Apollo program's objective had been met several times over,
a period of d6tente started. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed an accord in 1972 to allow the
exchange of scholars between the two countries. A decade later, however, the United
States let the accord lapse in protest over the Soviet imposition of martial law in Poland.
Nonetheless, many U.S. and Soviet scientists sought to collaborate, not compete, and they
did so with the tacit approval of their governments. Cold War rivalry and competition no
longer held sway. '_-'_
The justification for canceling VOIR was its high cost. The project, conflated into an
exploration of the surface, interior, atmosphere, and ionosphere of Venus, carried a total
price tag of $680 million. NASA andJPL sought ways to slash that price tag to $200 to $300
million.3° In the opinion of Gordon Pettengill, the project '_vas climbing a cliff. The pro-
ject people at NASA Headquarters were told that if they could cut the cost in half, they
could have their project. In other words, they had to do it for $300 million instead of $600
million. So an ad hoc group of JPL and NASA Headquarters people was put together to
study ways of cutting costs. '':_l
NASA renamed the low-cost reduced mission the Venus Radar Mapper (VRM).:_z The
trick was to lower the price tag, while still getting the science done. A number of
approaches were suggested and taken, not all of which were technological, such as the
reduction of personnel levels. Many of the cost-cutting decisions directly reduced the
scientific scope of the mission. For example, one of the earliest decisions was to .jettison
all scientific experiments that did not use the radar. Only the altimetry and imaging
experiments, which used the radar instrument, and the gravity experiment, which was car-
ried out by the Deep Space Network, remained. Among the rejected experiments was the
airglow photometer. :_'_As Pettengill pointed out, however, "they saved $150 million by
28. Pettengill 28 September 1993; Saunders, Pettengill, Arvidson, William L. Sjogren, William T. K.
Johnson, and L. Pieri, "The Magellan _ntts Radar Mapping Mission,"flmrnal Of_,e_rphy_ical Ib'warch vol. 95, no.
B6 (1990): 8339; Waft, .Ira,Jan Ody._ey: A Ihstory _( NASA'._ I'n_ject Galileo, chapter "Surviving the Reagan
Rew)[tttion," pp. 8-10, Waff materials.
29. Henry S. F. Cooper, Jr., "A Reporter at Large: Explorers," 1"he New Yorker 64 (7 March 1988): 50.
30. '%_(31R, Venus Mapper New Start Plans, 3/82," and %r()lR, _,_'ntts Radar Mapper, A Proposed
Planetary Program 1"o_ 1988," Box 10,,]PLMM.
31. t'ettengill 28 September 1993.
32. Fur at brief l)etiod in 1981 and 1982, project +.locutnents used the name '_k'nus Mapping Mission
(+q_lM).
33. %'OIR, Project Management, "_.'nus Orbiting hnaging Radar, 1981-82/' Box 1,t; +'VOIR, Venus
Mapper Brieting to NASA 1teadquarters, 1/82," Box 10; and "VOIR, Request for Proposal fox- VOIR Synthetic
Apextute Radar, 7/81, 3/3," Box L3,.IPLMM.
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getting rid of the four non-radar experiments that originally were intended for the
mission.'34
Throughout various iterations of the project, the dimensions of the high and low res-
olution radar images vacillated. In fact, for a while, the high resolution detailed images of
selected surface features disappeared entirely. In an early 1981 iteration, the VRM was to
map at least 70 percent of Venus with a resolution of 600 meters and take high resolution
(150-meter) data over about one percent of the planet. As described at a January 1982
briefing at NASA Headquarters, however, the VRM was to have no high resolution capa-
bility and would image only 70 percent of the planet with a resolution of better than one
km. At a February 1982 conference held at JPL for the selected contractors, Hughes
(SAR) and Martin Marietta (spacecraft), the SAR performance parameters called for cov-
erage of 90 percent of the planet with a single resolution of 300 meters. By 1984, though,
when the VRM became a NASA new start, the baseline performance had been raised to
resolutions of 215 meters by 150 meters and 480 meters by 250 meters.3_
The resolution, and consequently the science that the VRM would achieve, was a
trade-off against the cost of the project. Only by lowering overall costs didJPL and NASA
manage to put together a mission capable of high resolution. One of the key cost-reduc-
tion approaches was to "maximize inheritance," a term that meant to borrow as much
technology from other projects as possible. Magellan was to be pieced together from other
NASA projects.
Among the projects from which the VRM borrowed, or considered borrowing, were
Viking, Voyager, Galileo, and ISPM (International Solar Polar Mission). The VRM pro-
posed borrowing such hardware items as the Voyager 3.7-meter dish antenna for its syn-
thetic aperture radar, Galileo's tape recorder, and Viking's S-band low-gain antenna. Also,
JPL suggested using NASA standard equipment as well as various SEASAT parts, such as
sun sensor and solar array drive electronics and the solar array actuators, s6
In order to improve the VRM's data handling capabilities, JPL modified the radar
guidelines in order to use the Galileo Golay code, rather than the Golay code planned by
Hughes (contractor for the SAR). The Galileo Golay code and a restructuring of the radar
burst header format (for more efficient handling by the Deep Space Network) resulted in
a considerable saving in ground software costs.
Another key decision was the switch from a circular to an elliptical orbit. With an
elliptical orbit, the parameters of the radar varied as a function of the spacecraft's altitude
above the planet's surface. Mapping from an elliptical orbit eliminated the need for aer-
obraking. Aerobraking is a technique for trimming a spacecraft's orbit by having it pass
repeatedly through a planetary atmosphere. Its use would reduce the amount of propul-
sion needed for initial orbit insertion. Aerobraking offered a low-cost, low-risk option that
would both save fuel, and therefore mission weight, and lower mission costs. 37
Using digital processing to simplify the electronics was a significant saver of money.
Original VOIR planning centered on analog processing for the radar, but by 1981 it had
become clear that using digital circuitry was the preferred technology. The parameters of
an analog system could not change during flight; so, aerobraking and a circular orbit were
necessities. Digital processing allowed the radar parameters lo change during flight, there-
by tolerating the variations of a less expensive elliptical orbit? _
34. Pettengill 28 September 1993.
35. "VOIR, Request for Proposal for VOIR Synthetic Aperture Radar, 7/81, 3/3," Box 13; "VOIR, Venus
Mapper Brieting to NASA Headquarters, 1/82," Box 10; _,rOIR, Venus Mappe_ Conference w/Hughes and
MMC, 2/82," Box 10; and "VOIR, Pioject Management Report, 1984, 1/2," Box 14, IPLMM.
36. "VOIR, Venus Mapper Briefing to NASA Headquarters, 1/82," Box 10; '_dOIR, Venus Mapper New
Start Plans, 3/82," Box 10: and _,rOIR, Venus Radar Mapper, A Proposed Plane|ary Program for 1988," Box 10,
JPLMM.
37. "VOIR, Project Management Repoll, 1984, 1/2," Box 14, JPLMM.
38. Pettengill 28 Septemher 1993.
MAGELLAN 189
The Microsymposia
The decisions to change the orbital geometry, use digital processing, and borrow
technology from other projects lowered project costs to the point where VRM became a
new NASA start in 1984. As a result of the postponed launch of VRM, Soviet scientists
gained an important scientific opportunity to image Venus. When it appeared that the
United States would launch VOIR on schedule, Soviet scientists decided to launch their
own Venus imaging mission only if the United States did not send a Venus radar mapper
before 1984. Once NASA delayed launch of the VRM beyond 1984, Soviet scientists had
to move forward their own Venus radar mapper very quickly in order to seize the oppor-
tunity.
In June 1983, the Soviet Union flew two spacecraft equipped with radar mappers to
Venus; they arrived four months later. Venera 15 and 16 covered the same polar region of
Venus (30 ° North to the pole), probably on the assumption that one of the spacecraft
might fail. Their goal was to map that region at a resolution of one to two km in daily, 150
by 7,000 km strips 10 ° to the side of the orbital track, covering a total area of 115 million
square kilometers by the time the main mission ended in July 1984. 39
F_ Jt
l¢tutar imal.,e Of Venus, near Ma_.ll Montes. rrutde by Venera 15 and 16. (Courtesy of NASA, photo no. 88-14-8.)
39. Andrew Wilson, ._k_rSy._tem log (London:Jane's, 1987), pp. 112-113.
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Interpreting the images from the Venera 15 and 16 mission required more informa-
tion about Venus surface features than the Soviet Union had available. Previous Soviet
missions had landed only in limited areas of the planet. Soviet scientists, desperately in
need of information, turned to their American colleagues to exchange Venus data.
Since the Apollo era, several American scientists had made frequent trips to Moscow
and to international meetings where they met Soviet planetary scientists. Of those
American scientists, two of the most important ones for the Magellan mission were Jim
Head of Brown University and Hal Masursky (USGS), a member of the Pioneer Venus sci-
ence team. As Venera 15 and 16 data became available, its value to future American explo-
ration of Venus, especially the VRM mission, was apparent, and a parallel American inter-
est in collaboration developed.
On 25 March 1984, Alexander Basilevsky, a geologist and chief of the Vernadsky
Institute Planetology Laboratory, and Valery L. Barsukov, director of the Vernadsky
Institute (the Soviet equivalent of the USGS), presented Venera 15 and 16 results at the
Lunar and Planetary Science Conference held in Houston. United States scientists appre-
ciated that the Venera 15 and 16 SARs had yielded mosaickable images of a large part of
the northern hemisphere.
COMPLEX, the Committee on Planetary and Lunar Exploration of the Space
Science Board, requested that VRM scientists present an assessment of the Venera 15 and
16 accomplishments, as well as a summary of VRM capabilities and, if deemed desirable,
ways of improving VRM. Gordon Pettengill presented what was known about the Soviet
Venera mission, including SAR characteristics, range of resolution, and coverage, and he
compared Venera results with Arecibo high resolution range-Doppler images. Having reli-
able images of Venus was vital to the planning of the VRM mission. Although VRM scien-
tists already had data with which to plan the mission, the Venera 15 and 16 data would
have added important information on the northern hemisphere. Only two other sources
of images of Cytherean surface features were available.
One source was Pioneer Venus. Its radar altimeter measured the height of about
90 percent of the surface at roughly 75 km intervals, while the mapper mode furnished
low (20 to 40 kin) resolution radar images of only the equatorial region. Pioneer Venus
had not covered the northern polar region, unlike Venera 15 and 16. Higher resolution
imaging was available from Arecibo, the second source of Venus surface images. 4° Arecibo
covered about 25 to 30 percent of the planet at resolutions around 2 to 4 kin. However,
Arecibo could image well only the hemisphere of Venus facing Earth at inferior conjunc-
tion. 41
If they could be had on magnetic tape in a digital format, the Venera 15 and 16 data
would have assisted VRM planning significantly. The data did become available, but not
through any political maneuvering by the corresponding state departments or other high-
level official channels. The exchange of scientific results between Soviet and U.S. scien-
tists interested in the surface features of Venus came about as the result of an arrangement
made among the scientists themselves and their parent institutions.
The 11 March 1985 session on Venus at the Lunar and Planetary Science Conference
featured Soviet presentations of their recent interpretations of Venera 15 and 16 results
by Alexander Basilevsky, Valery L. Barsukov, and two others from the Vernadsky Institute.
Subsequently, on 19-20 March 1985, the first microsymposium took place at Brown
University. The four Soviet scientists reviewed recent results of Venera 15 and 16, Arecibo,
Pioneer Venus, as well as future Venus missions and Venus science in general. Among
those attending were geologists James Head and Harold Masursky and radar astronomers
Gordon Pettengill and Don Campbell of Arecibo.
40, "VOIR, Project Management Report, 1984, 1/2," Box 14,JPLMM.
41. Campbell 8 December 1993.
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ItwasattheMarch1985microsymposiumthatJamesHeadreportedthattheSoviets
appearedtobereceptivetotheideaofprovidingsomeoftheirdata.Preliminaryesults
indicatedthattheVeneraSAP,radarparameterswouldnotbeamajorobstacletotheir
usebyAmericanscientists.Moreover,bothSovietandAmericani vestigatorshadreached
apreliminaryagreementonthechoiceofaparticularsmallfeatureforthedefinitionof
theVenusprimemeridian.ThefeatureshadappearedinboththeAreciborange-Doppler
imagesandtheVenera15and16SARimages.Establishmentofacoordinatesystemwas
importanttotheplannedVRMcartographyefforts.
In November1985,VladimirKotelnikov,theleaderof Sovietground-basedradar
astronomyresearch,thenheadof Interkosmos,deliveredtoJimHeadatapewithone
stripofdigitalVeneraimagedatawithaccompanyingaltimetry.Headdistributedthetape
toSaunders,Pettengill,Campbell,andMasurskyforanalysis.Theyhadnodifficultyindis-
playingtheimageusingconventionalAmericanimageprocessingtechniques.
TheSoviet-AmericanagreementtoexchangeVenusdatawasunderway.Theagree-
mentmaterializedasaprotocolsignedin 1982betweentheGovernorofRhodeIsland(thelocationofBrownUniversity)andtheSovietAcademyofSciences.Undertheagree-
ment,onemicrosymposiumperyearwastotakeplaceineachcountry.Traditionally,the
AmericanmicrosymposiumhasbeenheldinMarchorAprilatBrownUniversity;while
theSovietmeetingtakesplaceattheVernadskyInstitutein Moscowin August.James
Headorganizedthe BrownUniversitygroup,andValeryBarsukov,directorof the
VernadskyInstitute,organizedtheSovietgroup.Thecreationofthemicrosymposiaowed
muchtothefacthatHeadwasaguestinvestigatornVenera15and16.42
TheSovietdatadeliveredoverthefollowingyearsat subsequentmicrosymposia
playedanimportantrolein thecreationofplanningmapsfortheVRM/Magellanmis-
sion.Themicrosymposiawerebutoneforumwithinwhichgeologyandradarcommuni-
tiesworkedtogether.TheVRMRadarInvestigationGroup(inchargeof theradarsci-
ence)wasanotherforumthatbroughtthetwocommunitiestogetherinacommoneffort.
TheRadarInvestigationGroup(RADIG)wasalargeandmultifacetedorganizationtypi-
calof BigScience.In orderto moreeffectivelycoordinateandcarryoutVRMand
Magellanscience,Pettengilldividedthegroupintosmallersubgroups(Table6).
TheVRM(andlaterMagellan)RadarInvestigationGroupcombinedtheformer
SyntheticApertureRadarGroupandtheAltimetryInvestigationGroupoftheVOIRpro-ject.GordonPettengillheadedtheRadarInvestigationGroup(RADIG).ThreeRADIG
subgroupsdealtwithmissiondesign,whilethreeothersubgroupsconcernedthemselves
withscientificinterpretation.Theselasthreesubgroupstreatedcartographyandgeodesy,
surfacelectricalproperties,andgeologyandgeophysics.Geologyandgeophysics,the
largestandmostcomplexareaof scientificinterpretation,consistedof evensmaller
groupsdealingwithvolcanicandtectonicprocesses;impactprocesses;rosional,deposi-
tional,andchemicalprocesses;andisostaticandconvectiveprocesses.43
NotonlydidtheRADIGbringtogetherplanetaryradarandgeologycommunities,
butit illustratedhowspaceflightsciencegroupsorganizedLittleSciencetofunctionas
BigScience,if onlyonatemporarybasiswithinephemeralorganizations.Ordinarily,ina
waycharacteristicofLittleScience,scientistsworkaloneatauniversityor technicalschool
withasmallbudgetandmodestlaboratoryequipment.NASAspacemissionsbringthese
individualscientistsogetherandmakethemfunctioninwayscustomarilyassociatedwith
BigScience,mainlyaspartofalargegroup.Anygivenscientistworksasamemberoftwo
groups,onedefinedbyaflightinstrumentandtheotherbythescientist'sdisciplineor
42. Cooper, "A Reporter," p. 50; Ford 3 October 1994; Campbell 8 December 1993; "VOIR, Report
Project Management, 1985," Box 14, JPLMM. The August 1991 microsymposium was delayed until November
because of the putsch.
43. V-(h'am no. 8 (24 March 1986): 2--4.
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Table 6
Members of Magellan Radar Investigation Group (RADIG)
Sc/ent/st Inst/tut/on
Raymond E. Arvidson
Victor R. Baker
Joseph H. Binsack
Donald B. Campbell
Merton E, Davies
Charles Elachi
John E. Guest
mles W. Head, Ill
liam M. Kaula
Kurt L. Lambeck
Franz W. Leberl
Harold C. MacDonald
Harold Masursky
Daniel P. McKenzie
Barry E. Parsons
Gordon H. Pettengill
Roger J. Phillips
R. Keith Pane)'
R. Stephen Saunders
Gerald G. Schaber
Gerald S_ Schubert
Laurence A. Soderblum
Sean C. Solomon
H. Ray Stanley
Manik Talwani
G. Leonard Tyler
John A. Wood
Washington University
University of Arizona
M1T
NAIC, Cornell
Rand Corporation
_PnLversity of London
Brown University
UCLA
Australian National University
Independent Consultant
University of Arkansas
US Geological Survey
Cambridge University
Oxford University
MIT
Southern Methodist University
Canada Center for Remote Sensing
JPL
US Geological Survey
UCLA
US Geological Survey
MIT
NASA, Wallops Island
Gulf Research and Development
Stanford University
Har ward-Smithsonian Astrophysical
Observatory
subdiscipline. Grouped together around a common instrument, scientists jointly design
the instrument that will generate their data. Grouped together around a common scien-
tific interest, such as magnetospheres or geology, scientists jointly utilize data derived from
the operation of all flight instruments. However much these scientists function within a
Big Science organization, the organization itself is defined by the temporary lifetime of
the project. In the end, they are once more Little Science.
Osmosis
In December 1985, NASA Headquarters notifiedJPL that the VRM had a new name,
Magellan. The name reflected NASA's general plan of naming major planetary missions
after famous scientists and explorers (Galileo, Magellan, Cassini).44 Ferdinand Magellan
had been a Portuguese navigator and explorer who led an expedition into the Pacific
Ocean under the Spanish flag.
By the end of 1985, construction of the Magellan radar instrument was underway.
After Hughes Aircraft Company and Goodyear Aerospace Corporation completed Phase
B studies of the project in June 1980, JPL issued a Request for Proposals for the synthetic
aperture radar system, including the antenna design, in April 1981. The selection of the
SAR and spacecraft contractors were separate processes. 4-_
44. "VOIR, Report Project Management, 1985," Box 14,JPLMM.
45. "VOIR, Venus Orbiting Imaging Radar Review, 4/80," Box 10, and WOIR, Request for Proposal for
VOIR Synthetic Aperture Radar, 7/81, 1/3/' Box 13,JPLMM.
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Hughes had hoped to turn its experience with the Pioneer Venus orbiter mapper
into an advantage, while Goodyear had been one of the first firms to commercialize air-
craft SAR systems to study the Earth. In 1983, NASA andJPL signed contracts with Hughes
and Martin Marietta for the SAR and spacecraft. Hughes signed the definitive radar con-
tract on 24 January 1984, and the contract was executed 27 January 1984. Throughout
1985 and 1986, Hughes increased the number of employees working on the Magellan
radar. The project had the second highest priority within the Hughes Space and
Communication Group, behind a smaller classified project. 46 Hughes' Pioneer Venus
gambit had paid off.
Magellan was on schedule and under budget when the Space Shuttle Challenger blew
up on 28January 1986. The tragedy caused a serious delay in the Magellan launch sched-
ule. In fact, the disaster adversely affected all Shuttle flights. The Shuttle would not fly
until the cause of the Challenger accident was determined and corrective solutions found
to prevent future repetitions of the accident. Only then would a new Shuttle flight sched-
ule be drawn up.
In February 1986, Magellan mission personnel began to appraise probable launch
dates. Realizing the uncertainties of the Shuttle launch schedule, they investigated two
launch windows that followed the approved launch period in April 1988. One was between
28 October and 16 November 1989, the other between 25 May and 13June 1991. In each
case, Magellan would spend eight months in orbit performing its prime mission, and the
mission would end at superior conjunction, in November 1990 or in June 1992, depend-
ing on the launch window. 47
A delayed launch also raised the likelihood of conflicts with the Galileo launch. If
Magellan held to its approved launch schedule in April 1988, and Galileo delayed 13
months, then coverage conflicts on the Deep Space Network eased considerably.
Whatever launch window Magellan eventually had, conflict with the Galileo launch and
scheduling of the Deep Space Network would have to be taken into consideration.
Further complicating the launch schedule was the cancellation in June 1986 of the
Shuttle/Centaur, which was to launch Magellan. After a study of alternate launch vehicles,
in October 1986 NASA settled on a combination of the Shuttle and a launcher known as
an Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) and assigned Magellan a position on the Shuttle manifest
for April 1989. 4_
The change required reduction of the spacecraft mass, as well as new structural loads
analyses. In order to undertake the analyses, a second spacecraft structure was needed for
static load tests. The only one available was on the Voyager spacecraft hanging in the
Smithsonian Air and Space Museum in Washington. NASA made arrangements to borrow
the Voyager bus from the museum and conducted the tests. 49
The Challenger accident also affected Magellan's use of Galileo technology. Because
Magellan launched before Galileo, the extra Galileo components were not available.
Ground support equipment to be borrowed from Galileo were unavailable. Now the
"spare parts" Magellan was to borrow from Galileo had to be returned to Galileo and pur-
chased new for Magellan.
The delay of Magellan also raised the cost of the project. The total dollar impact,
including the cost of hardware, mission design, and mission operations, was estimated to
be about $150 million. Gordon Pettengill summed up the situation: 'q'hat disaster need
not have happened, but it did; it was just one of those things. Magellan would not have
been as expensive, if we had launched when we were originally planned to launch. ''5°
46. Various documents, Box 6, and "VOIR, Repor! Project Management, 1986, 1/2," Box 14,JPLMM.
47. "VOIR, Report Project Management, 1986, 1/2," Box 14,JPLMM.
48. V-(;ram no. 10 (January 1987): 1 and 4.
49. V-(;ram no. 10 (January 1987): 1.
50. Pettengill 28 September 1993; V-Gram no. 10 (Ianuary 1987): 1.
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JPL received unofficial notification in May 1986 from NASA Headquarters that
Magellan had slipped to the October-November 1989 launch window, but no official
launch date had yet been established. Nonetheless, the Magellan project proceeded on
the assumption of that launch window. 51
Meanwhile, the collection and exchange of radar data for the assembling of maps to
be used in planning the mission proceeded. The Brown University-Vernadsky Institute
microsymposia continued to play a vital role in the exchange of scientific information
between American and Soviet scientists. In April 1986, the third international microsym-
posium on Venus took place at Brown University. Valery Barsukov, Alexander Basilevsky,
and four other Soviet scientists presented preliminary scientific results of the Venera 15
and 16 missions and a description of the radar system.
The Soviet scientists presented the Magellan project with three Venera data tapes
consisting of unpublished SAR digital data. They stipulated that the data be used strictly
for planning the Magellan project; it was not for scientific publication or distribution,
until the Soviet scientists had published the information. The request was reasonable; it
protected their priority of discovery. In exchange, the Soviet scientists received high reso-
lution digital data from the Viking mission to assist them in planning their Phobos mis-
sion to Mars's moon. ._2
The following year, Magellan investigators James Head, Steve Saunters, Hal
Masursky, Gerald Schaber, and Don Campbell attended a microsymposium held 11 to 15
August 1986 at the Sv_rnadsky Institute in Moscow. They and their Moscow colleagues
exchanged views on the interpretation of Venus data from Venera 15 and 16 and Arecibo.
The Soviet investigators presented the Magellan scientists with eight tapes of Venera 15
and 16 digital radar images and altimetry profiles for use by the Magellan project for plan-
ning purposes. 5:_
At the following microsymposium held at Brown University in March 1987, scientists
debated the origin and evolution of volcanic structures and deposits, domes, parquet ter-
rain, impact craters, ridge and linear mountain belts, and plate tectonics. Only slight con-
sensus over the interpretation of features emerged, because the resolution of features in
Pioneer Venus images (25 km) and Venera 15 and 16 images (1-3 km) was sufficiently
coarse to give rise to ambiguities in interpretation. Magellan's higher global resolution
(about 300 meters) promised to resolve many questions of geologic interpretation. Soviet
scientists provided the Magellan project with additional Venera 15 and 16 digital tapes; in
return they received more high-resolution Viking imaging data of Phobos and the surface
of Mars. 54
The microsymposia demonstrated the fruitful cross-fertilization of planetary geology
and radar. In order to facilitate the use of radar data by geologists, Magellan Project
Manager John Gerpheide, Program Scientist Joseph Boyce, Principal Investigator Gordon
Pettengill, Project Scientist Steve Saunders, and Science and Mission Design Manager
Saterios Sam Dallas formulated preliminary plap.s in July 1986 for various radar work-
shops. The first, to be held in 1987, was to cover radar operation and processing, the sec-
ond the interactions between radar waves and planetary surfaces, and the third interpre-
tation of SAR images. The second and third workshops were held in 1988 and 1989,
respectively. The sessions were open to Magellan scientists and to the Planetary Geology
and Geophysics Program investigators. In addition, they planned one-day Venus science
symposia to be held in conjunction with other project meetings for each year between
1987 and 1989.
51. '%rOIR, Repor! Prr_iec! Management, 1986, 1/2" and "VOIR, Report Project Management, 1986,
2/2/Box 14, JPLMM.
52. "VOIR, Report Project Management, 1986, 1/2," Box 14, JPI.MM.
53. '%rOlR, Report Pvojt'_t Management, 1986, 2/2," Box 14,JPLMM.
54. V-(;ramno. 12 (luly 1987): 1.
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In 1987,32scientistsandprojectpersonnelparticipatedin thefieldtrip tovarious
sitesin theMoiaveDesertandDeathValley.55Thegoalwastocompareavarie_ofgeo-
logicfeatureswithSARimagesoftheareas.SteveWall,MagellanRadarExperimentrep-
resentative,organizedthefieldtrip,whichTomG.FarrofJPL'sGeologyandPlanetologySectionled.GeraldSchaberof theUSGScontributedto thetechnicalpresentationby
sharinghisknowledgeofDeathValley.5_
In May1988,theUSGSFlagstaffhostedanotherfieldtrip,whichwasincorporated
aspartof tilequarterlymeetingofMagellanscientistsandprojectstaff.Themajorobjec-
tivewas1ofamiliarizeparticipantswithspecificradargeologytargetsinasemi-arid,rela-
livelyvegetation-fieenvironment.Thetrip alsoentailedcomparingeologicfeatures
with"X-handandl.-bandSARimages.ThefieldexercisewasplannedandledbyGerald
S_haber,RichardKozak,andGeorgeBillingsley,allthreewiththeUSGSFlagstaff.,_7
These field trips helped to introduce geologists to the interpretation of radar data.
Geologists learn from "hands-on" experience, but that kind of experience is impossible
when dealing with the geolo_, of Venus. Radar images, moreover, are not created by the
reflection of light, but by the scattering and reflection of electromagnetic waves. They can-
not be read like photographs, and radar maps cannot be read like ordinary geological
lnaps.
In order to fill in that gap, data to create a series of _band radar images of the lunar
surface were collected at the Arecibo Observatory between 1982 and 1992. The images
were made at various angles of incidence at a number of known lunar locations, such as
the Apollo 15 and 17 landing sites, Mare hnbrium, and craters Copernicus and Tycho, in
order to provide experience in interpreting surface geology in radar images. Don
Campbell, assisted by Peter Ford of MIT and later by Cornell graduate student Nick Stacy,
made the observations and images in collaboration with Jim Head of Brown University.
While initial image resolutions ranged from 200 to 300 meters, Nick Stacy brought image
resolution down to 25 meters beginning in 1990. Elaborate data processing techniques
attempted to replicate the synthetic aperture radar techniques used from spacecraft and
aircraft. _
As Gordon Pettengill pointed out, the workshops were not the main path for geolo-
gists to learn about radar. "The people who attended those made up a small fiaction of
the overall communiD'. That route is an exception to what I would call the more general
experience. Generally, people become part of a team, and they work with radar people,
like myself, who then, by a process I would call osmosis, pass along the mystique of what
is going on, when you see these structures on a radar image, how to interpret them, and
what to look out for, so you don't make errors."
This process of osmosis, Pettengill explained, "is the best way to go. A formal course
is difficult. They call them workshops. They are useful. But you need both. You need the
workshop as well as years of working with other people and growing used to what you are
seeing."_
That process of osmosis was most evident at the Arecibo Observatory, where Don
Campbell and his graduate students Barbara Burns and Nick Stacy and Research Associate
John K. Harmon, collaborated with Jim Head and other geologists at Brown University
through an informal accord between the NAIC and Brown University beginning around
1980. The heart of the accord was a cooperative effort to analyze Arecibo Venus imagery.
55. '%_OIR, Report l'Ioiect Management, 1986, 2/2," Box 14, JPLMM.
56. I/-(brt_n t_o. 11 (April 1987): 1.
57. V-(;ram no. 15 (Jantmry 1989): 15.
58. Fo_d 30ctobcl 199.t: Camptx'll 8 Decemtwr 1993; Nicholas John Sholto Stacy, "High-Resohttion
S_nflwfi_ Apc_tu_e Radm Obsevvations of 1he Moon," PhD. diss, Corneli University, May 1993; NAIC QR
QI / 1t-182, O.'t/1986, Q2/1990, Q,t/1990, and Q3/1992.
5!). Pettengill 29 September 1_.)93.
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As a result of the arrangement, a number of Brown students, such as Richard W. Vorder
Brueggie and David A. Senske, became involved in the analysis of Arecibo radar range-
Doppler imagery and wrote their theses from the data.
'¢Fhe effort was not under any formal agreement between the NAIC and Brown
University," Don Campbell explained. "We badly needed the backing of a planetary geol-
ogy group. We were into geology at this point. We were down to a few kilometers of reso-
lution, and they were extremely enthusiastic.Jim Head was very enthusiastic and had a lot
of students. They were very intent on getting ready for the Magellan mission and spent a
lot of effort on both the Pioneer Venus and Venera data sets."_
The Arecibo-Brown arrangement thus fostered the geological interpretation of
Venus radar images well before Magellan began its mapping mission, A major area of
interest was in identifying and explaining tectonic activity on the planet. Some of the 1979
high-resolution Arecibo radar images suggested Earth-like tectonic features, such as folds
and faults, while 1983 Arecibo radar images confirmed the presence of rifting in the
southern Ishtar Terra and surrounding plains and general tectonic activity in Maxwell
Montes. 61 Later studies examined evidence for tectonic activity in Beta Regio, Guinevere
Planitia, Sedna Planitia, and western Eistla Regio in the planet's equatorial region, as well
as in the southern latitudes around Themis Regio, Lavinia Planitia, Alpha Regio, and Lada
Terra.62
Don Campbell also collaborated with Jim Head's group in searching for evidence of
volcanism. Arecibo radar images of southern Ishtar Terra and the surrounding plains
revealed significant details of volcanic activity. Images made from data gathered at Arecibo
during the summer of 1988 of the area extending from Beta Regio to the western Eistla
Regio furnished strong evidence that the mountains in Beta and Eistla Regiones, as well
as the plains in and adjacent to Guinevere Planitia, were of volcanic origin. Arecibo radar
images of the southern latitudes showed additional evidence for past volcanic activity on
Venus.63
The study of cratering on Venus started by Barbara Burns for her doctoral thesis con-
tinued at Arecibo, too. She based her initial analysis on data collected in 1977 and 1979.
As of 1985, Burns was able to identify only two features that exhibited unambiguous radar
characteristics that could tentatively distinguish them as either volcanic (Colette) or
impact (Meitner) in origin. Don Campbell, with Jim Head and John Harmon, continued
60. Campbell 8 December 1993.
61. Campbell, Head,John IC Harmon, and Alice A. Hine, "Venus: Identification of Banded Terrain in
the Mountains of Ishtar Terra," Sdenc_"221 (1983): 644-647; L. S. Crumpler, Head, and Campbell, "Orogenic
Belts on Venus," (k,o/og_ 14 (1986): 1031-1034; Stofan, Head, and Campbell, "Geology of the Southern Ishtar
Terra/Guinevere and Sedna Planitae Region on Venus," Earth, Moore, and Planet.i 38 (1987): 183-207; R. W.
Vorder Brueggie, Head, and Campbell, "Orogeny and Large-Scale Strike-Slip Faulting on Venus: Tectonic
Evolution of Maxwell Montes,'Jcmrnal q[(;eophy.i'icalRe.iearchvol. 95, no. B6 (1990): 8357-8381.
62. David A. Senske, Campbell, Stofan, Paul C. Fisher, Head, Stacy, J. C. Aubele, Hine, and Harmon,
"Geology and Tectonics of Beta Regio, Guinevere Planitia, Sedna Planitia, and Western Eistla Regio, Venus:
Results from Arecibo Image Data," Earth, Moon, and Planets 55 (1991): 163-214; Bruce A. Campbell and
Campbell, "Western Eistla Regio, Venus: Radar Properties of Volcanic Deposits," (;eophysical Research Letters
vol. 17, no. 9 (1990): 1353-1356; Senske, Campbell, Head, Fisher, Hine, A. de Charon, S. L. Frank, S. T. Keddie,
K. M. Roberts, Stofan, Aubele, Crumpler, and Stacy, "Geology and Tectonics of the Themis Regio-Lavinia
Planitia-Alpha Regio-Lada Terra Area, Venus: Results from Arecibo Image Data," Earth, Moon, arm Planets 55
(1991): 97-161.
63. Stofan, Head, and Campbell, "Geology of the Southern Ishtar Te_ ra/Guinevere and Sedna Planitae
Region on Venus," F.arth, Moon, a_ul PIzt_t._ 38 (1987): 183-207; Campbell, tlead, Harmon, and Hine, _'¢enus:
Volcanism and Rift Formation in Beta Regio," S_ienc.e226 (1984): 167-170; Campbell, Head, Hine, Harmon,
Senske, and Fisher, "Styles of Volcanism on Venus: New Arecibo High Resolution Radar Data," Sc/ence246 (1989):
373-377; Campbell, Senske, Head, Hine, and Fisher, "Venus Southern Hemisphere: Geologic Character and Age
of Terrains in the Themis-Alpha-Lada Region," S_nce 251 (1991): 180-183; Senske, Campbell, ltead, Fisher,
Hine, de Charon, S. L. Frank, S. 12 Keddie, IC M. Roberts, Stofan, Aubele, Crumpler, and Stacy, "Geology and
Tectonics of the Themis Regio-Lavinia Planitia-Alpha Regio-Lada Terra Area, Venus: Results from Arecibo Image
Data," F.arth, Mrum, and Planet.i 55 (1991): 97-161.
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Burns'scraterstudies.Imagesmadefromthedatacollecteduringtheinferiorconjunc-
tionof1988oftheareafromBetaRegiotowesternEistlaRegiorevealedalowdensityof
impactcratersgreaterthan15kmin diameterin thatregioncomparedto theaverage
densityforthehighernorthernlatitudes.Thesecraterdensitiessuggestedthattheplains
weregeologicallyyoungerthanthenorthernregions.64
Campbell,withgraduatestudentNickStacyandcomputersoftwaremanagerand
part-timeradarastronomerAliceHine,madeafurtheranalysisofcrateringbylookingat
diameter-frequencydistributionsin thelownorthernlatitudesandthesouthernhemi-
sphere.TheAreciboinvestigatorsfoundthattheaveragecraterdensityforallcratersin
thenorthernmostquarter,usingVenera15and16data,was1.27permillionsquarekilo-
meters,whiletheaverageforthesouthernhemisphere(asimagedbytheAreciboradar)
was0.95permillionsquarekilometers.Thedifferentcraterdensitiessuggestedthatthe
southernlatitudesweregeologicallyyoungerthanthelownorthernlatitudesimagedby
Venera15and16.65
DonCampbella soparticipatedin themicrosymposiaorganizedbyBrownUniversity
andtheVernadskyInstitute.Asaresult,healsocameto collaboratewithAlexander
BasilevskyandotherSovietgeologistsontheinterpretationofVenera15and16results,
andthatcollaborationledtoco-authorshipofapaperwithcombinedVernadskyInstitute
andBrownUniversityauthors.66
DonCampbell'so moticinfiltrationofthescientificcommunityinterestedinVenus
typifiedtheshiftingparadigmofground-basedplanetaryradarastronomytowardgeolo-
gy.Furtherfacilitatingthatshiftwastheavailabilityoftechniques,hardware,andsoftware
at Arecibothatyieldedhigh-resolutionrange-Dopplerimagesandtopographicaldata.
Imageresolutionimprovedtoonetothreekmin 1983andto 1.5kmin 1988,thelast
observationsmadebeforethearrivalofMagellanatVenus.
BecauseMagellanusedafrequencylosetothatoftheAreciboradar,therewasome
concernthattheAreciboradarmightcontaminatetheMagellandataor endangerthe
spacecraft,soDonCampbelldidnotpursueVenusmappingafter1988.67Nonetheless,the
participationofAreciboground-basedinvestigatorsinVenusradargeologyillustratedthat
themarriageofradarandgeologywasnotlimitedtoMagellanandspace-basedra ars.
64. Burns and Campbell, "Radar Evidence for Cratering on Venus,".]_mrnal_![GeophysicalResearth vol. 90,
no. B4 (1985): 3037-3047; Campbell, Head, Hine, Harmon, Senske, and Fisher, "Styles of Volcanism on Venus:
New Arecibo High Resolution Radar Data," Science 246 ( 1989): 373-377.
65. Campbell, Stacy, and Hine, "Venus: Crater Distributions at Low Northern Latitudes and in the
Southeln Hemisphere from New Arecibo Observations," Ge_hysical Ib,search Letters vol. 17, no. 9 (1990):
1389-1392.
t;6. A.T. Basilevsky, B. A. lvanov, G. A. Burba, L. M. Chernaya, V. P. Kryuchkov, O. V. Nikolaeva,
Campbell, and L. B. Ronca, "Impact Craters on Venus: A Continuation of the Analysis of Data from the Venera
15 and 16 Spacecraft,"]_mrnal o[ (,e_rphy_ical l{ewarch vol. 92, no. BI2 (1987): 12,869-12,901; Stofan, Head,
Campbell, Zisk. A. F. Bogomolov, Rzhiga, Basilevsky, and N. Armand, "Geology of a Rift Zone on Venus: Beta
Regio and Devana Chasma," Geoh_g'ical Sm_ety _![America Bulletin 101 (1989): 143-156.
67. Campbell 8 December 1993; Burns, "Cratering Analysis of the Surface of Venus," p. 1; Stofan, Head,
and Campbell, "Geology' of the Southern lshtar Terra/Guinevere and Sedna Planitae Region on Venus," Earth,
Moon, and I'ktnet._ 38 ( 1987): 183-207; Richard W. Vorder Brueggie, Head, and Campbell, "Orogeny and Large-
Scale Strike-Slip Faulting on Venus: Tectonic Evolution of Maxwell Montes,"J_mrnal o[Ge_rphy_ical Research vol. 95,
no. B6 (1990): 8357-8381.
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Figure 32
Rtutar image of the central p_rrtzon _ Alpha Rtgio, Venu._, at a resolution of al,_mt L5 kin, 1988. This, and the image in
Fig. 33, iUustrate the fine re._olution_ achieved by the gnmrut-based Arecitu_ ()b._ervat_rry radxtr a._ Magellan began imaging
Venus. ( (_mrte_y of National A._tronomv arul lono._phere (;ente'6, which is trtu'rated by (_rrnell University under contract with
the National S_Tence F_mrutation.)
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Figure 33
Radar image of The/a Mons in Beta Reg_o, Venus, at a re_olution _[ 2 km rruute from data gathered with the Arecibo
Ob_ervat_rry radar, 1988. (('_mrte._y of Nati_mal Astronomy and lono._phere C,ent_ which i._ ¢_u, rated by (',ornell University
uruler contract with the National Science F_mndation.)
Magellan
Throughout 1987 and into 1988, assembly of the Magellan spacecraft and final test-
ing of the radar proceeded. Hardware, testing, and integration costs, coupled with an
overall tight NASA budget, necessitated cutbacks and deferrals from Magellan's fiscal
1988 budget to later years. Some of the top staff transferred to other projects. Magellan
Science Manager Neil Nickle, for instance, stepped down, and Thomas Thompson
replaced him. Thompson had carried out lunar radar research at Arecibo and Haystack
as early as the 1960s, and he was still making lunar observations with the Arecibo UHF
radar as late as 1987. Also, he had been on the SEASAT radar team in the 1970s and more
recently had made radar observations of Mars with the Goldstone Mars Station. 6_
68. Thompson 29 November 1994; V-Gram no. 15 (]anuary 1989): 16; V-C, ram no. 14 (May 1988): 2;
NAIC QR, Q2/1987.
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In September 1988, a month ahead of schedule, the completed craft was shipped to
Kennedy Space Center, where final assembly and testing took place. The Magellan launch
date was moved up on the Shuttle manifest from October-November 1989 to April-May
1989 to accommodate the launch of Galileo, which needed to go to Venus for a gravity
boost. The next launch window, June 1991, would have brought Magellan to Venus near-
ly a year later than the April-May 1989 opportunity. Launching six months earlier also
meant that Magellan would have to circle the Sun one and a half times, rather than the
usual one-half circuit, before encountering Venus. Although this trajectory took Magellan
almost a year longer to reach Venus than the October-November 1989 opportunity, it still
saved a year over the June 1991 trajectory. On 4 May 1989, after trouble with software, a
hydrogen pump, and the weather, the Shutde Atlantis carried Magellan aloft from
Kennedy Space Center. Magellan became the first planetary mission launched by the
Space Shutde. More problems, including several losses of signal, plagued Magellan's
mission. 69
Magellan entered orbit around Venus on 10 August 1990, 15 months after launch.
On 15 August, the radar sensor was turned on and powered up in preparation for the first
in-orbit radar test. The next day, during the radar test, the spacecraft lost its "heartbeat"
and protected itself by invoking on-board fault-protection routines. Ground control noted
this immediately by the terrifying loss of signal. Communications were re-established, then
lost a few days later. After a shaky start, the radar began mapping on 15 September 1990.
Mission personnel arranged the first images into mosaics. The mosaics covered
about 500 km segments of 30 or more individual image strips. One of the first mosaics was
centered at 27 ° South latitude and 339 ° longitude in the Lavinia region of Venus. It
showed three large impact craters, with diameters ranging from 37 to 50 kin. The craters
showed many features typical of meteorite impact, including rough, radar-bright ejecta,
terraced inner walls, and central peaks. Numerous domes of probable volcanic origin
were visible in the southeastern corner of the mosaic. The domes ranged in diameter
from 1 to 12 kin; some had central pits typical of volcanic shields or cones. 70
During its 243-day prime mission, Magellan amassed more imaging data than all pre-
vious U.S. planetary missions combined. 71 Magellan mapped over 90 percent of the plan-
et's surface, covering regions from 68 ° South latitude to the North pole. The images were
to have a resolution of about 120 meters near the equator, degrading slightly to about 190
meters near the poles because of the elliptical nature of the orbit. Although budgetary
cuts had threatened to lower the resolution of Magellan radar images, the application of
advanced digital electronic circuitry had restored the mission's high resolution capability.
SAP, data from each orbit was to be processed to make image strips about 350 pixels
wide in the across-track dimension by 220,000 pixels in the along-track direction. Some
1,852 such SAR image strips were to be generated byJPL's Multimission SAR Processing
Laboratory during the primary mission. These strips were to be sufficient in number and
coverage to encircle the planet, with overlap of adjacent strips even in lower latitudes.
Image element widths were 75 meters to properly preserve both the along and cross-track
spatial resolutions.
Each strip is called a Full-Resolution Basic Image Data Record or F-BIDR. In total,
the 1,852 F-BIDR SAR image strips formed a data set in excess of 100 billion bytes. The
large volume and the unwieldy width-to-length ratios for the data made them unsuitable
for general use. Thus, further processing was necessary to produce mosaicked images
(Mosaicked Image Data Records or MIDRs) that could be more readily used in photo-
69. V-C, ramno. 15 (January 1989): 1; V-C, ramno. 16 (August 1989): 1.
70. V-C, ramno. 18 (October 1990): 1-2.
71. V-Gramno. 13 (October 1987): 1.
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interpretative studies and in comparisons with the other Magellan data. Generating full-
resolution mosaics for the 90 percent of the planet covered by F-BIDRs created an enor-
mous data set, severely taxing available processing facilities. To streamline processing and
to focus efforts toward production of sets of mosaics that could be used for a variety of
studies, a decision was made to compile and distribute global mosaics from compressed
F-BIDR data. 7'_
The USGS converted the data into a set of 62 maps in the standard 1:5,000,000 USGS
planetary series. The maps showed SAR data at a resolution of about one kin, and they
were to contain altitude contours. In addition, a set of about 200 photomosaics were to
show the entire mapped area of the planet at a resolution of 225 meters, and an additional
set of about 250 photomosaics at the highest resolution, about 100 meters, were to be pre-
pared for selected sections of the planets. Complementary data products were to include
a topographic map at about 10-km surface resolution with a height accuracy of better than
50 meters, as well as special products displaying surface roughness, reflectivity, brightness
temperature, and emissivity. Today, the radar data is also available in annotated digital
form on CD-ROMs. 73
Key to creating these and other Venus images was an accurate knowledge of the plan-
et's pole position and spin vector. An analysis by Irwin Shapiro and John Chandler of 1988
Arecibo radar data supplied by Don Campbell, Alice Hine, and Nick Stacy provided a new
pole position, accurate to better than 3 kin, and a more accurate measurement of the
planet's rotational period. 74 Such participation in NASA space missions by radar
astronomers as "mission support" already had been the norm for two decades.
Don Campbell and Gordon Pettengill also worked closely with Stanford scientists
Len Tyler and Dick Simpson, who participated on the science team. Tyler chaired the
Surface Electrical Properties (SEP) Team, composed of Tyler, Campbell, and Gerald
Schaber (USGS). Tyler, Simpson, and John Vesecky used the altimeter function of
Magellan's radar to look at dielectric constants and roughness, to study the top meter of
Venus's surface, and to relate its structure to its interaction with radar waves. They trans-
ferred their data to a CD, with the intention of sending copies to scientists with whom they
72. V-Gram no. 10 (January 1987): 9-10.
73. V-(ram no. 8 (24 March 1986): 2-3.
74. MageUan Final Science Reports, Report D-11092 (Pasadena: JPL, 22 October 1993), p. 25; Shapiro,
Chandler, Campbell, Hine, and Stacy, 'q'he Spin Vector of Venus," The Astr_momicalJournal 100 (1990):
1363-1368. See also the analysis done at Goldstone: Slade, Zohar, and Jurgens, "Venus: Improved Spin Vector
from Goldstone Radar Observations," The AstronomicalJournal 100 (1990): 1369-1374.
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Figure 34
Rtular image of Venus at 65 deg'ree__ ea._t longittule, along the web,tern edge of MaxweU Monte_, rruute from Magellan ob._erva-
tion._. The slurping edge oJ Maxwell Montes, the highe._t rruruntain on Venu._, i._ vi._ible abrng the right hand side of the image.
TI_ imaged area is 3(X) km _vide. (Courte.vy o[ NASA, photo no. 90-H-752.)
collaborated, such as Don Campbell, Peter Ford, and Gordon Pettengill, as well as inter-
ested geologists.75
Typical of Big Science projects, Magellan thus became a meeting ground for differ-
ent scientific disciplines and subdisciplines. Its broad tent covered traditional ground-
based radar astronomy and Stanford bistatic radar astronomy, as well as planetary geolo-
gy. Magellan accelerated cross-fertilization between planetary geology and radar that
75. Simpson 10 May 1994; Simpson and Tyler, "Venus Surface Properties from Magellan Radio and
Radar Data," V-Grara 18 (October 1990): 12-18. For the results, see Tyler, Ford, Campbell, Charles Elachi,
Pettengill, and Simpson, "Magenan: Electrical and Physical Properties of Venus' Surface," Science 252 (1991):
265-270; Tyler, Simpson, Michael J. Maurer, and Edgar Holmann, "Scattering Properties of the Venusian
Surface: Preliminary Results from Magellan,"Journal of Geophysical Research 97 ( 1992): 13,115-13,139. Pettengill
and Ford also produced dielectric-constant and roughness maps to accompany the global topography and emis-
sivity data they produced. The Stanford investigators used different, but complementary, algorithms that com-
bined the altimetry and imaging SAR data to obtain estimates of surface roughness and dielectric constant. Both
data sets were made available on CD- ROMs.
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made radar results (mainly range-Doppler images and topography) more accessible to a
larger community of investigators. As Don Campbell reflected: "We are suddenly much
more respectable than we used to be! I don't want to characterize what people thought of
us, but to some degree I suspect that we were regarded as a little bit of the fringe. Radar
astronomy was regarded as a messy and expensive occupation. We came up with good
stuff, but how we did it was not all clear!"7_
As radar astronomers grew closer to planetary geology, they sought out their new
audience in new scientific settings. Radar astronomers still discussed their findings at
meetings of the IAU, the AAS Division for Planetary Science, and URSI, but also at
American Geophysical Union (AGU) meetings. General science and astronomy journals,
such as Science and The Astronomical Journal, and even more so the specialized planetary sci-
ence journals, such as Icarus and Earth, Moon, and Planets, remained forums for publica-
tion. In addition, because they had added the planetary geology community to their audi-
ence, radar astronomers now published in the Journal of Geophysical Research and
Geophysical Research Letters.
The new audience also shaped radar astronomy funding, although less so at the
Arecibo Observatory, where the NSF-NASA agreement assured an annual budget for
radar astronomy research. Researchers elsewhere seeking NASA money for planetary sur-
face studies faced the demands of the NASA planetary geology program. When Dick
Simpson or Len Tyler, for instance, applied for geology program funds to study planetary
surfaces, geologists reviewed their proposals. One of the frequent comments by those
reviewers was that the proposal should include a geologist on the science team. As a result,
Dick Simpson approached USGS Menlo Park geologist Henry Moore to collaborate with
him. 77 Through their role as proposal reviewers, then, planetary geologists began to shape
radar astronomy research proposals.
Throughout the 1970s, as planning for Magellan and the flight of Pioneer Venus
took place, the field of radar astronomy, measured in terms of active practitioners and
telescopes, grew smaller. In 1980, the Arecibo Observatory was essentially the sole active
telescope; it supported four active investigators. In contrast to this Little Science reality
stood the Big Science of Magellan. Around a single radar instrument, the big-budget,
multi-year mission organized individual scientists into groups that crossed turf boundaries
(radar astronomy versus Stanford "space exploration") and that fostered common inter-
ests among fields (planetary radar and geology scientists).
Although the exploration of planetary surfaces with space-based radars seemed to
invigorate radar astronomy, the space-based approach has its limits in an era of budgetary
limits. Cassini probably will be the last mission to carry a radar experiment into space. As
currently conceived, Cassini will explore Saturn's cloud-covered moon, Titan, with a SAR.
No other solar system bodies have impenetrable atmospheres that lend themselves to
radar investigation. The problem of transmitting data back to Earth at distances beyond
the orbit of Saturn is a major, though not insurmountable obstacle (as Voyager has
shown). The use of laser rather than radar altimeters on future missions means that mod-
ifying the altimeter to carry out imaging, as was done on Pioneer Venus, has reached its
technological limit (although military research may well yield a laser altimeter capable of
imaging).
However, the most formidable barrier to any future mission is the shrinking space
and national budgets. The Voyager, Galileo, and Magellan spacecraft were expensive, cost-
ing $2-3 billion, huge, standing seven meters high, as tall as most homes, and heavy,
weighing several tons. Galileo, for example, weighed three tons. In order to accommodate
a future of smaller budgets, NASA has initiated the Discovery program, in which low-cost
($150 million limit) small, lightweight spacecraft with limited scientific objectives carry
76. Campbell 9 December 1993.
77. Simpson 10 May 1994.
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out solar system exploration. One problem with this approach is that missions to Jupiter
and Saturn or beyond simply cost too much to fit the budgetary limits set for Discovery
missions. 7s Such is the price of practicing science on a large scale.
Magellan also effectively ended ground-based radar observations of Venus. Although
a few experiments were still possible, for example, the detection of rain on Venus with an
X-band radar or polarization studies of surface scattering properties, 79 they likely will not
achieve prominence. Indeed, Don Campbell, who has spent his scientific career doing
radar studies of Venus, volunteered to Nick Renzetti of JPL at the Lunar and Planetary
Conference at Houston in 1985 that he was not likely to do any more Venus observations;
instead, he planned to concentrate on asteroid and comet experiments. 80
Campbell typified the new direction that planetary radar astronomy began taking
after 1975, when the Arecibo and Goldstone upgraded radars became available.
Technology still drove planetary radar astronomy. New and better instruments and inne-
vative techniques allowed radar astronomers to solve problems previously unsolvable and
to detect and study solar system objects never before explorable with radar. The explo-
ration of those objects in turn presented unusual radar characteristics that led radar
astronomers to solve new scientific problems. The dynamic resonance between radar tech-
niques (epistemological issues) and problem solving (scientific questions) thus remained
at the heart of planetary radar astronomy. Nonetheless, despite a short spurt of growth
following the inauguration of the upgraded Arecibo and Goldstone radars, by 1980 the
planetary radar literature had reached a plateau of activity; the field had reached the
limits to its growth.
78. Richard A. Kerr, "Scaling Down Planetary Science," Stien¢t 264 ( 1994): 1244-1246.
79. Goldstein 14 September 1993; Pettengill 4 May 1994. Bill Smith tried to look for rain in Venus'
atmosphere at the Haystack Observatory in the 1960s. Smith 29 September 1993.
80. GSSR Min. 28 March 1985.
Chapter Eight
The Outer Limits
Planetary radar astronomy was a problem-solving activity, an algorithm in search of
a problem. Its fundamental driving force was the dynamic interaction between radar tech-
niques and the kinds of problems radar astronomy solved, hnprovements in radar hard-
ware and innovative radar techniques, such as range-Doppler mapping, allowed radar
astronomy to solve scientific problems of interest to astronomers and geologists.
Conversely, problem-solving could bring attention to radar techniques and properties pre-
viously neglected or little used, such as the polarization of echoes.
The institutional and financial linking of radar astronomy to NASA at Arecibo and
JPL gave the field a mission-oriented cast. The justification for fnnding was tile field's
utility to NASA space missions, and access to Goldstone antenna time required specific
mission support. Beginning with Viking, participation in NASA missions also brought
ground-based radar astronomers into closer collaboration with the radar scientists at the
Stanford Center for Radar Astronomy. The distinction made in the 1960s between
ground-based planetary radar astronomy and Stanford's "space exploration" held less and
less meaning.
Planetary radar astronomy "after about 1975 also remained above all else a science
driven by technology, namely, access to radars with the transmitter power and antenna
and receiver sensitivity to explore the planets. Without those radars, radar astronomy
could not exist. The decline of radar astronomy atJPL followed directly fiom the deteri-
orating state of the Goldstone radar. Improvements in radar hardware, on the other band,
drove planetary radar forward.
Additional transmitter power and receiver sensitivity meant access to pre_4ously
unexplored targets. The orbit of Mars defined the outer reaches of planetary radar astron-
omy until 1975, when both the Arecibo and Goldstone radars underwent upgrades that
significantly enhanced their value as research tools, as discussed in Chapter Four. For the
first time, the Galilean satellites of Jupiter, the rings of Saturn, cometary nuclei, and a
number of both Earth-approaching and mainbelt asteroids came within reach of those
planetary radars. Those targets represent considerable radar distances; the round-trip
radar time to the moons of Jupiter is about 1 hour and 12 minutes and to Saturn's rings
around 2 hours and 15 minutes.
Meanwhile, the planetary radar astronomy community remained small, and Arecibo
and Goldstone were the only active research facilities. Arecibo was still a major NSF-fund-
ed center for radio astronomy and ionospheric research. On the other hand, funded by
NASA, not the NSF, and associated with exploration of the solar system, radar astronomy
there occupied a small, peculiar niche, a niche that, nonetheless, furnished a research
facility for both Cornell and MIT graduate students to be trained as future radar
astronomers.
In contrast, Goldstone did not train graduate students. The radar astronomers atJPI_
did not hold the kind of appointment at Caltech that permitted them to train graduate
students as future radar astronomers, and no Caltech professor was interested in training
radar astronomers. A similar situation had existed at Lincoln Laboratory during the 1960s
until Pettengill's appointments at Arecibo and his subsequent teaching position at MIT
changed that situation and provided the institutional matrix for the training of graduate
2O5
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studentsasfutureradarastronomers.In short,theteacher-discipleatternthatprevailed
atArecibowaslackingatJPL,whereradarastronomerspropagatedthroughjob hiring.
PlanetaryadarastronomyatJPLremainedunofficialandinvisible.Between1978and
1986,furthermore,ssentiallynoradarastronomyworktookplaceatGoldstone,because
investigatorslackedareliableresearchinstrument.
The Galilean Moons of Jupiter
Among the new radar targets brought into range by the Goldstone X-band and
Arecibo S-band upgrades were Ganymede, Europa, Callisto, and It, named the Galilean
moons of Jupiter after their discoverer, Galileo Galilei. The radar exploration of those
moons illustrated the interactions between radar astronomers and geologists, as well as
the increasing collaboration with Stanford researchers that came to typify ground-based
planetary radar. Those moons also puzzled radar astronomers. Never before had they
encountered such peculiar radar characteristics among the terrestrial planets. An expla-
nation for the bizarre radar readings came from Earth and from leading edge research in
the physics of light.
The first, though unsuccessful, attempt at the Galilean moons took place in 1970.
Dick Goldstein (at Goldstone) and Dick Ingalls and Irwin Shapiro (at Haystack) tried to
detect echoes from Callisto using the bistatic Goldstack radar, in which the Haystack
300-kilowatt telescope transmitted and Goldstone received, l The experiment did not
work, however, because of a misunderstanding over polarization.
After unsuccessfully attempting Venus with the Goldstack radar, Ingalls and
Goldstein pointed the radar at the Moon and received "the weakest of signals." Goldstein,
trained as an electrical engineer, realized what was wrong. Bistatic radars require investi-
gators to agree on the polarization of the wave. Physicists, like Shapiro, use one definition
for left-handed polarization, defining handedness from the view of a person looking in
the direction that the wave is travelling, while electrical engineers use the opposite con-
vention, defining handedness from the view of the receiving antenna, so left and right are
reversed. Goldstack eventually searched for Ganymede and Callisto in late May and early
June 1970. "_The polarization of radar echoes was about to become a key radar technique
for studying the Galilean moons and other solar system bodies.
Dick Goldstein and George A. Morris succeeded in detecting Ganymede with the 400
kilowatts of Goldstone S-band radar power on six nights in late August 1974. Those echoes
set a record for the longest time of flight to a radar target, one hour and seven minutes.
The echoes, though, were very weak, well below the noise level. From those weak echoes,
Goldstein and Morris drew conclusions about the surface of Gan)anede.
From the total signal power returned and the width of the spectrum, they conclud-
ed that Ganymede "must have a considerable degree of roughness." Their data did not
agree with accepted theory, derived from infrared spectra and polarization studies, that
Ganymede's surface consisted mostly of ice. 3 Goldstein and Morris ventured that the most
1. Referred to in Campbell, Chandler, Pettengill, and Shapiro, "Galilean Satellites of Jupiter: 12.6-
Centimeter Radar Observations," ,Science 196 (1977): 650.
2. Shapiro 1 October 1993; "Funding Proposal, 'Plan for NEROC Operalion of the Haystack Research
Facility as a National Radio/Radar Observatory,' NSF, 7/1/71--6/30/73," 26/2/AC 135, and Sebring to
Hurlburt, 27 March 1970, 18/2/AC 135, MITA; NEROC, Proposal to the National Science Foundation for
Programs in Radio and Radar Astronomy at the Haystack Observatory, 8 May 1970, pp. 111.8- III. 10, LLLA;JPL
1970 Annual Report, p. 14,JPLA.
3. See .Joseph Veverka, "Polarization Measurements of the Galilean Satellites of Jupiter," haru._ 14
(1971): 355-359; John S. Lewis, "Low Temperature Condensation from the Solar Nebula," l,r:aru.,, 16 (1972):
241-252. Although It, Ganymede, and Europa were believed covered with frost, ('allisto was believed to be dif-
ferent, more like the Moon, though with some frost possibly present.
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likely possibility was for the surface to consist of rocky or metallic material from meteoric
bombardment embedded in a matrix of ice. 4
Soon after the Arecibo S-band upgrade reached completion, Don Campbell (NAIC
Research Associate) and Gordon Pettengill (MIT) made the first radar detections of
Callisto and Europa on 28 September and 5 October 1975, respectively, and detected
Ganymede on 30 September. Pettengill and Campbell noticed that the satellites had an
unusual radar signature. The three moons were almost uniformly radar bright; they
lacked the bright specular return from the subradar point, the area on the target closest
1o the Earth, that all terrestrial planets exhibit. The uniformity of brightness suggested
that the satellite surfaces were probably extremely rough on scales comparable to or larg-
er than the wavelength of 12 cm.
Io remained an elusive radar target. The innermost of the Galilean moons, Io is
inside Jupiter's magnetosphere, which may have interfered with the radar waves aimed at
Io. Campbell and Pettengill unsuccessfully attempted the satellite twice in 1975, and their
attempt to detect Io in January 1976 yielded only a weak echo that indicated an error in
the ephemeris large enough to explain the pre_4ous failed attempt. Not until 1987, when
improved hardware was available, did radar astronomers begin to receive good echoes
from It.
After reducing their January 1976 data on the four Galilean moons, Campbell and
Pettengill found surprisingly large radar cross sections for Europa and Ganymede,
approximately 1.5 and 0.9 times the geometric cross section, respectively, while those for
Callisto and It were around 0.4 and 0.2, respectively. The radar cross section is a measure
of target brightness. Although the values for Callisto and It were low and typical of the
terrestrial planets, the radar cross sections for Europa and Ganymede were abnormally
high. 5
When Pettengill and Campbell resumed their observations of Jupiter's moons in
October 1976, the Arecibo radar had a dual polarized circular feed paid for with NASA
S-band operations funds. The feed increased total system sensitivity over that available in
1975 and displayed the peculiar radar polarization properties of the Galilean satellites.
Previously, all observations of the Galilean moons had been made with linear feeds
in both orthogonal linear polarizations. The transmitter sent out signals with one sense of
polarization, and the antenna received both the same linear and orthogonal linear polar-
izations. The same linear echoes are much stronger than the orthogonal linear echoes for
all targets detected by radar. Although the switch from linear to circular polarization did
not alter the general character of the spectra for Callisto, Ganymede, and Europa, the cir-
cular polarization ratios of the echoes were totally unanticipated.
When radar astronomers transmit a right-handed circularly polarized signal, they
expect the echo to return mostly left-handed circularly polarized, the opposite handed-
hess. This type of polarization return is called variously the "expected," "polarized," or
"opposite circular" (OC). The echo power returned right-handed circularly polarized is
said to have "unexpected," "depolarized," or "same circular" (SC) polarization. The SC-to-
OC ratio is known as the circular polarization ratio.
The terminology "expected" and "unexpected" is out of place today. The "unex-
pected" polarization returns from the Galilean moons and other icy targets are no longer
considered unusual or "unexpected." The terms, however, reflected the surprise of radar
astronomers in the past, as they discovered polarization returns that differed markedly
from those of the terrestrial planets. For the sake of preserving that historical flavor of dis-
covery, and 1o avoid using terms likely unfamiliar and perhaps confusing to the reader
(such as "polarized" and "depolarized"), the terminology "expected" and "unexpected,"
or OC and SC, will be used throughout.
4. Goldstein and Morris, "Ganymede: Observations by Radar," Sc/en_z188 (1975): 1211-1212.
5. Campbell 8 December 1993; NAIC QR Q3/1975, 4-5; NAIC QR Q4/1975, 5; NAIC QR Q1/1976, 6.
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In radarobservationsoftheterrestrialplanetsandtheMoon,morepowernormally
returnsin theexpectedthanin theunexpectedmode.Thecircularpolarizationratiofor
thesetargetsisabout0.1;forVenusandtheMoon,it isonlyabout0.05.In thecaseof
Jupiter'smoons,however,morepowerreturnedin theunexpectedmode,aphenomenon
calledcircularpolarizationi version.ForEuropa,Ganymede,andCallisto,theaverage
circularpolarizationratioswere1.61±0.20, 1.48 ± 0.27, and 1.24 + 0.19, respectively. They
were the first solar system objects for which circular polarization inversion was observed. 6
The dominance of unexpected polarization from the Galilean satellites was enig-
matic and even unbelievable. "I'hat was a bit of a puzzle," Don Campbell recalled. 'There
was a lot of skepticism, frankly, about the results....That was a really significant puzzle to
everybody. ''7 The phenomenon was also a puzzle to Steve Ostro, then a graduate student
at MIT working under Gordon Pettengill. Ostro was looking for a dissertation topic. He
joined Pettengill and Campbell in observing the Galilean satellites at Arecibo in late 1976.
'q'he anticipation," Ostro explained, '_ras that working on those observations, as well as
on the data reduction and interpretation, would evolve into a good thesis topic. "s
When the bizarre circular polarization inversion first appeared during the 26
October through 7 December 1976 observations, Ostro recalled, "We tested to the point
of grasping at straws. Maybe we had crossed the cables. Or maybe somebody had screwed
up in the data acquisition program. We checked everything. We couldn't believe it, just
couldn't believe it." A test on Venus returned normal echoes. Then they pointed the tele-
scope at Europa, and the circular polarization ratio was about one and a half. At that
point, Ostro remembers watching Pettengill reflecting then saying, "Well, now I have to
believe it." Then he turned to Ostro and said, "If you can explain this, it would be a good
thesis topic. ''9
In order to investigate systematically the unusual radar cross sections and polariza-
tion ratios of the Galilean moons, Ostro, Campbell, and Pettengill undertook a new series
of 20 observation sessions in November and early December 1977 and obtained results
similar to those found the previous year. j0
Ostro, Pettengill, and Campbell continued their campaign on the Galilean satellites
in February 1979 and March-April 1980, when the satellites were in different phases. Also,
in order to determine whether the strange polarization ratios were a function of fre-
quency, Don Campbell undertook a separate series of observations with the old 430-MHz
(70-cm) radar and obtained a weak detection of Europa, but not of Ganymede. 11 Jupiter
then left the declination window of the Arecibo Observatory until 1987.
In order to account for the unusual radar signatures of Europa, Ganymede, and
Callisto, Steve Ostro developed a model, published in 1978. The model postulated a thick
surface layer of ice saturated with nearly hemispherical surface craters. Hemispherical
craters would favor double reflection of radar waves at a 45 ° angle at each reflection, so
that most of the signal would return with the same handedness of polarization. The same
craters could be made to explain the high radar cross sections, as well. 12
6. Campbell, Chandler, Pettengill, and Shapiro, "Galilean Satellites of Jupiter: 12.6-Centimeter Radar
Observations," S_ien_ 196 (1977): 650-653; Campbell, Chandler, Steven J. Ostro, Penengill, and Shapiro,
"Galilean Satellites: 1976 Radar Results," Icarus 34 (1978): 254-267; NAIC QR Q1/1976, 17; Ostro, "Radar
Properties of Europa, Ganymede, and Callisto," in David Morrison, ed., Satellitt_ t_{]upiter (Tucson: University of
Arizona Press, 1982), p. 213.
7. Campbell 8 December 1993.
8. Ostro 18 May 1994; NAIC QR Q1/1976, 6.
9. Ostro 18 May 1994.
10. Campbell, Chandler, Ostro, Pettengill, and Shapiro, "Galilean Satellites: 1976 Radar Results," Icarus
34 (1978) : 254-267; Ostro, "The Structure of Saturn's Rings and the Surfaces of the Galilean Satellites as Inferred
fiom Radar Observations," Ph.D. dissertation, MIT, 1978; NAIC QR Q4/1977, 5-6; NAIC QR Q1/1978, 6.
11. Ostro, Campbell, Pettengill, and Shapiro, "Radar Observations of Europa, Ganymede, and Callisto,"
/caru._ 44 ( 1980): 431-440; NAIC QR QI/1979, 10; NAIC QR Q2/1980, 11.
12. Ostro and Pettengill, "_lcy Craters on the Galilean Satellites?" Icarus 34 (1978): 268-279.
THE OUTER LIMITS 209
Dick Goldstein and Richard R. Green atJPL proposed a different model based on
their own observations of the Galilean satellites. After the pioneering observations of 1974
at S-band, Goldstein took additional data on Ganymede during six nights in December
1977 with the Goidstone X-band radar and received alternately right-handed and left-
handed circular polarization, in order to compare the expected and unexpected echo
strengths. Despite the high transmitter power (343 kilowatts) and low system noise
temperature (23 K), the Ganymede echoes were noisy. Nonetheless, the Goldstone data
confirmed the Arecibo results, which had been the subject of great incredulity. As Don
Campbell recalled, "That confirmation started a significant discussion about the
phenomenon. Why were we getting these odd reflections? ''j3
From the spectral data, Goldstein and Green measured the radar cross section and
polarization ratios and posited a model of Ganymede's surface. They assumed that the
upper few meters of its surface consisted of ice "crazed and fissured and covered by jagged
ice boulders." The critical part of the model was a large number of interfaces between ice
and vacuum where, depending on the angle of incidence above or below a certain limit
(called the critical angle), the sense of polarization was largely preserved and most of the
power remained in the original polarization sense. In a 1982 review article, Steve Ostro
concluded that "many questions remain about interpretation of the radar results, but we
seem to be pointed in a sensible direction. ''14
Voyager 1 had begun sending back pictures of the Jupiter system in early 1979.
Geologic activity on Ganymede appeared varied, while Callisto's entire surface was
densely cratered. Europa probably was covered completely by ice. 15 More information
than ever was available about the surfaces of the Galilean satellites, yet none of it resolved
the questions raised by planetary radar astronomers, who, in the meantime, attempted to
explain the strange radar characteristics of the Galilean satellites based on reflection
geometries and radar scattering rules, not the geology of those worlds as revealed by
Voyager imagery.
Among those offering explanations for the high cross section and circular polariza-
tion inversion was Tot Hagfors. He proposed that the satellites' unusual radar signatures
were due not to reflections at the interfaces of ice and vacunm, as Goldstein and Green
had suggested, but rather to the bending of the incident wave around continuous gradi-
ents in refractive index. 16 Von Eshleman developed an argument around refraction
scattering from imperfect spheroidal lenses. Then he modified his argument and
incorporated Ostro's notion of hemispheroidal impact craters, as well as elements from
the Goldstein-Green model. 17
The Ostro, Goldstein-Green, Hagfors, and Eshleman models all rested on radar
geometries and scattering mechanisms. Not a single model linked surface or subsurface
structure realistically to the radar signatures, nor did the models explain the origins of
those structures. Positing the existence of hemispherical craters was one thing; finding
geologic evidence for them was another. Not surprisingly, Voyager revealed no hemi-
spherical craters on any of the Galilean satellites. Ostro now sought an explanation for the
radar signatures of the Galilean moons in collaboration with USGS planetary geologist
Eugene Shoemaker.
13. Campbell 8 December 1993.
14. Goldstein and R. Green, "Ganymede: Radar Surface Characteristics," Scienct, 207 (1980): 179-180;
Ostro, "Radar Properties of Europa, Ganymede, and Callisto," in Morrison, Satellite.g of Jupiter, pp. 225-233. and
quote p. 235.
15. Morrison and.lane Samz, V_lyage to.Jupiter, NASA SP-439 (Washington: NASA, 1980), pp. 58, 60
and 142.
16. Hagfors, Gold, and M. lerkic, "Refraction Scattering as Origins of the Anomalous Radar Returns of
.Jupiter's Satellites," Nature315 (1985): 637- 640.
17. Eshleman, _Mode Decoupling during Retrorefraction as an Explanation for Bizarre Radar Echoes
from Icy Moons," Nature 319 (1986): 755-757; Eshleman, "Radar Glory from Buried Craters on Icy Moons,"
Sc/enc.e 234 (1986) : 587-590.
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Shoemaker had a rather simple and elegant geologic solution to the problem. In
developing his solution, Shoemaker drew upon his knowledge of the lunar regolith and
Voyager data. He assumed that the surfaces of the Galilean moons were exactly like that
of the Moon. From statistics of craters observed in Voyager images of Ganymede and
Callisto, Shoemaker inferred that the surfaces of those moons had a history of meteor
bombardment similar to that of the Moon. He concluded that they were probably
blanketed with fragmental debris produced by prolonged meteoroid bombardment. The
only difference, then, between the Moon and Jupiter's moons was that the rocks on the
Galilean satellites were made of ice, and the ice, given the extremely low ambient
temperatures, would behave like a silicate rock. Ice is highly transparent to radar waves,
so the icy surfaces of the Galilean moons would permit radar waves to penetrate those sur-
faces to a far greater extent than if they were made of silicate rock. The combination of
the greater penetrating depth and the greater number of scattering events could provide
an explanation for the peculiar radar signatures of the Galilean satellites, t8
The primary contribution of the Ostro-Shoemaker model was its geological per-
spective. Nonetheless, the model only partially explained the radar results; a satisfactory
understanding of the detailed scattering mechanism that gave rise to the odd radar sig-
natures still remained beyond reach. Meanwhile, Steve Ostro and Don Campbell had
begun a new series of radar observations of the Galilean satellites at Arecibo in 1987.
Unlike the previous campaign, Stanford researchers under the leadership of Von
Eshleman participated. Dick Simpson took data at Arecibo, while a graduate student, Eric
Gurrola, was charged with the analysis. Tor Hagfors, who also was interested in experi-
menting on the Galilean satellites for reasons similar to those of the Stanford researchers,
joined their group.
This new series of S-band observations was to provide thorough phase coverage for
all three icy satellites (Ganymede, Callisto, and Europa). Started in November 1987, the
campaign continued into 1988, then November-December 1989, January 1990, and
February-March 1991, when Ostro observed the satellites at rotational and orbital phases
chosen to fill in gaps in the 1987-1990 phase coverage. 19 Then Jupiter left the Arecibo
declination window.
At the same time, Arecibo obtained the first good echoes from It. Its radar proper-
ties were unlike those of the other Galilean satellites. Data collected in 1976 already had
shown that It's surface was significantly rougher on average than the terrestrial planets,
but much smoother than the other Galilean moons. Its radar cross section and polariza-
tion ratio were more typical of the inner planets, however, and argued strongly against the
presence of significant quantities of surface ice. _)
In parallel with the 2,380-MHz (12.6-cm) observations, Don Campbell studied the
Galilean moons with the 430-MHz (70-cm) radar beginning in November 1988, the first
time in 25 years that the UHF radar had been used in the continuous-wave mode. He
detected Ganymede and Callisto, then in November-December 1989, made the first UHF
detection of Europa. The purpose of the experiment was to compare the polarization
properties of the Galilean satellites at both S-band and UHE Campbell discovered that the
echoes from Ganymede at UHF were reminiscent of those at S-band. Additional UHF
measurements made in January 1990 apparently confirmed that the peculiar polarization
ratios of the Galilean moons were independent of frequency31
18. Shoemaker 30June 1994; Ostro and Eugene M. Shoemaker, "The Extraordinary Radar Echoes from
Europa, Ganymede, and Ca[listo: A Geological Perspective," Icaru._85 (1990): 335-345.
19. E-mail, Simpson to author, 9 November 1994; NAIC QR Q2/1987, 7; Q3/1987, 8-9; Q4/1987, 9;
Q2/1988, 9; Q4/1988, 8; Q4/1989, 7; Q1/1990, 7; Q1/1991, 7; Q1/1992.8.
20. Campbell, Chandler, Ostro, Pettengill, and Shapiro, "Galilean Satellites: 1976 Radar Results," Icarus
34 (1978): 254-267; NAIC QR Q1/1976, 6; Q4/1977, _6; Q2/1987.7; Q3/1987, 8-9; Q4/1987, 9.
21. NAIC QR Q4/1989, 7; Q1/1990, 7.
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SteveOstro,whonowhadapositionatJPL,alsoobservedtheGalileansatelliteswith
theGoldstoneX-bandradarbetween1987and1991andmeasuredpolarizationratiosand
radarcrossections.ThecombinedX-band,S-band,andUHFradardatatakenovera
longperiodof timedocumentedthedegreeto whichthesatellites'radarproperties
dependedontarget,rotationalphase,andfrequency.22Theyprovidedaconsiderablease
uponwhichtoexplainthebizarreradarsignaturesoftheGalileanmoons,andareason-
ableexplanationsoonwasinhand.
TowardtheendoftheAreciboandGoldstonecampaignontheGalileansatellites,
BruceHapke,anopticalastronomerandscatteringexpert,drewattentiontoagrowing
bodyof literatureonlaboratoryandtheoreticalinvestigationsofaphenomenoncalled
alternatively"coherent-backscattereffect"or"weaklocalization."Theeffecthaspotential
applicationi anewclassofsemiconductorsinwhichphotons,ratherthanelectrons,per-
formcircuitryfunctions.Weaklocalizationoflighttakesplaceatthemicroscopiclevel
andarisesfiom a combinationof coherentmultiplescatteringand interference.
Backscatteredintensityisenhanced,andtheforwardiffusionthroughthelow-lossmedi-
umreduced,byconstrnctiveinterferencebetweenfieldspropagatingalongidenticalbut
time-reversedpaths.'_:_
At the suggestion of Steve Ostro, Kenneth J. Peters of Caltech did calculations that
demonstrated that coherent backscattering from forward scatterers could explain the
high reflectivity and polarization ratios of the Galilean satellites. 24 Coherent backscatter-
ing now appeared to explain adequately the high radar cross sections and circular polar-
ization ratios of the icy satellites, and it was consistent with the geologic picture of those
moons painted by Gene Shoemaker. The scattering might arise less from individual pieces
of ejecta, but more likely from uncoordinated changes in porosity (and hence refractive
index) that occur randomly throughout "smoothly heterogeneons" regoliths, argued
Ostro and Shoemaker. __
Additional data on the radar properties of icy surfaces came from observations of the
Earth. In June 1991, the NASA/JPL airborne synthetic apertnre radar (AIR-SAR) flew
over a vast portion of the Greenland ice sheet called the percolation zone, where summer
mehing generates water that percolates down through the cold, porous dry snow then
refreezes in place to form massive layers and pipes of solid ice. The AIR-SAR radar
observed the Greenland ice sheet at several wavelengths (5.6-, 24-, and 68-cm) and
obtained values for the circular polarization ratio greater than one. _6
The riddle of the strange radar signatures of the Galilean satellites focused radar
astronomers' attention on epistemological questions, the fundamental need to under-
stand and interpret radar echoes and their relationship to the target. Such questions,
though, were of interest only to radar astronomers; their solutions contributed to an
22. Ost,o, Camphell, Simpson, R. Scott Hudson, Chandler, Keith D. Rosema, Shapiro, Standish, R.
Winkler, Donald K. Yeoman, Ray Vtlez, and Goldstein, "Europa, Ganymede, and Callisto: New Radar Results
fi-om Arecibo and Goldstone,"J*mrnal o/(,e_rphy._ical Researrh 97 (1992): 18,227-18,244. The Goldstone observa-
tions were made 10-11, 13, 15-16, 22, 26, and 29-30 November 1988; 5 and 8 December 1988; 13, 14, 15, 18,
19, 20, 22, 24, 27, and 29 December 1989; 13, 18, 22 and 27 December 1990.
23. Ostro 18 May 1994; Bruce Hapke, "Coherent Backscatter and the Radar Characteristics of Outer
Planet Satellites," ht, ru_ 88 (1990): 407-4 17; Hapke and David Blewett, "Coherent Backscatter Model for the
Unusual Radar Reflecti_'ity of Icy Satellites," Nature352 (1991) 46-47; SajeevJohn, "Localization of Light," Phyt'ic_v
"lhday 44 (May 1991): 32-40.
2,t. Kenneth J. Peters, "Coherent-Backscatter Effect: A Vector Formulation Accounting for Polarization
and Absorption Effects and Small or Large Scatterers," Phy_ictff ICe_iew B 46 (1992): 801-812;John, "Localization
of Light," l'hy_i*:_ 7hday 44 (May 1991): 32-40; Ostro 18 May 1994.
25. Ostro 18 May 1994; Ostro and Shoemaker, 'q'he Extraordinary Radar Echoes from Europa,
Ganymede, and Callisto: A Geological Perspective," I_aru_ 85 (1990): 335-345.
26. Eric J. Rignot. Oswro, lakoh J. Van Zyl, and IC C.Jezek, "Unusual Radar Echoes from the Greenland
Ice Sheet," S_ien_e261 (24 September 1993): 1710-1711.
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understanding of the radar characteristics of planetary surfaces, but not to the more gen-
eral scientific questions posed by non-radar planetary astronomers. However, if radar
astronomers were going to contribute to our knowledge of the Jupiter and Saturn systems,
they first had to resolve such basic epistemological issues relating to the radar properties
of those planetary systems.
Although the central focus of radar research on the Galilean satellites had been the
solution of the satellites' strange radar signatures, the data also has served to correct their
ephemerides as part of the Planetary Ephemeris Program of Irwin Shapiro and John
Chandler of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. The radar data uncovered
errors in the ephemerides as early as 1976. A round of Callisto observations carried out
beginning in 1987, though, were intended mainly for orbital ephemeris refinement in
support of the Galileo mission. '_7
Sensitized to the needs of planetary geologists, Ostro also attempted to relate radar
data collected at Arecibo and Goldstone between 1987 and 1991 to surface features on the
Galilean moons. The most prominent features tentatively identified in the echo spectra
were Ganymede's Galileo Regio and Callisto's Valhalla Basin. us Using a new radar coding
technique, John Harmon and Steve Ostro observed Ganymede and Callisto at Arecibo
from February to March 1992 and obtained the first range-Doppler images of the moons.
These observations also constituted the first successful ranging measurements to the
Galilean satellites and the farthest radar distance measurements ever reported. 29
The exploration of the Galilean moons of Jupiter illustrated the increasing com-
plexity of the planetary radar paradigm. Hardware improvements, coding techniques, and
even discoveries made in optics laboratories shaped the science done by radar
astronomers. Moreover, despite the shift toward geology, planetary radar remained ori-
ented toward astronomical questions and NASA missions, such as Galileo.
The Outer Limits
The rings of Saturn, like the Galilean moons of Jupiter, presented radar astronomers
with a target very different from the terrestrial planets. The rings of Saturn were believed
to be icy and until the 1970s, were thought to consist of tin},, micron-sized particles. Radar
astronomy upset that conception of the rings. In doing so, radar astronomy also set a dis-
tance record: the round-trip light time to the rings was about 2 hours and 15 minutes.
After an unsuccessful try in 1967, Haystack researchers successfully bounced X-band
radar waves off the rings in 1973. 3o Earlier, however, in December 1972 and January 1973,
Richard Goldstein and George A. Morris,.Jr., at JPL detected the rings with the S-band
(,oldslone Mars Station. Making the observation was not easy. The orientation of the rings
is optimum h_r radar observations only twice during each 29-year orbit of Saturn, when
the rings are tnost tilted t<_ the line of sight and present the largest projected area. At the
same time, the Doppler stHeading and consequent dilution of the signals in the noise is
the least.
27. NAIC QR QI/1976, 7: 0_.4/1977, 5-6; Q3/1987, 8-9; Q2/1988, 9; QI/1992, 8; Campbell, Chandler,
Pt+ttengill, and Shapiro, "(;alilean Satellites of Jupiter: 12.6-Centimeter Radar Obselvations," Scien+:e 196 (1977):
651; Osno, Campbell, Simpson, ltudson, Chandler, Rosema, Shapiro, Slandish. Winkler, Yeoman, Vt_lez, and
(;oldstein, "l']uropa, Ganymede, and Callisto: New Radar Results fiom Arecibo and C.oldslone," J_mrnal +?/
(;eoph'_'_ual l¢_'_ea_+h 97 (1992): 18,227-18,244.
28. Ostvn, (,ampbell, Simpson, Hudson, Chandler, Rosema. Shapiro, Standish, Winkler, Yeoman, V61ez,
and (;oldstein, "Ettl opa, (;anymede, and Callisto: New Radar Results from ArecitxJ and Goldstone,"J_mrnal of
(ieophy_ual ICe_eanh 97 ( 1992): 18,227-18,244; NAIC QR Q1/1991, 7.
29. Ostro, Pettengill, Campbell, Goldstein, Icarus 49 (1982): 367.
3(). NERO(:, Final I'rogre_ lCqmrt ICadarStuMie_ o/lhe PktneL_, 29 Augttst 1974, pp+ 1,3, 6 and 8-9; Log Book,
llaysta¢ k l'lanctary Radar, 11R-73-1, 27 June 1973 to 26 November 1973, SEBRING; and Goldstein, R. Green,
l'cttengill, and (:ampt_ll, "The Rings of Satut n: Two-Frequency Radar Observations," harus 30 (1977) : 105.
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The echoes Goldstein and Morris found were unexpectedly su-ong. Tile rings were
inclined at an angle about 26 ° with respect to the line of sight, and the amount of power
returned from the rings was about 10 times that for Mercury and five times that for Venus.
Moreover, wrote Goldstein and Morris: "Particles of any material that are much smaller
than our wavelength [ 12.6 cm] are ruled out by our data....Large (compared to the wave-
length), irregular, rough particles could produce the observed echoes. '':u
Shortly thereafter, on 31 July and 1 Angust 1973, JPL organized a workshop on
Saturn's rings at the request of S. lchtiaque Rasool of the Planetary Programs Office,
NASA Headquarters. Gordon Pettengill organized the scientific program. The workshop
responded to an upsurge in interest in the Saturn system, and the outer systems in gen-
eral, in anticipation of the 1977 Mariner Jupiter/Saturn mission, later known as Voyager.
The interpretation of the JPL radar experiment on Saturn's rings surprised
astronomers 3"_and caused rethinking about the ring particles and models published by
radio astronomers. The amazingly large particle size also raised questions about the safe-
ty of a spacecraft near the rings and gave rise to NASA andJPL interest in the radar results,
which George Morris discussed at tile workshop. Excited by the Goldstone radar findings,
astronomers during the general discussion expressed an interest in obtaining more radar
data on the rings. :_:_
The JPL results also surprised radar astronomers. For example, Gordon Pettengill
(MIT) and Tor Hagfors (then at the Department of Electrical Engineering of the Norges
Tekniske Hogskole, Trondheim, Norway), based on their own radar experience with the
terrestrial planets and the asteroids Icarus and Toro, felt that the radar cross section
observed by Goldstein and Morris, 0.62 + 0.15, was unreasonably high. "Even by assuming
the particulate matter in the rings to have linear dimensions comparable to or larger than
the radar wavelength," they wrote, "we are left with the need to explain a radar scattering
mechanism more efficient by a factor of about 10 than that of the inner planets, tmless we
wish to postulate an unreasonable ring particle density or composition. '':_4
Astonished, too, were radio astronomers. The high radar return had to be reconciled
with the rings's low radio emission, as well as with optical and infrared results. :_5As the
enigma of Saturn's rings continued to puzzle astronomers, the Arecibo S-band upgrade
reached completion. It seemed only natural, as Don Campbell explained, that the first
radar experiment with the upgraded telescope should be an attempt to detect echoes
from the rings of Saturn: "When Arecibo first came on line in 1974, the very first thing we
did to test the transmitting system, apart from trying to communicate with a star system
25,000 light years away, was to run a bistatic radar measurement on the rings of Saturn
31. Goldstein and Morris, "Radar Observations of the Rings of Saturn," h:arus 20 (1973): 260-262;
Morris, "Distribution and Size of Elements of Saturn's Rings as Inferred from 12-cm Radar Observations," in
Frank Don Palluconi and Pettengill, eds., The Rings of Saturn, SP-343 (Washington: NASA, 1974), p. 73.
32. Campbell 8 December 1993. See, for example, Allan E Cook, Fred A. Franklin, and F. D. Palluconi,
"Saturn's Rings: A Survey," Icarus 19 (1973): 317-337 and Pollack, "The Rings of Saturn," American Scienti._t 66
( 1978): 30-37.
33. Rasool, "Foreword," in Palluconi and Pettengill, pp. v-vi; ibid., pp. 192-195; and Morris,
"Disuibution and Size of Elements of Saturn's Rings as Inferred from 12--cmRadar Observations," pp. 7.%-82.
Interestingly, when a subsequent workshop on Saturn's rings was held at the Reston International Conference
Center, Reston, Virginia, 9-11 February 1978, and sponsored by the NASA Office of Space Science, no radar pre-
sentations were made. The purpose of the workshop was more tightly defined than the 1973 workshop; the 1978
workshop strictly prepared for the Voyager mission.
34. Pettengill and Hagfors, "Comment on Radar Scattering from Satuln's Rings," h:aru._21 (1974):
188-190, esp. 188.
35. Jeffrey N. Cuzzi and David Van Blerkom, "Microwave Brighmess of Saturn's Rings," harus 22 (1974):
149-158; Pollack, A. L. Snmmers, and B. Baldwin, "Estimates of the Size of the Particles in the Rings of Saturn
and their Cosmogonic Implications," Icarus 20 (1973): 263-279; Morrison and D. P. Cruikshank, "Physical
Properties of the Natural Satellites," Space ScienceRmhew 15 (1974): 722-732; Pollack, "The Rings of Saturn," Space
Sc2ente Review 18 (1975): 3-97.
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with Goldstone. At that time, we had transmitting capability, but we had not yet installed
the receivers. The dedication of he upgraded telescope had been in November 1974, and
this was in December, when we were trying to get the transmitter really working properly.'_6
Despite equipment difficulties at Arecibo, Goldstone received echoes from Arecibo
by way of Saturn. 37 In addition So the bistatic Arecibo-Goldstone radar test on Saturn's
rings in December 1974, Arecibo and Goldstone performed dual-polarization experi-
ments on two nights in January 1975. These bistatic linear polarization experiments estab-
lished that echoes from the rings of Saturn were highly depolarized, that is, more power
appeared in the unexpected than in the expected polarization.
Goldstein also conducted monostatic dual-polarization observations with the
Goldstone X-band radar on five nights in December 1974 and January 1975 and measured
a high circular polarization ratio. Goldstone and Arecibo investigators now knew that
Saturn's rings exhibited high linear and circular polarization ratios and that the
phenomenon was independent of frequency. Moreover, they confirmed at both X-band
and S-band that the rings had high radar cross sections. 3s
The high radar cross sections and polarization ratios of Saturn's rings were puzzling.
Campbell and Goldstein considered several possible explanations for those radar proper-
ties. Two models appeared plausible. One model hypothesized a thick cloud of irregular
water-ice chunks a few centimetdrs or larger in radius. The other posited a monolayer of
multimeter-sized water-frost-coated metallic chunks. Voyager data later rejected the metal-
lic composition of the rings, s9 In summing up the state of knowledge on Saturn's rin_s in
1975, Allan F. Cook and Fred A.gFranklin of the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory
speculated that the ring particles consisted of water ice, clathrated hydrates of methane,
and ammonia hydrates, _ in agreement with one of the radar models.
Meanwhile, James Pollack and other astronomers proposed that the ring system was
diffuse and many particles thick. In order to determine whether the rings of Saturn con-
sisted of one or several layers, and in general to test various models of the thickness and
composition of the rings, Gordo 0 Pettengill, Don Campbell, and Steve Ostro undertook
further radar observations in 1977, 1978, and 1979 on a total of 13 nights. Like those on
the Galilean satellites of Jupiter, the observations became part of Ostro's thesis. 41 In
March 1977, also, Gordon Pettengill and Dick Goldstein resumed bistatic observations of
Saturn's rings with the Arecibo and Goldstone S-band radarsA ")
The key to the radar observations made in 1977, 1978, and 1979 was the differing tilt
angles of the rings during the 13 total nights of observations. The tilt angle of the rings
relative to the line of sight declined over those three years from 18.2 ° to 11.7 °, then to
5.6 ° . The astronomers also received in both senses of circular polarization in order to
measure the polarization ratio as a function of tilt angle. Their results, when combined
36. Campbell 7 December t993.
37. NAIC QR QI/1975, 4.
38. Goldstein, R. Green, Pettetagill, and Campbell, "The Rings of Saturn: Two-Frequency Radar
Observations," Icarus 30 (1977) : 104-110.
39. L.W. Esposito, Cuzzi,J. B. Holberg, E. A. Marouf, Tyler, and C. C. Porco, "Saturn's Rings: Structure,
Dynamics, and Particle Properties," in ,Tom Gehrels and Mildred Shapley Matthews, eds., Saturn (Tucson:
University of Arizona Press, 1984), p. 464.
40. Allan E Cook and Fred A. Franklin, "Saturn's Rings: A New Survey," in Joseph A. Burns, ed.,
Planetary &ttellites (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977), pp. 412-419. See also Cuzzi and Pollack, "Saturn's
Rings: Particle Composition and Size Distribution as Constrained by Microwave Observations." Icaru._ 33 ( 1978):
233-262.
41. Campbell 8 December 19931 Esposito, Cuzzi, Holberg, Marouf, Tyler, and Porco, "Saturn's Rings:
Structure, Dynamics, and Particle Propel'ties," in Gehrels and Matthews, Saturn, p. 467; NAIC QR Q1/1978, 7;
NAIC QR Q1/1979, 9; Ostro, "The Structure of Saturn's Rings," pp. 105-157.
42. NAIC QR Q1/1977, 7.
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with earlier radar data and the theoretical calculations of Jeffrey N. Cuzzi and James
Pollack, 43 provided significant constraints on ring structure.
The observations confirmed that the radar reflectivity of the rings was qnite high and
that depolarization was also high. The polarization ratio for the Galilean satellites, a
mystery not yet solved, however, was higher. The data ruled out all large-particle mono-
layer models. On the other hand, the polarization and radar cross section resuhs favored
ring models of several layers. The radar data also appeared to support particle composi-
tion of ice or metal, but not silicate rock. 44
Ostro, Pettengill, and Campbell also concluded that the A and B rings (the outer-
most rings) were responsible for most, if not all, of the _band radar echoes, and that the
radar reflectivity of the A ring was nearly as great as the B-ring radar reflectivity. The radar
reflectivity of the C ring was notably less than that of the B ring. Also, they found no evi-
dence for radar echoes from beyond the A ring or from the planet itself. 45
The case of Saturn's rings resulted in radar astronomers contributing to planetary
science, in contrast 1o their studies of the Galilean moons. Those studies for a long time
had been limited to epistemological issues, namely, what caused the Galilean moons'
strange radar signatures? Radar contributed to Saturn science, on the other hand, by
focusing less on such questions of radar technique and more on scientific questions, such
as the size of the ring particles and the number and thickness of the ring layers. Although
the sohttion of technical problems was a prerequisite for any radar astronomy problem
solving, the lack of obvious relevance to planetary science was a serious matter; the abili-
ty to solve scientific problems, especially those relating to NASA space missions, was the
basis on which scientists judged the value of radar astronomy and on which funding deci-
sions were made.
Cometary Nuclei
The nuclei of comets provided radar astronomers additional icy research subjects.
Comets are believed to represent samples of the most primitive material of the solar neb-
ula and to hold clues to the origin of the solar system. 46 They make challenging radar
targets, because close approaches are rare. The relatively small size of comets dictates that
they be studied by radar only when they approach Earth at distances of a fraction of an
astronomical unit. Also, ephemerides derived from optical data lack the accuracy
demanded for radar observations. Only the S-band and X-band upgrades of the Arecibo
and Goldstone antennas made radar studies of comets possible.
43. Cuzzi and Pollack, "Saturn's Rings: Particle Composition and Size Distribution as Constrained by
Microwave Observations." Icarus 33 (1978):233-262.
44. Ostro, Pettengill, and Campbell, "Radar Observations of Saturn's Rings at Intermediate Tilt
Angles," h:aru_ 41 (1980) : 381-388.
45. Ostro, Pettengill, Campbell, and Goldstein, "Delay-Doppler Radar Observations of Saturn's Rings,"
Icarus 49 (1982) : 367-381. See also Ostro and Pettengin, "A Review of Radar Observations of Saturn's Rings," in
A. Brahic, ed., Planetary Rinl,'_ 1982 (Toulouse: CEPADUES Editions, 1982), pp. 49-55.
Later radar data collected at Goldstone by Goldstein and Jurgens and at Arecibo by Ostro, Pettengill, and
Campbell in 1981, when the rings were at a 6° tilt angle, confirmed that the ring particles were large, irregular,
andjaggecl in shape and made of ice; the researchers finally abandoned the notion that they might be metallic.
Moreover, they affirmed the conclusion that the A and B rings reflected most, if not all, of the radar echo from
Saturn's rings. Goldstein and.|urgens, "Radar Observations of the Rings of Saturn,".]¢mrnal o[(;e_phy._tcallCe.warch
submitted for publication; Ostro, Pettengill, Campbell, and Goldstein, "Delay-Doppler Radar Observations of
Saturn's Rings," harus 49 (1982): 367-381: Ostro, Pettengill, and Campbell, "Radar Observations of Saturn's
Rings at Intermediate Tilt Angles," harus 41 (1980): 381-388. This research is summarized in: Ostro and
Pettengill, "A Review of Radar Observations of Saturn's Rings," pp. 49-55.
46. Whipple, "Comets," in J. A. M. McDonnell, ed., (2_J._rniclh_._t(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978),
pp. 1-73.
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Early attempts all ended in failure. For example, after an attempt in January 1971 on
Comet Kohoutek stymied by rain and snow, the Haystack telescope again failed to detect
that comet in January 1974. Although Irwin Shapiro had prepared an accurate ephemeris
in advance, neither the bandwidth nor the center frequency of the radar echo was known
precisely, so they had to search for the echo. 47
It took the S-band upgrade of the Areciho Observatory to make the first comet detec-
tions possible. Paul G. D. Kamoun, a French student of Gordon Pettengill at MIT, built his
dissertation research around those detections. The main objective of his dissertation was
to use cometary radar data to discriminate between two different models of cometary
nuclei. 4s One model was that proposed by Fred Whipple, who served on Kamoun's dis-
sertation committee, and supported by Zdenek Sekanina, an established expert on
comets.
In the Whipple model, the cometary nucleus was like a rotating "dirty snowball," an
icy matrix of water ammonia, methane, carbon dioxide, or carbon monoxide, combined
with rock, dust and other meteoric debris. A popular model for the nucleus in the early
20th century predicated a "dust swarm" or swarm of solid particles of unknown sizes, each
particle carrying with it an envelope of gas, mostly hydrocarbons. However, that model
had a number of difficulties, and by the 1970s Whipple's "dirty snowball" model pre-
vailed. 49 Consequently, Kamoun's dissertation did not contribute meaningfully to the
comet debate.
Kamoun's research on comets turned around the unsuccessful cometary research
begun at Arecibo by Gordon Pettengill, Brian Marsden (Harvard-Smithsonian
Astrophysical Observatory), and Irwin Shapiro (who prepared the ephemerides). In late
July 1976, they attempted to detect echoes from Comets d'Arrest and Grigg-Skjellerup
during three observing sessions. Both attempts failed, although Comet d'Arrest came
within 0.13 astronomical units of Earth. 5°
The first comet detected by radar was Comet Encke. As Don Campbell explained, "It
was a historic first. We had never actually seen a comet before. ''5] French and German
astronomers had observed Encke earlier; its name came from the German mathematician
and physicist Johann Encke, who initially suggested an elliptical orbit with a period of 12.2
years, then correctly recalculated an elliptical orbit of 3.3 years, the shortest period of any
known comet. 52 Comet Encke was due back in November-December 1980. Although
Encke had a relatively stable and therefore predictable orbit, optical observations were
neither sufficiently numerous nor sufficiently accurate to formulate a satisfactory
ephemeris for the radar. Irwin Shapiro and Antonia Forni (Lincoln Laboratory) based
the radar ephemerides on optical data from both past appearances and new observations
associated with the 1980 appearance supplied by Brian Marsden. The ephemeris difficul-
ties resolved, I_moun, Campbell, and Ostro observed Encke for 12 hours on seven con-
secutive days, 2-8 November 1980, about 30 days before the comet reached perihelion
and at a distance of slightly more than 0.3 astronomical units from Earth. They found dis-
tinct, but very weak, echoes during each observing session. -_3
47. Log book, Haystack Planetary Radar, HR-73-2, 9 December 1970 to 11 August 1971, SEBRING;
Shapiro 1 December 1993; Eric J. Chaisson, Ingalls, Rogers, and Shapiro, "Upper Limit on the Radar Cross
Section of the Comet Kohoutek," Icarus 24 (1975): 188--189.
48. Paul Gaston David Kamoun, "Radar Observations of Cometary Nuclei," Ph.D. diss., MIT, May 1983.
49. Whipple, "A Comet Model. I. The Acceleration of Comet Encke," A_tr, rphysicalJournal 111 (1950):
375-394; Whipple, "A Comet Model. I1. Physical Relations for Comets and Meteors," ibid., 113 (1951): 464-474.
50. Kamoun, p. 31; NAIC QR Q3/1976, 6-7.
51. Campbell 9 December 1993.
52. John E. Bottle, "Comet Digest," .Skyand 7b/e_cope 60 (1980): 290; Kamoun, pp. 37-38.
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Next, Kamoun attempted radar observations of the Comet Grigg-Skjellerup, which
was discovered in 1902 by Grigg in New Zealand, then re-discovered as a new comet in
1922 by Skjellerup in South Africa. Grigg-Skjellerup has an orbital period of 5.1 years,
making it the second shortest periodic comet after Encke. The time of perihelion passage
was 15 May 1982, at a perihelion distance of nearly one astronomical unit (0.989).
Compared to other cometary experiments, Kamoun spent an unprecedented and
never repeated 49 hours observing the comet between 20 May and 2 June 1982, about a
week after it passed perihelion, while the comet was about 0.33 astronomical units from
Earth. He received echoes in both senses of circular polarization, but technical problems
prevented the acquisition of data on five days. An interesting feature was the very narrow
(less than one Hz) Doppler bandwidth of the echo, which indicated either a very specu-
lar echo, a slow rotation rate, or collinearity, of the polar axis with the line-of-sight. 54
Comet Austin came next. Unlike Encke and Grigg-Skjellerup, Comet Austin had
only been discovered on the morning of 19June 1982 by Rodney Austin in New Zealand.
Alan Gilmore, of Mount John University Observatory, New Zealand, confirmed the dis-
covery. The comet was first reported on 21 June 1982 in IAU circular 3705 of the Central
Bureau for Astronomical Telegrams by Brian Marsden, who also computed and made pub-
lic a set of orbital elements showing that the comet was moving on a parabolic orbit. From
the Marsden ephemeris, it appeared that Comet Austin would pass close enough to Earth
to detect it with the Arecibo radar.
Following receipt of IAU circular 3706 containing the improved elements of the
comet's orbit, Kamoun undertook the task of obtaining telescope time. He attempted to
observe the comet on the mornings of 8-12 August 1982. Despite equipment problems
that plagued observations on 8 and 9 August, the last three days yielded normal
performance. On the last day, 12 August, the analyzing bandwidth was doubled from 380
to 760 hz, with a corresponding increase in the frequency resolution, in order to widen
the search window. They computed an ephemeris after the experiment, using all the astro-
metric observations available for Comet Austin between June 1982 and November 1982.
That ephemeris turned out to be substantially different from the ephemeris used during
the actual radar observations. Despite correcting for this, and despite the distance from
Earth being very similar to that of Comets Encke and Grigg-Skjellerup, five days of obser-
vations in August 1982 did not result in a successful detection. -_5
Radar detections of comets were obviously fairly difficult to make, even with the best
radar telescope then available. Another opportunity to attempt a newly-discovered comet
came later that year. Comet Churyumov-Gerasimenko was discovered on a photograph
taken on 11 September 1969 at the Alma-Ata observatory in the Soviet Union by K. I.
Churyumov and S. I. Gerasimenko. At the time of Kamoun's radar observations in
November 1982, Comet Churyumov-Gerasimenko was 0.39 astronomical units from
Earth. It ought to have been detectable by the Arecibo radar. Kamoun attempted Comet
Churyumov-Gerasimenko for 33 hours between 7 and 16 November 1982. Serious tech-
nical problems on 7 and 16 November prevented acquisition of data. Further difficulties
on 8 and 11 November caused loss of some data. In the end, the attempt on Comet
Churyumov-Gerasimenko was not successful. 56
From his successful and unsuccessful observations of comets, Kamoun estimated the
radii of their nuclei, which were 0.4-3.6 km for Encke, 0.4-2.2 km for Grigg-Skjellerup,
54. Kamoun, pp. 90 and 85; NAIC QR Q2/1982, 7-8.
55. Kamoun, pp. 108-110; NAIC QR Q3/1982, 8.
56. Kamoun, pp. 21 and 122; NAIC QR Q4/1982, 7-8; K. I. Churymnov and S. I. Gerasimenko, "Physical
Observations of the Short-Period Comet 1969 IV," in G. A. Chebotarev, E. I. Kazimirchak-Polonskaya, and Brian
G. Marsden, eds., The Motion, Evolution ¢_fOrlnL_, and (hig4n o[('_JmeLs IAU Symposium 45 (New York: Springer-
Verlag, 1972), pp. 27-34. Both Churyumov and Gerasimenko were in the Department of Astronomy, University
of Kiev.
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less then 1.5 km for Austin, and less than 2 km for Churyumov-Gerasimenko. He also
placed upper limits on the number of millimeter and centimeter-sized particles in the
coma of the four comets (Table 7).57
Table 7
Upper Limits on the Number of Grains in the Coma of Four Comets
Compos/t/on
Comet Grain-Size Assumed Grain Magnetite
Ice Olivine Iron Su_qde
Encke
Grigg-SIsjeller up
and Austin
(:huryunlov-
(;erasimenko
mm
c m
mill
cm
fnm
Clll
4.5 I(1_7
1.5 I(P _
3 10 _7
10 H
6 10 _
2 10 _t
1.5 I() t;
6 10 "_
10'"
4,5 lO w
2 1(I tv
9 I(U _
7,5 10 x_
3 101°
2 10 'n
1017
4 I0 '°
In setting forth a program of future cometary radar studies, Kamoun noted that the
comets attempted in his dissertation could not be observed again during the next 10
years. Despite the scheduled reappearances of Encke in 1984 and 1987, of Grigg-
Skjellerup in 1987, and of Churyumov-Gerasimenko in 1989, none of the comets would
approach close enough for radar observation. On the other hand, he calculated, even if
no improvement in radar sensitivity occurred, other comets would be accessible,
particularly Comets Haneda-Campos (1984), Giacobini-Zinner (1985), Borelly and
Denning-Fujikawa (1987), and Brorsen-Metcalf and Dubiago (1989). 58 None of those
comets, however, was ever observed by radar.
Instead, opportunities, in fact far better opportunities, came from comets never
before seen. In early May 1983, as Paul Kamoun was writing his dissertation, preparations
were underway at Axecibo to observe Comet IRAS-Araki-Alcock. On 25 April 1983, the
Infrared Astronomical Satellite (IRAS) discovered Comet IRA_Araki-Alcock. Initially, sci-
entists believed it was an asteroid. In either case, it was sure to approach near the Earth.
Astronomers calculated that the object would pass Earth at a distance of only 0.03
astronomical units (450,000 km), that is, about 10 times closer than any other comet that
Kamoun had observed for his dissertation. In fact, such a close approach for a comet had
not been known to have occurred in more than two hundred years. Although Kamoun
had pioneered cometary radar, he would miss the most spectacular cometary opportuni-
ty. After writing up his thesis, he returned to France and took a position with a French
aerospace firm. 5u
But observing Comet 1RAS-Araki-Alcock was not going to be easy. Its orbit was high-
ly inclined relative to the Earth's equator, and to make observation at Arecibo that much
harder, as Don Campbell explained, "It was moving in declination so rapidly, that it
actually went through the entire sky coverage of Arecibo in one day. We had a two-and-a-
half-hour observing window, and that was it!"6°
57. Kamoun, p. 230.
58. Kamoun, p. 237.
59. Campbell 9 Decembel 1993; Kamoun, p. 238;Jurgens, "Seeing (;tract IRAS," p. 221; information
supplied by Pettengill.
60. Campbell 9 Decctnl:_r 1993.
THE OUTER LIMITS 219
The ability to get good data on Comet IRAS-Araki-Alcock depended heavily on hav-
ing an accurate ephemeris. That was the job of Brian Marsden and Irwin Shapiro, who
had just become Director of the Harvard-Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory in
January 1983, four months before the comet's discovery. 'q'aking over this place was an
all-consuming job," he recalled. "I worked clay and night:But for a few days, I dropped this
job like a ton of bricks, literally, to develop the ephemeris needed to observe IRAS-
Araki-Alcock at Arecibo and Goldstone. ''61
Working closely with Brian Marsden, Shapiro gener, ated an ephemeris for the comet.
"It was a big mess," Shapiro explained. "I was up until 2:30 in the morning every night.
The difficulty was due to there being very few comet observations, mostly bad. We had to
try numerous combinations to sort the good from the bad." Then Shapiro turned to the
task of preparing an ephemeris for the radar. 'q'he radar ephemeris was prepared at
Lincoln Laboratory; the radar observations were to be made at Arecibo. It was a logistical
nightmare, because of the incredible time pressure," Shapiro explained. "As the time of
close approach of the comet to Arecibo neared, we sent the ephemeris electronically. It
arrived an hour before the comet was to make its one and only pass over head. It worked
brilliantly."62
Don Campbell took high quality data on IRAS-Araki-Alcock for about three hours
during the single observation evening of 11 May when the comet was in the telescope's
declination window. Campbell recalled: "We got extremely nice data. You could actually
see the echo on the oscilloscope right there in the control room. It was all over the place.
A nice sine wave popping in and out. It was all very exciting. We measured only spectra
and obtained a lot of very interesting data on IRAS-Araki-Alcock in just that two-hour
period. ,,63
More surprising than a powerful echo from a relatively large nucleus, the spectra
showed a broad low-level skirt distinct from the nucleus echo. The skirt suggested the
possible existence of a cloud of unexpectedly large, centimeter-sized ejected particles
from the comet. The IRAS-Araki-Alcock skirt spectrum/appeared to be consistent with a
model in which large grains were ejected from the nucleus by the same gas-drag mecha-
nism used to explain the ejection of the smaller particles making up the dust coma and
tail. 64 "This was the first time that such particles had ever been discovered," Campbell
explained. "It made the whole experiment much more interesting. ''65
At the same time, Dick Goldstein and RayJurgens, in collaboration with JPL comet
specialist Zdenek Sekanina, prepared to look at IRAS-Araki-Alcock with the Goldstone
radar. Previously, they had made failed attempts at Comets d'Arrest (1976), Kohoutek
(1974), and Bradfield (1974). 66 IRAS-Araki-Alcock would be their first successful
cometary detection. Their chief obstacle was the resuscitation the Goldstone radar. As
Jurgens wrote: "As luck would have it, theJPL radar system had been shut down following
61. Shapiro 1 October 1993.
62. Shapiro 1 October 1993.
63. Campbell 9 December 1993; Harmon, Campbell, Hine, Shapiro, and Marsden, "Radar Observations
of Comet IRAS-Araki-Alcock 1983d," The Astrophysical Journal 338 (1989): 1071; Harmon, Campbell, Hine,
Shapiro, and Marsden, Rrular Observations q[ Comet IRAS-Araki-Alcock (1983d) Report 245 (lthaca: NAIC,
September 1988), Pettengill materials.
64. Campbell 9 December 1993; NAIC QR Q2/1983, 7; Harmon, Campbell, Hine, Shapiro, and
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65. Campbell 9 December 1993.
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theunsuccessfultracksofasteroid4Vestaon28May1982.Sincetheradarsystemhaseen
onlysporadicusageoverthepastfewyears,theX-bandtransmitter,the20yearold
computerandthedataacquisitionequipmentwereunreliable.Wewerein themidstofa
majorrebuildingprojectthatwouldnot beput into operationuntil March1985.
Fortunately,wehadnotremovedtheoldequipment.''67
JurgensandateamofJPLengineersefurbishedtheradarequipment,whileMike
KeeseypreparedaradarephemerisbasedonorbitalelementssuppliedbyBrianMarsden
andIrwinShapiro,whoalsohadsuppliedtheAreciboephemeris.TheGoldstoneobser-
vationstookplaceon11and14May1982atbothS-bandandX-band.Onafewruns,
echoeswerereceivedin thesamecircularpolarization.6sGoldstein,Jurgens,a dSekanina
concludedthatthenucleusofCometIRAS-Araki-Alcockwasveryroughonascalelarger
thantheradarwavelength.Theydid notbelievethatthepredominantbackscattering
mechanismwasimilarto that observed from the icy surfaces of the Galilean satellites, but
instead consisted of single reflections from very rough surfaces. They posited, further-
more, that the shape of the nucleus appeared to be irregular. Jurgens believed that the
nucleus's shape could be represented fairly well by a triaxial ellipsoid having equatorial
radii in a ratio of two to one. TheJPL radar astronomers estimated its radius to be between
three and six km (larger than any comet observed by Kamoun) and its rotational period
to be from one to two days.
Because of Jurgens' interest in asteroids, he and his JPL colleagues compared the
comet to known asteroids. '_fhe observed spectral shapes are typical of those measured for
small Earth-crossing asteroids except for the broadband skirt," they noted. "Due to dis-
tance and sensitivity limitations, such a skirt would not have been detected on any aster-
oid observed so far even if it existed. ''6_ However, they did not carry out a detailed analy-
sis of the skirt.
Within weeks after Comet IRAS-Araki-Alcock, another new comet, Sugano-Saigusa-
Fujikawa, passed the Earth. The two comets coming so closely together created a "once in
a lifetime" opportunity. Comet Sugano-Saigusa-Fujikawa came within 0.06 astronomical
units of Earth in early June 1983. Don Campbell attempted Sugano-Saigusa-Fujikawa on
the one day it was within the A1ecibo telescope's declination window, while Jurgens and
Goldstein tried during four full days of observations, which delayed the renovation of the
Mars Station antenna for one month. "Night after night,"Jurgens wrote, "we searched the
sky in the area of the comet with no indication of an echo. ''7° Arecibo, on the other hand,
did find echoes; however, Sugano-Saigusa-Fujikawa was about three times further away
than IRAS-Araki-Alcock had been, and it was a smaller comet, so that it was a less inter-
esting and "somewhat disappointing" target. 71
Despite the many unsuccessful and disappointing attempts to detect comets, until
the passing of Comet Halley, only the radar observations of IRAS-Araki-Alcock made at
Arecibo and Goldstone contributed to the vast amount of data collected by comet scien-
tists at optical, radio, infiared, and ultraviolet wavelengths. 72 Comet Halley returns every
76 years. Its reappearance prompted a global effort, the International Halley Watch, to
coordinate ground and space observations. Unlike previous comets, Halley was investi-
gated from a number of spacecraft sent by Japan (Suisei and Sakigake), the Soviet Union
(Vega 1 and 2), and the European Space Agency (Giotto). The radar results, however, did
67.
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69.
70.
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72.
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not play a part in the international effort. 73 Radar was still a marginal tool for cometary
research.
Comet Halley was to make two close approaches to Earth during its appearance in
1985-1986. At its closest approach in November 1985, it was to be 0.61 astronomical units
from Earth, and during its second approach, even closer, 0.41 astronomical units, to Earth
in April 1986. At the November 1985 approach, Halley would be visible at both Arecibo
and Goldstone, though far below likely detectability at the latter site. Moreover, Halley was
not within the Arecibo telescope's limited declination coverage during its closer approach
to Earth in April 1986. TM The chances for viewing Halley thus were small; the best chance
was in November and December 1985, when Halley was to be 0.62 astronomical units dis-
tant from Earth, not a good distance for observing comets.
At Arecibo, John Harmon observed Halley on 24, 28, 29 November and 1 and 2
December 1985 during its inbound Earth approach and detected a weak echo from Halley
at a distance of 0.62 to 0.64 astronomical units, the most distant comet yet detected with
radar. With the exception of IRAS-Araki-Alcock, comets observed earlier generally had
been about 0.3 astronomical units away. A broadband feature with a high radar cross sec-
tion and a large Doppler bandwidth dominated the echo spectrum, properties that were
inconsistent with an echo from the nucleus. Halley, then, became the second comet to
yield a radar detection of grains larger than two cm in radius ejected from the nucleus.
Comet Halley also was the first radar bright comet observed; it had the largest radar cross
section to date of any comet detected by radar. "If our interpretation of the echoes is
correct," Don Campbell explained, "Halley is the first comet to give a stronger echo from
particles than from the nucleus itself. "7-_
The Arecibo attempt on Halley in 1985 was the last successful radar detection of a
comet. In 1990,John Harmon attempted Comet Austin in cooperation with Steve Ostro,
who tried to obtain echoes with the Goldstone X-band radar. Harmon also attempted
Comet Honda-Mrkos-Pajddusakova in 1990, but again without success. 76 These failures
only served to highlight the extreme difficulty of doing radar research on comets and, as
a result, the lack of major radar contributions to cometary science.
A Vision of Things to Come
Asteroids did not make easy radar targets, either. Their small size and distance from
Earth placed them at the limits of planetary radar capabilities. Also, the known popula-
tion of asteroids outside the mainbeh between Mars and Jupiter, that is, the known
number of asteroids that might approach Earth close enough for radar study, was far
smaller than the quantity we know today. After the detection of Icarus at Haystack and
Goldstone in June 1968, only six more asteroids came under radar investigation between
then and July 1980: five near-Earth asteroids (1566 Icarus, 1685 Tort, 433 Eros, 1580
Betulia, and Phocaea) and two mainbelt asteroids (1 Ceres and 4 Vesta).
73. E. Grfin, ed., "Halley and Giacobini-Zinner," Advanc_g in Spac_ Reaearch vol. 5, no. 12 ( 1985): 1-344;
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Interest in asteroids was growing among astronomers during that 12-year period.
Tom Gehrels, University of Arizona at Tucson, was the most vocal advocate of asteroid
research. During the 1970s, he organized three asteroid conferences at Tucson which
provided much of the impetus for the modern investigation of asteroids. He also
initiated a program of asteroid detection called Spacewatch. Spacewatch, a survey
telescope located on Kitt Peak to discover new asteroids, started operating in May 1963.
Tom Gehrels also led an effort to use a modern CCD scanning camera on a specially
designed telescope beginning in 1979. In its first two years, Spacewatch discovered 69 new
asteroids. The rapid discovery rate of asteroids that started in the 1970s was due largely,
however, to the Palomar Planet-Crossing Asteroid Survey (PCAS), begun in 1973 by
Eleanor Helin and Eugene Shoemaker. The Survey initially used a 46-cm Schmidt camera
to detect asteroids on the four to five nights each month around the new Moon. The
exposed photographic plates were subjected to stereoscopic examination the same night
they were taken, in case a new asteroid was recorded on the film. If an object were
discovered, positional data was relayed by telephone to Brian Marsden at the Harvard-
Smithsonian Astrophysical Center, where he headed a center for data on minor planets
starting in 1978. Marsden then computed the orbit and ephemerides for further observa-
tions.
As a result of the Spacewatch and PCAS programs, the asteroid literature, as mea-
sured by citations of asteroid papers, underwent the kind of swift growth that is typical of
Big Science. 77 Although radar astronomers at first simply attempted to detect asteroids,
both Arecibo and Goldstone investigators initiated systematic programs of asteroid detec-
tion and research in the mid-seventies. The focus was on measuring radii, surface rough-
ness, and composition, and on improving orbits. In addition, RayJurgens pioneered the
modeling of asteroid shapes.
Dick Goldstein, using the Goldstone Mars Station, obtained echoes from 1685 Tort,
the first asteroid detected after Icarus, in 1972. After he combined the radar and optical
data, Goldstein inferred that the asteroid had an irregular rocky surface slightly smoothed
by a mantle of loose material. 7_ The following asteroid opportunity, 433 Eros, arrived in
January 1975. The experiment carried out on Eros at Goldstone was, in the words of Steve
Ostro, 'q'he most important asteroid experiment before 1980," because data was taken at
two frequencies (X-band and S-band) and in both senses of circular polarization. "As a
result," according to Ostro, "they achieved the best characterization of an asteroid's cen-
timeter-to-decimeter scale surface properties until the late 1980s. By then, all work was
dual polarization.Jurgens and Goidstein were well ahead of their time. "79
The data Goldstein and Jurgens collected indicated that the surface of Eros was
much rougher than the Moon or any of the terrestrial planets. They described a surface
completely covered with sharp edges, pits, subsurface holes, or embedded chunks. They
also estimated the asteroid to have equatorial dimensions of 18.6 and 7.9 kin. 8° In order
to better describe the shape of Eros and other asteroids, RayJurgens developed a triaxial
ellipsoid model. His work represented an important first step toward modeling asteroids
with radar data. Optical observations often provide the spin rate and pole, prerequisite
parameters for determining the shape of an asteroid from radar data. s!
77. CliffordJ. Cunningham, lntrt_luction to Asteroids: The Next Fr¢mtier (Richmond: Willmann-Bell, 1988),
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79. Ostro 25 May 1994.
80. Goldstein and Jurgens, "Radar Observations at 3.5 and 12.6 cm Wavelength of Asteroid 433 Eros,"
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In imb,r to mtulel the non._pherical ._ha]ue arul numer_ms axes _?[ rotation of asteroid._, Ray Jurgens deszgned a coordinate frame
to describe a._teroid._ a_ rotating triaxial ellipsoids. This wa._ the first attempt to nuxd.el asteroid shapes with radar data.
(C_mrte,_y q]_]et l"r_r[mL_ion lxtbtmzt(rry.)
Continuing his pursuit of radar asteroid research, RayJurgens outlined an ambitious
10-year program of asteroid opportunities in 1977. The program laid out the kinds of
measurements that ground-based radars (both Goldstone and Arecibo) could make with
currently available transmitter power and receiver sensitivity. Jurgens estimated that the
number of detectable asteroids available for study over the following 10 years was 60. It
took a few years longer to reach that number, however, for a variety of reasons. Jurgens
also pointed out that astronomers could use the radar data in many cases to calculate the
radius, average surface roughness, rotational rate, and polar axis direction, and in some
cases the radar albedos and orbital parameters, of asteroids. 8'_
In a memorandum to NASA Headquarters, Jurgens described the kinds of asteroid
opportunities that would become available upon the upgrading of the Goldstone radar
and argued for the scientific value of determining object size, rotation period, shape, and
surface properties from range and Doppler measurements, in the hopes of funding
asteroid radar research atJPL.83Jurgens had foreseen and mapped out the kind of radar
asteroid research program that only a few years later would materialize, but at Arecibo.
Jurgens' asteroid research program did not take root atJPL; the Goldstone radar was shut
down after some unsuccessful tracks on Vesta on 28 May 1982. _4 In contrast, radar aster-
oid studies at Arecibo were far more energetic. There, Brian Marsden worked with Irwin
Shapiro, the guru of the Planetary Ephemeris Program, to undertake a systematic study
82. Jurgens and D. F. Bender, "Radar Detectability of Asteroids: A Survey of Opportunities for 1977
through 1987/' haru_ 31 ( 1977): 483-497. The asteroid research program grew out of a larger workJurgens did
while at JPL namely lurgens, A Survey of (;r_ru_ul-ba._ed l_tdar A._tronomical Capability Emplcrying 64 and 128 Meter
Diameter Antenna Sy_tem.s at S and X Barul, Report 890-44 (Pasadena: JPL, March 1977). See also Pettengill and
Jurgens, "Radar Observations of Asteroids," in Gehrels and Matthews, A._teroid.s, pp. 206-211.
83. .lurgens to Geoffrey A. Briggs, 12 August 1982,Jurgens materials.
84. Jurgens, "Seeing Cornet IRAS," p. 222.
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of asteroid astrometry and composition. 8s The first asteroid observations that formed part
of that program were of Eros.
In 1975, Don Campbell and Gordon Pettengill observed Eros with the old UHF (430-
MHz; 70-cm) transmitter. That was the first asteroid detected by the Arecibo telescope
radar. Campbell and Pettengill measured the radar cross section of the asteroid and esti-
mated its radius to be about 16 kin. They also found the surface of Eros to be rough com-
pared to the surfaces of the terrestrial planets and the Moon. When Pettengill and
Campbell attempted to determine the composition of the surface, they could only con-
clude that it could not be a highly conductive metal, s6
After unsuccessful attempts at asteroids Ceres and Metis, Pettengill and Marsden
observed 1580 Betulia in 1976, the first asteroid target of the new S-band radar. Steve
Ostro, then a graduate student at MIT, did the analysis. He measured the asteroid's aver-
age radar cross section and set a lower limit to the asteroid's radius of 2.9 ± 0.2 kin. s7
Pettengill and Ostro next turned their attention to the mainbelt asteroid Ceres.
Already, in December 1975, Pettengill and Marsden, in collaboration with Goldstein (JPL)
and Tom Gehrels and Benjamin Zellner (University of Arizona) had failed to obtain
echoes from both Ceres and Meds, another mainbelt asteroid. The lack of an echo from
Metis was not surprising, but Ceres should have been easy to detect; they interpreted the
absence of an echo as indicating a smaller cross section than they had expected, s8
Ostro, Pettengill, and Campbell finally detected Ceres with the Arecibo S-band radar
in March and April 1977. This was the first mainbelt asteroid detected by radar. The
greater sensitivity of the S-band instrument made it possible for the radar to reach into the
mainbelt of asteroids and detect such a small body. The opportunity of March 1977 was
slighdy more favorable than that of 1975, thanks to the installation of a more sensitive line
feed in 1976. Ceres was found to have a low radar cross section, less than that for the
Moon, the terrestrial planets, and even Eros. On the other hand, the asteroid appeared to
have a very rough surface at some scale comparable to, or larger than, the 12.6-cm wave-
length of the radar, that is, rougher than the Moon and terrestrial planets, but smoother
than the Galilean satellites of Jupiter. s9
Noisy data taken on mainbelt asteroid Vesta during three nights of observations in
November 1979 returned only a weak detection. 9° Each asteroid detection seemed to
bring a new revelation; no pattern emerged. Unlike the terrestrial planets, asteroids pre-
sented not a few bodies to study but an entire population, a population, moreover, that
the growing discovery rate kept increasing. Although the systems of Jupiter and Saturn
defined the outer limits of planetary radar astronomy after 1975, the asteroids defined its
future. They were on their way to deposing Venus from its position as the favored target
of radar astronomers.
85. NAIC QR Q2/1976, 6-7.
86. Campbell, Pettengill, and Shapiro, _70-cm Radar Observations of 433 Eros," lcaru._28 (1976): 17-20;
NAIC QR Q1/1975, 4.
87. Pettengill, Ostro, Shapiro, Marsden, and Campbell "Radar Observations of Asteroid 1580 Betulia,"
Icarus 40 (1979): 350-354.
88. NAIC QR Q4/1975, 5.
89. Ostro, Pettengill, Shapiro, Campbell, and R. Green, "Radar Observations of Asteroid 1 Ceres," Icarus
40 (1979 ): 355-358; NAIC QR Q 1/ 1977, 6-7.
90. Ostro, Campbell, Pettengill, and Shapiro, _Radar Detection of Vesta," Icarus 43 (1980): 169-171;
Ostro 25/5/94; NAIC QR Q4/1979, 7.
Chapter Nine
One Step Beyond
Just as the Arecibo S-band and the Goldstone X-band upgrades had propelled radar
astronomy into new directions, in 1986 a second upgrade planned for the Arecibo radar
and the restoration and upgrading of the Goldstone radar stimulated new shifts in the
planetary radar paradigm. Instruments and hardware continued to drive the field. Fresh
techniques, either developed by radar astronomers or borrowed from other fields, name-
ly ionospheric and radio astronomy research, allowed radar astronomers to solve new
problems on the terrestrial planets. Also, the bizarre radar signatures of the icy Galilean
satellites appeared once again, though closer to home on the terrestrial planets, and sug-
gested new problems to solve.
The Goldstone Solar System Radar
Planetary radar astronomy survived atJPL in a tenuous state as a testbed for DSN
technology and as a mission-oriented activity. That state depended largely on support
from specific upper-management individuals, Eb Rechtin and Walt Victor. After Rechtin
left JPL and Victor transferred out of the Deep Space Network to the JPL Office of
Planning and Review in December 1978, radar astronomy became vulnerable to extinc-
tion. The DSN Advisory Group, headed by Rechtin, had judged that radar astronomy was
no longer the testbed of DSN technology.
The Goldstone radar was in desperate need of repair, and the old equipment had
become very hard to maintain; few people knew how to work with it. By 1980, much of the
equipment was old and not functioning properly. During experiments, for instance, entire
runs of data would be flawed or lost as a result of computer malfunctions. "You simply had
to bite the bullet and rebuild the whole damned thing, particularly the data acquisition
systems," RayJurgens explainedA However, nobody wanted to pay the cost of the needed
repairs and upgrades.
Reviving the Goldstone radar so that planetary radar astronomy could once again
prosper atJPL required that the activity have a new rationale. The initial arguments for
funding needed new equipment focused on the value of radar to NASA flight missions
and to planetary geology. In 1979, E. Myles Standish, Jr., who was in charge of the JPL
planetary ephemeris program, wrote a memo to Richard R. Green, who had recently been
promoted from the radar group to Advanced Systems, to explain that if no radar experi-
ments were conducted, then the accuracy of the ephemerides for the terrestrial planets
would suffer, andJPL would not be able to meet its ephemeris commitments to either the
Galileo or Magellan missionsY
Obtaining mission approval had been a requisite for acquiring antenna time for
radar experiments. As George Downs explained, "Dick Goldstein always wanted to
1. Jurgens 23 May 1994. In addition to the computer and other hardware problems, small cracks
appeared in the pedestal of the Goidstone Mars Station. The repair involved raising the 3,000-ton structure and
replacing a large portion of the pedestal concrete. The antenna did not return to service until June 1984, after
being down a year for repairs. JPL Annual Report, 1983, p. 26, and ibid., 1984, p. 26, JPLA.
2. Memorandum, Standish to R. Green, 10 May 1979,Jurgens materials.
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connectuswithaproject.I believehefeltthatif wetriedtogetconstituencyfromgeolo-
gistsalone,wewouldn'tmakeit.Well,hewasright.''_In 1979,GeorgeDownsaskedUSGS
geologistHenryJ.MooretowritealetterinsupportoftheGoldstoneradar;Moorewrote
toArdenL.Albee,CaltechprofessorfgeologyandthenewJPLChiefScientist.
Albeewasympatheticandmetwithmembersof theJPLradargroup,RayJurgens,
GeorgeDowns,StanButman,andRickGreen,on24January1980.Asaresultofthemeet-
ing,AlbeewrotetotheNASAOfficeofSpaceSciencer commendingalineitemforradar
astronomyin thefiscal1982budget.ThomasMutch,associateadministrator,NASAOffice
ofSpaceScience,repliedthathecouldnotraisetheannualallocation;thefundinglevel
wouldhavetoremainlevel.4
Somesupportforresurrectionf theGoldstoneradarcouldbecountedoncoming
fromthePlanetaryRadarWorkingGroup,whichconsistedlargelyof geologistsin the
USGSandacademiaplussmallernumbersofindividualsrepresentingSARremotesens-
ing and NASAHeadquarters,aswellasradarastronomersPettengill,Campbell,
Goldstein,andLenTyler.ThePlanetaryRadarWorkingGroupmetinconjunctionwith
theAASDivisionforPlanetarySciencesandtheLunarandPlanetaryScienceConference
anddiscussedprioritiesinradarastronomyatGoldstoneandArecibo.Ofcourse,thefate
oftheVOIRmission,ottheGoldstoneradar,wasthefocalpointofdiscussions.5
WithsupportfromthePlanetaryRadarWorkingGroup,RayJurgensandGeorge
Downswroteaproposalrequestingabout$1.8milliontopurchaseaVAXcomputerto
reduceradardata.Theysubmittedit totheNASAplanetarygeologyofficebecausethey
thoughtplanetarygeologistswouldbetheprimeusersofthedata.Inretrospect,George
Downsjudgedthatreviewerssawtheproposalsathreatotheirownfundinganddidnot
giveit goodreviews,whilethosewhosawtheproject'susefulnessgaveit goodreviews.
AlthoughJurgensandDownsdidnotgetheamountrequested,theNASAOfficeof
SpaceScienceandImplementationdidgranthemenoughtobuyanewVAX-700and
about$150,000ayeartoanalyzeradardata.Radarastronomyalsoachievedamodestlevel
of recognitionin 1982.Theoriginal1971NASAManagementI structiongoverning
groundradioscience,nowconsideredobsolete,replacedtheterm"radioscience"with
"RadioandRadarAstronomy."SuchwasthestateofradarastronomywhenDownsleftin
1982.6
In 1983,radarastronomyacquiredanewadvocate,NicholasA.Renzetti.Originally
aDSNmanagerresponsiblefortheinterfacebetweentheDSNanditsflightcustomers,
startingin 1975withtheVikingandVoyagerlaunches,Renzettigavelessattentionto
flightprojectsandmoreattentiontoapplicationsofradiotechnologytonon-flightpro-jects,suchasgeodynamics,theSearchforExtraterrestrialIntelligence,radioastronomy,
andstartingin 1983,radarastronomy.RenzettitookonthetaskofconvincingtheOffice
ofSpaceScienceandotherNASAHeadquartersdepartmentsthatit wasinNASA'sinter-
esttosupporttheGoldstoneradarasascientificnstrument.7
ThenewrationaleforfundingtheGoldstoneradar,asdefinedbyRenzetti,wouldbe
itsuseasascientificinstrument.In hiscampaigntogarnersupportfor theGoldstone
radar,RenzettiwasassistedbySteveOstro,whotookapositionatJPLin late1984,after
leavingCornell.TheynegotiatedanewtaskinDecember1987,inwhichtheGoldstone
radarwouldbetreatedasif it wereafacility,notasasciencetask,withanannualbudget
3. Downs 4 October 1994.
4. HenryJ. Moore to Arden L. Albee, 2July 1979,Jurgens materials; Memorandum, William H. Bayley
to Murray, 4 February 1980, 91/7/89-13, JPLA; Various documents in "NASA Correspondence, 1980-1981,"
JPLPLC.
5. Jurgens 93 May 1994; Planetary Radar Working Group mailing list, Jurgens materials;
Memorandum, Carl W.Johnson to Murray, `27 October 1980, 99/8/89-13,JPLA.
6. Jurgens `23 May 1994; Downs 4 October 1994; C. H. Terhune, Jr., to B. I. Edelson and R. E. Smylie,
'20 September 198`2, _Chron 1989, #2,'JPLPLC.
7. Renzetti 16 April 1999; Renzetti 17 April 1992.
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of about $200,000 for hardware improvements. The NASA task underwrote the interface
between the DSN and the radar astronomers. The objective of the new task, called the
Goldstone Solar System Radar (GSSR), was to support planning, experiment design, and
coordination of data acquisition and engineering activities for all Goldstone planetary
radar astronomy. As Steve Ostro explained, 'q'his has been the financial backbone for the
Goldstone radar, and it is separate from the DSN. ''s
At the same time, Renzetti created a part-time position, the Friend of the Radar. The
holder of that position was to carry out a number of duties, including NASA flight project
science and liaisons with Arecibo Observatory, but most importantly interfacing with the
scientific community. Tommy Thompson performed those duties until he became
Magellan Science Manager in 1988, when Martin A. Slade replaced him. Slade had been
a graduate student of Irwin Shapiro at MIT and had had some exposure to radar astron-
omy during summer jobs at Haystack. His main previous research interests, however, lay
elsewhere. 9
The creation of the GSSR task and the Friend of the Radar were only first steps in
addressing the core issue of funding the Goldstone radar on the basis of its use as a sci-
entific instrument. Renzetti took tentative, unsuccessful steps to open up the Goldstone
radar to outside researchers in order to operate it as a national research facility. He
approached Von Eshleman and two others from outsideJPL to propose radar experiments
at Goldstone. Renzetti also proposed to Tor Hagfors, NAIC director, that a single peer
review panel assess radar experiment proposals for both the GSSR (as the Goldstone Mars
Station or DSS-14 now came to be called) and Arecibo. Moreover, hoping to acquire a
facility budget for GSSR on a level with that of Arecibo, Renzetti proposed to Hagfors that
Arecibo and GSSR present a common front to NASA, rather than appear as competing
facilities, l0
But it did not make sense to pursue the common budget, Renzetti reasoned, as long
as the GSSR was not a national facility. The annual amount requested from NASA to make
the GSSR a "first-class scientific instrument," $500,000, was not well received at NASA
Headquarters. In comparison, the NASA budget for the Arecibo radar was only $362,000
in 1986. II Nonetheless, Renzetti, who felt there was a built-in bias in favor of Arecibo at
high-level NASA meetings, submitted a formal proposal to make the GSSR a national facil-
ity, but it never got off the ground, l'_
A chief critic of the proposal to turn the Goldstone radar into a national research
center was Dewey Muhleman of Caltech. He called parts of the proposal "ludicrous" and
declared that it would do "nothing for Science, the Nation, NASA nor, in the long run,
JPL." Moreover, he pointed out, the heavy scheduling of the antenna for spacecraft work
militated against the plan. "I strongly favor," he wrote, "the idea of getting Radar
Astronomy atJPL out of the closet of component development and into the light of pure
science."l,_
Gradually, that was starting to take place. During aJPL administrative reorganization
in the fall of 1987, the Office of Space Science and Instruments (OSSI) was created with
Charles Elachi as its head. Elachi was a seasoned radar engineer with decades of SAR
experience. After he obtained a modest level of funding, $150,000, from NASA
Headquarters, Elachi named Steve Ostro manager of Planetary Radar Science and autho-
rized him to allocate the funding. 14
1988.
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"At that point," Ostro explained, "I had a little bit of authority. I had the program
office backing me. I acted as somewhat of a filter on proposals and papers, when I could,
and I acted as the voice of science for radar." Ostro agreed with Muhleman's perception
thatJPL placed too much emphasis on hardware and not enough on doing science. The
science community in general, he pointed out, viewed the GSSR as state-of-the-art elec-
tronics, but saw Arecibo as producing state-of-the-art planetary radar data. The objective,
Ostro declared in 1988, "is, a year from now, to have a sparkling list of GSSR radar articles
that have appeared in high-quality journals."15 Despite such sterling intentions on the part
of Ostro and Renzetti, keepingJPL, DSN, and NASA management aware of the Goldstone
radar's scientific achievements and potential has been a Sisyphean task. In contrast, the
value of radar astronomy was established from the outset at the Arecibo Observatory.
Here was an important difference between the two facilities that had a profound
impact on the development of radar astronomy at each site. Even more important, how-
ever, was the fact that Arecibo had acknowledged and formalized the existence of radar
astronomy from the start; whereasJPL purposely had denied radar astronomy any formal
existence. The difference has had long-term implications that has favored radar astrono-
my science at Arecibo, while holding it back atJPL.
New hardware and flesh leadership enabled radar astronomers to make new discov-
eries about Mars, Mercury, and the asteroids with the Goldstone radar. The major
hardware upgrade did not arise from a concerted campaign on the part of Renzetti and
Ostro to improve the state of radar astronomy atJPL, but rather, in a fashion typical of the
history of planetary radar astronomy, came from outside radar astronomy, namely, the
Voyager mission to the outer planets.
The Voyager upgrade of the main GSSR antenna, known within the Deep Space
Network as DSS-14, involved enlarging the dish diameter from 64 (210 ft) to 70 meters
(230 ft), increasing the surface accuracy, and improving the receiving system. These
measures increased the sensitivity of the DSS-14 significantly. Tracking and acquiring data
from the Voyager spacecraft, as they encountered Uranus and Neptune, stretched the
capacity of the Deep Space Network. During the Neptune encounter, the Voyager X-band
radio signal would be less than one-tenth as strong as during the Jupiter encounter in
1979 and less than one-half as strong as during the Uranus encounter in 1986.
A study to enlarge all the DSN 64-meter antennas to 70 meters already had been
undertaken as early as 1973 in preparation for Voyager when it was still called Mariner
Jupiter/Saturn. After completion of design work in 1984, the upgrade of the DSS-14
began in October 1987 and concluded in May 1988. t6 When Steve Ostro arrived atJPL in
1984, the DSS-14 lacked the threshold of sensitivity to do meaningful asteroid research.
Upon completion of the initial upgrade phase, however, Ostro made his first successful
asteroid observations with the DSS-14 in May 1986, when he detected echoes from 1986
JK, an asteroid only just then discovered by Eugene and Carolyn Shoemaker.
The Voyager upgrade had a profound impact on the practice of radar astronomy at
JPL; it provided the GSSR the sensitivity needed to carry out research on a whole new set
of targets (and to begin solving new sets of problems). Not only did the GSSR gain the
ability to undertake significant asteroid research, but when linked to the Very Large Array
in New Mexico, as we shall see later, it became a new radar research tool.
Despite these major upgrades, the GSSR had serious problems as a scientific instru-
ment. The site lacked dormitory and cooking facilities for visiting or even JPL scientists,
and the drive to Barstow 50 miles away on winding roads after a night of observations was
dangerous. These deficiencies and dangers persist today. Furthermore, the radar itself was
far from user-friendly. "It was just impossible to work," Ostro explained. "For example, the
15. Ostro 18 May 1994; GSSR Min. 14January 1988 and 18 February 1988.
16. JPL Annual Report, 1973-1974, p. 15; ibid., 1984, p. 13; ibid., 1987, p. 41; and ibid., 1988, p. 28,
JPLA.
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VAXthatisusedfor dataacquisitionatGoldstoneisnotgoodfor radarastronomyfor
varioustechnicalreasons.It hasbeenimprovedalotsincethemid-1980s,butevennowit
isdifficult,forexample,tostampyourdatawithahigh-precisionUTC[fromtheFrench
forCoordinatedUniversalTime]timetag.Forthiskindofwork,thefirstthingyouneed
onyourdataisaUTCtimetag."17
TheAreciboObservatorystoodin sharpcontrastto theGoldstoneradar.It had
properquartersforvisitingscientists,andtheradarwasfarmoreuser-friendly.Moreover,
in 1986,theAreciboObservatoryproposedamajorupgradeof theradarthatwould
benefitbothionosphericandradioastronomyresearchandplanetaryradarastronomy.
TheAreciboupgradestirredRenzettitoseekfundingforaGoldstoneradarupgrade.
RenzettilobbiedtheDSNandNASAhierarchyfor fundingfor aGoldstoneone-
megawatttransmitter,whichJPLengineersinitiallyestimatedwouldcost$12million.A
goodargumentforDSNuseof theradarwouldnotfly;therationalehadtobeitsusefor
scientificresearch,Renzettirealized.Theradarupgrade,tobecompletedin fiscalyear
1993andcosting$10millionovertwoyears,appearedintheDSNbudgetforfiscal1989.
JPLviewedthepricetagas"paredtothebone."Intheend,Congressapprovedtheexpen-
diturenotasaspecificradarupgradebutasanambiguousimprovementof heDSN.This
ambiguityfreedDSNmanagementtousetheradartransmittermoneytopurchaselow-
noisesupercooledmaserstoimproveantennasensitivityforGalileo'sencounterwithIt.is
It wasnotclear,moreover,thatradarscienceatJPLneededtheone-megawatttrans-
mitter.Theestimatedcostof thetransmitternowstoodat $16million.SteveOstro
believedthatif thecostwerereducedbelow$8million,theimprovedsciencecapacity
wouldjustifytheexpense.ThehighcostreflectedJPLadministrativeandDSNoperational
supportequirementsthataddedseveralmilliondollarstothecost.19
OstrofavoredupgradingtheGSSRantenna'ssubreflectortoimproveitsabilityto
makeasteroidobservations.Thelongtimeneededtorotatethesubreflector,whichwas
neverdesignedto actasatransmit/receiveswitch,compromisedshortround-trip-time
asteroidobservations.'q'hemostpowerfulscientificrationaleforthelongterm support of
GSSR," Ostro argued, was work on near-Earth asteroids. The estimated price tag for the
transmit/receive upgrade, which involved turning the transmit-only horn into a horn
capable of switching quickly back and forth between transmit and receive, was $485,000. 20
Instead of going directly through the DSN hierarchy for a radar upgrade, Renzetti
changed his strategy. The one-megawatt transmitter and two other radar improvements
(construction of a transmit/receive horn and modernization of the data acquisition
system) were submitted to a panel of outside scientists for review. Gordon Pettengill
chaired the Goldstone Planetary Radar Science Review Committee, as the panel was
called. It included planetary astronomers and geologists, as well as Don Campbell and Tor
Hagfors from the Arecibo Observatory. 21
17. Ostro 18 May 1994.
18. GSSR Min. 22 January 1987, 18June 1987, 23.July 1987, 24 September 1987, 18 February 1988,
31 Ma_ch 1988. and 26 April 1990; Renzetti, Thompson, and Slade, "Relative Planetary Radar Sensitivities:
Arecibo and Goldstone," TDA Progress Report 42-94 (Pasadena: JPL, April-June 1988), pp. 287-293; Arthur J.
F_eiley, Bruce L. Conroy, DanielJ. Hoppe, and Alaudin M. Bhanji, "Design Concepts of a I-MW CW X-Band
Transmit/Receive System for Planetary Radar," IFJ'_ Trart*actionson Microwave Theory and Techniques 40 (1992):
1047-1055.
19. GSSR Min. 6 February 1992.
20. Memorandum, Ostro to Elachi, 29 August 1990; Memorandum. David ltills to Dick Mathison, 1
October 1990; Memorandum, Ostro to Larry N. Dumas, 15 October 1990, Ostro materials.
21. Pettengill to Elachi, 22 August 1991, and attachments, Ostro materials. The members of the
Goldstone Planetary Radar Science Review Committee were Gordon H. Pettengin, MIT; Michael]. S. Behon, Kitt
Peak National Observatory; Dona[d B. Campbell. NAIC; Clark R. Chapman, Planetary Science Institute; Tot
llagl_)rs, NAIC; Bruce W. Hapke, University of Pittsburgh; Randolph L. Kirk, USGS; David Morrison, NASA
Ames Research Center; and E Peter Schloerb, University of Massachusetts.
230 TOSEE THE UNSEEN
Although invited to join tile Committee, Muhleman declined. He "took the attitude,
well, this is one more panel, it can't be that important. How about ifI don't come? Let me
know how it comes out. That was a terrible mistake. It really was....TheJPL viewpoint was
not represented. ''_2 More importantly for Muhleman, his viewpoint was not represented,
and he paid the price. The Committee met on 8 August 1991 and presented its conclu-
sions later that month. The Committee applauded "the efforts currently underway byJPL
management to broaden the usage of the Goldstone facilities (including observations
jointly with the VlJk) to include members of the larger North American and global plan-
etary communities."
Of the three improvements, the committee gave the highest priority to the single-
horn, fast-transmit/receive-switchover system. That improvement would serve asteroid
work only. "At a lower, but still high, priority," the committee endorsed the modernization
of the data acquisition system and recommended that the output protocols and formats
of the new system be coordinated with those of the Arecibo planetary radar. Each of these
two improvements had a modest cost of about $500,000 spread over one to two years.
The one-megawatt transmitter, the committee judged, "seems less attractive as an
upgrading option than the first two presented." The cost was too high for the amount of
sensitivity gained. The value of the transmitter upgrade, the committee decided, lay in
observing Titan, "but we do not find the scientific argument compelling for what appears
to be a fairly narrowly focused study of a single object. We note also that the improved
transmitter is unlikely to be available in time to provide data that materially assist in the
design of the Cassini Mission. ''_3
Titan, however, was of the highest research interest to Dewey Muhleman. "In my
absence," he complained, "this panel frankly wrote a silly report, it just really made me
sick to read it. It said that the only advantage of going to a megawatt on the Goldstone
antenna was to be able to do Titan better with the VLA. Nothing else was really important.
That is ridiculous. For everything we do, our integration time would be cut down by a fac-
tor of four by doubling our power to a megawatt. We would be able to do much more on
each one of these objects and quite frankly continue to rival Arecibo after the upgrade. ''24
The Arecibo Upgrade
The struggle atJPL to gain recognition for the GSSR as a scientific instrument stood
in stark contrast to the effort to upgrade the Arecibo telescope. Both NASA and the NSF
already recognized Arecibo as a national research center, and the rationale for any
upgrade would be on the basis of scientific need. Furthermore, the Arecibo upgrade stood
to benefit all research at the facility, radio and radar astronomy and ionospheric research,
not just planetary radar astronomy. Other factors eased the process of garnering support
for the Arecibo upgrade, including the method of funding what was, in relative terms, a
low-cost project.
The Arecibo upgrade was a package of five interrelated improvements: 1) installa-
tion of a ground screen to virtually eliminate noise from the surrounding earth; 2)
adjusunent of the reflector surface to enhance antenna gain; 3) correction of the
pointing system; 4) replacement of the accumulation of radio astronomy line feeds with a
single reflector feed possessing large bandwidth, low loss, high gain, and continuous
frequency coverage from 300 MHz (1 meter) to 8 GHz (3.75 cm); and 5) doubling the
S-band transmitter power to one megawatt. The total effect of these changes was to
22. Muhleman 27 May 1994.
23. Pettengill to Elachi, 22 August 1991, and attachments, Osrro materials.
24. Muhleman 27 May |994.
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increase radar sensitivity by a factor of 10 to 50 (about 20 times on average), to double its
range or to detect objects 10 times smaller than previously possible. _5
The principal objective of the upgrade, however, was to solve a problem that had
plagued the telescope since its creation--the problem of spherical aberration. Unlike
parabolic dishes, the Arecibo spherical antenna did not focus waves in a single point. The
antenna feed system designed by the Air Force did not work efficiently, and though later
feeds improved the telescope's performance, they did not perform up to the level of a
Gregorian reflector, the solution recognized as early as the 1960s. Named for the
astronomer Jolm Gregory, a Gregorian reflector is concave and placed above the prime
focus of a telescope. In a Cassegrain system, the type used, for example, on the Goldstone
DSS-14, the reflector is convex mounted below the prime focus. 26
Designing the Gregorian optics was a daunting task. A Cornell graduate student had
considered the use of Gregorian optics, an option also studied by the AFCRL's Antenna
LaboratoryY 7 Frank Drake, director of the NAIC from 1971 to 1981, nurtured the
Gregorian reflector idea and attempted unsuccessfully to gain financial support to gather
together the necessary antenna expertise to submit a formal proposal to the NSE 28
Design of the Gregorian reflector did not begin until 1984, after Tor Hagfors became
director of the NMC in late 1982. After serving earlier as director of the Arecibo
Observatory following the departure of Gordon Pettengill, Hagfors spent a number of
years in Scandinavia building the EISCAT facility, before returning to Cornell to head the
NAIC.2_
EISCAT (European Incoherent Scatter Association) is a European consortium
headquartered at Kiruna, Sweden. Inaugurated by the King of Sweden in August 1981, the
EISCAT facility is a high-power radar installed at sites in Norway and Finland for the study
of the Earth's ionosphere, upper atmosphere, and magnetosphere at high latitudes.
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom bore the greatest share of its construction
costs (25 percent each), while Sweden (10 percent), Norway (10 percent), and Finland
(5 percent) contributed the rest. 3()
Under the direction of Tot Hagfors, the NMC initiated systematic studies of several
major antenna upgrading projects in 1984. As part of the upgrading project, the NAIC
concluded consulting agreements with a number of antenna experts. Among them were
Man Love, who had designed the telescope's first circular feed, and Sebastian yon
Hoerner. Morton S. Roberts, director of the National Radio Astronomy Observatory
(NRAO), and a member of the Arecibo Advisory Board, suggested that the NAIC hire as
a consultant yon Hoerner, a well known antenna expert working for the NRAO. The
project appealed to von Hoerner's imagination, and he set to work designing the
Gregorian optics and laying out the initial description of the shape and size of the reflec-
tor. He also realized the need for a tertiary reflector. -_
25. Hagfors, '_i'he Arecibo Gregorian Upgrading," in Joseph H. Taylor and Michael M. Davis, eds.,
Sdentific Ben_iL_o[an UpgradedArecib_Te.le_cope(Arecibo: NAIC, 1987), p. 4, and Ostro, "Benefits of an Upgraded
Arecibo Observatory for Radar Observations of Asteroids and Natural Satellites," in ibid., p. 233.
26. Campben 9 December 1993.
27. Kay, A Line S(mraeFeed,passim, and Pierluissi, A The_etical Study of GregorianRadio Te_scopes, passim.
28. Hagfors, "The Arecibo Gregorian Upgrading," p. 3; Per-Simon Kildal, Lynn A. Baker, and Hagfors,
"The Arecibo Upgrading: Electrical Design and Expected Performance of the Dual-Reflector Feed System,"
Proceedingsof the 11ff*2E82 (1994): 714.
29. NMC QR Q3/1982, 19; Campbell 7 December 1993; Campbell 9 December 1993.
30. Lovell, The.]_ulrellBank 7_lt._cope,pp. 270-271.
31. Campbell 9 December 1993; Hagfors, _The Axecibo Gregorian Upgrading," p. 3.
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Figure 36
Diagram illustrating Gregorian optics of the Arecibo upgrade subreflecto_. Unlike the Lincoln Ixzboratory radomes, this one is
not designed to allow radio szgnals to l._netrate the radome shell (Courtesy of National Astronomy and Ionosphere Ge'nte_,
which is operated by Cornell University under c_mtract with the National Science Foundation.)
In addition, Hagfors brought in Per-Simon Kildal, a professor at Chalmers University
of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden. Kildal was an expert in the design of feed horns and
antenna diffraction effects and a former student of Hagfors. He had performed some of
the design work on the EISCAT antennas for his doctoral thesis. When Kildal worked for
the NAIC for two months during the summer of 1984, he joined NAIC line feed designer
Lynn A. Baker. Baker and Kildal devised a practical Gregorian design to correctly illumi-
nate the primary reflector. 32
32. Campbell 9 December 1993; NAIC QR Q2/1984, 14; Hagfors, _I'he Arecibo Gregorian Upgrading,"
p. 3; Kildal, Baker, and Hagfors, p. 714.
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Designing and installing the Gregorian reflector also changed the mechanical stress
on the suspended platform. In order to work on the mechanical engineering aspects of
the project, Hagfors asked Paul Stetson, an antenna builder formerly with Lincoln
Laboratory, to come out of retirement. Stetson joined the NAIC in February 1984. -_s
As a test of the Gregorian feed concept, the NAIC at its own expense constructed and
installed a so-called mini-gregorian antenna which was to illuminate a 107-meter (350-ft)
diameter area of the reflector. Also, the ground screen underwent preliminary design,
and another study determined that the dish surface could be adjusted to be operational
up to 8 GHz (3.75 cm)._4
In 1984, as these design studies were underway, the NAIC submitted a preliminary
proposal to the National Science Foundation for Phase 1, the ground screen. The NAIC
submitted the Phase 2 preliminary proposal in 1985 for the Gregorian reflector system,
the new radar transmitter, ancillary receivers, and data processing equipment. The NAIC
then entered into negotiations with both the NSF and NASA, the two NAIC funding agen-
cies. The House subcommittee that handled NSF appropriations was well aware of the
upgrade project. Jerome Bob Traxler (D-Mich.), the chairperson of the House subcom-
mittee, Harry Block, the NSF director, and Dick Mallow, the subcommittee's chief of staff,
visited Arecibo several times. _5
The key to selling the project to the scientific community, which ultimately reviewed
all NSF proposals, was the building of consensus, a standard strategy among American sci-
entists. The NSF proposals were supposed to stand on their own merit. Whether those
reviews were good or bad was critical to the success of the upgrade project. The keystone
of consensus-building was a workshop held at Cornell University 13-15 October 1986. The
NSF proposal for Phase 1 was already under review, when the workshop took place. Talks
highlighted the kinds of scientific experiments one could do with the upgraded telescope,
whether in atmospheric research or in radio astronomy. Steve Ostro, Don Campbell, and
Irwin Shapiro pitched the possibilities for radar astronomy.
33. NAIC QR Q2/1984, 14; Campbell 9 December 1993; 1lagfors, "The Arecil)o Gregorian Upgrading,"
p. 3.
34. NAIC QR Q2/1984, 14, and Q3/1984. 15; Hagfors, "The Arecibo Gregorian Upgrading," p. 4;
Kildal, Baker, and }tagfors, pp. 717-718 and 722.
35. Campbell 9 December 1993; Dickman 2 December 1992.
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Figure 37
View o/ the Are_lnJ Ob,*ervatmy dish The completed _,w_mnd _creeTl _._ vi_ilJle in tlle b_t_kl..,mml. (C_mrte_y _4 Nati_mal
A._tronorny and hmo._phere (_nt_ which i_ _r]h,.rated t_ (_rrnell Unive_it'_ unde7 t_mtrmt with the Nali_mal Stie_lce
F_m ndation. )
Ostro largely proposed research on mainbelt and near-Earth approaching asteroids,
passing quickly over other solar system objects, such as the moons of Mars, Jupiter, and
Saturn. Don Campbell emphasized exploration of the terrestrial planets and comets. The
major impact of the upgrading, he and Shapiro acknowledged, would be on the observa-
tion of asteroids. ,_6 The scientific repercussion of the Arecibo upgrade for radar astrono-
my would be to sustain the observatory as the major research instrument and to make
asteroid studies the predominant area of research.
The NSF sent the NAIC upgrade proposals out for review. The reviews aided the NSF
in prioritizing its spending. Where the project stood within thc" NSF's own priority list of
projects also was subject to input from the Division of Astrommly, primarily, and fiom the
36. Ostro, "Benefits of an Upgraded Arecibo," pp. 233-239; Campbell, "P1ospects for Radar
Observations of Comets and the Terrestrial Planets," in Taylor and Davis, pp. 243-248: Shapiro, "Radar Tests of
Gravitational Theories and Other Exotica," in ibid., pp. 225-232.
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Division of Atmospheric Sciences. Within NASA, the planetary program decided funding
priorities. In 1988, following the Cornell workshop, the NAIC submitted the main pro-
posal for the Gregorian system and radar transmitter. Numerous discussions, presenta-
tions, committee meetings, and reviews followed. Also providing input was the Bahcall
Committee, the successor to the Whifford Panel. _7
The Bahcall Committee, named for its chair John N. Bahcall, Princeton Institute for
Advanced Study, and formally known as the Astronomy and Astrophysics Survey
Committee, was a group of 15 astronomers and astrophysicists commissioned in 1989 by
the National Academy of Sciences to survey their fields and to recommend new ground
and space programs for the coming decade. To carry out the actual work, the Committee
established 15 advisory panels to represent different subdisciplines, and those panels sub-
mitted their reports in June and July 1990Y
Radar astronomy came under the general umbrella of the Planetary Astronomy
Panel, chaired by David Morrison, NASA Ames Research Center, chair, and Donald
Hunten, University of Arizona, vice chair. Among the 22 planetary scientists constituting
the panel was one radar astronomer, Steve Ostro. The Planetary Astronomy Panel recom-
mended several facilities as "critically important" for planetary astronomy in the 1990s.
Prioritized according to their cost (small, medium, large) within the categories "space-
based" and "ground-based," the most important small ground facility for planetary astron-
omy was the Arecibo upgrade. -_9
The upgrade was never regarded as a huge project. The total estimated price tag of
the upgrade, around $23 million spread out over four years, placed it in the "small" cate-
gory; even the medium-sized proposed facilities cost substantially more. The relatively
small total amotmt underwent further diminution in such a way that the project was never
big enough to be a separate line item within the budget of the Office of Management and
Budget. Both NASA and the NSF split the total cost, which underwent further division
within each agency, so that the total amonnt per year was never a huge sum for each agen-
cy or for each agency program.
Geoff Briggs, director of the Division of Solar System Exploration within the NASA
Office of Space Science, chaired discussions about the project with the NAIC, NASA, and
the NSF. According to Don Campbell, "Briggs somewhat arbitrarilyjust took it on himself
to break tip who was going to pay for what right there. ''40
The allocation of the costs of what was already considered a small, low-cost project
was a strategy in tune with the budgetary times. NASA would pay 100 percent of the
ground screen and the one-megawatt radar transmitter costs, but the money came from
the budgets of three different divisions. The Division of Solar System Exploration paid for
the ground screen; the Office of Space Communications paid for the transmitter; and the
Division of Biological Sciences, the source of SETI (Search for Extra-Terrestrial
Intelligence) funding, contributed partially to the Gregorian reflector. The NSF paid for
the remainder, with the Division of Astronomical Sciences paying for some specific equip-
ment. The distribution of individual program contributions split the cost evenly between
the two agencies and became the basis for the memorandum of understanding between
NASA and the NSF that covered the upgrade. 41
37. Campbell 9 December 1993: Kildal, Baker, and tlagfors, p. 715.
38. John Bahcall, "Preface," in National Research Council, 77_e l)e_ade o/ Discover) in A_tronomy and
A_tr,phy_ic_ (Washington: National Academy Press, 1991), pp, ix-xi,
39. Nalional Research Coumil. _}wkinl,_ Pap_: A_tronomy and A_tr_qdlysic._ Panel Rqmrt_ (Washington:
Na|ional Academy Press, 1991 ), pp. X- I-X-20.
40. Campbell 9 December 1993.
41. Dickman 2 December 1992: Camp|xql 9 December 1993.
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Titan
The Arecibo upgrade, when completed, promises entirely new research capabilities
that will open up a new set of targets to be explored and new problems to be solved.
Another upgrade, though not intended to provide new radar capability, created a research
instrument that never existed before. That was the Voyager upgrade. It involved improve-
ment of the GSSR, as well as the Very Large Array (VIA), a radio telescope located in New
Mexico. For the VIA upgrade, NASA installed low-noise X-band receivers on each of the
27 VLA antennas. When radar astronomers linked the Goldstone radar and the VIA in a
bistatic mode, they created a radar with an extraordinary capacity for exploring the solar
system.
The upgrade of the VLA for the Voyager mission originated in the need to commu-
nicate with the spacecraft at unprecedented distances. During Voyager's encounter with
Neptune, its X-band radio signal would be less than one-tenth as strong as from Jupiter
and less than one-half as strong as from Uranus. In addition to the enlargement of the
DSN 64-meter antennas to 70 meters in diameter, the Neptune encounter required assis-
tance from the Parkes telescope in Australia and the VIA. Through the radio astronomy
technique of arraying, and the installation of low-noise receivers on each VIA dish, the
echoes received from the VI_ were combined with those received at the Goldstone
70-meter and 34-meter dishes to provide a data rate more than double that which would
have been available with Goldstone's antennas aloneA_
The idea of using the VI_A as a receiver in a bistatic radar system was not new; Ed
Lilley had suggested some two decades earlier a bistatic radar consisting of the VI_ and
the NEROC transmitter for carrying out planetary radar mappingA ,_ Moreover, the VIA
management already had thought of the possibility of a Goldstone-VI_ bistatic radar years
earlier, when they were looking for a broader foundation of support for a facility strictly
dedicated to radio astronomy. They, therefore, were receptive to the suggestion of Nick
Renzetti (JPL) that joint Goldstone-VI.A radar experiments be conducted, provided the
proposed experiments first would undergo the normal review process. 44
As the Goldstone and VLA upgrades were underway, Caltech professor Dewey
Muhleman became interested in the possibilities opened up by a Goldstone-Vl_A bistatic
radar. After abandoning a career in radar astronomy in 1966 as professor of planetary sci-
ence at Caltech, Muhleman switched to the study of radio emissions from the planets.
Muhleman thought the Goldstone-Vl_A radar an excellent tool for exploring Saturn's
barely explored and poorly understood moon, Titan. Scientists knew nothing about
Titan's surface, because like the surface of Venus, it is hidden by an opaque cloud cover. 45
Despite, or perhaps because of, this lack of knowledge, scientists speculated on the
nature of the satellite's surface. According to conventional wisdom, Titan's surface was an
ocean of ethane and methane, which would have almost no reflecting surface at radar
wavelengths. 46 In 1980, Voyager 1 flew past Titan and provided fresh facts about the
moon's surface temperature (about 94 ° Kelvin) and surface pressure (around 1,500 mil-
libars). Voyager found an atmosphere composed mainly of nitrogen and trace amounts of
42. Murray to Morton S. Roberts, 25 February 1982, "Chron 1982 #1," and Memorandum, Associate
Administrator for Space Tracking and Data Systems to Deputy Director, JPL, 28 February 1983, "NASA
Correspondence, 1983, pt. #1,"JPLPLC;JPL Annual Report, 1984, p. 13, and ibid., 1987, p. 41,JPLA.
43. Memorandum, Lilley to CAMROC Project Office Members, 14June 1966, 18/I/AC 135, M1TA.
44. Renzetti 17 April 1992.
45. Muhleman 8 April 1993.
46. The ethane-methane ocean model of Titan was developed by Jonathan I. Lunine, David J.
Stevenson, and Yuk L. Yung. See, for example, Lunine, Stevenson, and Yung, "Ethane Ocean on Titan," Science
222 (1983): 1229-1230.
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hydrocarbons and nitriles, including ethane, methane, and acetylene. But Voyager
revealed nothing about the moon's surface featuresA 7
Titan's surface remained hidden from the view of radar astronomers, too. In
February 1979, using the Arecibo S-band radar, Don Campbell, Gordon PettengiU, and
Steve Ostro unsuccessfully attempted to detect Titan. Later, in 1987 and 1992, Dick
Goldstein and RayJurgens also failed to receive echoes from Titan using the Goldstone
Mars Station alone. 48 The bistatic Goldstone-VLA radar, however, promised an extra
measure of sensitivity.
Muhleman hoped to find land masses and challenge the ethane ocean model. He
already had conducted a radio study of Titan, but that research had yielded ambiguous
results. Muhleman teamed up with JPL radar astronomer Marty Slade, who oversaw oper-
ation of the Goldstone half of the bistatic radar. Muhleman's graduate students, Bryan
Buffer and Arie Grossman, participated in the experiments, too. In order to test the sys-
tem, Muhleman, Slade, and Butler attempted a known target, the rings of Saturn, in the
spring of 1988. The success encouraged them to attempt Titan. 49
Muhleman, Butler, and Slade first observed Titan on the nights of 3, 4, 5, and 6June
1989 with the VIA in the so-called C configuration, in which the maximum separation
among the 27 25-meter (82-ft) telescopes was about three km. The echoes were marginal,
although those obtained on 4 June were strong, and the detection of 5 June was "quite
certain." "The data," they concluded, "appear to favor a real variation in surface proper-
ties but more observations are required. "5°
The backscatter from Titan was highly diffuse, similar to that from the Galilean
satellites of Jupiter. The diffuse hackscatter, they believed, was a strong argument against
an ethane ocean being the reflecting medium. A liquid body without floating scatterers
would be a specular not a diffuse reflector. Instead, the radar echoes from Titan suggest-
ed an icy surface similar to that of Europa, Ganymede, or Callisto. The experiment,
however, did not rule out entirely the existence of liquid hydrocarbons on Titan's surface
that might exist in the form of small lakes.
Muhleman, Slade, and Butler attempted Titan again in August 1992 and in the
summer of 1993. 51 From these fresh echoes, they concluded that Titan does not always
keep the same hemisphere towards Saturn, as had previously been believed. In addition,
one region very bright to the radar consistently appeared 15 hours earlier than expected,
suggesting that its rotational period was 49 minutes shorter than its orbital period of
15.945 Earth days.
More importantly, variations in radar reflectivity gave the first indications of surface
conditions on Titan. Results from instruments on the Voyager spacecraft in the 1980s
suggested that there might be a global ocean of liquid ethane. However, Muhleman,
Slade, and Butler reported that only a few patches of liquid will be found by the European-
built Huygens probe scheduled to land on Titan early in the next century after a journey
47. Muhleman, Arie W. Grossman, Bryan J. Butler, and Slade, "Radar Reflectivity of Titan," Sclenee 248
( 1990): 975-980.
48. NAIC QR Q1/1979, 9; Campbell 8 December 1993; Goldstein and Jurgens, "DSN Observations of
Titan," in Posner, ed. The Telecxnnmunications and Data Acquisition Report: Progress Report, Jan.-Mar. 1992 (Pasadena:
JPL, 1992), pp. 377-379.
49. Muhleman, G. Berge, and D. Rudy, "Microwave Emission from Titan and the Galilean Satellites,"
Bulk.tin of the Amencan Astronomical Society 16 (1984) : 686; JPL Annual Report, 1988, p. 29, JPLA.
50. Muhleman, Grossman, Butler, and Slade, "Radar Reflectivity of Titan," Scitmce 248 (1990): 975-980,
quote on p. 979.
51. Muhleman, Grossman, Slade, and Butler, "Titan's Radar Reflectivity and Rotation," Bulletin of the
American Astronomical Soc/ety 25 (1993): 1099; Butler, Muhleman, and Slade, "Results from 1992 and 1993
VLA/Goldstone 3.5 cm Radar Results," ibid., p. 1040; GSSR Min. 19 February 1993.
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aboard the Cassini spacecraft. The moon's surface seems to be covered mainly by icy
continents, perhaps coated in tars of hydrocarbons.
The results of Muhleman's radar research on Titan were of enormous interest to
Dennis L. Matson, Cassini project scientist, and others involved in the planning of the
Cassini mission. In 1989, NASA was preparing the Cassini Announcement of Opportunity
for release on 1 December 1989. A major experiment on Cassini, as then planned, was a
radar instrument to be built byJPL. The nature of Titan's surface was a major parameter
in the design of any radar system for the Cassini mission.
If an ocean of ethane and methane really covered Titan, the radar would have to be
designed to anticipate the special scattering conditions that such a surface would create.
The Goldstone-VLA radar data, then, would be useful in targeting the Huygens probe,
and the targeting decisions had to he made before the launch of the Cassini spacecraft
itself. _2 As Nick Renzetti characterized the situation: "So why put a $20 million radar on
Cassini and get zilch? That really stirred the community for the last three years. ''_,s
The Polar Ice Caps of Mars
The radar results from Titan were revealing but puzzling. The radar study of Titan
also highlighted the continuing mission-oriented nature of radar astronomy. The same
was true of Mars radar research. Although Muhleman intended to use the Goidstone-VI,A
bistatic radar primarily to study Titan, equally startling results came from its application
to Mercury and Mars. The Goldstone-VLA system allowed radar astronomers to solve
problems previously unsolved or solved unsatisfactorily. The Goldstone-VLA work added
to a long tradition of studying Mars topography that began, as we saw in an earlier chap-
ter, before Viking went to Mars, and continued in support of the Viking mission. Most of
the Mars radar topography work done in the 1970s, in fact, related directly to Viking.
The exploration of Martian topography and radar reflectivity from the 1970s into the
1980s had yielded some rather interesting results. The studies done for Viking had
revealed high roughness (large rms slopes) and sharp roughness transitions in the area
around the Tharsis volcanoes and their associated lava flows. Tharsis itself was found to
have a low overall reflectivity. The most unusual and controversial development was the
claim by Stan Zisk and Peter Mouginis-Mark, from their analysis of Goldstone Mars data
from 1971 and 1973, that the Solis Lacus region showed seasonal variations in its radar
reflectivity which might indicate the presence of near-surface liquid water. 54
The Tharsis and Syrtis Major regions were of special radar interest. Syrtis Major was
a classical radar dark spot on Mars. From topographical data, George Downs showed that
the Tharsis bulge was lower than originally thought. Geologists used the radar data to
show that Tharsis had been tectonically inactive since the occurrence of the last major lava
flows. Topographical data tbr the south Tharsis region suggested that it was an ancient
impact basin. Interpretation of the radar studies of I)owns and Simpson (at Arecibo) of
the Syrtis Major area by USGS geologist Gerry Schaber indicated 01at it was a low-relief
52. Muhleman to W. E. Giberson, I0 February 1989, and Memorandum, D. L. Matson to Dumas,
8January 1991, Renzetti materials.
53. Renzetti 17 April 1992.
54. Harmon, "Radar Observations of Mars and Mercury: Histony and Progress," paper read at the
Thirtieth Anniversary Celebration of Planetary Radar Astronomy, 3 October 1991, Caltech; Zisk and P.J.
Mouginis-Mark, "Anomalous Region on Mars: Implications for Near-Surface Liquid Water," Nature 288 (1980):
735-738. See also Aaron P. Zent, Fraser P. Fanale, and Roth, "Possible Max tian Brines: Radar Observations and
Models,"Jtmrnal _?[Gegrphy_ical ICe,earth vol. 95, no. B9 (1990): 14,531-14,542.
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shield volcano, rather than the impact basin it had always been believed to be, because it
was not very heavily cratered. 55
.John Harmon arrived shortly after the installation of the Arecibo S-band radar as a
Research Associate, after graduating from the University of California at San Diego with a
doctoral thesis on solar winds. John Harmon began a series of studies of Mars topography
and scattering, initially under the direction of Don Campbell, and drew the first topo-
graphic profile of Syrtis Major. Starting in February 1980, Harmon and Steve Ostro under-
took a study of Tharsis and the surrounding area using both the Arecibo S-band and the
Goldstone X-band radars and taking data in both senses of circular polarization, in order
to compare polarization ratios at both S-band and X-band.
While the initial focus in 1980 had been on the Tharsis region, the 1982 observations
took in a broader area and revealed correlations between maximum depolarization and
the volcanic regions Tharsis and Elysium, while the heavily cratered upland terrain yield-
ed relatively low depolarization. This led to the suggestion by Harmon and Ostro, and
confirmed independently by radar astronomer Tommy Thompson and USGS Menlo Park
geologist HenryJ. Moore, who used Goldstone data, that most of the strong sources of dif-
filse and depolarized backscatter on Mars were rough-surfaced lava flows. 56
Such was the state of radar studies of Martian topography and scattering, when
Muhleman, Butler, and Slade began looking at Mars with the Goldstone-VLA bistatic radar
in 1988. The proximity of Mars, in contrast to the great distance to Titan, allowed them
to construct filll-disk images of the planet. During the 1988 Mars opposition, moreover,
the Earth and Mars were closer than they had been for 17 years.
These images were not the product of radar range-Doppler techniques, but of stan-
dard VI_ radio astronomy imaging software. The array and its software avoided the prob-
lem of north-south ambiguity that typically plagued planetary range-Doppler mapping;
the VLA radio imaging software, which Muhleman regularly used in his planetary radio
astronomy research, created unambiguous images. In this bistatic imaging mode, the
Goldstone radar illuminated the target with a continuous-wave signal whose frequency was
adjusted to remove the Doppler shift. When the VLA aimed at a target, the signal came
from all over the planet, as though the target were a natural emitter of radio waves. Then
the powerful imaging software of the VLA processed these echoes.
Muhleman, Butler, and Slade observed Mars twice during the opposition of 1988 and
three times during the opposition of 1992-1993. They obtained surface resolutions of 80
km at the snhradar point. The Mars observations differed from those of Titan, because for
Mars the _q_ A array (36-kin maximum spacings) was used. The transmitted signal to
55. Downs, Mouginis-Mark, Zisk, and Thompson, "New Radar-Derived Topography for the Northern
llemisphere of Mars,".pmrnal _f Ge_hysical Re._earrh87 (1982): 9747-9754; Mouginis-Mark, Zisk, and Downs,
"Ancient and Modern Slopes in the Tharsis Region of Mars," Nature 297 (1982): 546-550; Simpson, Tyler,
Harmon, and Alan R. Peterfreund, "Radar Measurement of Small- Scale Surface Texture: Syrtis Major," Icaru._49
(1982) : 258-283; Schaber, "Syrtis Major: A Low-relief Volcanic Shield," Journal r_[Cm¢_physicalRe._earch87 (1982) :
9852-9866; Roth, Downs, Saunders, and Schubert, "Radar Altimetry of South Tharsis, Mars," Icarus 42 (1980):
287-316; R. A. Craddock, R. Greeley, and P. R. Christensen, "Evidence for an Ancient Impact Basin in Daedalia
Planmn, Mars,"Jm_rnala[Geophy._ical ICesean:h95 (1990): 10,729-10,741; Downs, R. Green, and Reichley, "Radar
Studies of the Maltian Surface at Centimeter Wavelengths: The 1975 Opposition," lcaru.g 33 (1978): 441-453;
Roth, Saunders, Downs, and Schubert, "Radar Ahimetry of Large Martian Craters," lcaru._79 (1989): 289-310.
56. Harmon 15 March 1994; tlarmon, Campbell, and Ostro, "Dual-Polarization Radar Observations of
Mars: Tharsis and Environs," Icarus 52 (1982): 171-187; Harmon and Ostro, "Mars: Dual-Polarization Radar
Observations with Extended Coverage," harus 62 ( 1985): 110-128; Thompson and HenryJ. Moore, "A Model for
Depolarized Radar Echoes from Mars," I'roceeding_of the Lunar Planetary Science Cam[eren¢e19th (1989): 409-422;
Moore and Thompson, "A Radar-Echo Model of Mars," l_roceedinl,_r?[the Lunar Planetary Science Cdrnference21
(1991): 457-472. I.ater radar mapping supported these observations: Muhleman, Butler, Grossman, Slade, and
_lurgens, "Radar Images of Mars," Science253 (1991): 1508--1513; Harmon, Michael P. Sulzer, Phillip J. Perillat,
and Chandler, "Mars Radax Mapping: Strong Backscatter from the Elysium Basin and Outflow Channel," Icarus
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Mars was circularly polarized and both opposite circular and same circular echoes were
received and mapped. As anticipated, the opposite circular echoes were dominated by the
so-called specular (or phase-coherent) reflections.
Muhleman and Butler found regions with anomalously high radar cross sections on
Mars, particularly around the three Tharsis volcanoes and Olympus Mons. These,
Muhleman recalled, '_just lit up like a Christmas tree." In contrast, the region west of
Tharsis, extending over 2,000 km in the East-West direction and 500 km across at its widest
point, displayed no cross section distinguishable from the noise in either polarization.
"We didn't believe that result. We've never seen that on any real surface," Muhleman
explained. 57
Muhleman dubbed the area "Stealth," because it was invisible to the radar.
Photographs do not indicate the nature of the Stealth region. Muhleman interpreted the
lack of radar echo as arising from a deposit of ash or pumice spewed from the bordering
Tharsis volcanoes and carried by winds blowing off the Tharsis ridge. He estimated that
the Stealth material would have a density of less than about 0.5 grams per cubic centime-
ter, be free of rocks larger than one centimeter across, and have a depth of at least five, if
not ten, meters.
Equally surprising was the radar signature of the residual southern polar ice cap. The
1988 observations were made in the southern hemisphere around -24 ° latitude in late
spring, so the seasonal carbon dioxide ice cap had sublimated away and exposed the resid-
ual southern polar ice cap. That area had the highest radar cross section of any other area
observed on the planet in 1988. Furthermore, the residual ice cap exhibited strong
circular polarization inversion. Thus, unexpectedly, part of one of the terrestrial planets
displayed radar characteristics more typical of the Galilean satellites.
When Muhleman, Butler, and Siade looked at the VIA images, they "instantly saw
that the brightest thing on the planet was the South pole, which turned out to be the
residual South polar ice cap," Muhleman recalled. 'q'he amazing thing to us was that this
ice was so reflecting, so bright, and its size was exactly the residual polar cap. ''58 Also
amazing was the fact that Dick Simpson and Len Tyler had failed to notice any unusual
scattering properties from the North pole in data from a bistatic radar experiment
conducted from the Viking spacecraft. 59
Butler, Muhleman, and Siade again looked at Mars with the Goldstone-VLA radar
during the 1992-1993 opposition, when the planet's North pole was visible from Earth. It
was early northern spring on Mars, and much of the seasonal carbon dioxide polar ice cap
was present. They were anxious to study the northern polar ice cap, but the ice was invis-
ible to the radar. In stark contrast to the southern pole, no regions with enhanced radar
cross sections appeared. '"eVe still haven't figured that out," Muhleman admitted. "It's
totally a mystery why we didn't find the residual North polar ice cap. "_
The high radar cross section and polarization inversion of the Martian South polar
ice cap were confirmed by observations made at the Arecibo Observatory during the 1988
opposition by John Harmon, Marty Slade, and R. Scott Hudson. Hudson was a Caltech
graduate student working on a doctoral degree in electrical engineering and had chosen
aircraft radar imaging as his dissertation topic. Like those made by Harmon and Ostro in
57. Muhleman 27 May 1994.
58. Muhleman 27 May 1994.
59. Muhleman 27 May 1994; Slade 24 May 1994; Muhleman, Butler, Grossman, and Slade, "Radar
Images of Mars." Scienc_ 253 (1991): 1508--1513; Butler, "3.5-cm Radar Investigation of Mars and Mercury:
Planetological Implications," Ph.D. diss., California Institute of Technology, 9 May 1994; Simpson and Tyler,
"Viking Bistatic Radar Experiment: Summary of First-Order Results Emphasizing North Polar Data," Icarus 46
(1981): 361-389.
60. Muhleman 27 May 1994; Butler, "3.5-cm Radar Investigation;" Butler, Muhleman, and Slade,
"Martian Polar Regions: 3.5 cm Radar Images," Lunar and Planetary _ct (_mferenc_25 (1994) : 2i 1-212; Butler.
Muhleman, and Slade, "I'he Polar Regions of Mars: 3.5 cm Radar Images," Icarus submitted in May 1994.
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1980and1982,theseweremonostatic,dual-polarizationcontinuous-waveobservations
madewiththeAreciboS-bandandtheGoldstoneX-bandradars.
Afterobtainingpromisingresultsfromacomparisonfthe1988dataatbothwave-
lengths,anadditionalsetofobservationsweremadeatS-bandandX-band uringthe
1990opposition.Despiteschedulingdifficultiesandthedemandsofcompetingtypesof
radarobservations(rangingobservationsforaltimetryandmappingwerealsomadeat
the twofacilities),a goodcontinuous-wavedatasetfor S/X-bandcomparisonwas
obtainedin 1990.
TheArecibodataconfirmedtheexistenceofStealth.Usinganalgorithmdeveloped
byScottHudsonandtheDopplerspectratakenin theunexpectedsenseofpolarization,
theyproducedepolarizedreflectivitymapsthatshowedclearlytheanomalouslyhigh
radareflectivityandpolarizationi versionoftheresidualSouthpolaricecap.Hudson's
algorithmallowedtheinvestigatorstouseonlyDopplerspectra,withoutrangemeasure-
ments,to createatwo-dimensionalm pof theMartiandisklargelyfreeof north-south
ambiguity._l
Hudson'simagingtechniquewasnecessaryinordertoovercometheplanet'sover-
spreadnature.In comparisontoVenus,Marsrotatesrapidlyonitsaxisandcausesradar
echoesfromthelimb(beyondthesubradararea)todispersebroadly.Theechodelay
correspondingtotheradiusofMarsis22.6microseconds,whichismuchgreaterthanthe
maximumintervalof0.725microsecondsneededtopreservecompletespectralinforma-
tionoverthebandof frequenciespresentin theecho.Asaresult,whenthecomputer
samplesignals,echoesfromdifferentrangescontaminateeachotherandbecome
indistinguishable.Suchradartargetsarecalled"overspread."
Areciboscientistsalsohadatechniqueforovercomingtheoverspreadproblem,but
theywerenotmotivatedto applyit until theGoldstone-VLAresultsbecameknown.
Harmonexplained:"DeweyMuhleman,withhisVIAexperiment,spurreduson totry
anddobetter.| reallyhadn'tbeenthinkingaboutheoverspreadingproblem.I probably
shouldhave;I shouldhavebeentryingtofigureoutwaystogetaroundit.''62
Overspreadingwasaproblemthationospherics ientistshadbeendealingwithfor
years,becausetheionosphereisanextremelyoverspreadtarget.MichaelE Sulzer,an
ionosphericistat heAreciboObservatory,solvedtheproblemfortheionospherebyusing
non-repeatingcodes.AlthoughDonCampbellatonetimehadaskedSulzerto think
aboutapplyingthetechniqueto Mars,noprogresshadbeenmadeuntilHarmontold
Sulzerhewasinterestedin tryingthenon-repeatingcodetechnique.
HarmonthenworkedwithSulzerandPhilPerillat,whowrotethemodifieddata-
takingprogram.Normally,whenacontinuous-waveradarsendsoutasignal,thesignal
carriesacodewithafinitenumberofelements,andthecoderepeatsataregularinter-
val.HarmonandSulzertestedthenon-repeatingcode,calledalterna,elythe"random
code"or"codedlongpulse"technique,andit workedthefirsttime.ThenHarmonwrote
programstodothedataanalysis.
HarmonandSulzermadetheirfirstrandom-codeobservationson18nightsduring
theMarsoppositionof September-December1990andcreatedrange-Dopplermaps.
Thosemaps,likeallrange-Dopplermaps,includedanorth-southambiguityaroundthe
Dopplerequator.However,f omeyeballcomparisonswithmapsobtainedearlyandlate
in theopposition,Harmonwasabletoresolvemuchoftheambiguity.
61. lludson, telephone conversation, 21 November 1994; Hudson and Ostro, "Doppler-Radar Imaging
of Sphelical Planetary Surfaces,".]_mrnal o[Ge¢rphy._ical Research 95 (1990): 10,947-10,963; Harmon, Slade, and
Hudson, "Mars Radar Scattering: Arecibo/Goldstone Results at 12.6- and 3.5-cm Wavelengths," lcaru._98 ( 1992):
240-253.
62. Harmon 15 March 1994.
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The random<ode maps confirmed the observations made with the Goldstone-VI.A
radar and revealed new information about the Elysium region, which Harmon had spent
a long time studying in previous observations of Mars. Through those and subsequent
observations made during the 1992-1993 opposition, he discovered strong depolarized
radar echoes from the Elysium/Amazonis outflow channel complex. He interpreted the
region, which was very young by Martian standards, as having lava flows that appeared to
have partially filled pre-existing channels cut by flowing water. _-_
Mercury: Baked Alaska?
The strange radar signature exhibited by the southern residual polar ice cap of Mars,
reminiscent of the radar characteristics of the icy Galilean satellites of Jupiter, did not pre-
pare Muhleman, Butler, and Slade for the surprising discovery of ice on Mercury. Mercury
was simply too hot to support even the smallest ice deposit. Previous radar observations of
Mercury had focused on scattering and topography and had not detected ice.
Analysis of Mercury data taken between 1963 and 1965 at Goldstone, Haystack, and
Arecibo showed the planet to have a radar roughness 'Seery similar" to that of the Moon.
Dick Goldstein, from radar observations of Mercury made in 1969, started characterizing
Mercury's topography. His work was the most detailed radar study of Mercury's surface
prior to the Mariner 10 encounters and provided the first strong evidence for the exis-
tence of craters on the surface. Dick Ingalls at Haystack and Don Campbell at Arecibo also
found altitude variations on Mercury's surface from 1971 observations. Some of the ear-
liest topographic radar studies of Mercury were carried out at Haystack by Bill Smith and
Dick Ingalls. 64
These early radar studies of Mercury were not linked to any specific NASA mission,
but not because of any radar shortcomings. NASA made no meaningful effort to study
Mercury until Mariner 10 flew by and photographed that planet in 1974-1975. The
Mariner 10 photographs revealed a heavily cratered, lunar-like surface, as predicted by
radar. Although Mariner 10 photographed over half of Mercury's surface during its flyby
mission, it did not photograph any of the side not then exposed to the Sun's light and
yielded only limited topographic information. Moreover, its flyby geometry prevented
Mariner 10 from examining either pole directly. 65
These gaps in Mercury coverage motivated a program of observations at Arecibo and
Goldstone. John Harmon and Don Campbell, working in collaboration with Brown
University geologists D. L. Bindschadler and James W. Head, carried out a campaign of
63. Harmon 15 March 1994; NAIC QR Q2/1990, 7; Q4/1990, 7-8; and Q1/1991, 7; Q1/1993, 9;
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S-bandradarobservationsof blercury at Arecibo fiom 1978 to 1984. They measured
Mercury's topography over much of tile equatorial zone (between 12 ° North and 5 ° South
latitude), an area not imaged by Mariner 10, and concluded tbat radar depths for large
craters supported previous indications from photographs that Mercury's craters were shal-
lower than hmar craters of the same size. _+ At the same time, Ray Jurgens, using the
Goldstone S-band radar, started an ongoing series of Mercury observations to study the
planet's topography and to correlate radar measurements with Mariner 10 visual images,
in collaboration with geologists Gerald G. Schaber (USGS Flagstaff) and P. E. Clark
(II,L) .67
Such was the state of radar research on Mercury, when Muhleman, Butler, and Slade
began their observations with the Goldstone-\qA bistatic radar during the inferior con-
junction of August 1991. Although they made fitrther observations during the inferior
conjnnctions of November 1992 and February 1994, the 1992 effort failed because of
transntitter problems, and the 1994 data yet remains to be reduced? +s The key results,
then, were those from the 1991 observations. The}' did notbing less titan revolutionize our
knowledge of Mercury in a way that radar had not done since the discovery of the plan-
et's 59-<1ay spin rate by radar astronomers Gordon Pettengill and Rolf Dyce in 1965.
During the first Goldstone-VLa. observation of Mercury on 8 Angnst 1991, Ray
Jurgens coordinated activities at the Goldstone X-band transmitter, while Marty Slade and
Bryan Butler awaited the echoes at tim VLA, which was operating in the so-called A array,
the most widely spaced configuration. During the 10 hours of observation, the VIA
received in both senses of circular polarization. At the time of these observations, Mercury
was at inferior conjunction and presented the hemisphere not photographed by Mariner
10, roughly between 180 ° to 360 °, to the radar. As a result, the subradar point was far
enough North to see over the North pole anti into areas believed to be permanently shad-
owed from the Sun.
When Mubleman, Butler, and Slade looked at their results, they were astonished;
they had found ice near Mercury's North pole. What signalled the presence of ice was the
abnormal radar signature of the spot, which was unusually bright and sbowed a ratio of
same circular to opposite circular polarization greater than unity, that is, a circular polar-
ization inversion. This was the same type of radar signature displayed by Jupiter's Galilean
moons. Muhleman recalled: "We instantly looked at tim first image and saw this white spot
on the North pole. We said, 'My God! Are we going to find an ice cap on every planet we
look at?' This is crazy!" Marly Slade remembered looking at the bright spot and reacting:
"It's not possible that could be ice! It's too hot! ''_9
Mvhleman, Butler, and Slade again observed Mercury with the Goldstone-VLA radar
two weeks later on 23 August 1991. This time, they transmitted both right-banded (RCP)
and left-handed circular (LCP) polarization, and they received in both senses of polariza-
tion for either sense, so that they could make all four correlations of the two polarizations
(RCI' to I.CP, RCP to RCP, LCP to RCP, and LCP to LCP). Mercury as seen from Earth had
rotated 101 °. The subradar point was around 353 ° and the ice near the northern polar
66. t tarmon, Campbell, Bindschadler, ttead, and Shapiro, "Radar Altimetry of Mercury: A Preliminary
Anal)'sis," ]ournal o/(;eophy_it al lfe_eanh 91 (1986) : 385_01_
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region still stood out brightly and exhibited polarization inversion. The researchers now
knew that this was no fluke. 7°
Surprised by their own results, Muhleman, Slade, and Butler announced their results
in two separate talks given on 6 November 1991 at the meeting of the AAS Division for
Planetary Science, held in Palo Alto, California. 71 The scientific community greeted the
news of their discovery with a fair amount of skepticism. 72 Prior to the launch of Mariner
10, few had suggested the presence of ice on Mercury, and then for the wrong reasons.
Some drawings of Mercury showed a white spot visible at the northern pole, and in 1974,
on the eve of Mariner 10's first reconnaissance of Mercury, an atmospheric scientist had
proposed that ice could have accumulated in the small planet's polar regions, perhaps in
permanently shaded regions. 73
The evidence for the presence of ice near Mercury's northern pole was based on an
analogy between the radar signatures of known icy targets, the Galilean moons of Jupiter,
and those found on Mercury. But more convincing evidence was needed, because Mariner
10 had documented that planet's intense surface heat. The landscape was a parched
wasteland of impact craters and volcanic plains, where midday temperatures soared to
700 ° K, hot enough to melt lead. At the same time, though, Mariner 10's ultraviolet
spectrometer had identified traces of hydrogen and oxygen in the tenuous atmosphere of
Mercury. Project scientists had considered them to be remnants of the comets and aster-
oids that periodically collide with the planet. 74
While such collisions would explain the existence of water on Mercury, an explana-
tion for the existence of a permanent water ice deposit on the planet came from a
consideration of the geometry of Mercury's orbit. An impact crater could provide an area
of permanent shade, provided that the geometry was just right. Mercury spins on its axis
and rotates around the Sun in such a way that its equator always lies in the same plane as
the Sun. As a result, neither pole ever sees more than a sliver of the Sun's disk above the
horizon. On the other hand, the plane of Mercury's orbit about the Sun is inclined by
seven degrees relative to that of the Earth, so that Earth-based radars can see into impact
craters that are never directly illuminated by the Sun.
David A. Paige and Stephen Wood of UCLA recomputed the thermal environment
for Mercury's surface and concluded that the interior slopes of impact craters within five
degrees of the poles would be cold enough to keep the loss of water ice through subli-
mation at essentially zero. Other planetary scientists also began to argue for the existence
of ice in craters on Mercury, and they suggested that craters on the Moon might also
contain ice. As early as 1961, Kenneth Watson, Bruce C. Murray, and Harrison Brown had
proposed that ice might exist in permanently shadowed craters near the lunar poles, but
70. Slade, Butler, Muhleman, "Mercury Radar Imaging: Evidence for Polar Ice," Science 958 (23 October
1992): 635---640; Butler, Muhleman, and Slade, "Mercury: Fun-Disk Radar Images and the Detection and Stability
of Ice at the North Pole," Journal of(_hysical Re.search vol. 98, no. E8 (1993): 15,003-15,023.
71. Slate, Butler, and Muhleman, _Mercury Goldstone-VLA Radar: Part I," Bulletin of the Amencan
Astr*nu_mical .Society 23 ( 1991 ): 1197, and Butler, Muhleman, Slade, andJurgens, "Mercury Goldstone-VIA Radar:
Part 11," Ibid., p. 1200.
72. David A. Paige, _Chance for Snowballs in Hell," Nature 369 (1994): 182; Chapman, "Ice Right
Under the Sun," Nature 354 (1991): 504-505; J. Kelley Beatty, "Mercury's Cool Surprise," .Sky & Telescope 83
(January 1992): 35-36.
73. Richard Baum, "Radar Bright, Ice Bright: V. A. Firsoff and Ice Caps on Mercury,"Journal of the British
Astronomical A.gsociation 103 (1993): 126 and 139; Firsoff, "Could Mercury have Ice Caps?" The Observatory 91
(1971): 85--87; and G. E. Hunt, "q'here is no Evidence for Ice Caps on Mercury," The Observatory 92 (1972): 16;
Beatty, "Mercury's Cool Surprise," Sky & Telescope 83 (1992): 35-36; Gary E. Thomas, "Mercury: Does its
Atmosphere Contain Water?" Sc/ence 183 (1974) : 1197-1198.
74. Beatty, p. 36; Chapman, "Ice," p. 505; Chapman, Planets of Roc.k and Ice: Fr*rm Mercury to the Moortt of
Saturn (New York: Scribner, 1982); arid Faith Vilas, Chapman, and Matthews, eds., Mercury (Tucson: University
of Arizona Press, 1988).
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to date no lunar probe, not even the Clementine orbiter, has found any ice on the
Moon. 75 A radar search at Arecibo also proved unsuccessful.
Nick Stacy, a graduate student working on a thesis in radar astronomy under Don
Campbell, looked for ice on the Moon with the Arecibo radar. Earlier, starting in 1982,
Don Campbell and Peter Ford had carried out high-resolution range-Doppler imaging of
the Moon and found no evidence of ice, but they were not looking for it. Ford and
Campbell brought the resolution of their images down from 300 to 150 meters, using the
Higuillales antenna in a bistatic mode with the big dish. Stacy reduced the resolution to
20 meters and aimed at the lunar poles. Unfortunately, the radar could not see far enough
into the polar craters and detected no ice, though Stacy found some unusual scattering
properties _'ound a number of lunar cratersY 6
Although the discovery of lunar crater ice remained elusive, John Harmon and
Marty Slade at the Arecibo Observatory confirmed the existence of ice on Mercury. They
imaged Mercury using the non-repeating code technique developed by Harmon and
Mike Sulzer in order to overcome overspreading on Mars. These Arecibo images, accord-
ing to David Paige, left "little room for doubt" about the presence of ice on Mercury. 77
Soon after observing Mercury on 8 August 1991 with the Goldstone-VLA radar,
Marty Slade travelled to the Arecibo Observatory to collaborate with Harmon on a dif-
ferent set of Mercury observations. They acquired their initial data prior to 8 August 1991,
on 28 separate dates during the periods 28 March to 21 April 1991, 31 July to 29 August
1991, and 14 to 29 March 1992. During the spring 1991 observations, the subradar point
of the Arecibo telescope subtended an area in the southern hemisphere of Mercury, while
the summer 1991 observations covered a portion of the northern hemisphere, as the
Goldstone-VLA had. The March 1992 data added to that already observed in the southern
hemisphere.
When Slade arrived at Arecibo, his first time at the observatory, Harmon had not yet
analyzed the spring 1991 data; he had been too busy studying Mars data. Slade suggested
to Harmon that they analyze the Mercury data and look for the icy radar signature near
the North pole, which he, Muhleman, and Buffer had just found with the Goldstone-VLA
radar. According to Harmon, Siade said, "We think it's the pole; we're not sure." The
Arecibo data confirmed the Goldstone-VI..A discovery. There was no question of priority;
Muhleman, Butler, and Slade discovered the ice on Mercury first, with the Goldstone-VLA
radar.
Harmon also examined the data collected from the southern hemisphere of
Mercury in March-April 1991. "I saw a feature coming from what I figured probably had
to be the South pole, because the latitude was about five degrees South [sic]," Harmon
related. "I was pretty convinced it was coming from the South. ''Ts To confirm that the
South pole was the source of the icy radar signature and not an artefact of north-south
ambiguity, which would have shown a portion of the northern polar echo at the South
pole, Harmon and Slade observed Mercury again in March 1992, when the subradar point
was again in the southern hemisphere. The polar ice feature was seen again, confirming
the presence of ice at the planet's South pole. 79
75. Simpson 10 May 1994; Paige, Stephen E. Wood, and Ashwin R. Vaasavada, "The Thermal Stability of
Water Ice at the Poles of Mercury," Sc/ence 258 (1992): 643---646; Andrew P. Ingersoll, Tomas Svitek, and Murray,
"Stability of Polar Frosts in Spherical Bowl-Shaped Craters on the Moon, Mercury, and Mars," Icarus 100 (1992) :
40-47; Kenneth Watson, Murray, and Harrison Brown, '*The Behavior of Volafiles on the Lunar Surface,"Journal
of(_ophysical Re.watch 66 ( 1961): 3033-3045.
76. Ford 3 October 1994; Campbell 10 March 1993; Campbell 8 December 1993; Stacy, _High-
Resolution Synthetic Aperture Radar Observations of the Moon," Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, May 1993.
77. Paige, "Chance for Snowballs in Hell," Nature369 (1994): 182.
78. Harmon 15 March 1994.
79. Harmon 15 March 1994; Harmon and Slade, "Radar Mapping of Mercury: Full- Disk Images and
Polar Anomalies," Scu, n,_. 258 ( 1992): 640--642; Harmon and Slade, "An S-band Radar Anomaly at the North Pole
of Mercury," Bullttin _?f the Amenca n A._trcrntnnical .%Jciety 23 ( 1991 ) : 112 I.
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Next, Harmon and Slade proceeded to fit the radar results to photographic data
from Mariner 10. Showing a correlation between a known crater and the radar ice would
be persuasive confirmation of the discovery. Matching the northern polar radar ice loca-
tion with a crater was hard; no Mariner 10 photographs were available for the entire
region. Furthermore, the North polar radar anomaly was too large to fit within a single
crater. The image, instead, appeared to consist of a number of crater-size (15-60 km in
diameter) bright spots. Harmon and Slade plotted those features on a locating map cre-
ated by NASA and the USGS and assigned letter !abels to those features that lay in the pho-
tographed hemisphere and to three prominent features in the unphotographed hemi-
sphere. Many of the radar spots (8 out of 20) appeared to correspond to impact craters.
Correlating the southern polar radar image with topography was simpler. The radar spot
was entirely inside a crater called Chat Meng-Fu. s°
The Goldstone-VLA and Arecibo images of Merct,ry once again highlighted how
planetary radar astronomy often solves problems left unsolved or unsatisfactorily solved by
optical techniques. The discovery of ice near Mercury's North and South poles, moreover,
has inspired the European Space Agency to mount a major "keystone" mission to Mercury
in search of polar ice, as well as a more modest-sized NASA Discovery flight. 8j
Radar astronomers also sought signs of anomalous radar signatures on other terres-
trial planets. Muhleman, Butler, and Slade turned the Goldstone-VLA radar on Venus
twice, 18 and 25 February 1990, receiving both senses of polarization in order to detect
any peculiar polarization inversion, and made two maps. The maps had several striking
features. Surprisingly, Alpha Regio had a high unexpected (depolarized or SC) reflectivi-
ty on both maps and conulined the second highest retlectivity values after Maxwell. On
the second day's map, the point of highest reflectivity was in the Aphrodite region and was
not visible in the previous map. On both maps, many very small areas, only a few pixels
across, also had large unexpected (depolarized or SC) reflectivities, and some of them
corresponded to mapped elevated areas such as Gula Mons, sir Mons, and Bell Regio.
Muhleman, Butler, and S[ade concluded that a correlation existed between unexpected
(depolarized or SC) reflectivities and elevation. Further bistatic observations of Venus in
the spring of 1993 fnrnished fuel for another Muhleman graduate student, Albert
Haldeman, to begin doctoral research, while Slade and RaW.lurgens also found highly
reflective areas on Venus using just the Goldstone radar. _
Asteroids
Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, the number of asteroids discovered and
the number of publications dealing with asteroids grew at an unprecedented rate, at first
as a result of the Palomar Planet-Crossing Asteroid Survey studies initiated in the 1970s,
then as the number of asteroid researchers swelled. In 1932, an astronomer discovered
the first Earth-crossing asteroid, 1862 Apollo. By 1994, about 200 Earth-crossing asteroids
were known, more than half of which had been discovered in the previous seven years; yet
80. Harmon, Slade, V6lez, Andy Cfespo, M.J. Dryer, andJ. M. Johnson, "Radar Mapping of Mercury's
Polar Anomalies," Nature 369 (1994): 213-215; tlarmon and Slade, "Radar Mapping of Mercury: Full-Disk
Images and Polar Anomalies," S_eTue 258 (1992) : 640-643.
81. Muhleman 24 May 1994; Paige, "Snowballs," p. 182.
82. Slade 24 May 1994; K. A. Tryka, Muhleman, Butler, Berge, Slade, and Grossman, "Correlation of
Multiple Reflections flora the Venu_ Y,mface with Topography," Lunar l'lanetary Science 22 ( 1991): 1417;Jurgens,
Slade, and Saunders, "Evidence fol Highly Reflecting Materials on the Stir t,_ce and Subsurface of Venus," Science
240 (1988): 1021-1023; Buffer, "3 5-cm Radar Investigation," passim; Slade 24 May 1994; and information pro-
vided by Bryan J. Butler.
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the tmdiscovered population is huge. In the decade 1975-1985 alone, the total number
of catalogued asteroids rose from 2,000 to more than 3,200. _-_
The tield, as measured by the expanding literature, was undergoing the kind of swift
growth that is typical of Big Science. Asteroid astronomy became a new theoretical frame-
work with problems that radar astronomers sought to solve. Radar found its niche within
asteroid astronomy because it could solve problems that other observational techniques
could not do, namely, the creation of more accurate and reliable ephemerides and the
imaging of asteroids.
Tile focus of asteroid research was on near-Earth asteroids, although main belt
objects remained of interest, too. Near-Earth asteroids, like meteorites, are thought to
come primarily li-om mainbelt asteroids (Table 8). A large population of asteroids also
cross the orbits of Earth and Mars. The term near-Earth asteroid usually means any aster-
old that can come close to the Earth, whether or not it crosses the orbit of the Earth. Eros,
for example, crosses the orbit of Mars, but it is not an Earth-crossing asteroid and does not
come neat the Earth. ,almost all of the near-Earth asteroids detected so far by radar are
Earth-crossers.
Table 8
Asteroids Detected by Radar, 1968-1994
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83. ()stto, Campbell, and Shal)im, "Mainbelt Asteroids: Dual- Polarization Radar Observations," Science
229 ( 1985): ,1,t2,
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The more interesting near-Earth asteroids also were better radar targets than main
belt asteroids, because now and then they come closer to the Earth. With targets as small
as asteroids, some only a kilometer or two in diameter, the distance to the target is critical
to radar observations. The number of asteroids observed by radar astronomers grew
rapidly during the 1980s because of the availability of radars with sufficient power and sen-
sitivity to detect and study them. Another key factor in the growth of radar asteroid stud-
ies was the decision of one radar astronomer, Steve Ostro, to begin studying asteroids
almost exclusively. Quickly, his efforts dominated the asteroid study started at Arecibo and
Goldstone in the 1970s.
Before beginning this intense study of asteroids, Ostro had been making radar obser-
vations of the Galilean moons and the rings of Saturn. In March 1979, about the time of
Voyager's encounter with Jupiter, Ostro attended the third Tucson asteroid conference
organized by Tom Gehrels. There, Ray Jurgens and Gordon Pettengill delivered a joint
paper on radar observations of asteroids. The conference, especially the talks that placed
the science of meteoritics and asteroid science in context with each other, gave Ostro the
asteroid bug. He saw how the study of asteroids was essential to understanding the origin
and evolution of the solar system. He also realized that radar was potentially the primary
post-discovery technique for observing asteroids, and that asteroids, unlike planets and
their moons, constitute a huge and diverse population. 84
Later in 1979, his MIT dissertation completed, Ostro took a teaching position at
Cornell University and began preparing a campaign of asteroid observations at Arecibo.
The following year, he submitted his first NASA proposal for support of asteroid research.
Echoing the work ofJurgens a few years earlier, Ostro laid out those asteroid opportuni-
ties that would become available over the forthcoming decade at Arecibo, as well as the
kinds of information he expected from his experiments. As targets, Ostro proposed three
mainbelt asteroids (Iris in September 1980, Psyche in i_ovember 1980, and Vesta in
February 1981) and two Earth-crossing asteroids (1862 Apollo in November 1980 and
1915 Quetzalcoatl in March 1981). He planned to detect echoes from each target, esti-
mate echo strength, and measure polarization, spectral bandwidth, and Doppler shift.
From those four quantities, Ostro proposed to estimate asteroid size and rotation, place
constraints on the composition and structure of asteroid surfaces, and improve knowl-
edge of their orbital parameters. 85
Over the following years, the estimation of asteroid physical properties and the deter-
mination and refinement of their orbits remained fundamental aspects of Ostro's radar
studies of asteroids. He systematically took range and Doppler data on all asteroids, as well
as polarization measurements (receiving in both the expected and unexpected senses) in
order to best estimate their surface roughness and structure. From measurements of the
surface's reflectivity came estimates of the bulk density of the surface, its porosity, and rel-
ative metallic composition. With each observation, Ostro tried to contribute to scientific
knowledge about asteroids.
Ostro also studied mainbelt asteroids. "Virtually every experiment gave an interest-
ing result, and each radar signature was different," Ostro recalled. "Every single experi-
ment was lucrative. '_6 By 1992, Ostro had observed 28 near-Earth and 36 mainbelt
asteroids. Between 1980 and 1985 alone, he made dual-polarization observations of 20
mainbeh asteroids at Arecibo. These objects had low circular polarization rados (the ratio
of unexpected to expected echo power) ranging from about 0.00 to 0.40. The lowest
84. Ostro 25 May 1994; Pettengiil and Jurgens, "Radar Observations of Asteroids," in C,ehrels and
Matthews, pp. 206-211.
85. Ostro 95 May 1994; Ostro, "Radar Investigations of Asteroids," proposal submitted to NASA in June
1980 for support 1 November 1980 through 31 October 1981, Ostro materials.
86. Ostro 25 May 1994.
ONE STEP BEYOND 249
value, 0.05 + 0.02 for the asteroid 2 Pallas, required that nearly all the echo arise from
single-reflection backscattering from very smooth surface elements.
"It became clear," Ostro explained, "that the mainbelt asteroids had a dispersion of
reflectivities and polarization ratios. This was evidence for diversity in surface structure
and in surface bulk density. "s7 The data collected helped to characterize asteroid surfaces
at scales between several centimeters and several kilometers and furnished constraints on
surface bulk density and metal concentration, beyond those constraints obtained by
optical methods.
The metallic composition of the asteroids was an interesting question relating to pos-
sible meteoritic analogues. The radar observations suggested wide variations in metal
abundance, porosity, and decimeter-scale roughness on mainbelt asteroid surfaces, under-
scoring the diversity of the asteroid population already evident from visible and infrared
wavelength studies. Although the radar signatures of mainbelt asteroids required
substantial surface roughness at some scale much larger than a meter, Ostro could not dis-
cern the precise scale of this structure, much less the actual morphologies of surface
features. Similarly, the radar albedos bolstered the hypothesis that metal concentrations
on asteroids run the gamut. Serious questions remain, however, about detailed mineralo-
gies, meteoritic associations, and evolutionary histories. _
"Each of the near-Earth asteroids is interesting in its own way," Ostro pointed out,
"and still some interesting mysteries remain. "89 Echoes from the near-Earth asteroid 1986
DA showed it to be significantly more reflective than other radar-detected asteroids. This
result supported the hypothesis that 1986 DA was a piece of nickel-iron metal derived
from the interior of a much larger object that melted, differentiated, and cooled, and
subsequently was disrupted in a catastrophic collision. This two-kilometer-sized asteroid
appeared smooth at centimeter to meter scales but extremely irregular at 10- to 100-meter
scales. It might be (or have been part of) the parent body of some iron meteorites. The
composition of asteroids thus bears directly on the question of their relationship to mete-
orites, as well as the relationship between near-Earth and mainbelt asteroids. 9°
Starting in 1983, Steve Ostro began observing echo spectra with unusual shapes,
including some spectra with double peaks (called bimodal). The first asteroid to show a
bimodal spectra was 2201 Oljato, observed during 12-17June 1983 at A.recibo. Asteroid
astronomers had been discussing binary asteroids and contact-binary asteroids for a long
time, but no evidence of their existence was at hand. 216 Kleopatra, a large mainbelt aster-
oid, exhibited a strong bimodal echo spectrum. "I'hat almost definitely is a contact bina-
ry," Ostro explained. "But almost definitely is not definitely. "_l
Proof of the existence of binary and contact-binary asteroids eventually came from
radar data. 92 Finding that proof was a problem left unsolved by optical and other research
techniques. To the telescope, the biggest asteroid looks like a little dot, its shape indis-
cernible. Radar succeeded in solving that problem through the development of new imag-
ing and modeling techniques. The key to developing an appropriate technique, though,
was to avoid simplistic models. Too, it was important that the asteroid approach Earth
close enough to provide the Arecibo and Goldstone radars a sufficiently strong echo to
resolve the target.
87. Ostro 25 May 1994.
88. Ostro, Campbell, and Shapiro, "Mainbeh Asteroids: Dual- Polarization Radar Observations," Sa)rnce
229 (1985): 442_t46.
89. Ostro 25 May 1994.
90. Ostro, Campbell, Chandler, Hine, Hudson, Rosema, and Shapiro, "Asteroid 1096 DA: Radar
Evidence for a Metallic Composition," Sdenc* 252 (1991): 1399-1464.
91. Ostro 25 May 1994.
92. See, for example, the discussion in W. I. McLaughlin, "Radar Tracking of Asteroids," Spaceflight 34
(1992): 167-169.
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RayJurgensdevelopedthefirstmodellingtechniquefordescribingasteroidshapes
in the1970s.Heappliedit tospectraldatafromEros.SteveOstroappliedJurgens'triax-
ialellipsoidmodeltohis1980andearlier1972Torodataandderivedaroughdescription
oftheasteroid.93Similarly,whenheappliedJurgens'modeltotheEarth-crossingasteroid
2100Ra-Shalomin1981,Ostrofoundit tohaveasomewhatirregularshape.94
WithresearchersatCornell,Ostrodevelopedadifferentmodellingtechnique,one
thatsynthesizedchospectracquiredatdifferentrotationalphasesoftheasteroidinto
aconvexenvelope,calledthehull,whichrepresentedtheasteroid'ssilhouetteasviewed
fromapole.Afterhefit thehullmodeltoJurgens'Erosdata,OstromodeledtheEarth-
crossingasteroids1627Ivarand1986DA,observedinJuly1985andApril1986atArecibo.
Interestingly,thehullestimatesindicatedthat1986DA'shullwas"extremelyirregular,
highlynonconvex,andpossiblybifurcated.'"95
Thecaseof1986DAsuggestedthatanyasteroidmodelhadtoaccommodateth pos-
sibilitythatthetargetmightnotbeconvex;bothJurgens'triaxialellipsoidandthehull
modelswereinadequate.Ostroalsoattemptedto imageasteroidswithrange-Doppler
mappingtechniques,beginningwith1627Ivarin1985.
Range-Dopplermappingrevealedabimodaldistributionofechopower,suggesting
thatthetargetwasnotconvex.AllpreviousimageshadreliedexclusivelyonDopplerspec-
tradata;thesewerethefirstrange-resolvedimagesofanasteroid.Nonetheless,theyfailed
todefinetheasteroid'sglobalshapeP_
Thenextopportunityto attemptrange-Dopplerimagingcamein 1988,withthe
closeapproachto Earthof thesmallasteroid1980PA.Thetechniciansat Arecibo
improvedthetelescope'sdataacquisitionsoftwareandhardware,in orderto improve
resolutionoftheasteroid;theresolutionof theGoldstoneradaronthesametargetwas
stillnotfineenough.TheGoldstoneradardidnotachievethelimitneededforradar
asteroidobservationsuntil1986,whentheVoyagerupgradeswerecompletedP7
Ostroagainattemptedrange-Dopplerimages,thistimeof 1989PB,laterknownas
4769Castalia.On9August1989,EleanorHelindiscoveredtheobjectonphotographic
platestakenatPalomarObservatory.Orbitalcalculationstwodayslatershowedthatthe
asteroidwouldpassthroughtheAreciboObservatory'sdeclinationwindowduring
19-22Augustandthatat closestapproach,Castaliawouldbeonly0.027astronomical
unitsfromEarth.ThesewereidealconditionsforimagingtheasteroidatArecibo,though
not soat Goldstone.CommunicationswithVoyager2, whichwasmakingits closest
approachtoNeptune,occupiedtheGoldstone70-meterantenna;it wasunavailablefor
useasaradartelescopeuntil30August,whensomeobservationsof Castaliatookplace
afterclosestapproach."AtGoldstone,"Ostrorecalled,"everythingwasadisaster.Wehad
aneight-hourt ack,andwegotabout20minutesofdata.''9_
GettingtimeontheAreciboantennaonsuchshortnotice(10daysafterdetection)
wasnotaproblem;OstroalreadyhadtimetoobserveVictoria,amainbeltasteroid,which
hadshownahintofadouble-peakspectralstructurein 1982.Afterdoingafewrunson
93. Ostro 25 May 1994; Ostro, Campbell, and Shapiro, "Radar Observations of Asteroid 1685 Toro," The
Astronomical.]ourna188 ( 1983): 565-576.
94. Ostro, Alan W. Harris, Campbell, Shapiro, and James W. _bung, "Radar and Photoelectric
Observations of Asteroid 2100 Ra-Shalom," Icaru_ 60 (1984): 391-403.
95. Ostro, Robert Connelly, and Leila Belkora, "Asteroid Shapes fi-om Radar Echo Spectra: A New
Theoretical Approach," harus 73 (1988): 15-24; Ostro, Rosema, and .lurgens. "The Shape of Eros," Icartt_ 84
(1990): 334-351; Ostro, Campbell, Chandler, Hine, Hudson, Rosema, and Shapiro, _Asteroid 1096 DA: Radar
Evidence for a Metallic Composition," Soence 252 (1991): 1399-1404, esp. pp. 1400-1401.
96. Ostro 25 May 1994; Ostro, Campbell, Hine, Shapiro, Chandler, C. L. Werner, and Rosema, _Radar
Images of Asteroid 1627 Ivar," T/u, A._tr_rnomlcalJ_rurna199 (1990) : 2012-2018.
97. Ostro 25 May 1994.
98. Ostro 25 May 1994.
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Figure 38
I_ange4hrppler radar images _[ A._teroid 1627 h_ar, 1985, made at the Arecitx_ Observaterry by Steve OstrtJ_ These are the first
rrutar images made ¢,] an it.steroid. ( (_mrte._y _?f.]et I_r_r]mL_ion l.at_rrattrry.)
Victoria, Ostro spent the rest of the time on Castalia. "We saw CW [continuous-wave]
echoes instantly," Ostro remembered. "A few of them from the first day looked strongly
bifurcated." This was the first echo signature that said "This is a contact binary." Although
he had never claimed discovery of bifurcated asteroids in print, Ostro had seen the
idiosyncratic radar signatures several times before. '-_
From the Doppler and range data, Ostro created 64 images of the asteroid with an
average of two dozen pixels each. Each image was bifurcated and showed a bimodal
distribution of echo power. Reading the sequence of images from left to right from top to
bottom, one can see the asteroid rotate.
When Ostro presented the images at the AAS Division for Planetary Science meeting
a few months later, they attracted a dramatic intensity of attention; it was no less than the
first time that anyone had resolved the shape of an asteroid from Earth. 'q'his was a major
breakthrough, definitely a major breakthrough," Ostro reflected, l_x_
99. Ostro 25 May 1994.
100. Ostro 25 May 1994: Ostro, Chandler, Hine, Rosema, Shapiro, and Yeomans, "Radar Images of
Asteroid 1989 PB," S_ev_ce 248 ( 1990): 1523-1528.
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About a year after the imaging of Castalia, Scott Hudson started working on a math-
ematical modelling technique to reconstruct the asteroid's shape in three dimensions.
While still a Caltech graduate student, Hudson had worked with Ostro in developing a
technique for creating planetary Doppler images free of north-south ambiguity. Hudson
devised a complex mathematical model with 169 parameters in order to capture the shape
of asteroid Castalia. The resultant three-dimensional model showed indisputably that the
asteroid was bifurcated into two distinct, irregular, kilometer-sized lobesJ 01
Modelling three-dimensional asteroid shapes from radar data provided further evi-
dence for the existence of asteroids with exotic shapes upon the approach of 1989 AC
(later known as 4179 Toutatis), discovered in January 1989. Because of its extremely close
approach to Earth, 9.4 lunar distances on 8 December 1992, Toutatis showed high
promise as a candidate for imaging. Ostro proposed a Toutatis experiment to the NAIC
and to Nick Renzetti, explaining how extraordinary the opportunity was and urging that
Goldstone also make observations.
Ostro planned to use both telescopes to take data in both senses of polarizations and
to create range-Doppler images of several thousand pixels, considerably more resolution
than had been achieved ever before. The high resolution was possible at Arecibo and
Goldstone because of incremental improvements made in the data acquisition hardware
and software over the preceding years. Ostro obtained continuous-wave echoes at
Goldstone on 97 November, then range-Doppler images daily from 2-18 December 1992
and at Arecibo each day from 13--19 December. In addition to the roudne monostatic
observations, Ostro's team took advantage of new antennas recendy made available. They
observed Toutatis bistadcally with the DSS-14 transmitting and a new 34-meter beam-
waveguide antenna (DSS-13) 21 km away receiving, and on one day they received with
both DSS-14 and DSS-13 to acquire interferometric data. On yet another day, they col-
lected data with the Goldstone_VLA radar.
Preliminary analysis of the data showed Toutatis to have an unusually slow rotation
rate and a maximum dimension of no less than 3.5 km. Interestingly, too, Toutatis
appeared to consist of two irregularly-shaped components in close contact. The images
provided a first glimpse of craters on an Earth-crossing asteroid, as well. The asteroid's
roughness, as measured by the circular polarization ratio, indicated a considerable degree
of general roughness at centimeter-to-decimeter scales, supporting the belief that Toutads
had undergone a complex collisional history.
101. Hudson, telephone conversation, 21 November 1994; Ostro 25 May 1994; Hudson and Ostro,
"Shape of Asteroid 4769 Castalia (1989 PB) from Inversion of Radar Images," Saenc. 263 (1994): 940-943;
Hudson and Ostro, "Doppler-Radar Imaging of Spherical Planetary Surfaces,"/'ournal o/Geophysical Re._earch95
( 1990): 10,947-10,963.
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t¢,axlar images of Asteroid 1989 PB (later known av 4769 Ca._talia). "/'he. a._teroid_ rotation iv noti_lbl_ in the 64 images.
((_mrtesy _]et t_ropuL_ion La&n-at_rry.)
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Figure 40
M_uIel of Astertnd 4769 Castalia. It was the fi_t three-dimen.*ional mtutel _] an asteroid ever frr¢;duced. The picture ._hows 16
d![ferent views of a three-dime'n,_ional m_lel °[ Castalia, which i_ I. 8 km acm*.* at it* wide._t. The me.tel way treated tr2' Scott
Hu_L_tm (Washingttm .State University) and 5;teve O._tro (]PL) from data taken at Arecilm Oh_ert,attrf_ in 1989. (('_mrte._y o/
Jet IXro/ruL_itm Lalnrrattrry, photo no. P4 3041A. )
Since then, Scott Hudson has elaborated his model to recreate three-dimensional
asteroid shapes. With Toutatis, he was dealing with over 1,000 parameters. The application
of Hudson's reconstruction technique to the Toutatis images was complicated by the aster-
oid's rotation. Unlike all other targets detected by radar, Toutatis was in a tumbling rota-
tional state.
At the 1994 AAS Division for Planetary Science meeting in November 1994, Ostro
and Hudson presented several movies of Castalia, including one in which the asteroid was
portrayed as it might be viewed in space, complete with fictional optical illumination. The
use of the older Castalia data was on purpose; it suggested the potential rewards of using
higher resolution data. In addition to Castalia and Toutatis, Ostro and Hudson began
working in 1994 on three-dimensional modeling of 1620 Geographos, an asteroid which
the ill-fated Department of Defense's Clementine spacecraft was scheduled to observe
during a flyby mission. Although a computer malfimction prevented the Clementine
encounter, Ostro captured a detailed sequence of Geographos images at Goldstone only
days before the scheduled flyby. Subsequent modeling of the data has yielded an impres-
sive simulation of an asteroid flyby. 1°2
102. Ostro 25 May 1994: Hudson, telephone conversation, 21 November 199,t; Ostro,.Iurgens, Rosema,
R. Winkler, D. ]lowald, R. Rose, Slade, Yeomans, Campbell, Perillal, Chandler. Shapir_, Iludson, P. Palmer, and
i. de Pater, "Radar Imaging of Astcloid 4179 Toutatis," Bulletin o/the A menc_ln A_tr_m.mi_al Society 25 ( 1993): 1126.
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Figure 41
7"he._e radar imal_e_ o[ T_mtatis repre-
gent the highest re._Jlution lhen
a_hieved on an a_ter_,id. A Jew impact
crrzte'r_, the tirol ever documentevl, are
vi_it)b o in lhe image_. ((Jourte_'_ e_f.]et
l'r_Jpul._.m Laboratory, ph_tt_ n_.
1'41525)
The state-of-the-art imaging and modeling of Castalia,
Toutatis, and Geographos are feats that only a spacecraft
flying by an asteroid could match. Although no probe
deliberately set out to photograph an asteroid, Galileo, on
its voyage to Jupiter, sent back the first spacecraft images of
an asteroid, mainbelt object 243 Gaspra, on 29 October
1991 from a distance of about 16,200 km. Interestingly,
Galileo also discovered that mainbelt asteroid 951 Ida had
an orbiting satellite, recently named DactylY ),_
While the Toutatis images in themselves are spectacu-
lar witnesses to the ability of radar astronomy to solve prob-
lems left unsolved by other techniques, radar astronomy
has achieved an equally great degree of success in another
problem-solving area, asteroid orbits. Determining asteroid
orbits with better degrees of accuracy and predictive relia-
bility gained higher attention as scientists and the general
public came to perceive asteroids as an ultimate threat to
human civilization and to life itself on Earth. The percep-
tion grew out of the work of nuclear physicist and Nobel
laureate Luis Alvarez, who first proposed that an asteroid
was responsible for the extinction of the dinosaurs some
65 million years ago. Since then, evidence supporting the
theory has accumulated, though not without arguments
and evidence questioning the theory.
In a seminal paper published in Nature, Clark
Chapman and David Morrison argued that the probability
of a kilometer-size asteroid hitting Earth in the next centu-
ry was 1 in 5,000. The collision would have a global effect,
regardless of the impact site, because the dust blasted into
the stratosphere would end agriculture for several years.
Billions of people would starve to death."_4
In order to detect a potentially civilization- and life-
threatening asteroid, the scientific community proposed
Spaceguard, a network of six optical telescopes dedicated
to detecting asteroids. The name Spaceguard came from
the book Rendezvous with Rama, in which its author Arthur
C. Clarke envisioned an asteroid striking Earth in northern
Italy in the year 2077. In response to the impact's devasta-
tion, the nations of Earth formed Project Spaceguard.
Creating a real Spaceguard has not been so straight-
forward. After asteroid 1989 FC came very close to the
Earth in 1989, the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics recommended to the House Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology that it sponsor studies of
asteroid detection and defense. Congress then commis-
sioned NASA in 1990 to write reports on those subjects.
103. 771e Spaceg'uard Survey: l¢ffurrt ¢?f the NASA International Near-
Earth-Ol*ject Detection Wink.shop (Pasadena: JPL, 25 January 1992), p. 19;
NASA Press Release 94-158, 20 September 1994, Renzetti materials.
104. Chapman and Morrison, "Impacts on the Earth by Asteroids
and Comets: Assessing lhe llazard," Nature 367 (199't): 33-40.
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NASA already had considered asteroid detection in a 1981 workshop held in Colorado,
but 10 years later it acted in response to a Congressional mandate. The NASA 1991 work-
shop brought together 24 asteroid scientists from around the world, including radar
astronomer Steve Ostro. 105
Although Congress has not yet funded Spaceguard, a battle over how to defend the
planet against a "killer asteroid" rages. The recent collision of Comet Shoemaker-Levy
with Jupiter has driven home the point that the planets, Earth included, are susceptible
to potentially life threatening impacts from comets and asteroids. The Spaceguard
proposal came along just as the Department of Defense was seeking post-Cold War appli-
cations of its nuclear arsenal. The deflection of a menacing asteroid or comet with a series
of nuclear explosions is, in the words of Carl Sagan and Steve Ostro, "a double-edged
sword," which if wielded by the wrong hands could "introduce a new category of danger
that dwarfs that posed by the objects themselves." They pointed out that a series of
nuclear explosions capable of thwarting a dangerous asteroid is also capable of diverting
a benign asteroid toward Earth. 1°6
Regardless of the means used to defend Earth against asteroid hazards, radar is suit-
ed to play a vital role in identifying potentially hazardous objects. Radar is the essential tool
for astrometry (position and movement); it can determine asteroid orbits with greater
accuracy and reliability than any other method. After the detection of an asteroid and the
determination of its orbit, astronomers extrapolate the orbit into the future. Without
radar precision measurement, the uncertainty of that extrapolation increases strikingly.
The role of radar in Spaceguard, consequently, is as the primary, post-discovery ground-
based technique for refining asteroid orbits.
After Steve Ostro's experiences with the errors in the ephemerides provided for 1986
DA and 1986JK, he and fellowJPL employees Don Yeomans and Paul Chodas, who were
in charge of calculating ephemerides for space missions, including those for a potential
future asteroid flyby mission, assessed the extent to which radar observations could
improve the accuracy of near-Earth asteroid ephemerides. They wanted to know how use-
ful radar ranging was for refining the orbits of Earth-crossing asteroids. Could radar
improve the extrapolation of asteroid orbits into the future?
They studied four asteroids with different histories of optical and radar observations,
1627 Ivar, 1986 DA, 1986 JK, and 1982 DB. The radar data provided only a modest
absolute improvement for Ivar, which had a long history of opdcal astrometric data, but
rather dramatic reductions in the future ephemeris uncertainties of asteroids having only
short optical-data histories. Those improvements were impressive ones, to three orders of
magnitude.
RayJurgens, who had been observing asteroids at Goldstone since the 1970s, wrote
a proposal to fund asteroid emphemeris work at JPL and persuaded Don Yeomans and
Paul Chodas to help in the analysis of asteroid ephemerides. As Jurgens became over-
whelmed by research and the rebuilding of the Goldstone radar, Steve Ostro took up the
tasks of strengthening JPL's asteroid ephemeris program and advocating software tools
and other measures for improving Goldstone's capability of detecting asteroids and
improving the accuracy of asteroid orbit predictions. 107
105. The Spaceguard Survey, pp. 1-3 and 49-52; Cunningham, pp. 113-116 and 141.
106. Sagan and Ostro, "Dangers of Asteroid Deflection," Nature.368 (1994) : 501.
107. Ostro 25 May 1994; Yeomans, Ostro, and Paul W. Chodas, "Radar Astrometry of Near-Earth
Asteroids," The AstronomicalJournal 94 (1987) : 189- 200; Ostro, "l'he Role of Ground-Based Radar in Near-Earth
Object Hazard Identification and Mitigation," in Hazards Due to Comets and Asteroid_,in press, p. 9. For a summary
of asteroid radar astrometry, see Ostro, Campbell, Chandler, Shapiro, Hine, V_lez, Jurgens, Rosema, Winkler,
and Yeomans, "Asteroid Radar Astrometry," The Astronomical Journal 102 (1991): 1490-1502; and Yeomana,
Chodas, M. S. Keesey, Ostro, Chandler, and Shapiro, "Asteroid and Comet Orbits using Radar Data," The
Astronomical Journal !03 (1992): 303--317.
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The astrometric and imaging capabilities of radar soon will combine to reformulate
the IAU circular that announces the discovery and orbit of a new asteroid. For newly
spotted asteroids, Ostro has a vision of the kind of IAU circular that might be available
before the end of the century. After astronomers discover and track an asteroid optically
for a few nights and the orbit is at least crudely known, an IAU circular announces the
object's existence. A few days later, the Arecibo or Goldstone radar observes the asteroid
and takes range-Doppler data, refines the orbit, and images the object. The ephemeris is
updated immediately. Streamlined software transforms the image data into a three-dimen-
sional model of the asteroid, then produces a video simulation of the Sun-illuminated
asteroid. This process yields a computer file that becomes the first post-discovery IAU
circular: a finely-resolved video image of the object, as if made by a flyby spacecraft
within a few days of discovery.108 Here was the future of asteroid radar research and, to a
dramatic degree, the future of planetary radar astronomy, as well.
108. Ostro 25 May 1994.

Conclusion
W(h) ither Planetary
Radar Astronomy?
The dynamic interaction between epistemological (instruments and techniques)
concerns and the kinds of problems radar astronomers seek to solve, which we have seen
driving planetary radar astronomy to the present, also in all likelihood will continue to
determine its future. Both new instruments and techniques will furnish the means for
exploring new targets and for resolving problems, especially those left unresolved or
unsatisfactorily resolved by optical means.
Planetary radar techniques developed recently perhaps hint at the sources of future
techniques. Three examples are John Harmon's non-repeating code, which he adapted
from Arecibo ionospheric research; Dewey Muhleman's use of radio astronomy imaging
and arraying techniques at the VLA, as part of the bistatic Goldstone-VLA radar; and the
planetary imaging technique developed by Scott Hudson and Steve Ostro. The Harmon
and Mnhleman techniques reflect the continuing, though diminished, influence of iono-
spheric research and radio astronomy on planetary radar astronomy.
A surprising number of new instruments may be available, too, many through the
grouping of either the Goldstone or Arecibo antenna in tandem with a radio telescope to
form a bistatic radar. The Goldstone-VLA radar appears to point the way to additional
combinations with the soon-to-be-completed Green Bank radio telescope, or perhaps to
the Goldstone X-band radar in tandem with a tracking station in the So_et Union.
Already, the Russian Yevpatoriya tracking station has made bistatic observations of the
asteroid Toutatis in conjunction with the Effelsberg radio telescope, though without
achieving the impressive results of the Arecibo and Gotdstone antennas. Politics and fund-
ing will limit what, if any, future bistatic experiments take place outside the United States.
Additional bistatic possibilities in the United States include the JPL Mars Station in com-
bination with other Goldstone antennas, as well as an Arecibo-Goldstone link.
The bistatic possibilities are not limitless, however; not inconsequential institutional,
political, and budgetary obstacles aside, the elementary technological need for compatible
transmitting and receiving frequencies limits many bistatic options. Even more limited is the
creation of new radars. Other countries continue to build antennas, such as the Arecibo-size
dish planned in Brazil, but none anticipate a radar capability. No facility dedicated entirely
to planetary radar astronomy ever has been built; nonetheless, Steve Ostro believes that it is
time to build one in order to study asteroids. The cost of designing and building such a
radar observatory would approach the modest level budgeted for NASA's Discovery space
missions, l The role of this facility in the Spaceguard project aside, its potential scientific
value in a short period of time would exceed that of any one Discovery flyby of an asteroid.
Time will tell whether this worthwhile and economical project is realized.
1. Osno 25 May 1994.
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Theseareall possiblefutureplanetaryradarinstruments.Nothing,especiallynot
theirscientificmerit,eitherguaranteesor favorstheirrealization;budgets,notscience,
willdeterminetheirviability.Withoneexception,planetaryradarastronomyalwayshas
subsistedonthebudgetarylilargins,eitherbydesign(asatJPL)orbyfate(asatLincoln
Laboratory).Asbudgetsaretrimmed,thefreedomtofundbistaticexperimentsfromdis-
cretionaryfundsdiminishes,too.TheonlyexceptionisArecibo,whereafive-yearcontract
stabilizestheresearchbudget,althoughwithintheshrinkingNASAandNSFbudgets.If
onecansayanythingabouthefutureofplanetaryradarastronomywithcertainty,it is
thatthefutureisattheupgradedArecibotelescope.
TheAreciboupgrade,aswellasthepotentiallyavailablenovelinstrumentsandtech-
niquesmentionedabove,will bringnewresearchtargetswithinthereachof radar
astronomers.AmongthemoststrikingnewtargetsvisibletotheupgradedArecibobser-
vatorywillbethesatellitesofJupiter,Iapetus,Rhea,Amalthea,Dione,andHyperion.The
detectionsofthosebodiesverywellmayleadtoradarsolvingnewscientificproblems.In
addition,theupgradedArecibotelescopewillbeabletomapJupiter'sGalileanmoonsat
muchhigheresolutions,perhapsdownto100kilometers,anduncoverf eshfactsregard-
ingIoandSaturn'smoonTitan.z
Planetary radar may contribute as well to our understanding of the terrestrial plan-
ets through analysis of their polarization ratios; however, the greatest amount of research
activity will be directed toward neither the terrestrial planets nor the systems of Jupiter
and Saturn, but the asteroids. Tile space in which Earth turns abounds with thousands of
asteroids. Tile largest, a kilometer or larger in diameter, number about 2,000, while those
100 meters or more in diameter number 150,000 or more, and those 10 meters and
larger amount to some 300,000,000. These are estimates of the asteroid population; the
number of asteroids actually observed increases continually. The likelihood that one of
those asteroids might approach Earth perilously close has heightened interest in them.
In many ways, then, planetary radar astronomy has come full circle. It began with the
study of large populations of meteors, and the observation and analysis of the large and
varied asteroid population is carrying it into the future. Forty years ago, the forte of radar
lay in its ability to determine accurately the radiants and speed of meteors and to
ascertain unambiguously that they orbited around the Sun. Today, the value of radar is its
ability to fix asteroid orbies with an accuracy and certainty, that no other method can
match.
Current planetary radar techniques, however, can do much more with asteroids than
the earliest radar investigators at Jodrell Bank and the Canadian National Research
Council were able to do with meteors using their pioneering techniques and far less sen-
sitive radar equipment. Today's planetary radar astronomers can characterize asteroid
composition, size, and shape and can provide a unique imaging ability. The ever-growing
number of asteroid targets, combined with this wide range of epistemological tools and
the present societal interest in a potential "killer asteroid," guarantees that the future of
planetary radar astronomy will be asteroid research.
W(h) ither Planetary Radar Astronomy?
Asteroid literature and funding have grown markedly over the last fifteen years. In
the past, similar rapid growth in ionospheric and radio astronomy research carried
forward planetary radar astronomy. This growth has not yet reached radar studies of aster-
oids, however, and despite the expanding observational opportunities created by asteroid
studies, the number of radal astronomers probably will not increase significantly. Steve
2, Ostlo, "Benefits f)f az_ t![)gvaded Arecibo Obsel vatol y," pp. 238 239; ()silo 25 May 1994; Campbell
8 December 1993.
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Ostro remains the sole full-time asteroid radar astronomer. Once the upgraded Arecibo
radar becomes available, the number of radar investigators studying asteroids probably
will increase, or rather, must increase, if an adequate number of observational opportuni-
ties are to be seized. Already, the Arecibo Observatory has fiired a planetary astronomer
with an interest in asteroidsy -_who will also take part in radar observations of asteroids.
Don Campbell will participate in those observations, as too may Dick Simpson of Stanford.
The growth in asteroid science, then, may shift current radar researchers into the field,
rather than provide a basis for expanding planetary radar astronomy.
As a scientific species, planetary radar astronomers have tended not to reproduce
themselves. Hiring individuals from other fields yielded planetary radar astronomers in
the 1960s and 1970s, but none in the last 15 years with the exceptions of Marty Slade at
JPL and the recent hire at Arecibo. The number of planetary radar astronomers created
through paid employment, therefore, may remain small and relatively stable. Being small
yet may have its advantages in a future certain to be shaped by budget cuts in NASA and
U.S. scientific research in general.
The other traditional career path into radar astronomy, university training, may
furnish fresh practitioners, though. Gordon Pettengill at MIT and Don Campbell at
Cornell directed many radar astronomy dissertations, although certainly not all of those
students entered the field. The MIT-Cornell axis has supplied planetary radar
astronomers since the 1960s, but the last Ph.D. to enter the field through that route (Steve
Ostro) graduated in 1978. Moreover, with the retirement of Pettengill at MIT and the
approaching retirement of Campbell at Cornell, who will train future planetary radar
astronomers at Arecibo?
Outside of MIT and Cornell, only Cahech appears equipped or willing to train them.
There, Dewey Muhleman has graduated one student, Bryan Butler, in 1994, who did
doctoral research in radar astronomy. Although interested in pursuing radar research,
Butler is at least equally excited by the prospect of planetary radio studies at the VLA,
where he has taken a position. Muhleman is not interested in training additional radar
astronomers.
In contrast, Steve Ostro atJPL teaches a course on radar astronomy at Caltech. That
position gives him the ability to both recruit and train future radar astronomers. The key
to training future radar astronomers in an academic setting like MIT or Cornell remains
the master-disciple relationship. Replacing Pettengiil and Campbell, then, is Ostro, who is
in a unique position to carry the MIT-Cornell alliance one step further by linking Caltech,
JPL, and Goldstone to it.
Ostro, a graduate of MIT who conducted his doctoral research on Cornell's Arecibo
instrument, and a former member of the Corneil faculty, found RayJurgens and Marty
Slade, graduates of the Cornell and MIT programs, respectively, when he began work at
JPL. Ostro's arrival atJPL signalled a joining of theJPL and MIT-Cornell research groups.
His opportunity to teach at Caltech and recruit radar astronomers, coming near the
retirements of Pettengill and Campbell, assures the continuation of the master-disciple
relationship as the source of future radar astronomers, but within a larger institutional
(MIT, Cornell, Caltech-JPL) and instrumental complex that joins the Arecibo and
Goldstone radars. The centering of Ostro within that complex also positions him to direct
the future of radar astronomy.
Like the number of practitioners, the radar astronomy literature will remain at a low
level as a result of both the small number of researchers and the nature of the science
reported in those publications. The discoveries to be made on the terrestrial planets and
the moons of Jupiter and Saturn will not generate a substantial number of articles,
because those discoveries likely will not merit that level of scientific attention. The results
3. Harmon 15 March 1994.
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ofasteroidresearch,moreover,willbedescribedinarticlesthatdiscuss the characteristics
of a substantial population of asteroids and not the properties of just one or two asteroids.
Consequently, the number of asteroid-related publications will remain limited.
Indeed, virtually the entire history of planetary radar astronomy has been one of
limits. The number of practitioners has been limited, if not declining. As we saw, after the
initial "explosion" of planetary radar activity in the early 1960s, as measured by the
number of experimenters, publications, and instruments, the field of planetary radar
astronomy assumed the manpower and publication dimensions of Little Science. After
further shrinking during the 1970s, leaving a handful of researchers utilizing a single
radar instrument in 1980, planetary radar astronomy stabilized at this lower level (the
Arecibo radar being down fi)r the duration of the upgrade). The circnmscribed number
of opporttmities to train future radar practitioners in academia, as well as retirements
(most current practitioners are at or near retirement age), will keep manpower levels low.
Little Science, Big Science
The practice of planetary radar astronomy as Little Science in the instrumental and
institutional context of Big Science will likely continue into the future. A number of
factors integral to the field have confined planetary radar astronomy to its existence as
Little Science. To begin with, the field generally has operated at the limits of the technol-
ogy (the instrument hardware). As soon as an instrument became available, radar
astronomers sought to discover what new targets it could detect. Once the farthest target
was reached, and the spatial limits of research defined, radar astronomers had insufficient
sensitivity, to achieve more than a detection, hnaging planetary surfaces always involved
pushing the instrument's signal-to-noise ratio and resolution capability, to the limit. These
restrictions in turn prompted radar astronomers to continually press for hardware modi-
fications that provided incremental increases in sensitivity. In the end, though, what could
be done was limited by the capability of the instrument.
Another growth-limiting factor inherent in planetary radar astronomy is the avail-
ability of targets, a factor intimately linked to instrument capability. The planets and their
moons cannot be detected unless they are within radar range. The sensitivity limits of
planetary radars, such as the Arecibo telescope, prevent investigators from observing
targets except when they approach Earth. At other points in their orbits around the Sun,
they are too far away for radars to detect them. Thus, Venus is observed at inferior
conjunction and Mars at opposition.
A related problem is that of declination. Although most planets rotate around the
Sun more or less in the same plane, called the ecliptic, they are not visible in the sky at all
times because of the Earth's motion about its own axis. A further complicating factor is
the ability of the radar antenna to "see" a portion or all of the visible sky, that is, the
so-called declination window of the antenna. The declination window of the Goldstone
DSS-]4 dish runs from 40 ° South to 80 ° North, while the Arecibo telescope is limited to
solar system objects that pass within the far narrower band from 40 ° North to just below
the equator. 4
The combination of declination window and radar sensitivity restricts observational
opportunities, so that planetary research demands only about five percent of total anten-
na time. The finite number of planetary targets and the narrow observational windows
also tend to limit the number of radar researchers. Thus, the tendency at Arecibo was to
establish a given target as the terrain or turf of a particular researcher. The number of
radar investigators at JPL was always too small for such a division of targets, although
4. Renzetti, Thompson. and Slade, "Relative Planetary Radar Sensitivities: Arecibo and Goldstone,"
TDA Proj,we._l¢.eportno. 42-94 (Pasadena: JPL. April-June 1988): 292.
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duringthe1970sRayJurgens"specialized"inVenusandasteroidsandGeorgeDownsin
Mars,withDickGoldsteincontinuingtodoalittleofeverything.
Theconsiderableandexpandingnumberofknownasteroidsistoolargeforasingle
investigator.Thiswillbeespeciallytruein thenearfllture,onceasteroidetectionrelies
onCCDimagingandtheAreciboupgradereachescompletion.ThenjoiningOstroin
radarobservationsofasteroids(manyasteroidscientistshope)willbevirtuallyallmem-
bersofthesmallclubofradarastronomypractitioners.Again,theexpandedprogramof
asteroidradaresearcbthatwilltakeplacethroughouttheremainderof thisdecadewill
notleadtoatransformationfplanetaryradarastronomyintoBigScience.
PlanetaryadarastronomyhasbeenandlikelywillremainLittleScienceembedded
in thematrixofBigScience.JohnKrige'studyofBritishnuclearphysicsresearchin the
periodrightafterWorldWarII prm4desadifferentcaseofLittleSciencebeingconduct-
edwithBigScienceinstruments.Onecanfindanotherparallelexamplein thetelegraph
networksofthenineteenth-centuryUnitedStates.
TheWesternUniontelegraphcompany,formedbythemergerofseveralseparate
companies,absorbedhothofitsprincipalrivalsin 1866tobecomeoneof thenation's
largestcompaniesandtherebycreatedthelargestelectricalcommnnicationnetworkin
theworld.WhilenotBigScience,thiswasBigBusinessandBigTechnology.Bythevery
natureof theirpositionin tbecompany,telegraphoperatorshadaccesstothelarge-scale
technologicall boratoryformedbythetelegraphlines.Justasaccesstotechnologyledto
theemergenceofplanetaryradarastronomy,soaccesstothetelegraphnetworkledthese
operatorstoperformelectricalexperimentsonthelines.Outofthosexperimentscame
numerousinventions,manyofwhichwerepatented.5
It isnotgoingtoofartodrawthisparallelbetweenLittleScience(planetaryadar
astronomy)andLittleTechnology(telegraphinventors),for severalreasons.Forone,
mostradarastronomersweretrainedaselectricalengineers,notscientists.Also,radar
astronomywasasciencedrivenbytechnology,namely,theavailabilityofradarscapableof
planetary exploration. It was through these instruments and their associated techniques
of analysis, not through direct sensory observation, that radar astronomers conducted
their experiments. They analyzed not sensory experience, but wave patterns of electro-
magnetic signals which analysis by computer software made 'Msible." Thus, not only were
the instrumentation and techniques of radar astronomy dependent on technology, but so
was the very content of the science.
Planetary radar astronomy historically has remained at the intersection of science
and engineering. Attendance of radar astronomers at both IAU and URSI meetings dur-
ing the 1960s reflected the dichotomous nature of radar astronomy, perched between
radio engineering (URSI) and astronomical science (IAU). The dichotomy arose from
the fact that radar astronomy is a set of techniques (engineering) used to generate data
whose interpretation yields answers to scientific (planetary astronomy and geology) ques-
tions. Also as a resuh of this dichotomy, planetary radar astronomy concerns itself with two
different but related sets of problems (in the Kuhnian sense discussed in Chapter Five).
One set of problems is epistemological, that is, it deals with how radar astronomers know
what the)' know and relates to the radar characteristics of the planets, such as surface scat-
tering mechanisms, dielectric constants, and radar albedos; these problems arise out of
5. For a carefld scholarly study of telegraph operators as inventors, see Patti Israel, From Machine Shtrp
t,, Industrial Lab,_ratory: Telegraphy and the Changing Context _![ American Invention, 183(1--1920 (Baltimore: .Johns
Hopkins University Press. 1992), which is based on the dissertation of the same title, Ph.D. diss., Rutgers
University, 1989. For a discussion of the role of the entrepreneur in channeling the resources of large-scale
organizations, specifically, the introduction of radio and radio research within the French military by Gustave
Ferri6, see A. Butrica, 'q'he Militarization of Technology in France: The Case of Electrotechnics, 1845-1914,"
paper read at the joint meeting of the American Historical Association and the History of Science Society,
Cincinnati, December 1988.
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the engineering side of radar astronomy. A second set of problems, such as planetary
orbits and spin rates, arises out of the science side of the field.
The roofing of Little Science (of Little Technology) within large technological sys-
tems, such as the Western Union telegraph network or the Deep Space Network, suggests
that it may be in the nature of large-scale "technosocial networks" or "systems" (to borrow
the terminology of the social construction of technology mentioned in the Introduction)
to sustain Little Science (or Little Technology). Large technological systems form a uni-
fied set of relafions among individuals, objects, and ideas. As tightly "constructed" as these
technosocial networks may be, the magnitude of the resources they encompass is of a suf-
ficient extent to allow small-scale entrepreneurs (be they scientists, engineers, inventors)
within the system to "socially construct" smaller technosocial networks within the larger.
Without the larger technosocial network, then, the smaller network is unthinkable.
Planetary radar astronomy simply would not have existed without the enormous, power-
ful, highly sensitive radars on which the experiments were conducted and which were
called into existence by the demands of the Cold War and Big Science. Another requisite,
of course, was the radar experimenters themselves. The linking of research groups at MIT
(Lincoln Laboratory), CorneU University, and (most recently) JPL (Caltech) has provid-
ed a means by which the Little Science planted in the interstices of large technological sys-
tems can perpetuate itself despite declining resources and limits to growth. For example,
as planetary radar activity ceased at Haystack, it continued at the Arecibo Observatory.
Given the symbiotic relationship between Big Science and the Little Science which
depends on it, as well as the nature of that dependency, funding cutbacks intended to
reduce Big Science also will diminish, or perhaps even eliminate, Little Science. Future
research will have to determine how vast (and by what standard(s) that vastness is mea-
sured) a technosocial network must be in order to sustain Little Science.
The technological dependence of radar astronomy, and the availability of that tech-
nology within large technological systems, thus accounts for the emergence of radar
astronomy within Big Science settings. The technological dependence of planetary radar
astronomy, however, does not explain its utilitarian proclivity, namely, the tendency of
radar astronomers to justify their research by its usefulness to space exploration. Nor does
the training of most radar astronomers as electrical engineers, who must think in both
theoretical and practical terms at the same time, illuminate that tendency. The rise of
radar astronomy concurrently with the creation and rapid growth of NASA was perhaps
not coincidental.
Although the space agency did not build research instruments outside NASA labo-
ratories during the 1960s, its very existence from 1958 suggested the future availability of
funds for instruments and research activity. The Endicott House Conference reflected
those funding hopes. After 1970, when NASA funding became a reality, radar astronomy
quickly began participating in NASA space missions, such as Viking, until radar astrono-
my becamea space project, the Magellan radar mission to Venus. This close relationship to
NASA space missions certainly amplified whatever utilitarian bent radar astronomy
already had.
This utilitarian bent also arose from the very nature of conducting Little Science
within the context of Big Science. Doing Little Science requires that scientists constantly
defend the pragmatic value of their research. A good example is radar astronomy at JPL;
it lived off the budgetary margins of NASA space missions un til the 1980s. Because obtain-
ing antenna time depended on securing the approval of a NASA mission, radar
astronomers had to argue the value of their research on practical, mission-oriented terms.
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In contrast, obtaining antenna time at the Arecibo Observatory depended on the sci-
entific value of the radar experiment; its value to NASA was far less important, although
research directly related to NASA space missions was carried out there. The primary dif-
ference between the JPL and Arecibo facilities was the official recognition granted radar
astronomy at Arecibo from the start. The Arecibo telescope always had radar astronomy
as one of its prime research objectives, while theJPL Goldstone antenna served mainly to
track NASA launches, not conduct scientific experiments. NASA recognition for the sci-
entific value of the Goldstone radar dish has yet to be realized fully or even established on
a permanent foundation, though some preliminary steps have been taken.
We can conclude briefly the following about planetary radar astronomy. After a brief
initial burst of activity, radar astronomy quickly developed the characteristics of Little
Science in terms of manpower, instruments, and published literature. The field continued
to shrink throughout the 1970s, reached a low plateau of activity around 1980, then rose
slightly in the middle 1980s, as the Goldstone radar once again became available for
research.
A number of factors kept planetary radar astronomy a Little Science. Radar sensitiv-
ity and target visibility within the declination window limited observational opportunities.
The shortage of observational opportunities in turn restricted the number of investigators
who could pursue radar astronomy on a full-time basis. Close ties to NASA space projects
intensified radar astronomy's utilitarian tendency. The need to justify Little Science with-
in a Big Science setting played at least an equal part in shaping that tendency. The case of
the Arecibo Observatory, though, demonstrates the importance of securing institutional
recognition for the conduct of Little Science from the outset. Finally, the subsistence of
Little Science within Big Science niches and their symbiotic relationship may be a func-
tion of large-scale technological systems, whether they be the Western Union telegraph
network of the nineteenth century or the big dishes of twentieth-century radio astronomy
and space communications.

Planetary Radar Astronomy
Publications
At the beginning of this project, a bibliography of radar astronomy literature, con-
sisting of 384 items arranged chronologically by year of publication and alphabetically by
author within each year, was constructed from a search of the NASA STI Database (aero-
nautics and space) and a published bibliography, Jean E. Britton and Paul E. Green, Jr.,
Radar Astronomy (Cambridge: MIT Lincoln Laboratory Library, 1962), which Mr. Green
generously made available. The NASA STI Database search alone resulted in a printout of
589 items published since 1963. To this initial bibliography were added additional publi-
cations uncovered in the researching and writing of this book.
The initial bibliography, with fewer than 400 entries, illustrated the diminutive char-
acter of planetary radar astronomy. In comparison, the radio astronomy literature of just
the past two decades measures in the thousands. Because the extent, as well as the devel-
opment, of the literatnre might help to characterize the progress of planetary radar
astronomy over several decades, the bibliography was pruned and grafted in such a way as
to reflect the published literature. Dissertations were missing from the bibliography, while
publications by foreign researchers and abstracts abounded.
A number of rules were followed in including and excluding publications. Internal
reports were omitted; these are not intended for consumption by the general public or
the scientific community. Only works by American practitioners were included; British
and Soviet titles were excluded. Planetary radar astronomy was defined more strictly than
in the text; solar, lunar, meteor, auroral, and Earth radar studies; and synthetic radar aper-
ture research were left out, because they are specializations unto themselves. Also exclud-
ed were items dealing with hardware, instruments, or techniques and those providing
interpretations of radar results by individuals outside the field. For example, an article on
the interpretation of radar topographic data, whose first author was a planetary geologist,
was left out; however, if the first author was a radar astronomer, tile article was added.
Finally, abstracts were excluded, dissertations included.
The resuhing planetary radar literature, spanning the period from 1958 to 1994
inclusively, amounted to 272 entries, or an annual average of about seven. Only twice did
15 or more items appear in a single year. A line chart (Table 9) showing the annual dis-
tribution of planetary radar publications indicates the explosion of radar astronomy activ-
ity during the 1960s. The remainder of the chart suggests the technological dependence
of radar astronomy. A second spurt of growth appears following 1975, when the Arecibo
Observatory S-band radar first became available, and a third spurt occurred around 1990,
just after the Voyager upgrade of the Goldslone radar.
When the annual publication numbers are grouped by 5-year intervals, the sharp
peaks and valleys of the annual chart are smoothed out and a new trend emerges (Table
10). The volatile growth of the 1960s remains, but what appeared to be seesaw-like growth
around 1975 and 1990 disappears. Instead, a dip replaces the growth following 1975, and
the literature reaches a plateau of activity. This plateau suggests that since 1980 the field
has reached the limits to its growth.
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A Note on Sources
For the early history of radar astronomy, a number of archival sources were consult-
ed. The Historical Archives, U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command, Ft.
Monmouth, NJ, have several boxes of material on the pioneering lunar radar work of John
DeWitt, but no such archival material was found on the radar work of Zoit_n Bay, with the
exception of the documents in the possession of his widow. The Naval Research
Laboratory Historical Reference Collection, Office of the Historian, was not a ready
source of information on the lunar radar work carried out there; much of the
Laboratory's records remain classified. In contrast, the archives of Jodrell Bank, housed
at the University of Manchester, contain a wealth of open information on radar astrono-
my, and a computerized index is available.
Radar research on meteors began at Stanford University as early as the 1950s. The
university archives, however, hold no records relevant to either the early or later work
done there. The only records available are those of the Stanford Center for Radar
Astronomy, which for the most part consist of a large collection of offprints that document
the Center's research results. Von Eshleman, the Center's director, was a far more impor-
tant source of documentation.
Records relating to radar astronomy at the Arecibo Observatory are located for the
most part in filing cabinets at the National Astronomy and Ionosphere Center (NAIC)
offices on the Cornell University campus and are not normally open to researchers.
Among the most useful of those records are the quarterly reports to the NSF and copies
of Center for Radiophysics and Space Research (CRSR) research publications. The NAIC
library retains copies of dissertations completed at the Arecibo Observatory. The CRSR,
located in the same building, has the earlier ARPA reports. The library of the Arecibo
Observatory contains additional reports, program plans, dissertations, and other materi°
als. The minutes of the open sessions of the National Science Board were helpful, as were
the archives of the AFCRL at Phillips Laboratory, Hanscom AFB, although the amount of
documentation at each place was lean.
In contrast, an overwhelming abundance of documents relating to the history of
radar astronomy were found at MIT and Lincoln Laboratory. The Lincoln Laboratory
Library Archives contain both documents and photographs, while the MIT Institute
Archives and Special Collections is a treasure trove of documentation, including NEROC
materials. The Pusey Archives, Harvard University, hold additional NEROC documents. In
general, the MIT, Lincoln Laboratory, and Harvard materials are available to researchers;
examination of the Pusey papers requires written permission from the director of the
Harvard College Observatory, though. A small building near the Haystack Observatory
named for its first director, Paul Sebring, holds logbooks and other records relating to the
Millstone and Haystack facilities, but those records normally are closed to researchers.
Documents relating to radar astronomy at Goldstone can be found in the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory archives. Magellan materials, although somewhat organized, have
not been fully integrated into that portion of the archives open to researchers. Also, a
smaller batch of materials, initially removed from document storage for a history of the
Deep Space Network and slated for integration into theJPL archives as the Peter Lyman
Collection, was especially useful.
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For further documentation of the NEROC saga, see the Archives of the Smithsonian
Institution, in particular, the Office of the Secretary and the Under Secretary collections.
The papers of William Brunk, at the NASA History Office, and the Historian's File, at the
National Science Foundation, held valuable materials on the first upgrading of the
Arecibo facility. The library of the National Science Foundation and the archives of the
National Academy of Sciences also held useful secondary sources.
A significant number of documents relating to radar astronomy are in the possession
of individuals who made the materials available exclusively for the writing of this history.
Until the day arrives when (and if) those documents are entrusted to an archive, the
above noted depositories will be the chief source of documentation for the history of
radar astronomy. In addition, materials gathered or created in the process of writing this
history, including photocopied documents, notes, and oral history transcripts, have been
deposited with the NASA History Office for consultation by researchers.
Oral History Interviews
Because planetary radar astronomy is a relatively new field, virtually all of the
founders, even those active during the 1940s, and practitioners are still with us. This pro-
ject has been fortunate, too, in that with only one exception everyone approached agreed
to be interviewed. Two-thirds of the interviews were taped and transcribed. The author
alone conducted all interviews with the exceptions of Schaber, Soderblum, and
Shoemaker, which were carried out jointly with Joseph Tatarewicz, as noted below. Copies
of all transcripts are held by the NASA History Office and theJPL Archives; interviews of
individuals formerly with MIT Lincoln Laboratory are also maintained at their archives.
Those interviews not transcribed, as well as the telephone interviews, consist of
either notes or tapes on file at the NASA History Office and theJPL Archives. Additional
interviews, carried out by Jos6 Alonzo and housed at the JPL Archives, were consulted;
they are listed below, too.
Interviewee
Donald B. Campbell
Clark R. Chapman
George Downs
Roll B. Dyce
Von R. Eshleman
John V. Evans
Thomas Gold
Richard M. Goldstein
William E. Gordon
Paul E. Green,Jr.
John K. Harmon
Raymond EJurgens
Sir Bernard Lovell
Duane O. Muhleman
Steven J. Ostro
Gordon H. Petlengill
Robert Price
Alan E. E. Rogers
Irwin I. Shapiro
Richard A. Simpson
Martin A. Slade
William Boyd Smith
Interviews
Transcribed Interviews
Date of lnterview
7 December 1993
8 December 1993
9 December 1993
28June 1994
4 October 1994
22 November 1994
9 May 1994
9 September 1993
14 December 1993
14 September 1993
28 November 1994
20 September 1993
15 March 1994
23 May 1994
11 January 1994
19 May 1994
27 May 1994
18 May 1994
25 May 1994
28 September 1993
29 September 1993
4 May 1994
27 September 1993
5 May 1994
30 September 1993
1 October 1993
4 May 1994
19 May 1994
24 May 1994
29 September 1993
Place of lnterview
Cornell University
Flagstaff, Arizona
Lincoln Laboratory
Aguadilla, Puerto Rico
Stanford University
NASA Headquarters
Ithaca, New York
JPL
Rice University
Hawthorne, New York
Arecibo Observatory
JPL
Jodrell Bank
California Institute of
Technology
JPL
MIT
Lexington, Mass.
Haystack Observatory
Harvard-Smithsonian
Center for Astrophysics
Stanford University
JPL
Cambridge, Mass.
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Thomas W. Thompson
O. Leonard Tyler
Herbert G. Weiss
Interv/ew_
Donald B. Campbell
Robert Dickman
Peter G. Ford
Richard M. Goldstein
Alice Hine
Richard P. Ingalls
Raymond E Jurgens
Duane O. Muhleman
Steven J. Ostro
John E. B. Ponsonby
Martin A. Slade
Robert.son Stevens
Interv/ewee
Roland L. Carpenter
Robert Desourdis
John H. DeWitt, Jr.
Von R. Eshleman
Daniel H. Herman
R. Scott Hudson
Benjamin Nichols
Eberhardt Rechfin
29 November 1994
10 May 1994
29 September 1993
JPL
Stanford University
Cambridge, Mass.
Untranscribed Interviews
(Excluding Telephone Interviews)
oat. o/
10 March 1993
2 December 1992
3 October 1994
7 April 1993
12 March 1993
5 May 1994
26 January 1993
28 April 1993
8 April 1993
1 April 1993
11 January 1994
26 January 1993
14 September 1993
Place of l_
Arecibo Observatory
NSF
MIT
JPL
Arecibo Observatory
Haystack Observatory
JPL
Caltech
JPL
JodreU Bank
JPL
JPL
Telephone Interviews
Date of lnterview
14 September 1993
22 September 1994
14June 1993
26 January 1993
20 May 1994
21 November 1994
14 December 1993
13 September 1993
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Paul Reichley
Donald Spector
E. Myles Standish
lnterv/eu_
Gerald Schaber
Eugene M. Shoemaker
Laurence A. Soderblom
19 May 1994
22 September 1994
20 May 1994
Interviews with
Joseph N. Tatarewicz
Date of Interview
27June 1994
30 June 1994
26 June 1994
Place of lntert, iew
Flagstaff, Arizona
Flagstaff, Arizona
Flagstaff, Arizona
Interviews Conducted by Jos_ Alonzo
Interviewee Date of lntox, i_ Place of lnterview
Richard M. Goldstein 19 September 1991 JPL
22 July 1992
Nicholas A. Renzetti 16 April 1992
17 April 1992
20 February 1992
JPL

Technical Essay
Planetary Radar Astronomy
The basic technology of planetary radar astronomy is, as the name implies, radar.
Radar is an acronym for RAdio Detection And Ranging. U.S. Naval officers Lieutenant
Commanders E R. Furth and S. M. Tucker devised the acronym in 1940. By 1943, all allied
forces had adopted the name, though it remained a classified term until after the second
world war, when the acronym radar received general international acceptance, though
more as a term than as an acronym)
As the expression "radio detection and ranging" denotes, radar involves the use of
radio for both detection (is it there?) and ranging (how far away is it?). Radar involves
transmitting electromagnetic waves (commonly known as radio waves) toward a target and
receiving the echoes from that target.
The wavelength of a radio or radar signal traveling through space is measured in
meters and fractions of a meter (decimeter, centimeter, millimeter), and its frequency,
that is, the number of waves per second, is expressed in hertz or multiples of hertz. One
hertz is one wave per second. The high-frequency radar waves used in planetary research
are expressed in megahertz (MHz, a million hertz) and gigahertz (GHz, a billion hertz).
There is no real difference between radio and radar waves. International treaties and
regulatory agencies have set aside certain groups of radio frequencies, called bands, for
specific radio uses, including radar applications (see Tables 11 and 12). Although the first
radars to attempt detections of the Moon and Venus operated in the UHF band, planetary
radar astronomy today uses only the S and X bands.
A radar system consists of a transmitter and a receiver, plus modulators, signal pro-
cessors, and data processors. Generally, the transmitter and receiver share the same anten-
na. Such an arrangement is called a monostatic radar. When the transmitter and receiver
do not share the same antenna, that is, when they are located in different places, it is
called a bistatic radar.
All of the radars used since 1958 to study solar system objects have a parabolic or dish
shape, with one exception. The exception is the Arecibo antenna, which is spherical.
Another difference among the planetary radars is their transmitters. The Millstone
Hill radar, which Lincoln Laboratory investigators used to attempt a detection of Venus as
early as 1958, was a pulse radar. Pulse radars transmit short bursts of energy and are best
suited to tracking objects. Millstone, in fact, was an experimental prototype of a Ballistic
Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radar used to detect and track potential incom-
ing enemy missiles. In contrast are the continuous-wave radars. They transmit a continu-
ous flow of energy and are better suited for communications applications. JPL's planetary
radars at Goldstone are continuous-wave radars.
The output power of radars is expressed in watts. When comparing the power of
pulse and continuous-wave radars, one must keep in mind that although pulse radars have
relatively high peak power outputs (that is, the amount of power at the highest part of the
pulse), their average power output, a measure more comparable to that of the continu-
ous-wave radars, is much lower. Average power is what counts. Thus, while the Millstone
pulse radar had a peak transmitting power of 265 kilowatts in 1958, theJPL transmitter in
l. Louis A. Gebhard, Evolution tJf ?v'aval ICadio-Electronics and Contritmtion.i o/the Naval IX.warch Lal.w/ratory,
Report 8300 (Washinglon: NRL, 1979), p. 170.
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Table 11
Radar Frequency Bands and Usage
Letter Frequency Usage
Band Range in Radar
HF
VHF
UHF
L
Ku
K
Ka
V,W
Millimeter
3-30 MHz
30-300 MHz
300-1000 MHz
1-2 GHz
2-4 GHz
4-8 GHz
8-12 GHz
12-18 GHz
18-27 GHz
27--40 GHz
40-110 GHz
110 GHz
Over the horizon radar
Very-long-range surveillance
Very-long-range surveillance
Long-range surveillance
Enroute traffic control
Moderate-range surveillance
Terminal air traffic control
Long-range weather
Long-range tracking
Airborne weather detection
Short-range tracking
Missile guidance
Mapping marine radar
Airborne weather radar
Airborne intercept
High-resolution mapping
Satellite altimetry
Little used (water vapor)
Very-high-resolution mapping
Short-range tracking
Airport surveillance
Smart munitions
Remote sensing
Experimental
Remote sensing
Source
Fred E. Nathan_m, Radarl2*s_gn Pnnciptes, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, l.t_-)l), p. 19.
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Table 12
Standard Radar Frequency Bands
Letter Frequency Specific Frequencies
Band Range Assigned to Radar
HF 3-30 MHz
VHF
UHF
L
S
C
X
Ku
K
Ka
V
W
Millimeter
30-300 MHz
300-1000 MHz
1000-2000 MHz
2000_000 MHz
4000-8000 MHz
8-12 GHz
12-18 GHz
18-27 GHz
27-40 GHz
40-75 GHz
75-110 GHz
110-300 GHz
None assigned
(in practice, from just above the
broadcast band, 1.605 MHz, to
40 MHz or higher
138-144 MHz
216--225 MHz
420-450 MHz
890-942 MHz (at times included
in the L band)
1215-1400 MHz
2300-2500 MHz
2700-3700 M:'lz
5250-5925 MHz
8.5-10.68 GHz
13.4-14.0 GHz
15.7-17.7 GHz
24.05-24.25 GHz
33.4-36.0 GHz
59-64 GHz
76-81 GHz
92-100 GHz
126-142 GHz
144-149 GHz
231-235 GHz
238-248 GHz
Fred E. Nathanson, Radar Design Pr/ndp/_, 2d ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991), p. 19.
1961 was more powerful, though its average power output was only nine kilowatts. When
the current Arecibo upgrade is completed, it will have the highest continuous-wave trans-
mitter output available, one megawatt (1,000 kilowatts).
Radar sensitivity relates to the ability to receive signals. One of the limits to radar sen-
sitivity is the noise created by the antenna and receiver systems, not to mention cosmic
background and extraneous terrestrial radiation, all of which is expressed as noise "tem-
perature" in Kelvins (abbreviated K), analogous to the temperature scale of the same
name. The higher the system temperature in Kelvins, the noisier the radar and the lower
its sensitivity. In 1958, the Millstone radar had an overall system temperature of 170
Kelvins, while the more sensitive JPL radar receiver had an overall system temperature of
64 K in 1961. Although impressively low in their day, these temperatures today are judged
intolerably high.
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Planetary radar astronomy borrows much of its terminology from optical astronomy,
although not always retaining the original meaning. Facilities for conducting radar astron-
omy research are called observatories and the instruments telescopes. Radar telescopes
"illuminate" the surface of targets. The reflecting geometries of radar telescopes, called
their "optics," take their names from optical instruments (Cassegrainian and Gregorian
subreflectors, for example).
Detection and ranging are two of the elemental observations made by planetary
radar astronomers. A detection occurs when a radar antenna transmits waves toward a sus-
pected target, the target reflects those waves, and a radar antenna receives the reflected
waves (echoes) from the target. If we were crossing the Atlantic Ocean aboard a fictional
ship, say the U.S.S. Marconi, we could use a radio transmitter and receiver, acting as a sim-
ple radar system, to detect the presence of icebergs or other ships. The radio pioneer
Guglielmo Marconi suggested doing precisely that in a speech delivered in 1922.
If our U.S.S. Marconi radar were to detect the presence of another ship, we could
determine the distance from the Marconi to the other ship with our radar. Measurements
of the distance to the target are called range, time-delay, or delay measurements. The abil-
ity to use radar to measure range is based on the knowledge that radio waves travel at a
constant speed, namely, the same speed as light.
In order to determine how far away a target is, we simply measure how long it takes
the echoes to arrive at the receiver antenna. The greater the distance to the target, the
longer the echoes take to appear in the receiver. Conversely, the shorter the distance to
the target, the less time the echo takes to appear in the receiver. The time between the
moment of transmission and the moment the echo is detected can vary considerably. For
the farthest bodies detected by radar astronomers, such as Saturn's rings, the signal
round-trip travel time is about two and a half hours, while the round-trip travel time to
some asteroids detected close to Earth is about two and a half seconds.
Another basic planetary radar measurement is Doppler frequency shift. Whereas
range measurements indicate the distance between the radar observer and the target,
Doppler shift indicates the motion of the target relative to the observer. With our fiction-
al U.S.S. Marconi radar, we can determine not only the presence and distance of another
ship, but its speed toward or away from us as well.
Radar transmitters send waves at a specific frequency. A perfect reflection from a
motionless target appears at the radar receiver (after Fourier transformation, see below)
as an almost line-like peak. The echo from an actual solar system target, however, is spread
over a range of frequencies. This frequency spread is called a spectrum (plural spectra).
In radar astronomy experiments, the motions of the Earth, on which the planetary radar
sits, and the motions of the target are far more complex. The Earth spins on its axis and
rotates around the Sun, while the target planet similarly spins and rotates. The relative
motions of the Earth and target planet cause what is known as the Doppler effect or
Doppler shift (or even Doppler offset).
Simply stated, the Doppler effect causes the frequency of radar echoes to differ from
the transmitted frequency. The Doppler effect on sound waves is a rather common expe-
rience around high-speed transport. If we stand alongside railroad tracks, or a freeway, we
can detect the Doppler effect with our ears. As a train rapidly approaches, the sound of
the train seems to rise in frequency, that is, in pitch; as the train travels away from us, its
sound seems to fall in frequency. The same Doppler effect occurs in radar. Depending on
the line-of-sight motion of a planet (or whether the object is approaching or moving away
from the observing radar), the frequency of the planet's echo will be higher or lower than
the transmitted frequency.
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PlanetaryadarastronomerswantoremovetheaverageDopplereffectinorderto
analyzetheinformationcontainedin theDopplerspectrumspread,sotheyusearadar
ephemerisprogram.AlthoughtheaverageDopplereffectsometimesisremovedin the
transmitter,suchaswhenseveralntennasreceive,ingeneralit isremovedin thereceiv-
er.Anephemeris(pluralephemerides)i anastronomicaltermthatrefersto asetof
tablesthatindicatethepositionofaplanetorotherbodyin thesky.A radarephemeris
programiscomputersoftwarelinkedtotheradareceiverthatautomaticallyadjuststhe
incomingsignalfortheexpectedDopplershift.Theamountof Dopplershiftpredicted
bytheephemerisprogram ustbeaccurateenoughtoavoidsmearingtheechoin fre-
quency,andthisrequirementplacestringentdemandson thequalityof theradar
ephemeris.OnceweknowtherangeandDopplershiftvaluesofasolarsystemtarget,wecan
constructa two-dimensionalradarimageof thetargetcalledarange-Dopplerordelay-
Dopplerimage.Mapsmadefromtheseimagesarevitaltotheexplorationofthesolarsys-
tem,especiallytheplanetVenus,whosesurfaceisobscuredbyclouds.
In range-Dopplerimaging,weassumethatthetargetisaperfectsphere.Anexcep-
tionisthecaseofasteroids,whosenonsphericalshapesrequirespecialmodelingtech-
niques.Thetransmittedradarwavesarrivefirstattheareaontheplanet'surfacethatis
closestto Earth.Thisareaofinitialimpactiscircular,becausewehaveassumedthatthe
targetisspherical.Thepointontheplanet'surfacethatisclosesttotheobserveriscalled
thesubradarpoint.Ifwecouldlookatthetargetwithradarsensitiveeyes,wewouldseea
relativelydarkspherewithasmallbrightspotin themiddle,ratherlikeashinyballbear-
ingbeinghelduptothelight.
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Echoes from the area beyond the subradar point are fewer than those that produce
the central bright spot. Moreover, they reach those areas later than the waves striking the
subradar point, because they have a greater distance to travel. The range values for those
areas toward the limbs, then, are greater than those for the subradar region. Looking
again at the target with our radar sensitive eyes, we see that the areas at a constant distance
(range) from the radar transmitter form rings around the subradar point. These are
called range rings.
As the planet spins on its axis toward or away from the oncoming radar waves, the
spinning motion creates a Doppler effect. The Doppler frequency shift is the same along
a strip or slice running across the planet's surface, because within each Doppler strip of
the planet's surface, the motion relative to the observer is the same. When range and
Doppler measurements made at the same time are combined, the strips of equal Doppler
shift intersect the range rings to form "cells." Each range-frequency cell (or resolution
cell) corresponds to a particular area on the planet's surface. The amount of area in a par-
ticular cell represents the amount of resolution of the radar image.
In range-Doppler imaging, any given range ring passes through the same Doppler
strip at two points. One point is in the northern hemisphere, the other in the southern
hemisphere of the planet. The two points have the same range and Doppler values,
because they are in the same range ring and the same Doppler strip. As a result, these two
points are indistinguishable in the radar image although they are in different hemi-
spheres. Radar astronomers call this problem north-south ambiguity.
We can resolve the north-south ambiguity on the Moon by using a radar whose
beamwidth is narrower than the diameter of the Moon. The beamwidth is the area of sky
subtended by the radar beam. Astronomers measure beamwidth, and all solar system
objects, in minutes and seconds of arc. The diameter of the Moon is a half degree or
30 minutes of arc. With a beamwidth of only 10 minutes, we can aim the radar antenna so
that the subradar point is 10 minutes of arc north of the lunar equator. Echoes are not
received from most of the southern hemisphere, so that echoes from the two hemispheres
do not overlap. However, the technique is applicable to only the Moon. Compared to the
Moon's 30 minutes of arc, Venus is only a speck; its diameter is but one minute of arc.
Asteroids are less then one second of arc across.
In order to resolve north-south ambiguity on planetary targets, radar astronomers
sometimes use a technique called interferometry. An opdcal interferometer is an instru-
ment for analyzing the light spectrum by studying patterns of interference, that is, how
light waves interact with each oLher. Radio astronomers began designing interferometers
in the late 1950s. Planetary radar interferometry derived directly from those interferom-
eters. Radio interferometers use two or more radio telescope antennas arranged along a
line (called the base line). The separate antennas are linked electronically, so that the
signals received at different points along the base line can be combined, compared, and
studied with elaborate computer programs. Radar interferometers are somewhat simpler.
A radar interferometer consists of two antennas. The primary antenna transmits
signals to the target and receives them. A secondary antenna, located not far (say, 1 to 10
km distant) from the primary antenna, also receives the echoes. Although a three-
antenna radar interferometer was attempted between 1977 and 1988,_ in practice radar
interferometers use only two antennas.
2. Jurgens, Goldstein, Rumsey, and R. Green, "Images of Venus by Three-Station Radar
Interferometry: 1977 Results,"Journal of GeophysicalResearch85 (1980) :8282-8294.
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The echoes received by both antennas are fed into a complex computer program
that combines the echoes and obtains the fringe size (amplitude) and phase for each
range-Doppler resolution cell. The computer program rotates the fringe pattern so that
the lines of constant phase are perpendicular to the strips of equal Doppler value. The
north-south ambiguity now is resolved, because the phase at points A and B have distinct
phase values.
During the 1950s, researchers underwritten by the military developed a similar radar
imaging process that used both range and Doppler data. However, that process involved
imaging the Earth from aircraft and relied on developing a radar "history" of the target
to create an image, while planetary range-Doppler mapping created a "snapshot" of a
planetary surface from a ground-based radar. The airborne imaging process, called
synthetic aperture radar, has since played a key role in the mapping of Venus by the
Magellan spacecraft.
Radar astronomers do not depend entirely on range and Doppler data, however. The
echo from a solar system target exhibits a number of attributes. From their analysis of
those attributes, radar astronomers draw conclusions about the characteristics of the
target. For example, the shape of power spectra can provide information about a target.
If we aim at an asteroid and get an echo with two major peaks, called a bimodal echo, we
can interpret the echo as possibly indicating a bifurcated shape, perhaps two asteroids
joined together. Radar observations of asteroid 4769 Castalia (1989 PB), for instance,
revealed it to be a contact binary asteroid. 3
Small detail features on power spectra also can reveal vital information about a
target's motion. For example, radar observations of Venus made in 1964 indicated that
planet's rotational rate and direction. The radar instrument was both sufficiently power-
ful and sensitive that a large feature on the planet's surface showed up in the power
spectra as an irregularity or "detail." The detail resulted from the fact that the surface
feature scattered back to the radar antenna more energy than the surrounding area.
On close examination, one irregularity in the power spectra persisted day after day
and appeared to change its position slowly. A study of the irregularity's movement led to
a calculated rotational rate for the planet, but not immediately its prograde (forward) or
retrograde motion. That information came from measurements of the width of the lower
portion of the power spectra. Those widths were compatible with only a retrograde
motion.
In the normal, round-trip journey of a radar wave from transmitter to target to
receiver, a certain amount of power is lost. The amount of that loss is given by the so-called
radar equation. The amount of power that reaches a target is inversely proportional to the
square of the distance to the target, but the amount of power returned from the target to
the receiving antenna also varies inversely proportional to the square of the distance to
the target. After the complete round-trip from transmitter to receiver, the amount of
power that arrives at the receiving antenna varies inversely with the distance to the target
raised to the fourth power, that is, the square of the square of the distance. The radar
equation shows that large amounts of power (hundreds of kilowatts) must be radiated into
space in a very narrow beam in order to detect a target.
The amount of power returned from a target can reveal much about its surface char-
acterisdcs. The total power returned from a target is a function of its radar cross section
3. Hudson and Ostro, "Shape of Asteroid 4769 Castalia (1989 PB) from Inversion of Radar Images,"
.gc/em_263 ( 1994): 940-943.
282 TOSEETHE UNSEEN
or backscattering coefficient, that is, the target's ability to reflect energy to the radar
receiving antenna. Radar astronomers express the radar cross section of a target in terms
of an equivalent, perfectly reflecting surface. If a target scatters power equally in all direc-
tions, its cross section is equal to the geometric area of the target. That is the case of our
ideal ballbearing target. For a perfectly reflecting spherical target, the radar cross section
is one fourth the total surface. Surface irregularities affect the amount of power returned
(or scattered back) from a target. Radar echoes have two scattering components, called
quasispecular and diffuse. The quasispecular component arises from mirror-like reflec-
tions from parts of a flat or gently undulating surface. Those surface facets are perpen-
dicular to the line of propagation, so they direct a large amount of energy back toward the
observer. Such echoes concentrate at the center of the planet's visible disk, that is, around
the subradar point, because the likelihood of finding favorably oriented facets is highest
where the surface is perpendicular to the incoming radar beam. The diffuse scattering
component comes from objects and structures with irregular shapes and therefore facets
that redirect much of the radar beam away from the observer. The signal returned from
the areas toward the limbs is called diffuse.
The amount of power returned from a target is, therefore, a consequence of the scat-
tering component, quasispecular or diffuse, and the angle of a surface facet relative to the
line of propagation of the radar wave. Flat surfaces perpendicular to the line of propaga-
tion return power directly back to the radar. The greatest amount of power returned from
a target, then, comes from flat surfaces that are perpendicular to the line of propagation.
If the reflecting surface is not perpendicular to the line of propagation, then power will
be reflected away from the radar, and the amount of power returned to the radar anten-
na will diminish. The reduction in power will increase as the surface is tilted away from
the radar.
For example, if a planetary target has mountains or craters, a pordon of the radar
power will be reflected away from the return path, depending on the angle, that is, the
amount of slope, of the mountain or crater. The more power returned, the gentler is the
slope or angle of the surface. Factors other than surface slope can affect the amount of
power returned from a target, too.
If a planetary surface is covered by boulders or other material with multiple sides, a
complex scattering process takes place. Some power is returned to the radar, some power
is deflected away from the radar return path, while some power scatters among the boul-
ders. If the surface is covered by material significantly smaller than boulders, say volcanic
ash, the loss of power from scattering in directions other than the return path can be con-
siderable.
Although range-Doppler mapping techniques provide one means for correlating
echo power spectra and surface features, they are not always practical. Other methods
must be used. For example, Mars rotates much faster than Venus, whose slow retrograde
motion makes it an ideal radar target. Mars is what radar astronomers call an overspread
target. The rapid rotation of that planet means that the signal from one range ring
spreads over into the next ring, or the signal from one Doppler strip spreads over into the
next strip. Also, the echo from Mars is much weaker, because the distance to Mars is
greater than to Venus.
In helping to select a landing site for the Viking lander, for example, radar
astronomers relied on a different approach to interpret the amount of power returned
from an area of the surface. In this approach, a geometric model for the entire visible sur-
face of the planet was assumed. These models, or scattering laws as they are called, also
can be derived empirically from actual radar observations of the target, if the target sur-
face is sufficiently well known. The most commonly used model is the Hagfors scattering
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law,namedforitsoriginator,TorHagfors,anionosphericistandradarastronomerwhois
currentlyDirectoroftheMaxPlanckInstitutffirAeronomie.
In studyingcandidatesitesfor theVikinglander,radarastronomersatHaystack,
Aaecibo,andGoldstoneappliedtheHagforsscatteringlawanddeterminedtheslope,that
is,thedegreeoftilt fromthelineofpropagation,ofvariousareasoftheMartiansurface.
Sitecandidateshadtobeinclinednomorethan19degrees;otherwise,thelanderwould
toppleover.Theyalsohadto befreeof rocksandotherobjectslargerthan22cm,the
heightofthelandervehicle.
RadardatawerecapableofindicatingtheroughnessoftheMartiansurfacedownto
afewcentimeters,whilephotographsadaresolutionofroughly100meters,largerthan
afootballfield.Theradardata,however,wasnotexpressedvisually,likethephotographs,
butmathematicallyastheroot-mean-square(rms)slope.Thermsisaspecialmathemati-
calmethodforaveraging.Thermsslopegivesanindicationoftheaverageslopeorincli-
nationofagivenareaof theMartiansurface.WhenapplyingtheHagforscatteringlaw,
thevalueforthermsslopevariesin theoryuptothreedegrees,theupperlimitforthe
validityoftheassumptionsunderlyingthemodel.In practice,however,theHagforscat-
teringlawyieldsmuchhighervaluesofrmsslope.Oneof themostimportantsignalparametersu edinplanetaryradarastronomy
todayispolarization.TheearliestlunarradarexperimentscarriedoutatJodrellBank
usedalinearantennafeed.Antennafeedsareeitherlinearorcircular,andthefeedshape
determinesthepolarizationofthetransmittedwave.WhenJodrellBankinvestigatorssent
radarsignalsto theMoon,theydiscoveredtwopatternsof signalfading.Normallunar
librationcausedtheslowlyfadingechoes,whiletherapidlyfadingsignals,theyconclud-
ed,resultedfromtheradarwavespassingthroughtheEarth'sionosphere.
In the19thcentury,theBritishscientistMichaelFaradaydiscoveredthatamagnetic
fieldcouldaltertheplaneof polarization.Theeffectsincehascometo beknownas
Faradayrotation.In thecaseofthelunaradarsignals,theEarth'smagneticfieldrotated
thesignals'planeofpolarizationastheypassedthroughtheionosphere.
A radartargetalsocanchangethehandedness,or rotationalsense,of circularly
polarizedwaves.Ifwetransmitcircularwaveswithright-handedpolarizationtoaperfect-
lyreflectingtarget,thepowerreturnswithaleft-handedpolarization.If wetransmitright-
handedpolarizationandadjusttheantennafeedtoacceptright-handedpolarization,the
antennawilldetectlittleornoreturnedpower.In practice,whendealingwiththeinner
planets(Mercury,Venus,andMars),mostpowereturnsfromaplanetarytargetin the
oppositesenseofpolarizationi whichit istransmitted.
ExceptionstothisrulearosewhenradarastronomersbeganexploringtheGalilean
moonsofJupiterandothericytargets.Whenradarsignalsreturnfromthesurfacesof
thosetargets,omewhatmoreofthepowerisreceivedin thesamesenseofpolarization.
Inotherwords,if wetransmitright-handpolarization,moreofthepowerwillreturnwith
right-handedpolarization.Thepeculiarnatureof theseradartargetshaselevatedthe
importanceoftheratioofsamesensetooppositesensepolarizationasaradarmeasure-
ment.Radarastronomersnowtransmitonesenseofpolarizationandreceivebothright-
handandleft-handpolarization,thentheycomparetheright-handandleft-handvalues.
Whilefracturediceistheapparentcauseof thispolarizationphenomenon,themecha-
nismthatgivesrisetoit isonlynowbeginningtobeunderstood.
Planetaryange-Dopplerradarexperimentstakeplaceinseveralstages:datataking,
decoding,rotatingthematrix,theFouriertransform,conversioni tolatitudesandlon-
gitudesto createmaps.Thefirststages,especiallydatatakinganddecoding,arerather
routineandstandardized;softwarespecializationte dstotakeplacein thelaststagesof
theprocess,uchasconvertingthedataintolatitudesandlongitudes.
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Whiledatatakinginvolvesthecombineduseoftheradarsystem and an associated
computer, the remaining stages take place entirely on a computer. Computer time
accounts for most of the processing time spent on a range-Doppler experiment. With
modern computer technologies that accelerate processing time, data reduction takes far
less time than before. At the Arecibo telescope, a typical run of observations on Mercury
takes about 10 minutes. Data processing of those 10 minutes of radar activity consumes
another hour and a quarter to an hour and a half of computer time. Roughly, then, every
minute spent making radar observations translates into eight minutes of processing dme.
Without those special accelerating technologies, a mainframe computer takes far
more time; it is almost 80 times slower. One run, then, might take an entire day to pro-
cess. Older mainframe computers were even slower. The competition for computer time
was often as intense as it was for antenna time. Moreover, these computer times apply only
to data reduction, the initial preparation of the data. Analysis, modeling, and interpreta-
tion can be far more time consuming.
The first stage of a planetary radar experiment is the recording of the raw echoes as
they come from the antenna through the receiver. In the earliest lunar radar experiments
conducted atJodrell Bank in the 1950s, the echoes were observed on an oscilloscope and
recorded with a cinema camera. The films are extant and form part of the archives
deposited with the University of Manchester. Beginning with the first attempts on Venus
in 1958, the raw signals were recorded on magnetic tape. In addition, they were routine-
ly converted from analog into digital signals for processing. Today, all planetary radar
astronomy is carried out digitally.
The unprocessed echoes are usually too weak and too noisy to process, so the echoes
are accumulated together. The next stage is to decode the signals. Before transmission,
the signal is encoded with a repeating binary code. Pulse radars achieve binary coding by
turning the signal off and on. With continuous-wave radars, binary coding is accom-
plished by changing the phase of the signal. These off-on states and phase changes in the
coded transmission tell the radar astronomer which part of the wave is being examined.
An accompanying time code identifies the location on the planet where the particular
echoes originate.
The next step in forming a planetary radar map is to rotate the matrix. Once the
codes have been removed from the echoes, the signals are arranged in a matrix that cor-
responds to the various range rings on the planet. The computer software looks at each
code cycle and considers each range ring separately. The values for a given range ring are
a function of time. The software now must decide which frequencies are present, in order
to find the Doppler delay values.
A Fourier transform sorts echoes from a given range ring into frequency bins. A
Fourier transform is a specific type of transform, a powerful mathematical expression that
transforms (hence the name) one geometrical figure or analytical expression into anoth-
er. During the 1960s, the Fast Fourier transform was devised by engineers in the field of
signal processing. As a result, a mathematical operation that previously took 30 minutes
on an IBM 8094 mainframe computer now took only about five seconds. 4
The result of the Fourier transform is a range-Doppler, two-dimensional picture.
Additional analysis with various computer algorithms written in the software can yield a
three-dimensional picture. However, the three-dimensional picture requires adding
further information to the range-Doppler map.
This succinct cursory overview of a planetary radar experiment is limited to only
range-Doppler mapping. Radar astronomers carry out several other types of experiments.
Most experiments are roudne and rely on cookbook software and processing. Radar
4. Gwilym M.Jenkins and Donald G. Watts, SpectralAnalysis arm it._Applications (San Francisco: Holden-
day, 1968). pp. 313-314.
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interferometryand the randomcodetechnique,adaptedfrom ionosphericradar
research,forexample,mployspecializedsoftwareandprocessingtechniques.
Anumberof articlesandbookchaptersonradarastronomypublishedsince1960
discussthefield,itsaccomplishments,anditstechniques.Theirintendedaudienceruns
thegamutfromgeneralto specialized.Theyarerecommendedto thosewishinginfor-
mationonradarastronomybeyondthatprovidedhere.
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Kelvin. In the case of organizations, they are always introduced by their full name; abbre-
viations appear only in subsequent references, though not all subsequent references are
abbreviated. Most readers will recognize many organizational abbreviations immediately,
such as NASA.
Interviews are referenced in the notes in an abridged form. Only the interviewee's
surname and the interview date (in the form date/month/year) are noted; complete
interview information is located in Appendix Two, Oral History Interviews.
A few reports that appear serially and are available from only a limited source are
routinely cited in the notes in abbreviated form. The annual reports published byJPL and
found in theJPL Archives are cited asJPL Annual Reports, JPLA. The quarterly reports of
the NAIC were found only at the NAIC. These reports consist of a small number of typed
pages submitted to the NSF, the oversight agency for the Arecibo Observatory. In order to
cite them simply, the following form was used: NAIC QR Q2/1987, 4-5, in which pages
4-5 of the second QR (quarterly report) of 1987 are referenced. Also, the minutes of the
meetings of the Goldstone Solar System Radar, furnished to the author by Steven Ostro,
are referred to as GSSR Min., followed by the date of the meeting in the form
date/month/year.
The GSSR minutes were only one of many items provided by several individuals from
their personal materials. In the notes, these are referred to as "Smith materials," after the
surname of the individual providing them. The Acknowledgments (p. iv) section above
indicates the full names of those furnishing such materials.
Documents in open archives are cited in one of two ways, depending on whether the
archives had assigned numbers to files. When a file number is available, the citation pro-
vides a description of the item and its date, followed by the file number, the box number,
and the accession number (or collection name), and lasdy the name of the archival repos-
itory. Otherwise, the description of the item and its date are followed by the folder title in
quotes, the box number and accession number (or collection name), and the name of the
archival repository.
References to unpublished materials use the following abbreviations to indicate
archival repositories and specific collections within those archives.
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CRSR Center for Radiophysics and Space Research, Cornell University
HAUSACEC Historical Archives, U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command,
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JBA Jodrell Bank Archives, University of Manchester
JPLA Jet Propulsion Laboratory Archives
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